


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(THE JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY)

PHILOSOPHY

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
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CIVILIZATION

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NOVEMBER 16, 1937)

VISCOUNT SAMUEL, G.C.B., G.B.E., M.A., HON.D.C.L.

IN what, after all, does civilization consist? If Japanese aggression in China were successful, would it bring to the Chinese a higher civilization or subject them to a lower? Sidney and Beatrice Webb entitled their spacious survey of present-day Russia *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization?* with a query at the end. In a postscript to that book they give reasons why they think that query might be omitted. But Hitler, Mussolini, and Franco assert that Communism is not a civilization at all, but an embodiment of the forces of destruction, to be resisted at all costs and to the death. History has accorded the title of "the Great" only as a rule to the mighty conquerors—Alexander, Charles, Frederick, Napoleon. "And we avow ourselves," said Odysseus, "to be the men of Agamemnon, son of Atreus, whose fame is even now the mightiest under heaven, so great a city did he sack, and destroyed many people." But is that the true standard of greatness?

In our ordinary lives we have to decide every day which values are best. Take for example the problems of the educationist. How far should the education of children be literary and humanistic, or scientific and utilitarian, theological, artistic, athletic, military? Different schools of thought, here and elsewhere, put different values upon these elements. Which is right? Or are all of them right? Or none of them?

Consider the problem which underlies the economic situation in this country—and in all countries. The advance in science, invention, and technical organization and skill has vastly and rapidly increased the productivity of industry and agriculture. The benefits of that

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progress may be distributed in various ways. They may go to the employing class in larger profits. Or they may go to the workers: in better wages, or else in more leisure; or perhaps in less labour for married women, young persons, or children. They may go to the consumers: in lower prices, or in the better quality of goods, or in more convenient methods of distribution. They may be diffused in a growing expenditure upon forms of trade competition. Or they may be taken by governments in taxation; and spent either upon social services and the like, or upon armaments and war. The political and economic controversies of our time spring very largely from differences of opinion as to the comparative worth and necessity of these various purposes.

The market values of commodities themselves are not determined, as Marx taught, by the amount and quality of the labour needed for their production, but in the first place by the ideas that govern the demand for them. A country house, which cost perhaps a hundred thousand pounds fifty years ago, may not be worth one thousand to-day; the bigger it is and the more it cost, the less it is worth. As much labour would be needed to produce a crinoline now as in the eighteen-sixties; it would have fetched a price then, it is worthless to-day. A fat pig has considerable value in Chicago; it has none in Mecca or Tel-Aviv.

To take a different class of cases: young men and women have to choose occupations of some kind; and the choice is not solely a question of opportunity, but in varying degree also of predilection. Unless we are to be like thistledown, blown haphazard upon the wind, taking root or failing to take root wherever the floating seed may rest, there must be some judgement as to the kind of life, within the limits that are open, that is most worth while.

The answers given to all such questions determine the kind of civilization we shall have. In turn, the kind of civilization that we have helps to determine the answers that we give. We are in a circle; our choice of values determines our civilization, and our civilization determines our choice of values. Unless we can find some standpoint outside the circle where we can frame an independent criterion, we may go on for ever round and round.

For thousands of years religion set the standards. The character of a civilization was determined by its creed. It was a Christian civilization or Islamic, Buddhist or Hindu, Confucian or Shinto. God had spoken, or the prophets and the sages; the peoples had only to accept. Beliefs crystallized into customs. In Europe all through the Middle Ages civilization was based on Christian theology—the theology especially of St. Thomas Aquinas, which had drawn into alliance Aristotle's philosophy and found its interpreters in the

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Church and the Schoolmen. Throughout the Middle East and among Moslems elsewhere the Suras of the Koran gave the answer to every problem. The Crusades were the typical manifestation, on the one side and on the other, of the civilizations of the age. Judaism had become largely a matter of Rabbis, the meticulous application of verbally inspired texts. In India the caste system grew up as a religious ordinance. In China popular Confucianism and Taoism developed their own codes of morals.

There came the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with the beginnings in Europe of modern science. Astronomy, and physics in general, anatomy, and all branches of physiology began rapidly to develop, and there arose straightway the great conflict between the established theology and the new science. Giordano Bruno was burnt at the stake; Galileo was indicted and persecuted; Spinoza excommunicated by the synagogue; Descartes intimidated by the attacks of theologians.

When the cause of intellectual liberty had won the victory the scope of the human mind speedily expanded. It no longer felt itself, to quote a sentence of Mr. H. G. Wells, "boxed in imaginatively by the Creation and the Day of Judgement." It saw its background in a history immensely prolonged and visualized an almost boundless future.

The eighteenth century brought the *philosophes* of France and their Encyclopaedia; the "Philosopher Kings" of Prussia, Austria, Russia, Sweden, and Spain; in England appeared the precursors of the Philosophic Radicals, who were to influence so greatly the century that followed. Philosophy was no longer conditioned by theology, but began itself to mould religious thought.

With Kant the idealist school arose, acquired a predominant position, but brought no conclusions generally agreed. Authority, whether religious or philosophic, was found to be insufficient. To fill the need, various currents of thought flowed in. Science was inclined to materialism, and set a trend that way. Marxism followed the trend; the aggrieved elements in an economic system disorganized by the Industrial Revolution found in it a creed and a purpose. Then came Nietzsche and the intuitionists starting an anti-intellectual movement; and that movement gave room for Sorel, Spengler, and the philosophy of violence. Out of these ideas have now arisen the Fascism of Italy and the National-Socialism of Germany. A lack of accepted standards in morals and politics have led thought into chaos, action into confusion, and have given us the world that we see around us to-day.

"Turn back, O Man, forswear thy foolish ways," says a poet of our time. His words would find an echo in many minds. Widespread

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among us is the feeling that there must be a fresh start. It is often said that in these days civilization itself is in peril. But in what civilization consists, or should consist, we do not quite know; and not everyone is sure that the civilization we now have deserves to be saved from whatever perils may threaten it.

Who is to answer these questions? Who is to give us the independent criterion of values that we need? Where shall we find again the authority that has been lost?

"The philosophy which a nation receives," wrote Emerson, "rules its religion, poetry, politics, arts, trades, and whole history." But the nations of to-day do not receive—or at all events do not accept—any coherent philosophy of any kind. The reason is not far to seek. It obviously comes from the disagreements among philosophers. The ordinary man might be willing to accept their guidance if they spoke with one voice, but wisely recognizes that he is not competent to decide between them when they differ. "Moreover," as Dr. Joad says, "many of the disputes of philosophers are disputes about what exactly it is that they are disputing about."

Bishop Gore wrote in his Gifford Lectures: "It must of course be admitted that if a student to-day reads in succession the works of a number of contemporary or almost contemporary philosophers—surrendering himself to each in turn before he seeks to estimate the ultimate value of his speculations—he will be impelled towards a final scepticism, because he will find the conclusions, confidently presented to him for acceptance, so different and irreconcilable. But to acquiesce in the sceptical attitude which is content to find all views interesting, while abandoning the attempt to reach a conclusion or conviction of one's own, is to abandon the very aim of reason, which is the conviction of truth." Yet to this surrender many thinkers feel themselves obliged to consent, in despair of reaching definite conclusions.

Some among them find an excuse by asserting that, after all, it is the search that matters and not the finding. They accept the defeatism which says—I have heard Lord Baldwin use the quotation more than once—"it is better to travel hopefully than to arrive."

Or else they take refuge in a theory that at bottom a man's philosophy can never be anything more than the expression of his temperament. Professor Schiller, whose death a few months ago all the members of this Institute deeply deplore, published a book not long before with the title, *MUST Philosophers Disagree?* He came to the conclusion that they must; because, he wrote, "every philosophy was the offspring, the legitimate offspring, of an idiosyncrasy, and the history and psychology of its author had far more to do with its development than *der Gang der Sache selbst*." Elsewhere Schiller wrote, "Behind all philosophy lies human nature, and in

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every philosopher there lurks a man." This is the same as Fichte's doctrine, "The kind of philosophy that a man chooses depends upon the kind of man that he is."

Such views may be amusing; they have in them a touch of good-humoured cynicism; but if they were taken seriously they would be fatal to any prospect of help from philosophy in finding an issue from our troubles. Philosophy would sink into a matter of personal taste. As Gore says, "to abandon all hope of forming a decision of our own, and to be content to find all opinions interesting . . . is ignoble." We may rather take our stand with Professor Laird, who, asking "What is the relation of contemporary philosophy to contemporary temperaments?" answers, "This question seems to me to be essentially unfair. It assumed that there should be stock philosophies for stock figures when the truth is that a good philosophy should be able to dominate every temperament."

But where is philosophy to find its title to dominate? How is it to escape from the swamp of mere speculation, of assertion and counter-assertion, of "proclamation without proof"?—to borrow a phrase of Professor Radhakrishnan. For my own part, I feel convinced that we shall find firm ground, that we shall be able to make a fresh start with any hope of success, only if philosophy, with full deliberation, accepts science as its basis. Premises for philosophy, I firmly believe, can be found nowhere but in the conclusions of science.

The school of thought initiated by Kant and Hegel, which with its various developments was predominant in Europe for more than a century, is essentially anthropocentric. It starts, not with the universe, but with the faculties and processes of the human mind. To many a student it seems that, after an immense and pertinacious elaboration of ingenious logical thought, it produces at the end of the argument nothing different from the assumptions that were put in at the beginning—unless indeed something fresh has surreptitiously been slipped in during the process, usually under cover of some verbal ambiguity. Each dialectic appears convincing until the next dialectician shows its omissions and inconsistencies; himself to be refuted in turn by the one who comes after. Meanwhile decades, generations go by; and philosophy goes on, intangible and elusive, giving to the hungry and thirsty human soul just such food and drink as the ironic gods gave to Tantalus.

It may be said that, since there is no permanency in science, since its conclusions change as knowledge grows, philosophy on this principle will find its premises ever shifting. To some extent this must be so. And is it wrong that it should be so? If in earlier times philosophy had had at its disposal the knowledge that has now

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been brought by physics, chemistry, psychology, biology in all its branches; and the social sciences also, politics, economics, eugenics—can we doubt that it would have shaped itself differently? Plato and Aristotle must needs have written differently, and Descartes and Spinoza. As Wildon Carr has said, "If Immanuel Kant had lived in our day, he could not have written *The Critique of Pure Reason* without such fundamental modifications as would have made it not only another book but a new philosophy, even though his old philosophy should have been contained in it." And there is no reason to doubt—or to regret—that in so far as the basic conclusions of the science of the next century will differ from those of the science of to-day the philosophy of the next century will be modified correspondingly. There must be what Ernst Mach called "the gradual accommodation of thoughts to facts."

We may see, looking back, that it was the dualism of Descartes that set us on the wrong track. His principles, says Whitehead, "lead straight to the theory of a materialistic, mechanistic nature, surveyed by cogitating minds. After the close of the seventeenth century science took charge of the materialistic nature, and philosophy took charge of the cogitating minds. Some schools of philosophy admitted an ultimate dualism; and the various idealistic schools claimed that nature was merely the chief example of the cogitations of minds. But all schools admitted the Cartesian analysis of the ultimate elements of nature." Whitehead adds that philosophy, emphasizing Mind, was out of touch with science during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; but, he says, "it is creeping back into its old importance owing to the rise of psychology and its alliance with physiology." And he speaks elsewhere of "the groundwork of common experience which is the final test of all science and philosophy."

The human mind has ever sought a window through which it might look upon the universe; idealistic philosophy gave it only a mirror, so that it was merely itself that it saw.

From this the conclusion does not follow that philosophy is to be regarded as nothing more than a branch of science without specific functions of her own. She may draw her materials from science, but she must choose her tasks and reach her results for herself. As Professor Laird puts it, "Philosophy has never flourished except in alliance with the sciences, and also has never flourished when it was prepared to plod humbly after them."

We may regard, then, the frontier where science and philosophy meet, where the conclusions of the one are handed across to become the premisses of the other, as the vital centre in the wide realm of thought.

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If this general conception were accepted, it would lead straightway to an immense simplification of metaphysics.

Take for example the principle of causality, which has given rise to such vast and subtle dissertations. For science there is nothing transcendental about it. Causation is merely a statement of fact, a name for a process; certain events in combination are followed by other events; we call the first "causes" and the others "effects." As soon as the conditions are present together the effect necessarily follows. That is the position from the scientific standpoint, and is there any reason why philosophy should spend her energies in seeking anything more recondite?

It is true that there has arisen in recent years, as we all know, a school of physicists—Heisenberg, Bohr, Schrödinger, Eddington, and others—who challenge the principle of causality itself, and assert that an opposite principle of uncertainty operates throughout nature. When I first ventured to address the Institute on this subject—on a similar occasion to this five years ago—it appeared that that theory was becoming predominant in physics and was likely to influence philosophy profoundly. Since then the movement of thought has been the other way—largely owing to the repudiation of Heisenberg's theory by the two most eminent theoretical physicists of our time, Einstein and Planck, and its non-acceptance by the most eminent experimental physicist, Lord Rutherford—a man illustrious throughout the world, whose death is universally mourned, and most of all by those who had the great privilege of his warm-hearted friendship.

The recent International Congress of Philosophy, held in Paris, assigned one of its sections to this question of indeterminism; and I was interested to find that far the greater volume of opinion, expressed in the papers submitted and in the discussions, was against the indeterminists. Until fresh reason is shown to the contrary, philosophers are under no obligation to abandon the earlier doctrine, held with unanimity by all scientists for many generations, that the processes of nature are uniform, that pure hazard does not enter, that effects follow causes with certainty, and that like causes always produce like effects.

Consider another of the great simplifications that will follow if philosophy frankly accepts the conclusions of science as its own starting-point. The scientific world is agreed as to the validity of the principle of evolution, whatever controversy there may still be with regard to natural selection as its biological method. Man, therefore, must see himself as an offspring from lower organisms, and his mind as occupying, not a quasi-creative position—not a "position of miraculous privilege," to quote Professor Laird again—but the status of the organ of intelligence of one creature among

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thousands, or possibly millions. Consequently we must primarily regard man as from the universe, and no longer, as the idealists sought to do, primarily regard the universe as from man. As Professor A. D. Ritchie has written: "There are many possible ways of approach to philosophy, and there is also an impossible one, though one that has often been tried. That the philosopher can somehow spin his philosophy out of what he finds inside himself, that he has some private internal source of information in virtue of which he can decide what the universe must be, without needing to take the trouble to look at it, is a belief that dies hard."

Consider again how great will be the alleviation to philosophy when all the metaphysical discussions on such subjects as "colour" disappear; it being discovered that there is nothing there to be discussed. We know now how the different colours, as we term them, arise from the fact that a ray of ordinary light, when it falls upon an object, is split up into a number of component rays of different wave-lengths; some of these are absorbed into the atoms of which the object is made up, and others are reflected. If a group of these reflected rays enter a human eye, they cause a sensation in the brain which we call seeing a red or green or yellow object, or whatever the particular colour may be, depending upon the length of the waves of the radiation. But "colour," as such, in the abstract is non-existent. It is our name for that group of phenomena. Physics tells us about the rays, and physiology and psychology tell us about the sensations. Consequently there is nothing for philosophy to discuss; except indeed the nature and value of the emotions which colour may evoke—when we see a sunset, for example, or flowers, or a painting; and the nature and value of a universe of which such emotions form part.

I would submit another of the gains to philosophy from the simplification which will follow an acceptance of scientific conclusions; it comes from the establishment by physics of the unity of space-time. Here the consequences seem likely to be revolutionary. All the long and elaborate discussions on the nature of absolute Time and its relations with absolute Space, all the metaphysics which turn on the idea of pure Duration, fade away. They are deprived of their very subject-matter. It is futile to discuss Time in itself, or Duration in itself, if there is no such thing.

The ingenious speculations of Mr. J. W. Dunne on what he terms Serial Time have attracted much attention of late. The plays of Mr. Priestley, based upon those speculations, are a rare example of metaphysics penetrating into daily life, and even fascinating crowded audiences in the theatre. But are the metaphysics sound? Is the popular mind being enlightened or being confused? Let us pause to examine the question that is involved.

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The investigation of the structure of the atom has proved that at the heart of things there is motion. Within each atom electrical units of various kinds are in incessant movement with inconceivable frequencies. We imagine that a piece of rock at the heart of a mountain remains the same continually from one million years to another. If we could see into its innermost substance, we should find that it does not remain the same from one-millionth of a second to the next.

There can be no physical existence without some kind of motion. Motion involves that something is at one *time* in one *place* and at another *time* in another *place*. It is therefore impossible that there should be motion in space alone or in time alone; there can be motion only in a combination of the two. Try to separate them, and motion would cease. Without motion nothing could exist. Hence we are brought to the inescapable conclusion that absolute time apart from space, or absolute space apart from time, are conceptions that have no counterpart in the perceived universe. They are no more than empty imaginings of the human mind. It may be said that we can divide space into miles or acres or inches; and time into years or days or seconds; and that these are quite different. But such divisions, considered in isolation, are conventional fictions only. Since absolute Space and absolute Time represent nothing actual in the universe, they can be of no value to philosophy. The only basis for metaphysical speculation, therefore, is the conception of the single indivisible Space-Time.

We are meeting in London on a Tuesday. We assume that London is in one category and Tuesday in another. London, we say, was here on Monday and will be here on Wednesday; the conceptions of place and of time are altogether separate. But on consideration we shall see that that is not so. If we wish to state the facts correctly, we should say that we are meeting in London-as-it-is-on-this-Tuesday; or we could meet in London-as-it-is-on-a-Wednesday, or on any other day; but it is not possible to meet in a London on no day, for London could not exist apart from time. Nor could we meet on a Tuesday nowhere, for that could not exist either. There can be no "duration" unless there is something that endures.

It has long been recognized that it is impossible to separate in actuality the three spatial dimensions of length, breadth, and thickness. We may write books of geometry in which points are discussed possessing none of those dimensions; or lines which have one dimension; or plane surfaces which have two; and it is useful to engage in such discussions because of the deductions that can be drawn from them by other sciences, or in practical life; or indeed because of the intellectual exercise. But we have always known quite

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well that there are no such things in reality as points or lines or planes as so defined.

The conclusion is that if philosophy is to deal with the actual universe; if it is to be something more than a mere exercise in logic, a kind of intellectual game played with counters which are conventionally given an artificial value and according to rules invented by the players—then it must accept the fact that a separate Space and a separate Time are non-existent, and that it is futile to spend energy in discussing them.

Once grasp this conception of an indivisible Space-time and speculations such as those of Mr. Dunne are deprived of their first premiss. You may represent Time in general as T , and particular times as t_1, t_2, t_3 , and so forth; you may make use of these symbols in ingenious equations, and apply them in "an infinite regress." Nevertheless they do not mean anything actual. Time apart from extension is merely a word. In the universe that we can perceive you cannot separate time from things. Events can no more take place twice over than a loaf of bread can be eaten twice over.

Caesar died, stabbed in the Senate-house at Rome, on the Ides of March in the year that we call 44 B.C. At a particular moment his heart ceased beating, his lungs stopped breathing, his vital processes ceased. An astronomer might have determined the precise moment by sidereal time, by the positions that were occupied by the earth, the sun, and certain stars when Caesar drew his last breath. That event and that moment were unique in the history of the universe. No question of relativity, or of " t_1, t_2, t_3 ," or of infinite regresses, could make Caesar die twice, or that position of the earth, sun, and stars occur twice. And so with every event that has happened or will happen, with every phenomenon and every thought.

Mr. Dunne in his books gives many interesting examples of prevision. What the explanation of those occurrences may be I do not know; but I feel convinced that it cannot be any form of "Serial Time," of dual or multiple happenings.

The conception of a unified Space-time must rule out also such ideas as that of "pull from the future." General Smuts, in his *Holism and Evolution*, writes (speaking of an organism): "The pull of the future is almost as much upon it as the push of the past, and both are essential to the character, function, and activities which it displays in the present." Professor Arnold Toynbee, in his *A Study of History*, quotes, with concurrence, another passage in the same book: "The Universe . . . has a trend; it has a list. It has an immanent Telos. It belongs to or is making for some greater whole. And the pull of this greater whole is enregistered in its inmost structures." If such expressions as "the pull of the greater whole that the universe is making for" are merely figures of speech, well

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and good. It would be pedantic to quarrel with them. Or if they are merely intended to convey the fact that organisms, man among them, are animated by purpose, by a desire to attain to something which may be expected to come later, then they are obviously expressing a reality. It is not indeed a pull from the future; it is a push, due to experiences in the past showing their effects in the present and giving an impulse forward. But there is nothing actual which "pulls" the acorn to become an oak. It is pushed by the constitution and capacities it has inherited from the past. If those expressions are meant to imply that there is such a thing as "the future," which has actuality and can exercise some kind of influence, then they can only mislead and confuse us.

The last example that I would submit of the simplification that may come to philosophy if it consents to take science as its purveyor relates to the long effort that has been made to define universals: What is the nature of "the Absolute"? What is the meaning of "the Good"? and so forth. If philosophy has not been able to present any definition, for instance of "the Good," that will meet with general acceptance, may it not be because there is no such thing? If the idea is no more than an artificial abstraction drawn from the many particular goods that constitute reality, it is not surprising that it cannot be defined apart from those particulars. Life does not offer us "the Good" any more than nature offers us "the Tree." So also philosophy has failed to find "the sanction for morality"—to take another example—because there are many sanctions, and not one only, as we may see around us every day. I would venture to suggest that the most dangerous word in the whole philosophic vocabulary is the apparently humble and insignificant word "the."

Kant had one great advantage over all the philosophers who came after him: he did not have to spend years of his life studying Kant. The longer the list of the classic philosophers extends the more the mind of the student is liable to be clogged by the mass of historical knowledge he is required to absorb. It is not a question of "going back to Spinoza," to use a phrase sometimes heard nowadays. It is not a question of going back to anyone. Philosophy ought not to be a matter of choosing one of a series of pigeon-holes inscribed with the names of thinkers or of schools of thought, of creeping in and sliding to the cover. Philosophy, I would submit, should rather devote itself in these days to a new clarification of its own ideas in the light of those new and fundamental discoveries of science. Then it may seek a synthesis with science and with religion. It is that threefold synthesis which may be able to offer to the world the guidance it so urgently needs; may be able to tell us

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what values are really worth while, in what a high civilization really consists.

Such a synthesis will not give us, indeed, a definite programme of practical action. That is the province of politics and economics, of the specialized sciences, and of religion separately; religion moulded no doubt by philosophy and by science, but animated by its own authentic spirit and bringing its own specific contribution. The function of philosophy, in union with the others, is rather to set the aims which practical action should seek. As Hume said, "We come to a philosopher to be instructed how we shall choose our ends, more than the means for attaining the ends."

But mark the number of practical issues besetting our minds day by day on which this synthesis of philosophy, science, and religion will have a bearing.

Is the State or nation a real entity, as Hegel taught and the Nazis and Fascists believe? Or is it only one more "fictional abstraction"? Does the individual exist ultimately for the State, or the State for the individual?

Is war between nations the outcome of a supreme natural law of a struggle for existence leading to the survival of the fittest, and therefore in the end beneficent? Or is this merely a misapplication of biological conclusions to a sphere they do not fit?

Is it true that thermodynamics proves conclusively that the earth is doomed to become lifeless, as the moon is; that the universe itself is on the way to ultimate death? If so, does this involve a fundamental pessimism in our general outlook, with a repudiation of the optimistic element in the religious creeds?

Is it possible to find a sound basis for ethics apart from theology? If it is, in what does the basis consist? If it is not possible, does it follow that theological dogmas ought to be accepted even if they are believed not to be true?

How far, if at all, should political ideologies influence scientific conclusions? Sidney and Beatrice Webb, in their book on Soviet Communism, quote the following watchwords from *The Journal for Marxist-Leninist Natural Science*: "We stand for Party in Mathematics"; "We stand for the purity of the Marxist-Leninist theory in surgery." Is this an example to be imitated?

If the principle of Causality is acknowledged to be supreme, what will be effect upon the current popular superstitions? What shall we think, for example, of the Town Council of Margate, which decided in January 1937 that no house in any new street on its housing estates was to be numbered thirteen? What shall we think of some of our newspapers with vast circulations which print week by week columns of astrological prophecies under such titles as "The Stars Foretell"? And what shall we think of their readers?

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These are features—some more important, some less—in the civilization of the twentieth century to which a synthesis of philosophy, science, and religion may address itself.

I would end by venturing, perhaps rashly, to submit some of my own beliefs as to the direction in which such a synthesis may lead us.

It may come to be recognized universally that, as Bernard Shaw says, "Civilization needs a religion as a matter of life and death." That religion will no doubt take various forms to meet the needs of various races and temperaments and under the influence of various traditions. But it can hardly fail to be at bottom theistic. I would remind you how many of the eminent philosophers of to-day accept the theistic position, conspicuous among them Whitehead, Alexander, Bergson, Lloyd Morgan. Religion in the future will necessarily be purged of ideas in the sphere of physics and biology that have been inherited from the past but are now discredited. It must be such as to invite and to satisfy both the saint and the scientist.

A fire, a mist, and a planet,
A crystal and a cell,
A jellyfish and a saurian,
And a cave where the cavemen dwell.
Then a sense of law and beauty,
And a face turned from the clod,
Some call it Evolution,
Others call it God.

The civilization that may come cannot be materialist. It will not lay too much emphasis on "things." Let each nation do honour to those of its members who are engaged in material production; but I cannot imagine a really great civilization being content to take as its symbol the tools of industry and agriculture, the hammer and the sickle; or spending for long its chief enthusiasm upon factories and tractors. That is to see in man a body that makes and consumes, rather than a mind that thinks and creates, understands, aspires and enjoys. A civilization in which economic factors are not kept as servants but are raised to be rulers, or even gods, can never suffice the human soul.

When the "fictional abstractions," as Vaihinger calls them, have disappeared, the individual man will be left clear-cut against the sky, no longer enshrouded by metaphysical mists. State, nation, industrial corporations and the like will be seen for what they are, nothing more than groupings or patterns of men and women. Then may be ended the domination of political myths; peoples will no longer be willing to surrender the right to think for themselves; no longer consent to become fodder for ideologies, as well as *kanonen-futter*;

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no longer submit to be intellectually enslaved, to sink to the status of Helots of the mind.

A synthesis of philosophy, science, and religion will keep intuition in its proper place, make it subject always to the guidance of the rational judgement. It will not underestimate the value of common sense; will be suspicious of philosophic paradox; will believe that an idea need not be false merely because it is obvious, and that even a truism may still be true. It will find the road to wise conclusions in the worldwide and age-long process of observation and experiment, trial and error, practical experience and free discussion.

Among the truisms, among the things that are obvious, is the infinite mischief done by the two great evils of the modern world, War and Poverty. When Oswald Spengler says that "War is the creator of all great things" he gives us the authentic utterance of barbarism. Mankind will come to see that by far the greatest danger to its own welfare is the existence of States which combine technical strength with moral weakness, the possession of great means with indifference to good ends.

Nor will the future be likely to tolerate that mingling of splendour and squalor which the twentieth century has inherited from the eighteenth and nineteenth—a brilliant garment on a body dirty and diseased. First let the body be cleansed and cured; then array it. When intelligence and goodwill get fully to work on our social system, they will bring about great changes.

We see that the movement towards such ends as these has already succeeded in setting a fresh value on simplicity. Great mansions, for example, are gradually becoming anachronisms of the countryside, like the medieval castles that preceded them. Lavish display, troops of servants, are out of fashion, not only because of the pressure of equalitarian taxation, but also because private pomp sees itself to be an insult to poverty.

Art follows, as always, the predominant trend of thought. We see it now no longer creating ornament for ornament's sake; catering less for private luxury and more for ordinary comfort and general civic needs; aiming at imparting beauty to everyday things. We cannot doubt that that tendency will develop.

There have been signs indeed that this movement may overpass itself, going beyond the simple and beautiful to the merely primitive, which may also be the ugly. Because we prefer a Doric temple to the Albert Memorial, that is no reason why we should prefer the art of Easter Island or Benin to the Doric temple; no reason why we should prefer Epstein's "Genesis" to Michelangelo's "Dawn," the style of the Futurists or Surrealists to that of Rembrandt, or negroid music to the purity of Bach or the majesty of Beethoven.

It is easy to stress the evils of the civilization that is now around

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us. We may easily come to think that it offers little else than evils. Yet the men of the Middle Ages, could they reappear, would envy us our freedom from the more constant wars, the more desperate poverty, the widespread ignorance, the unchecked diseases and constant epidemics from which they suffered. The study of the conditions of the past is often the best cure for pessimism about the present.

Nor is it true that our age is wholly deafened by its own noise and degraded by its own vulgarities. We read of the "noble simplicity and quiet greatness of the age of Pericles," and we draw a contrast. Yet there are many men and many women to-day, in all countries and among all classes, whose lives are marked by just those qualities. It is they who may be the precursors of the next age, and not the others.

"All the great ages," said Emerson, "have been ages of belief. I mean, when there was any extraordinary power of performance, when great national movements began, when arts appeared, when heroes existed, when poems were made, the human soul was in earnest, and had fixed its thoughts on spiritual verities." And all the great ages have had confidence in themselves and in the future; have been forward-looking; not critical merely and parasitical upon the past. Hellenism became decadent, became Hellenistic, when, as Whitehead puts it, "learning and learned taste replaced the ardour of adventure" and "genius was stifled by repetition." If a statue were to be designed symbolizing man, it might well be modelled on the statues of Janus, with two faces; one countenance regarding the past—and it would be the face of old age; one countenance turned to the future—the face of youth.

So philosophy coming out of its phase of classicism, science coming out of its phase of materialism, and religion from its servitude to dogmas that are outworn, may join in constructing a spiritual and intellectual framework for the future. They may give to mankind clear-cut ideas, simple, easily grasped, alive in the mind and powerful to guide conduct. "Meliorism" may become a key-word—the discard, that is to say, of both optimism and pessimism, with emphasis on the need and the hopefulness of effort to make things better.

Conscious Evolution may be another root idea. Man has come to understand, however imperfectly, his place in the history of things; his environment, and how in some degree it may be modified; his own nature, and how in some degree it may be moulded. The knowledge will stimulate his efforts, help to determine their direction, immensely accelerate the pace of his progress. "Man is in the making," Lowes Dickinson wrote, "but henceforth he must make himself. To that point Nature has led him out of the primeval slime. She has given him limbs, she has given him brain, she has given

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him the rudiment of a soul. Now it is for him to make or mar that splendid torso. Let him look no more to her for aid; for it is her will to create one who has the power to create himself. If he fail, she fails; back goes the metal to the pot; and the great process begins anew. If he succeeds, he succeeds alone. His fate is in his own hands. Of that fate, did he but know it, brain is the lord, to fashion a palace fit for the soul to inhabit."

Such are the ideals to which our trinity, intimately unified, of philosophy, science, and religion may point. There we may see in what a true civilization consists. Lighted by that conception the landscape through which we are passing need not seem so gloomy, but will have the sunshine slanting through it.

GREAT THINKERS

(XIII) IMMANUEL KANT

PROFESSOR G. DAWES HICKS, M.A., PH.D., LITT.D., F.B.A.

THE close proximity of the nineteenth century to our own age is an impediment in the way of tracing with confidence the lines of its intellectual development, and more especially of estimating the significance of its philosophical speculation. Certain characteristics of the latter are, however, already sufficiently obvious. It is clear, at any rate, that the chief attempts at philosophical construction in the nineteenth century were the outcome of German reflexion; it is clear also that the great thinker who died in 1804 set the current of speculative activity upon a course markedly distinguishable from any that had been followed in preceding centuries. As a philosophical epoch, the nineteenth century was emphatically the century of Kant. It began with the elaboration of the idealistic systems which have often been regarded as constituting the advance from Kant; it ended, after the culmination of those systems, in metaphysical conceptions that seemed the apotheosis of what had been propounded in Königsberg, with the demand for a "return to Kant," as the condition of philosophical speculation understanding itself and of pushing forward to new undertakings. In more ways than one Kant was the founder of modern philosophy. It was he who gave to the fundamental questions of philosophy the form which they still retain; it was he who first applied the methods of research by which solutions of these questions are still being sought.

Immanuel Kant was born in Königsberg, a small city on the extreme north-eastern frontier of Prussia, on April 22, 1724. He spent the whole of his life in Königsberg and never visited any towns other than those in his own province of East Prussia. His father was a poor but very worthy citizen, a saddler and strapmaker by trade; his mother was a woman of intelligence and of a deeply religious nature, largely influenced by the revivalist movement then of considerable influence in Germany known as Pietism. Kant himself always spoke of his father's ancestors as being of Scotch descent, but as to this there appears to be a great deal of doubt. He was the second of a family of nine children, only five of whom, however, survived the years of infancy. His early education was probably rendered possible by the generosity of one Dr. F. A. Schulz, who was the head of the most important school of Königsberg, the Collegium

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Fredericianum, so called on account of its being endowed by Frederick the Great, and who was impressed by the manifest signs of promise which he discerned in his pupil. Schulz was a man of wide learning, and was also deeply imbued with the spirit of Pietism, and he evidently exerted considerable influence upon Kant's mental development. When the school years were over, Kant began to attend lectures at the age of eighteen, in the year 1740, at the University of Königsberg. He supported himself meanwhile by teaching, apparently also receiving some little help from an uncle. At the University he gained the personal friendship of the ablest of the professors, one Martin Knutzen, a man of distinct philosophical ability and well versed likewise in the principles of natural science. Through his advice, Kant commenced to study the works of Newton, and in the first instance his interest centred upon mathematical and physical investigations rather than upon philosophy. His earliest work, written in 1747, in his twenty-third year, and published in 1749, was an *Essay On the True Estimate of Moving Forces*; and six years later appeared his *General Natural History and Theory of the Heavens*, an elaborate exposition of the nebular hypothesis of the origin of planetary systems, in which he anticipated by forty years the celebrated work of the great French Astronomer, Laplace. For nine years previous to the publication of this treatise in 1755 Kant had been obliged, through stress of circumstances, to act as domestic tutor in various families in the neighbourhood of Königsberg. In 1755 he returned, however, to the University, took his Degree as Doctor of Philosophy, and wrote the Latin Dissertation *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World* (published in 1770) to habilitate, as the Germans say, at the University—that is, to qualify himself for teaching there. He then became a Privat-Dozent, a private lecturer, namely, without a salary, taking classes in Logic, Metaphysics, Physics, and Mathematics. The eleven years following were years of extreme hardship and poverty; he had to eke out a living by such stray appointments as he could get. His struggle in this respect was ended in 1770, when he was forty-six years of age, by his being appointed to the Chair of Logic and Metaphysics in the University, the duties of which he continued to discharge until 1797, after which year he was prevented from lecturing through the increasing infirmities of age. It was during his career as a professor that his greater works were published. He died on February 12, 1804.

Kant's chief philosophical works, written during the period of his professorship at Königsberg, are the following: *Kritik of Pure Reason*, first edition, 1781; *Prolegomena to every Future Metaphysic*, 1783; *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals*, 1785; *Kritik of Pure Reason*, second edition, 1787; *Kritik of Practical Reason*, 1788;

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Kritik of Judgement, 1790; *Religion within the Bounds of Pure Reason*, 1793; *Metaphysic of Morals*, 1797.

It was only gradually that Kant succeeded in working his way to the point of view of the Critical Philosophy. As a student he had been brought up in the traditions of the philosophy of Leibniz, in the form in which that philosophy was then represented in the German Universities. C. F. Wolff, in trying to make Leibniz's philosophy consistent, had reduced it to a mere skeleton of what it was in its author's own hands, and had converted it into a barren system of logical distinctions. Wolff's whole mode of thinking may not unfairly be described as rationalism in its crudest and most arid aspect; and, as thus developed, it fell an easy prey to the more promising method of empirical investigation which had its home in England, and was then becoming familiar to German scholars. "I honestly confess," wrote Kant in the Preface to the *Prolegomena*, "that my recollection of David Hume's teaching was the very thing which many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber, and gave my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy a new direction." It is, however, impossible in a single article to trace the stages of Kant's Pre-Critical period; and I proceed at once to an account of his philosophy in its mature form.

His own investigation Kant was wont to describe as "critical." And by the term "critical" he intended to emphasize the change in the point of view taken by himself from what had been adopted in the earlier philosophies especially of Leibniz and Wolff, but also, though not so explicitly, of Locke and Hume. Trained, as I have said, in the traditions of the first, awakened from the "dogmatic slumber" which that training had engendered in him by the sceptical doubts of the second, Kant, in his subsequent thinking, made it his aim to reconcile the elements of truth he discerned in each of these systems and to transcend them. In their own way, no doubt, Locke, Leibniz, and Hume had been critics too, critics of the conventional notions and assumptions prevalent in the science and popular thinking of their day. But, as a distinguishing mark of philosophical procedure, "criticism" had for Kant a specific and carefully defined meaning, a meaning which it had not previously borne and which it was not henceforward to lose. "Criticism," in his view of it, stood opposed to what he called "dogmatism." And by "dogmatism" he invariably understood any mode of dealing with facts purporting to be known facts without a previous inquiry into the significance and legitimacy of the notions by which such facts were interpreted. In seeking to determine the nature and relations of real things, metaphysical thinkers had freely employed conceptions such as those of ground and consequent, cause and effect, identity and difference, and the like; and, although Hume had called in question the validity of the

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ordinary notion of causal connectedness, yet he had availed himself, without compunction, of most of the other categories, and the problem had never been seriously faced whether so-called "things" were rightly conceived by the help of these and such-like notions at all. The *impasse* before which the philosophy of the eighteenth century had found itself at a stand was, consequently, not surprising. If, for instance, "things" were regarded after a manner sufficiently familiar, as in some way "given" to the faculty of thought or intelligence, and if, further, these "things" were conceived as things-in-themselves, things, that is to say, existing in fulness of being independently of their being known, then it appeared to Kant evident that the only relation possible between the assumed "things" and the mind would be the relation indicated by the term "affections" or "modifications" of the mind, and that what was called knowledge of the supposed things-in-themselves could at the best be only knowledge of the results, the impressions, produced by them. In that case, not only would such knowledge in no sense be, what the interpreting notions made use of led to the belief it was, universal and necessary, but since it was in the first instance, at any rate, knowledge of the subjective furniture, so to speak, of the mind itself, the doubt must ever remain whether it adequately, or even at all, represented the nature and relations of real being. Indeed, one might push Kant's reflexions beyond the point to which he himself carried them in his own introductory statements, and insist that if what we take to be knowledge of things-in-themselves be thus in truth the merely subjective having of impressions, produced by such "things," there would be no means of explaining how from these "affections of the mind" there should grow up the wholly different mental attitude expressed by the phrase "knowledge of things." An *impasse* of this kind seemed, then, to Kant to be inevitable so long as the interpreting notions which reflective thought employed, and perhaps unavoidably employed, were not first of all subjected to critical scrutiny, and the precise significance they had, other than the obvious one of being modes in which a thinking mind orders and arranges its experience, ascertained. What the nature of a "thing" is apprehended as being will largely depend upon the interpreting notions applied in the process of its apprehension, and the peculiarity of the critical method lay in the preliminary justification it required of the interpreting notions thus applied.

Kant further described his investigation as "transcendental," and by this term likewise he gave expression to a characteristic feature of his method of research, a feature also distinctive of much of the speculation which has followed the Kantian. A transcendental treatment of experience was explicitly defined by Kant as one in which there is given the ground for *a priori* determinations in respect to

objects. By *a priori* determinations he meant determinations which are universal and necessary, as contrasted with what is taken to be *a posteriori* or particular. And, since all knowledge involves universal and necessary factors, since universal and necessary factors are essential to knowledge of whatsoever kind, a transcendental inquiry was in truth an inquiry into the nature of knowledge as such, an examination of knowledge undertaken with a view to exhibiting the conditions implied in knowing, or in being aware of, anything. A transcendental inquiry thus stood opposed to a psychological investigation into the way in which knowing as an operation or a process of an individual mind happens or is brought about. Considered as a complex of mental events or occurrences, an act of knowing is a particular fact in the natural world, an infinitesimal constituent of the great totality of existence; and, in endeavouring to trace its genesis and history, the psychologist is compelled to use the notions or categories, the *a priori* principles as Kant called them, without which the said act of knowing could not be known by him at all. The psychologist assumes that this fact, the occurrence, namely, of particular mental events, can be known; he assumes also that the means by which it is known are reliable and trustworthy. But it was just the assumed reliability and trustworthiness of the notions involved in knowledge, whether in knowledge of what we call material or of what we call mental facts, that appeared to Kant to offer to philosophy the initial problem it had to solve. This problem concerned not at all the natural circumstances under which knowing takes place in an individual mind; it concerned not at all the actual contents of the knowledge which might be obtained either by one individual or by any number of individuals. It was restricted to what may be called the logical conditions of knowledge and to determining the range within which knowledge on account of its nature must be confined.

To show, then, how knowledge of objects is possible, to discover the ground on which the validity of such knowledge is based, and to fix the boundaries beyond which the validity of what claimed to be knowledge could not be sustained, such was the task which Kant set for himself in the *Kritik of Pure Reason*. The outcome of his investigation may be said briefly to be the reverse of the familiar Platonic view of the relation of cognition and existence. Plato sharply distinguished the world of ultimate reality, the world of the Ideas (*ἰδέαι* or *εἰδή*), the eternal essences in a sphere transcending the sphere of time and space, from the world of phenomena, the world of sensuous things, subject to perpetual flux and change. Knowledge, in the strict acceptance of the term, *ἐπιστήμη*, there could be, so he held, of the former, but of the latter we become aware only through the dubious, uncertain medium of belief or opinion, *δόξα*, Kant, too,

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was led, as a result of more than one line of consideration, to draw a sharp distinction between the world of ultimate realities, or noumena, as he named them, and the world of phenomena, or objects of sense. But, unlike Plato, he reached the conclusion that only of phenomena could there be, in the strict sense of the term, knowledge, whilst of noumena, of things-in-themselves, we were unable through the avenue of the understanding to form any positive conception. Kant, then, believed himself in the *Kritik*, on the one hand, to have established the trustworthiness of ordinary experience, and the validity of the reasoning exemplified in mathematics and the natural sciences, and, on the other hand, to have disposed of the claims of metaphysics to rank as a *Wissenschaft*.

Let us dwell for a while on some of the salient points yielded by the analysis of experience from which the conclusion just referred to was drawn. Kant's discoveries were numerous and important, but perhaps no one of them was of greater significance than his singling out the characteristic of *objectivity* as that which presented the central problem for a theory of knowledge. Why was it that what is known *stands over against* the knowing subject as other than and distinct from the act of knowing? How comes it that a subjective activity of the mind, be it produced or not produced by the influence of external things, should carry with it the unique feature, reference to an object? Expressed quite generally Kant's solution of the problem is the following. Sense data received into the *a priori* forms of intuition, space and time, are apprehended as constituents of objects in consequence of being wrought into the texture of experience through means of the pure notions of the understanding, or categories. The object cognized is, that is to say, essentially a complex of heterogeneous factors; and, in and by the act or process of cognizing, a synthesis or conjunction of these factors is brought about. The process involved, in the first place, the multiplicity of sense-material, sense presentations, mere impressions, not *per se* so much as cognizable, and devoid of any power to group or arrange themselves. These elements are *a posteriori*, particular and given, Kant was often inclined to suppose, by the action of real things upon the faculty of sensibility. The process involved, in the second place, two forms or general modes, in which the manifold of sensations is received. As universal conditions of sense perception, these forms of space and time, although sensuous in character, do not belong to any sense, nor are they, although general, notions or concepts. They are pure *a priori* intuitions, ways in which any intelligence that is like ours sensuously affected *must* receive the data of sense. The process involved, in the third place, the rules or principles according to which the given elements of sense are combined and, in being combined, are cognized. The manifold of sensuous stuff or material is in itself

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a mere *ἄπειρον*, a merely indefinite mass of disjointed particulars; it can become content of knowledge only through being brought into relation with the unity of consciousness, the fundamental identity in the midst of difference. The supreme unity in conscious experience is the unity of the self or ego; and, as referred to the unity of the self or ego, the data of sense have imposed upon them systematic order and connectedness. The categories—such interpreting notions as those of quantity and quality, of substance, of cause, etc.—are the ways in which the Unity of Self-consciousness expresses itself in relation to the empirical detail, the modes in which self-consciousness plants itself out, so to speak, in the given material. And the gist of Kant's contention was that it is precisely the function of this act of synthesis to give to sense-presentations *the* centre of reference, *the* unity in difference, which is what we mean by their objectivity, that it is precisely the function of this act of synthesis to be productive of the peculiar component in the object which constitutes it, apart from its special concrete clothing, an object at all.

This contention is so opposed to our ordinary conceptions, and so crucial for the Kantian philosophy as a whole, that it is worth while running the risk of being wearisome in order to throw light upon it. Let me now try to state as simply as I can what I conceive to have been Kant's meaning. Popular reflexion habitually takes for granted that the dependent, given, impressed character of sense-affection is responsible for the reference involved in an act of perception to an object. Now, while it is true that in his unguarded moments Kant did sometimes allow himself to slip into phraseology that would seem to imply this popular doctrine, yet to him at any rate the credit is due of having unmistakably demonstrated its falsity. In his own way, he pressed the consideration that sense qualities as elements in the content perceived do not tell the story of their own origin. Be they "affections," or "impressions," or what not, still, even so, their impressed, produced, dependent character constitutes no part of the account they give of themselves to the subject apprehending them, and cannot, therefore, be the determining conditions of the subject's ascribing them to an external object. Kant left, indeed, undisturbed the common psychological view of the way in which sensations come about. But he did insist that as "impressions," as "affections of the mind," sensations are purely subjective modifications, and bring with them no report whatsoever of the source from which they come. Consequently, he turned to the other factors, which analysis had revealed as present in the complex whole called an object, to find an explanation of the characteristic of objectivity. Of these other factors, all are universal and necessary, and the categories, although not in themselves fully formed notions or products of thought, emanate from the spontaneity of the Ego, the

principle that thinks. How, then, can it be the function of the categories to give objective connectedness to the particulars of sense intuition? Is there not an air of paradox in attributing to the spontaneity of the *subject* precisely *the* characteristic in the object which leads us to determine the object as other than, or as standing over against, the subject? Kant's answer may be expressed in the following manner. The assertion would be paradoxical if the term "subject" in the first as in the second of these references denoted the individual mind. The Unity of the Subject, however, which finds expression in the categories is not to be identified with the individuality of the subject that opposes itself to the object. It is possible for each one of us to make of his own mental life matter of contemplation, and the inner life will, in that case, exhibit a variously compounded unity and identity, the unity and identity, Kant would have said, of an object, an object whose components differed unquestionably from the components of that kind of object which we describe as material, but nevertheless, in Kant's view, an object all the same. On the other hand, the Unity which was the source of the categories was not this unity, not the unity of an object, but the Unity which was implied as a prior condition in making even of the inner life itself matter of contemplation. The Unity which Kant distinguished as transcendental must be understood to refer to that aspect of consciousness of which we can offer no further explanation, because any explanatory term would be found to involve it as a precondition. "Consciousness in general" (*Bewusstsein überhaupt*), "original unchangeable consciousness," "the permanent and abiding Ego," "the correlatum of all our presentations"—these are some of the metaphors used by Kant in speaking of this fundamental principle of experience, metaphors which were intended to indicate partly its non-individual, partly its purely formal character. "It is," as William Wallace put it, "consciousness in general which is Kant's theme, just as it is granite in general, and not the block in yonder field, which is the theme of the geologist." Whilst then actualized, if the expression may be permitted, in each concrete centre of consciousness, consciousness in general yet transcends the latter in the aspect of what Windelband aptly described as "a super-individual function." In every act of knowing, the individual mind *must*, therefore, conform to the conditions imposed by consciousness as such; it was precisely in virtue of their being conditions due to the nature of consciousness in general that the categories were universal and necessary. Now, as involved in an individual's act of knowing, the universality and necessity of the categories come to recognition in and through the independent position assigned to the object. The object is apprehended by the individual as something external to and distinct from himself because the categories by means of which he apprehends it

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are not his private property, but the common property of every self-conscious mind. Or, in other words, the characteristic feature of the object, its standing over against the apprehending subject, means that its empirical elements are arranged in a regular, definite, determinate manner, according to a fixed order or prescribed rule, that the individual subject, in apprehending what is offered to him in experience, is *compelled, constrained*, to conform to the conditions imposed by consciousness as such. The laws of the game are not laid down by him; he is forced to observe the terms on which it is to be played. And he experiences the constraint as something other than himself. The mode of synthesis, that is to say, is not at the mercy of his caprice; it does not vary in different individuals, it does not vary in the same individual at different times. And so, in contrast with his *changing* states, the object appears as *permanent*, as the correlate of "the unchanging consciousness," upon which also his empirical individual self, as an object, is dependent. To use Kant's own words, the object is that which steadies, that which gives stability to, the wandering manifold of sensuous intuition. And, he might have added, the object is likewise that which steadies, that which gives stability to, the transient states or phases of the individual mental life. For it is only in so far as the wandering manifold of intuition is thus steadied, through being referred to an object, that the individual subject becomes aware of his concrete self as one and identical. Were the manifold of intuition not referred to an object, "we should," Kant wrote, "have a self as many coloured and as various as the impressions we receive"; or, otherwise expressed there would neither be awareness of self nor any self to be aware of. The unity and identity of the self is realized in and through the unity and identity of the object; awareness of self and awareness of an object are correlative and inseparable aspects of experience.

The view taken by Kant of the constitution of the knowable universe follows directly from the analysis he offered of the structure of an object and of the conditions which render objective knowledge possible. As just indicated, subject and object, according to his conception of them, mutually involve each other; experienced fact, that is to say, can only be interpreted in terms of Mind or Intelligence. There can be no fact of the kind we experience as objective that is not related to the transcendental Unity of Consciousness. The latter, in so far as it finds expression in the categories, Kant called specifically the understanding (*Verstand*); and, whilst he would never allow that the understanding produces nature, whilst he would never allow that the concrete content of nature is derived from the understanding, yet he explicitly asserted that the understanding makes nature, makes it in its intelligible aspect as a systematic, orderly whole of inter-related parts. Nature, in his view, is a network of

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thought-relations into which material has been imported; and, as imported, the material consists of sense-presentations capable of being formed into constituents of objects. Obviously, therefore, as constructions of Mind, and as composed partly of material given to mind, the objects of knowledge can only be phenomena or appearances, appearances, possibly, of a reality or realities not thus dependent for their existence upon mind, but appearances which in that case are essentially other than and distinct from that of which they are appearances. Within this enveloping unity of phenomenal experience, resting upon the transcendental Unity of Consciousness every knowable object is to be found; and science deserts its proper territory, and strays into regions of phantasm, when it essays to extend its province beyond the realm of sense experience. A science of nature is possible, but a science of things-in-themselves would be a contradiction in terms. For things-in-themselves are not, at any rate, sensations; they cannot, therefore, be received into the sensuous forms of space and time, they cannot be reduced into objects by being connected with the Unity of Self-consciousness through means of the categories. The effort to acquire scientific knowledge of ultimate reality turns out to be, in truth, only a delusive attempt to sensualize the Supersensible.

Nevertheless, the thing-in-itself was for Kant no excrescence on the critical philosophy; and, as Robert Adamson once said, it is very far from playing the part of "that convenient receptacle for difficulties of thought, the unknown and unknowable." Kant, it is true, restricted the range of positive scientific knowledge to the sphere of phenomena. But it was assumed by him as equally certain, throughout his treatment of experience, that the phenomenal itself indicates, contains a reference to, a realm of being other than the phenomenal. For, not only does reflexion on the nature of finite things leave us with a certain characteristic set of problems unsolved, it literally forces upon us the all-important distinction between the limitedness, the incompleteness, of the phenomenal world of knowledge and the infinitude, the completeness, of the world of real existence. It is to the lines of reflexion in question that I now direct attention.

In the first place, Kant laid, as we have seen, stress on the consideration that the Understanding is not productive of the world of objective fact. Nature is intelligible, so his contention runs, because it has being only as object for a thinking mind; and it must, therefore, possess those relations through which alone it becomes intelligible for a thinking mind. This intelligibility is, however, but the *form* of nature. Not only when we view nature in general but in the more special analysis of knowledge itself there appear in constant conjunction the material and the formal factors. Understanding,

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which confers upon the matter of sense intelligible form, has still to accept the sensuous matter. The form of nature, the variety of ways in which its parts are related to one another, depends upon and expresses the Unity of Consciousness. But nature is more than a system of relations; it is a system of related *facts*. And the concrete content of these facts cannot be explained as in like manner dependent upon and expressive of the Unity of Consciousness. The particular elements in the context of experience are, so far as consciousness is concerned, contingent, accidental, empirical. Nature, then, is dependent upon intelligence in that its form as a related system implies intelligence; it is not dependent upon intelligence for its material, its sensuous detail. These foreign factors, adopted by intelligence, are due, Kant found himself impelled to say, although he was aware that it is a hazardous mode of speech, to excitation of the mind; and the admission of such excitation requires the postulation of a reality beyond experience as its cause. On this account, therefore, the object known must be regarded as merely phenomenal of the thing-in-itself.

The weakest position of the Kantian philosophy comes here to view, and Jacobi summed up the difficulties of most students of the *Kritik* when he declared that without the supposition we have been considering he had found it impossible to enter into the critical system, whilst with it he had found it impossible to remain therein.¹ One objection to the doctrine in question is obvious at the outset. Whoever avails himself of the conception of sensations as "affections" or "excitations" of the mind is, *ex hypothesi*, identifying the mind of which he is speaking with the concrete individual existence of a particular conscious subject at some specific interval of time and under specific empirical conditions. But, as we have already seen, the Kantian theory in regard to the intelligible relations of natural phenomena is by no means synonymous with the doctrine, propounded, for example, by Berkeley, that the objects of experience are dependent upon the existence of individual conscious subjects. Quite the contrary. The proof offered of the necessary implications of conscious intelligence in nature had been perfectly general in its scope and had been limited by no one of its terms to the particular concrete existence of the individual thinking subject. Nay, Kant had insisted, as I have tried to make clear, that the existence of concrete individual subjects itself called for and was capable of interpretation only in terms appropriate to a world conceived as involving, or dependent upon, Thought or Intelligence. The transcendental Unity of Consciousness was not, that is to say, an existing entity that could be acted upon, or influenced by, other existing entities; it was a general principle, a logical condition, realized in particular existents,

¹ Jacobi's *Werke*, i, p. 304.

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but not itself a particular existent, occupying a position alongside of, or amongst other particular existents. Moreover, the relation of cause and effect was one of the modes in which Unity of Consciousness expressed itself in the realm of knowable objects, a relation subsisting between occurrences in nature in consequence of the dependence of nature upon Intelligence. Now, this relation must be viewed either in one way or the other—either as a relation arising from Intelligence, and in that case intelligence itself cannot be regarded as springing out of it, or as a relation not arising from Intelligence, and, in that case, instead of the critical theory of knowledge, we should be thrown back once more upon the ordinary, crude, uncritical assumption of things and minds, as existing independently of one another, and of experience as resulting from the operation of the former upon the latter. Further, Kant never succeeded in showing how, on this supposition, any organic synthesis of contingent particulars and *a priori* relations is so much as conceivable. Were the material elements really given in haphazard fashion, no manipulation of them by the understanding would ever transform them into constituents of a world in which rational law and order reigned. On the whole, therefore, this line of reflexion must be pronounced irreconcilable with the main principles of the critical philosophy.

Kant has, however, other and stronger arguments to advance in respect to the existence of supersensible realities. 57195

He insisted, in the second place, upon a thought which reflexion on the contrast of Understanding and Sense inevitably awakens. The realm of determinate knowledge evinces itself as limited and as limited in two ways. On the one hand, the general forms of connexion entering into knowledge are restricted in their application to the elements of sense intuition, in the absence of which their significance vanishes. But, to draw a limit, even though within its boundaries there may be said to lie all that can be said to be in the strict sense known implies a distinction; and the ground for that distinction must be found somewhere in the nature of Intelligence itself. Reflective thought frames, as it were of necessity, the idea of a reality freed from the limitations of the world of experience and distinguishable, therefore, from the world of experience. The idea of this supersensible reality is thus a *Grenzbegriff*, a limiting notion, and it may at least serve to warn us that sense apprehension has no legitimate claim to be regarded as exhaustive of the whole realm of being. The idea in question may be called the idea of a noumenon, the idea of what would be apprehensible by an intelligence not tied down as ours is to finite categories and to given data of sense.

There is yet a third trend of reflexion followed in the *Kritik* which, although not at first assigned the same prominence as the others, comes in the long run to be the most important of the considerations

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that weighed with Kant in carrying his thought beyond this world of space and time. To the categories had been attributed in a word the general function of rendering possible a united connected experience for an apprehending subject. Such connected experience, it had been shown, the presence of the categories did up to a certain point secure; objective law, regularity, possibility of passing from one natural fact to another—all this had been traced to an intelligible ground. Yet, when more closely looked at, the phenomenal world, so Kant urged, will be found to fall short of the unity for which we are in search. Every part of it, when carefully scrutinized, will exhibit marks indicating unmistakably that something more is wanted in order to give satisfaction to the effort, inevitable on the part of a self-conscious being, to work together his experience into one connected whole. Knowledge of the parts presupposes unity of the whole, and it is still incumbent upon us to endeavour in some way to determine what the whole is of which they are parts. Nay more. The very forms of Understanding, requisite and adapted for knowledge of the relative and the conditioned, prove themselves to be inadequate and ill adapted for knowledge of the absolute and unconditioned totality. But, argued Kant, recognition of this inadequacy, recognition of the problems for the solution of which the categories are insufficient, is only to be accounted for on the supposition that reflective self-consciousness in some way contemplates a world—call it meanwhile a world of existence—other than and distinct from the world of our ordinary experience, which other world is, in truth, the world of things-in-themselves. It was, in fact, from the presence of an additional element in self-consciousness, over and above what has entered into the construction of ordinary experience that the conception of things-in-itself arises and through which it takes the more positive form of a *complement* making up with the world of phenomena the sum total of intelligible reality.

Self-consciousness, then, is not, according to Kant, exhausted in the Understanding and its modes of expression. A self-conscious being exercises also the higher function called by him specifically Reason (*Vernunft*), and the great problems of the moral and spiritual life group themselves round that of determining the authority which may be legitimately accorded to the deliverances of Reason. Reason, as Kant viewed it, is the faculty which seeks completed explanation of the piecemeal experience presented in cognition; it is the faculty from which emanate Ideas—adopting Plato's term—of the Unconditioned, the Unlimited, the Absolute. Carrying back the fragmentary results of human experience to what seem to be their ultimate issues in a summed-up totality, Reason postulates the three Ideas of the Soul, as the simple, perdurable, immaterial substance from which the phenomena of consciousness are derivative manifestations, of the

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World as a whole of external phenomena, of God as the supreme reality, that transcends, creates, and keeps in relation all the diversities of existence. Bringing the instrument of criticism to bear upon these efforts of Reason, it was Kant's purpose to show that we cannot theoretically demonstrate the actual existence of realities corresponding to any of the Ideas. For, in the attempt to fill in the content of the Ideas, Reason has no other resources at its command than the categories, and the categories have validity only as forms whereby we construe to ourselves the parts of experience and the connexion of the parts each with each; severed from the sense material which they objectify, the categories lose their meaning and significance. Under these circumstances, then, Reason finds itself readily enough confronted with absurdities and contradictions. The illegitimate and transcendent employment of the categories leads us inevitably to regard the Unconditioned as an object. But whatever realities may correspond to the Ideas of Reason, these realities are certainly not objects, entities that stand over against a finite knower upon which his powers of observation can be directed. Construe the soul as an object, and you do but confuse the pure Unity of Self-consciousness with the empirical ego, and there results a hybrid whose immortality it would not be worth while either to assert or deny; construe the World in its entirety as an object and you become entangled in the antinomies which have perplexed and baffled human thought; construe God as an object, and you get the anthropomorphic notions of Deity that have estranged thoughtful minds from religion. The Ideas, then, are not realizable in knowable objects; they have not in experience a *constitutive* value, like the categories, and when we try to give that value to them they come to be constitutive of illusions merely. So far as science is concerned, the futile attempt to construct unconditioned objects serves but as an occupation of imaginative intellects. The empirical psychologist can pursue his course without the hypothesis of an invisible and immortal soul; the physicist can industriously carry on his researches without troubling to speculate about ultimate atoms or an ultimate void; and the astronomer who has swept the sky with his telescope and found no God need occasion us no alarm.

But, whilst he conceived scientific knowledge incapable of throwing light on the great questions of metaphysics—God, Freedom, and Immortality—Kant was very far indeed from suggesting that these are names of non-entities. Although it cannot be known, absolute reality can be—nay, must be—thought; and, however defective the thought may be, it is yet on a higher plane than the relative and discursive work of the Understanding. The faith of Reason has no affinity with the blind credulity of inexperience; rather is it the ripened fruit of the largest experience and the widest knowledge.

And the theses of a rational faith science is at least as little able to disprove as to prove. Furthermore, if the Ideas of Reason possess not constitutive value, they are yet in another and most significant respect supremely valuable. As *regulative* principles, they direct and govern the activity of the intellect; they enable us to organize our experience, to estimate its worth. They furnish the impulse to knowledge; they prescribe, so to speak, its problems, and set, at the same time, its ideals. In endeavouring to trace the working of the human mind, we invariably assume the identity of the soul throughout all its changing states, for no thinking being can conceive of himself as more than one soul, and the very notion of a soul as not one and identical involves a scepticism that strikes at the very possibility of knowledge. Yet to work out this apparently simple presupposition, to connect the diverse phenomena of the empirical subject *as if* they were states of one identical soul—that is the never completely attained goal which psychological science has before it. It is the ideal towards which psychological science strives, and it is likewise the motive which originates the striving. So, too, men assume, in however dim and confused a way, from the earliest stages of culture, that the world of experience is one whole, for even the uncivilized man looks upon the world as being in one time and in one space. And yet to make manifest the unity of the world, to show the natural interconnexion of all its parts with one another, to exhibit all its phenomena *as if* they were constituents of one systematic universe—that is the ultimate goal of physical science which in truth it never completely attains. It is the ideal towards which physical science strives and it is also the motive which originates the striving. Finally, the intercourse of the individual mind with nature never fails to awaken the thought of a supreme Intelligence in and through whom mind and nature are related. The consciousness of a divine existence has been at the root of the religious experience of men in all ages, and to live *as if* that consciousness conveyed a true report has been the aspiration of the purest minds. And yet to free the thought of God from all obscurity, to reconcile with it the fate that befalls individuals and the history of the race—that would be to attain the goal of religious reflexion, no less than the last result of philosophy. It is the ideal towards which all philosophy and all religion strive, it is also the motive which originates the striving.

Science, then, reposes ultimately upon a faith, a hope, a trust—the faith of Reason in its own supremacy or in the rationality of the world. The Ideas of Reason are not ideas of objects, but they are Ideas through which we go in quest of the meaning of objects. Man, however, doth not live by science alone, and the logic of science is not the sole code of his intellectual and spiritual life. The examination of our nature as moral agents in the *Kritik of Practical Reason* enabled

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Kant to discover a significance of the Ideas richer and deeper than the regulative import they possess in the field of theoretical cognition. Already Reason had evinced itself as that in experience which is primordial and supreme; already the Ideas of Reason have been seen to be, in reference to the world of sense, Ideas of worth or value—Ideas of what *should* or *ought to be*—and, as such gradually, though never completely realizing themselves in the direction they give to the processes of knowing. But, whilst our theoretical experience exhibits no other than determined objects and occurrences, each of which might find a kind of explanation in a statement of the relations in which it stands to the other members of the system, practice or conduct exhibits what Kant insisted must be called a fact, yet a fact which from its nature can find no place in the system of reciprocally determining objects, but which requires as the ground of its possibility, over and above the categories of the Understanding, the notion of Freedom. The fact in question is the fact of Duty. In the fact of Duty Kant found a positive exemplification of that kind of reality to which the Ideas of Reason had all along been leading, a reality, namely, which although having a definite content, is in no sense an object in the context of experience. Duty, that which ought to be, indicates something altogether distinct from the objects of nature, something which does not stand over against us as other than and external to ourselves, yet something nevertheless whose reality is none the less certain. The truth with which we are here concerned evidently has specific reference to the nature of man. From the treatment of cognition itself, it had become obvious that man cannot be regarded as *merely* a natural object. The human subject, participating in the Unity of Self-consciousness, is clearly more than the empirical ego that can be psychologically examined and dissected; the supersensible factor in his being expresses itself in the notions that render a sensuous world possible and in the Ideas that carry his thought beyond it. When, however, man is considered as a moral agent, his two-fold character becomes still more strikingly apparent. Looked at from one point of view, man undoubtedly belongs to the realm of nature. His appetites, his impulses, his inclinations have a natural origin, and come about through his connexion with the things of sense. Did he, however, belong entirely to the realm of nature, his actions would be determined solely after the manner in which every event in nature is determined, mechanically, inevitably, according to the law of causation. Yet self-consciousman ascribes his actions to himself, regards himself as determining his own line of conduct, conceives of himself as the source of what he resolves or wills. And Kant's contention was that a man who can only act under the idea of Freedom must *be* free; a man who thinks himself free is *ipso facto* free. Freedom, then, the characteristic of man as a member of the spiritual

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or supersensible realm, cannot but be accepted as a reality, even though we can give of it, in terms appropriate to theoretical knowledge, no explanation. Now, freedom is only another name for self-determination; it is identical with autonomy of will, with Reason as practical prescribing a law for itself. That law, the moral law, comes to recognition in the fact or consciousness of Duty. In the consciousness of Duty we have no other than the Supremacy of Reason, as constituting the very core or essence of Self-consciousness. The "I ought" of Duty is the assertion by the rational self of its own authoritative rank as contrasted with all that belongs to the empirical ego, the assertion of its own sovereign pre-eminence over the impulses and inclinations of the sensuous side of our nature. And since Reason has here to do, so to speak, with itself—to determine its own life, to make its own maxim the principle of its action—it requires nothing but what is capable of being fulfilled, the *sollen* implies *können*. Accordingly, the ideal of Reason, which in the sphere of theoretical knowledge took the form of faith or trust makes itself felt in practice as an unconditional command, a categorical imperative. The realization of the good will is neither a merit that calls for praise nor a means to gratification as a reward; respect or reverence for a self-imposed law is the one feeling that accompanies it. Hence Kant was the strong opponent of all *Trinkgeldmoral*, which is ready and willing enough to perform the virtuous deed, and then holds out its hand in the hope that *some* little consideration in the shape of pleasure may fall to its lot, and the merciless critic no less of that *Tugendeitelkeit*, which prides itself upon having prudently chosen the better part and upon having won real bliss thereby.

There should now be no difficulty in seeing why Kant assigned what he called the primacy to Reason in its attitude or function as practical. For only in respect to practice or conduct does it, in his view, become absolutely impossible for any reflective mind to interpret Self-consciousness after the fashion of objective fact. In theoretical experience the Ideas of Reason suggest the possibility of the orderly systematic laws of phenomena being ways in which a spiritual or noumenal reality appears to us, but in the sphere of conduct this possibility gains the additional evidence needed to convert it into assured certainty. Reason in relation to practice brings before us in very vivid fashion a mode of being transcending the limited sphere of the categories, and only from what there is given in the sphere of practice can anything definite be concluded as to the further determination of the world of spiritual reality. Kant never wavered in regard to the supreme importance of Reason in the universe of being. We think, and must think, the ends prescribed by Reason to be the dominating factors in the realm of intelligible reality. The chief end prescribed by Reason in its practical aspect, the subordination,

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namely, of the sensuous side of our nature to the requirements of morality, postulates as the conditions of its fulfilment the immortality of the soul, positive freedom of will, and the existence of an intelligent ground of both. What, then, the theoretical Reason in that it is weak through its dependence upon sense could not do becomes possible for the moral consciousness which is not so dependent. Instead of the bare idea of the permanence of a thinking substance, it offers us the practical and rational certainty of the unbroken continuance of the individual's self-conscious life as progressively realizing the moral law. Instead of the contradictory notion of the phenomenal world as complete in itself, it offers us the practical guarantee of freedom in self-determination, and with it of man's citizenship in the spiritual kingdom. Instead of the mere conception of an absolute Being whose existence could not be proved, it offers us the practical warrant of the reality of a Mind that is morally perfect and in and through whom the harmonizing of the spheres of sense and of Reason is secured. Thus the *Kritik of Practical Reason* expands and gives concreteness to the abstract conception of Reason as Self-determining which alone had remained from the analysis of theoretical knowledge.

Reconciliation of the two spheres, those of necessity and freedom, which seemed at first so disparate, Kant came to recognize as incumbent upon philosophical reflexion, owing to the circumstance that the ideals of Reason have to be realized in the phenomenal world. And in the third *Kritik*, the *Kritik of Judgement* (*Urteilstkraft*), he faced and wrestled with this final question: What conception are we compelled to form of nature, if it is to be regarded as the field of action, the field of development, for conscious subjects with moral and spiritual ideals? It was through means of the notion of the *adaptation* of empirical fact to the ends of Reason, through the notion, in other words, of purpose or design in nature, that he attempted to span the gulf between the two worlds previously kept apart and to solve the problem in which his researches so far had culminated. In two specific departments of the natural world he found illustration of the adaptation for which he was in search.

On the one hand, the analysis of aesthetic judgements, judgements asserting that objects are beautiful or that nature is sublime, reveals, he argued, the fact that the opposition of sense and thought can be transcended, if not in knowledge, yet in feeling. The appreciation of beauty arises in the case of the consciousness of an object in which the particulars of sense are felt, if not known, to be in conformity with the demands of Reason. Such judgements rest, it is true, upon subjective experience, and yet we unhesitatingly claim for them universality and objective validity. Beauty would seem to be for us the realization in the phenomenal world, and as if by free grace, of an idea that cannot be verified in knowledge, the spiritual breaking

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through, as it were, the impedimenta of sense and giving us an *Ahnung* of what lies beyond. So, again, the sublime in nature indicates the presence of a higher greatness than the materials of nature can hold or express. Thus the starry heavens, which at first by their immeasurable magnitude appal us, come at length to suggest to us the majesty of the unconditional moral law within us, and hence seem to reveal to us something in sympathy with our essential and better self. Consciousness of the beautiful and of the sublime leads us, then, to discern in nature the work of a spirit akin to our own.

On the other hand, still more markedly is the appearance of objective validity in the teleological judgements we pass on certain phenomena of outer nature. Our world is the home of organic life; and, in regard to organic beings, we seem compelled to resort to the category of purpose. We find in them a mode of growth wholly unlike the only mode of growth compatible with mechanical principles, the addition, namely, of part to part. We find in them, again, a mode of structure not in the least resembling such an aggregate of components as is exemplified in inorganic things, for the whole and the parts of an organism appear to stand in a position of mutual dependence and reciprocal determination. In interpreting the existence and growth of organic beings, we inevitably, therefore, bring to our aid the conception of causality according to ends, a conception of causality in which the parts do not determine the whole but the whole the parts, in which the *idea* of the whole is antecedent to the existence of the parts.

We cannot, however, stop here. In our judgements in respect to organisms there is and must be a perfectly general principle involved. Otherwise the possibility of passing such judgements in this special case would be inexplicable. And this general principle is none other than the idea of the structure of nature as being *adapted to Reason or Intelligence*. The employment of the teleological principle with respect to organisms suggests, and indeed compels, the extension of it to the world as a whole, and more especially to the entire sphere of human life. When, however, we fashion to ourselves the idea of the intelligibility of nature in its contingent particulars, we must of necessity take such idea to be that of a determination of the particular by an Understanding wherein the particular, for us contingent, is a necessary expression of its universal principles. Thus, the more concrete expression of the idea of the intelligibility of nature, of end in nature, is the idea of an *intuitive Understanding*, an Understanding that produces the particulars in and through the representation of the whole. So far as the sphere of theoretical knowledge is concerned, the idea of such an understanding is of no more avail than the regulative principles of Reason, of which, indeed, it may be said to be a concrete expression. Moreover, in the sphere of theoretical cognition it can

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never be possible to regard any one part of what is known as itself constituting an absolute end. But in the sphere of practice a final end is presented. Man, not as a natural product, but as the bearer of the moral law, is a final end, a final end not merely in respect to nature where such a conception is, indeed, foreign, but in the whole system of intelligible reality. An ethical teleology, according to which the entire system of real fact is adapted to the attainment on the part of human beings of the life of goodness, may be said, therefore, to be the final form of the Kantian metaphysics. "The world," Kant averred, "must be represented as having originated from an Idea if it is to harmonize with that use of Reason without which we should hold ourselves unworthy of Reason, namely, the moral use, which rests entirely on the idea of the Supreme Good."

Even from an account of the critical philosophy so meagre as the foregoing it is apparent that divergent principles come to light at different stages in the development of the system. Taken as a whole these divergent lines of reflexion exhibit a suspicious tendency to fall asunder, and not seldom the devices to which Kant had recourse for the purpose of holding them together present the aspect of being strained and artificial. Thus, it is not surprising that various antagonistic streams of metaphysical speculation found their starting-point and many of the arguments by which they were supported in the Kantian philosophy. By following out the central thought of Kant's theory of knowledge and the path suggested by his treatment of Reason and of the idea of end or purpose, his immediate successors reached a view of existence as dependent in its entirety upon one ultimate ground or principle of Self-consciousness, the view characteristic of Post-Kantian idealism (Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel). Again, in so far as stress was laid in the Kantian philosophy upon the necessity of assuming things-in-themselves, as real entities which were the causes of sense-impressions, it prepared the way for that form of realism which was subsequently developed by Herbart. Once more, the primacy attributed by Kant to the practical Reason led by a series of easy stages to the metaphysical theory of Schopenhauer of the Will as the ultimate reality.

I should like, however, in conclusion, to revert to the considerations which induced Kant to describe the world of things-in-themselves as a *complement* making up with the world of phenomena what we may call the world of intelligible existence. As the Kantian *Kritik* proceeds, and stage by stage the supreme significance of Reason or Self-consciousness in the structure of reality as a whole is brought to light, it becomes clear, I think, that Kant had offered no sufficient ground for maintaining that the expression just used, a complement to the world of phenomena, is either accurate or justifiable. In developing his conception of Self-consciousness, Kant

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himself effectively disposed of the view that the realm of phenomena and the realm of things-in-themselves form two parts of the world of existence, the term "existence" being applied in the same sense to each. It would have been truer to his own mode of interpreting reality had he said that in the strict meaning of the term "existence" the world of phenomena does *not* exist. For he made it abundantly evident that phenomena cannot be regarded as separate independent entities, that they can be no more than the orderly connected ways in which reality is apprehended by a finite mind under the restrictions of sense-intuition. The reality of a phenomenon certainly, therefore, did not indicate for him *existence* of that phenomenon in the ultimate sense; it indicated rather the orderly connexion of one part of the experience of a thinking mind with other parts. This conclusion, however, having been reached, we can readily see how easy it was for Kant to fall into the habit of treating the world of experience after the fashion of a resultant, produced by the intercourse of two entirely unknown entities—on the one hand, the unknown things-in-themselves which are other than the mind and, on the other hand, the equally unknown thing-in-itself which is the mind. And then it followed, by an inevitable inference, that ultimate reality eludes knowledge, that real being can be affirmed only in so far as a ground of explanation for the limited and finite character of knowledge must be sought. Yet, by the help of such a supposition, the finite and limited character of knowledge cannot itself be regarded as connected in any vital or integral fashion with the ultimate nature of existence, but only as in some inexplicable and mysterious way following from it. In short, the conception of things-in-themselves which thus emerges evinces its untenability in face of the following dilemma. If things-in-themselves are in no way connected with things as known and do not enter into the same system with them, the assumption of their existence aids us not at all in solving the problem of the possibility of knowledge; if they are in any way connected with things as known and do enter into the same system with them, it cannot be legitimate to deny to them the relations, the connexions, which would render them possible facts of knowledge for a self-conscious subject. Kant's own criticism itself affords, that is to say, sufficient warrant for refusing to recognize the possibility of any realm of the Unknowable, however unhesitatingly it has to be admitted that vast regions are to us unknown.

THE PARADOXES OF KANT'S ETHICS

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NOBODY interested in philosophy need be deterred by Kant's reputation for difficulty from familiarizing himself with his ethics. While the *Critique of Pure Reason* and his other non-ethical works are very hard to follow, the first two chapters of the *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals*¹ at least are clear and straightforward and presuppose little previous acquaintance with philosophy. The third chapter is not about ethics as such but about the metaphysical problem of freedom and should be omitted by anyone who is not familiar with Kant's general philosophy, but the first two give a fairly complete though outline account of his main ethical principles and can be grasped by themselves as a whole. The difficulty the reader will feel is not so much in understanding what Kant says as in understanding why he says it. I wish to help him with this and show what case can be made out for the two main ethical doctrines of Kant which are most likely to strike him as repellent. Now, while any reader who is not prejudiced in favour of naturalism or hedonism will probably see that Kant has something very important to say at least about one side of our moral experience, it must be admitted that there is no great moral philosopher whom it is so easy to criticize as Kant. To point out obvious objections to his central ethical doctrines does not seem to be beyond the capacity of even a third-class student. This is due, I think, partly to the fact that his ethics is very much out of harmony with the spirit of the present day, though this is not *necessarily* an objection to Kant, and partly to his very laconic way of stating the fundamental principles of his system. He does not say enough to make it clear how he would have answered objections, and consequently in considering them we have to guess what he would have said or think for ourselves how his words might be interpreted so as to

¹ This should be distinguished from the *Metaphysic of Morals*, which is a more detailed ethical treatise but is much less important and not often read. The *Critique of Practical Judgment*, while giving Kant's ethical principles, has as its main object the connection of Kant's ethics with the rest of his philosophy and presupposes the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant's *Theory of Ethics* by Abbott consists of a translation of the *Fundamental Principles* . . . and the *Critique of the Practical Reason* in full besides some selections from other works. The best criticisms of Kant's ethics that I know are to be found in chapters in Rashdall, *Theory of Good and Evil*, vol. i, and Broad, *Five Types of Ethical Theory*.

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escape them. For I think that it is, in dealing with a great philosopher, always better, if possible, to interpret his words in a way which will make them seem defensible rather than in a way which will make them seem simply foolish. Unless we have conclusive reasons for supposing that Kant made a fool of himself, it is surely more likely that he has not done so than that he has, and he should therefore, if possible, be interpreted accordingly. I shall go on this principle in the present article.

The two most characteristic and startling doctrines of Kant are his view that the rightness of an action is to be determined *a priori* irrespective of its consequences and his denial of value to all actions that are motivated by desire. I am no adherent of Kant on these points and incline to a very different theory of ethics from his, but I wish to give him a fair run for his money. As a preliminary I must first mention one other point briefly. People sometimes think of Kant as holding the view that the good will is the only thing good otherwise than as a mere means. But this is not true, for Kant did regard pleasure as good otherwise than as a means. What he refused to admit was that pleasure was good unconditionally, i.e. under all circumstances. According to him the pleasure of a bad man is bad, not good, but the pleasure of a good man is good irrespective of its consequences. It is better even according to Kant that a good man should enjoy himself than that he should not, even if he were annihilated next moment and his enjoyment produced no appreciable good effect. This makes pleasure good otherwise than as a means, but it does not make it unconditionally good, for it can only be good if the man who enjoys it is morally good. Consequently for Kant there are always two goods, the good will, which is unconditionally good, and pleasure, which is good only when it accompanies the former. He does not admit any other good and expressly denies any difference in value according to quality between different pleasures. The doctrines that pleasure is only good if it is enjoyed by a morally good man (an assumption which will seem less plausible to many people when it is pointed out that it implies the retributive theory of punishment) and that there are no other goods besides pleasure and the good will are not proved, but then no assertions about what is good-in-itself can be. What is good-in-itself is a question to be answered ultimately by intuitive insight rather than by argument.

Now, to return to the first of the two doctrines of Kant mentioned at the beginning of the previous paragraph, we must not exaggerate Kant's attitude. There is no need to suppose that he meant that empirical facts should never be considered at all in deciding what is right. He insists that empirical objects must not be "the condition" or "determining-ground" of a moral law, but this is not to deny that

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empirical knowledge is required to carry out the law. It is plain in the first place that, if the major premiss—all lies are wrong—is *a priori*, we must, before we can act on it, have given in experience the minor premiss—this is (or would be) a lie. Further it is incredible that Kant can have failed to realize that detailed empirical knowledge may be required in order to carry out the principle, e.g., to discover the best way of telling the truth so as to make it clear to the individual to whom it is our duty to tell it. With two of the moral laws (categorical imperatives) he gives—develop our talents and help those in need—it is still more obvious that if they are to be applied effectively much empirical knowledge is necessary. We must consider consequences then according to Kant, but only up to a point. We must consider the effect of our truthful words on the state of mind of the person to whom we speak them so far as to determine whether they really will make the truth clear to him, but not so far as to determine whether they will give him and others more pleasure than pain. What we must not do according to Kant is base the general principle forbidding us to tell lies on empirical grounds, such as the bad consequences of lying, or to make exceptions to the law in particular cases on the ground that to tell a lie in this or that special case will produce more good than evil. It is thus only the general law and not its particular applications which according to Kant can be seen to be independent of consequences and *a priori*.

Kant's attitude on this point may be traced to the following causes: (1) For Kant the only things which are intrinsically good are the good will and, in a lesser degree and subordinate position, pleasure, provided it is deserved by the person who enjoys it. Now the good will is not a consequence but something inherent in the act. Kant's morality, therefore, could only have been based on consequences if he had been prepared to be a hedonist.

(2) Moral action cannot, according to Kant, be determined by empirical cases because otherwise it would not be free. But the only non-empirical cause is the consciousness of a law *a priori*, therefore it must be determined by that. (This ground for Kant's view cannot be adequately appreciated without knowledge of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.)

(3) We seem, sometimes at least—I am afraid Kant implies "always," which is quite untenable—to know with certainty, and not merely to have a probable opinion, that an act is right; but if its rightness or wrongness were to be judged by its consequences we could, owing to our lack of ability to foretell the future, never be quite certain of this.

(4) Experience can only tell us what is, but ethics deals with what ought to be; and this is unfortunately often very different from what is, therefore ethics cannot be empirical.

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(5) We are conscious of the moral law as carrying with it an absolute, unconditional necessity, therefore it cannot depend on particular circumstances or even on features common to all men but not to all possible rational beings.

From the supposed *a priori* nature of ethics various others of the fundamental doctrines of Kant would seem to follow. An *a priori* proposition, it seems, must be universal; if it is necessary *a priori* that *S* should be *P*, it is impossible that it could be sometimes not-*P*. Therefore Kant concluded that moral laws must be universal and must not admit of exceptions in particular cases. Just as it is inadmissible to say $5 + 7$ usually $= 12$, but in this case I had better suppose that they $= 13$ because otherwise my accounts will not balance, Kant would insist that it is inadmissible to say—It is usually wrong to tell lies, but in this particular case I shall do more good than harm by telling a lie, therefore I had better lie. Further, an *a priori* principle must be such that its truth or falsehood is capable of being seen without reference to empirical circumstances, and therefore a moral law would seem to be in the same position and cannot depend for its validity on the empirical fact that its observance is likely to produce good consequences. Further, an *a priori* principle would seem to be one the denial of which was self-contradictory,¹ and to show this would seem to be the only way of proving it if it is not self-evident but requires proof. So Kant's main test for showing the wrongness of different kinds of acts is by showing that they express a self-contradictory principle. Thus by a series of plausible steps we seem to be led to a position like Kant's. I do not think myself that we can stop there, or that the arguments given are all indisputably valid, but I hope I have said sufficient to show that Kant's doctrine of universal *a priori* moral laws is not merely gratuitous but has something to be said in its favour. I think myself that Kant was right in holding that universal *a priori* propositions are presupposed in all ethical judgment, but wrong as to the nature of the former. He thought they were propositions to the effect that a certain kind of act is right under all circumstances, but this has been generally rejected by other moral philosophers, I think rightly. The alternative is to hold that the universal *a priori* propositions are either propositions about what is good, or propositions about *prima facie* obligations in Ross's sense (e.g., that we are always under an obligation to keep a promise although this may be occasionally outweighed by a stronger obligation) or both.

¹ Kant admitted exceptions to this in the theoretical sphere with his synthetic *a priori* principles, but they can only be synthetic according to his philosophy because they are dependent on the forms of sensible intuition, space and time, and they are therefore not completely *a priori* in the sense in which the principles of ethics are. There is nothing analogous to these in his ethics.

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Kant's principal means of testing whether an act is right or wrong is by asking if one could without inconsistency will the universal application of the maxim on which it is based. In the *Grundlegung* (Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals) he claims to show by this method that it is wrong to commit suicide when life has become more painful than pleasant, wrong to make promises which you do not intend to keep, wrong to neglect to develop your talents, and wrong to refuse help to those in need of it.¹ In each case he contends that, while we may will these wrong acts ourselves if we are immoral, we could not will that such a principle should be universalized. The method has been much criticized, and I should agree with the criticisms in so far as they show that Kant did not succeed in demonstrating the presence of a contradiction in any of these wrong principles such that it would be logically impossible for a race to exist in which they were applied universally. This is, however, entirely a new point. Kant only claims to find such a contradiction in the first two of the four wrong principles, i.e. the principle of committing suicide as soon as we can see that the remainder of life is likely to yield a surplus of pain over pleasure and the principle of making promises whenever it suits our interests without intending to keep them. He does not even attempt to do so in the case of the last two, neglect to develop one's own talents and neglect to help other people. The reason he gives why these actions are wrong is not that the principles cannot be *thought* as holding universally but that they cannot be *willed* to hold universally, as "such a will would contradict itself."² Now I think that this distinction is very important and that Kant would have made out a much stronger case if he had confined himself to saying in all four instances that *willing* the law to hold universally would contradict itself and had not added in the first two that it was self-contradictory even to think them to hold universally. A race in which people lied and made false promises whenever they thought it suited their interests is perfectly thinkable and might well continue to exist, though in an unsatisfactory condition, but to will that such a principle should be universally practised might still be said to be self-contradictory in the sense of being *a purpose which tended to its own defeat*. For if everybody lied the liar would not be believed and therefore he could not consistently will that his principle should be universalized, though he may well enough will to make an exception in his own case. It has been objected against Kant that many right principles such as—help the destitute—would, if universalized, likewise be self-contradictory, since there would then be no destitute people left to help, but this is to overlook a fundamental difference between the two cases. A man who helps the destitute could

¹ Abbott, *Kant's Theory of Ethics*, p. 39 ff.

² *Ibid.*, p. 41.

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universalize his principle without inconsistency because, if there were as a result no destitute people left to help, this would only mean that his purpose had been completely fulfilled; but the liar could not thus universalize his principle for, if as a result, there could be no more lies because they would not be believed, his purpose would be thwarted, not fulfilled. The liar is pursuing a policy which may or may not be successful in securing his individual ends (Kant leaves this point open here), but which if universalized would be self-defeating and therefore could not be universalized consistently. No doubt a particular man might hope that, even if his principle were universalized, he would be able to lie more plausibly than other people, and so still gain the advantage, but this could not apply to all liars, and the universalization of the principle would at least *tend*, other things being equal, to its own defeat, while the universalization of the principle of helping the destitute would tend to the success of the purpose of the men who embraced this principle and not to its defeat.

I cannot see that the argument which Kant chooses to show the wrongness of suicide is more than a sophistry. Both Rashdall¹ and Field² give a wrong account of the grounds for Kant's condemnation of suicide in the *Grundlegung*, saying that his reason is that, if everybody committed suicide, there would be nobody left to commit it and therefore the principle could not be universalized. Kant's real argument³ is more subtle. It is as follows: If I commit suicide in order to escape pain I am acting out of self-love. But the object of self-love is to further life. Therefore it is self-contradictory to kill oneself out of self-love. The argument seems to depend on an ambiguous use of self-love to mean the desire for pleasure and aversion to pain in the first premiss and the desire to preserve life in the second. It also covers only the case of a man who commits suicide on hedonistic grounds. Kant therefore fails to justify the prohibition of suicide as an independent principle. No doubt it could in most cases be brought under the principle of not refusing your help to a world which needs it, but this would not enable one to rule out euthanasia *a priori*, as Kant would have liked to do, since it would be very difficult to forbid the suicide of many hopeless and suffering invalids under this principle.

I think, however, that a case can be made for Kant's treatment of the other two principles. Kant says that the man who refuses to help those in need is acting on a principle which, if universalized, would defeat its own end, since it would deprive him of the chance of being helped by others and there is no man who can be certain that he will not sometimes need this help. He has refused to give

¹ *Theory of Good and Evil*, pp. 114-115.

² *Moral Theory*, p. 24. ³ Abbott, p. 39.

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because he prefers his own comfort and pleasure, but his own comfort and pleasure are liable to depend on or at least to be greatly influenced by the uncovenanted kindness of others. We should not interpret Kant so narrowly as to limit his meaning to financial help, and, in fact, while everybody does not need "charity" in the financial sense, everybody, however prosperous, does need kindness from others in the ordinary intercourse of life. It has been objected that this account bases the rule on consequences after all and even on selfish expediency, so that Kant contradicts his own principles; but there is a fundamental difference between giving something because we expect we shall be repaid for that particular gift ourselves and giving it because we realize that it is unfair not to give when we know that we should not wish to be ourselves debarred from the hope of receiving any kindness from others. A man who sends a cheque to a particular charity is usually not at all likely to be helped later on by that particular charity himself or to gain help from any other source because of that cheque, but it remains true that one of the reasons why, if he can afford it, he should give money for charitable purposes is because he would wish others to help him if he needed their help, and therefore in all consistency he ought also to help others who need his help. To appeal to the consequences of the hypothetical practice of the general rule is not to appeal to the consequences of the particular act itself. It would be a morally worthless act if I gave only because I thought I could get back more for myself by giving, but it is not morally worthless if I give because I realize that it is inconsistent to expect kindness from others and yet refuse to show it to others myself. Now this is certainly *one* of the reasons why it is a duty to help others, though Kant, I must admit, is wrong in speaking as though it were the only one.

It has been objected against Kant that there are people who would prefer to suffer want themselves rather than to have their pride offended by being helped by somebody else, and that such people might therefore cheerfully will the universalization of the principle that one should give no help to others. But while there seem to be people who would rather starve than apply to the Poor Law, it is extremely doubtful whether there are any who would wish to be cut off from all possibility of kindness on the part of others, though they might say they did without really meaning it. And, even if there be such people, Kant could say that, though they willed the universalization of the wrong principle, they willed it inconsistently. For they would will it either for the sake of their own happiness or out of pride. But the universalization of the principle would certainly be detrimental to their chances of happiness and would hinder rather than promote the attainment of

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anything for which they could legitimately feel pride. Therefore in either case the principle they willed would tend to its own defeat if universalized.

The argument for the principle that we ought to develop our own talents is stated as though it were simply that a man's talents are useful to himself in general, but it is capable of the same development as in the case of the principle that we ought to help others. A man who neglects to develop his capacities does so usually in order to secure enjoyment and ease, but if this principle had been applied universally it would have meant less, not more, enjoyment and ease for humanity as a whole and for the man himself as an individual. We should have had, e.g., no labour-saving inventions. The policy, if universalized, would have again therefore defeated the very purpose for which it was adopted by the individual.

It cannot be contended that Kant has justified all his categorical imperatives in this way, but then he only puts these forward as examples of his method. But it is at least arguable that in general all wrong action expresses a self-defeating principle because, while a particular wrong act may gain its end, the principle on which it is based could not be made universal without conducing to the defeat of this very end. We must not say that the particular wrong act will necessarily interfere with the satisfaction of the doer and that therefore he ought not to do it—in that case we are advocating a selfish morality which is altogether opposed to the spirit of Kant—but we may say consistently with his spirit that the reason why we ought not to do it is because *if universalized* it would have that effect. The wrong act may be conducive to the man's own happiness,—apart from theological postulates such as Kant makes elsewhere about a future life—but it is the expression of a principle which could not be applied in all cases without defeating itself, and therefore it is a principle which it is impossible to apply impartially without destroying any reason that could be given for its application.

Kant has thus, I think, found a characteristic which belongs to all wrong acts and which gives one of the reasons why the acts in question ought not to be performed, namely, a certain inconsistency which reveals itself if the principle is universalized. In this he expresses one important aspect of ethics which has been worked out by writers like Paton. But it is not the only side. One of the reasons why I ought to help those in distress is that, if I were in distress myself I should need the help of others, and I am therefore not acting fairly in refusing to them what I should expect from them myself if the positions were reversed. But surely another reason is simply that it produces good or at least lessens their pain (an evil). It *may* indeed still be the case that the first reason is ultimately

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reducible to the second and that the only reason why we ought to act fairly is because on the whole it will produce the greatest good, but it is clear that the second reason cannot be reduced to the first. There is clearly some obligation to remove evils that we can remove just because they are evil and for no other reason.

In the second place Kant has not given a strict proof that any of the acts of which he speaks are wrong. All he has done is to advance considerations that would be likely to make a man who is not a complete ethical sceptic see better that and why these acts are wrong. We may add that this is in any case probably all that a philosopher can do. Kant himself vacillates between the view that ethical principles are capable of formal logical proof and the view that they are self-evident, and I doubt whether he intended to give a proof with his last two examples, though he did with his first two. To me it seems clear that no strict proof of Kant's kind is possible in either case, and this for the following reasons:

(1) It does not follow because the universal performance of a certain kind of act would be *inconsistent* or even *logically impossible* that to do it in any case or indeed in all cases would be *morally wrong*. The notion of moral necessity (obligation) is not deducible from that of logical necessity, nor the notion of moral badness from that of logical inconsistency. They are quite different concepts, and Kant provides no intermediate links to bridge the gulf between them. Even granted that it would defeat my purpose if everybody did what I do, why should I not do it all the same if it suits my end, knowing that in fact everybody else will not do it? Indeed, why should it be immoral even for everybody to do it always? It would fail to give them what they wanted, but Kant would be the last to wish to derive obligation from desire. Even if it were logically impossible, that would not make it or any attempt at approximation to it immoral.

(2) We might succeed in showing that the universalization of a principle would be inconsistent with the fulfilment of the desires which lead people to practise it, but that would not trouble anybody who asserted the principle as a categorical and not only as a hypothetical imperative. Kant can show that the universal practice of lying would be inconsistent with the attainment of the ends normally thought to be secured by lying, but if anybody maintained that it was a "categorical imperative," a duty for its own sake, to tell lies, as Kant said it was to tell the truth, this would not trouble him. In fact, I suppose nobody would maintain this, but the logical possibility of it is sufficient to show that Kant has not succeeded in his proof. The principle of telling the truth for its own sake is consistent in a way in which the principle of telling lies to suit one's particular ends is not, but how can we show that the principle of

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telling the truth for its own sake is more consistent than the principle of lying for its own sake would be?

(3) While Kant intends his argument to be *a priori* and independent of human psychology, it really in each case assumes certain empirical facts about human nature. Universal lying would not defeat its own end if it were not an empirical fact that human beings tended to disbelieve assertions when they had already been deceived or knew others to have been deceived. The principle of not helping others would likewise not be self-defeating if it were not for the empirical fact that there is nobody whatever who can count on never having any use for the kindness of others. But, though Kant has not *proved* the rightness or wrongness of any acts, he has advanced considerations which help us to see better why they are right or wrong.

Further, I am not prepared to agree with Kant that the laws in question admit of no exception, still less that we (in the strictest sense) know this to be the case. It is not, indeed, desirable to think very much about the possibility of exceptions, since the great majority of people are far more likely to sin through departing from truth when they ought not to do so than through failing to depart from it in the very rare cases when they ought to do so. But I cannot hold, as Kant does, that it would be wrong to tell a murderer a lie in order to save his victim, and still less can it be admitted that *all* duties are capable of being brought under the heading of fairly simple universal laws which allow of no exception. If we are to retain universality and certainty for the moral laws, we must make an amendment which Kant would not have countenanced and say that they are not absolute duties but *prima facie* duties in the sense in which the term is used by Ross.¹ It may be sometimes right to tell a lie, e.g., in order to save life, but we could still say that it was always a *prima facie* duty not to lie, meaning that it was an absolute duty unless overridden by a more binding moral claim. Whether even the *prima facie* duties are not themselves always dependent on some good to be realized or some evil to be averted is a very difficult question.

One difficulty about Kant's method is to decide what exactly it is we are to universalize in a given case. If *A* wishes to marry *B* he certainly could not consistently will that everybody else should do so, but this would hardly make the action of marrying *B* wrong. It is obvious that, if we ask Kant's question, we must ask it about something more general than that. On the other hand, it cannot be made completely general, or it would provide no clue at all as to what is right or wrong in a particular case. But what degree of generality is required? I could not consistently will that everybody should devote his working life to philosophizing, because in that case

¹ *The Right and the Good*, p. 19 ff.

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we should all starve, including myself, but it does not follow that it is wrong of me to do so. Yet can we say that the principle—philosophize all one's working life—is less general logically than the principles about lying and suicide? No doubt there are fewer people with whom the question arises, but this merely numerical point cannot be the point of difference which brings it about that the impossibility of willing the universalization of the principle is in one case an argument showing that the act is wrong, and in the other case quite compatible with its rightness. Kant might reply that the question of philosophizing fell under the more ultimate one of developing one's talents, the universalization of which is not self-contradictory, but he does not say how we are to tell when we have reached an ultimate principle. So, though Kant's criterion is no doubt sometimes very useful, there are certainly difficulties about its application.

Let us now turn to the second question which I expressed my intention of discussing, the question of the value or non-value of actions which are motivated by some desire and not by "respect for the moral law." It is sometimes said that Kant supposed we could and ought to perform moral acts without having any desire to do so; but this, though strictly accurate, is misleading, since Kant says that such acts are performed out of "respect for the moral law," and this "respect for the moral law," though sharply differentiated from other desires, is regarded by him as being analogous to a desire in so far as it can serve as a motive for action. It really makes very little difference whether we describe the tendency to find satisfaction in doing one's duty as a desire, and then add, as we should have to do in any case, that it is different from other desires, or we deny, like Kant, that it is a desire and then add that it is something analogous to desire. But it remains a paradox that value is ascribed only to actions motivated by respect for the moral law and not to actions motivated by a so-called higher desire, especially love. A distinction ought, however, to be drawn between (1) acting because of such a desire, and (2) merely acting in accordance with the desire, and I am not sure whether Kant meant to exclude all value from the latter or only from the former actions.

Now for the position that there is no value, or at least no moral value, in action from such a desire a good case can be made out. If I do something merely because I desire, say, the advance of knowledge or another person's welfare, this, though it would be generally held to be a case of a higher as opposed to a lower desire, cannot give my action moral value. For, if I act merely from a particular desire, however "high," I am wantonly taking the risk that my act may be wrong since I cannot be certain that the acts to which any particular desire prompts me will coincide with the

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right ones. Even if they do coincide and the act is externally right, I cannot claim any merit for this, any more than I can when an act prompted by a selfish desire is thus in accord with the general good. For, since I am acting simply from desire without asking about what is right, this coincidence is a mere accident. If my motive is only a desire without reference to the moral law, it might rather seem that I was morally to blame for taking the risk that my act might be wrong. If I do something merely because I want to without considering whether it is right or wrong, am I not definitely guilty of immorality whether it does in fact turn out right or wrong?

Nevertheless, despite these arguments, most people feel that somebody who was always thinking of the moral law and consciously applying it to all his everyday choices would be more likely to be a prig than a saint and that the action of a man who sacrifices himself from love without thinking of the moral law at all may have a great deal of value. The answer to this difficulty seems to be that we are sometimes justified in acting from desire and *taking it for granted* that what we do if we choose the best means to the end set by the desire will be morally right. Thus I have a certain desire to teach philosophy effectively and it is while engaged in my teaching work almost always morally right for me to do what will most further the end of that desire. I can almost always take for granted that if, when teaching, I act from this desire to the best of my ability, I shall be doing what is morally right, also I know that to ask further in detail about each particular step I take to that end—say, each sentence in a lecture—whether it is also for the greatest good in general and does not conflict with any other moral law would be useless and would prevent my doing my work effectively by wasting time and distracting my attention from the pursuit of the end which I can take for granted I ought to pursue here. The reason is simply that the act which is best fitted to promote this end will only in very rare cases clash with other ends of superior importance, and it is fortunately quite possible to take this for granted without thinking about it in almost all cases and yet make an exception in case of a real conflict, e.g., interrupt a lesson to save life. No doubt, if there is a conflict between the desire in question and another desire such as the desire to save trouble or perhaps the desire to make others believe that I am teaching effectively, it is desirable that one's moral consciousness should intervene in order to turn the scale in favour of the first desire. The moral man need not be always thinking about the moral law but may simply follow his desires as long as he is justified in taking it for granted that the acts prompted by the desire will be in accord with the moral law. This taking for granted is done at his peril, but the risk must be taken, because if he always asked explicitly about every act, whether

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it was an exception or not he would probably make more mistakes and certainly get very much less work done. Kant himself reprimands the person who is always asking whether his acts correspond to the moral law in trivial cases; yet, of course, in proportion as a man is morally good he will be less likely to overlook real exceptions.

It would not necessarily follow from this that actions done simply from, e.g., love had any *intrinsic* value. Most people would, however, say that they had, and I should agree with them. But, granted that they have value, have they *moral* value? Perhaps it may be objected that this is only a question of terminology, but there may be and, I should say, clearly are different species of intrinsic value, and it might be contended that Kant had given a perfectly correct account of moral value and merely erred in forgetting that there were other kinds of non-hedonistic value and so identifying this very important species of value with all values (excepting the case of a good man's pleasure, which Kant holds also to be good in a non-instrumental sense). There certainly seems to me to be something quite specific about the nature of moral value as described by Kant sufficient to justify us in making it a separate species distinct from other kinds. It is also true that if a person possesses this kind of value he is in a fair way to attain himself and produce for other people the remaining kinds also, as far as physical obstacles permit, a circumstance which gives it a special importance. Also besides being instrumentally the most important, it is intrinsically the highest in some important sense of the term.

Further, while we may perhaps refuse to ascribe "moral value" to any action which is not due to the moral motive, we need not suppose that the latter must necessarily take the form of respect for an abstract universal law. It may take this form, as it did in Kant, but it may also take the form of a desire to produce good, not any particular sort of good but all goods in proportion to their relative values, or it may take the form of what McDougall calls the self-regarding sentiment, the desire to be the sort of man I could respect; or, again, in a religious man it may take the form of love of a righteous God. To limit the moral motive to respect for the moral law as described by Kant would be to say that a person who thinks in terms of a moral theory conflicting with Kant's, or has not the same kind of psychology as Kant, cannot be moral. Even if thinking of morality in one of the ways I have just mentioned should turn out on analysis to presuppose a wrong theory of ethics, we must not therefore conclude that people who thought in that way were not moral, and I do not suppose Kant really meant to draw this conclusion himself. I am only warning the reader against a possible inference from his words. No doubt to each of the motives I have mentioned in their genuine and desirable form

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there corresponds one or more spurious forms, e.g., the desire not to be the sort of man that could be respected but rather actually to be respected by myself and others (egotism¹), or the desire to do God's will for fear of being punished if I do not. Neither do I commit myself to the view that all these motives, or rather all these different forms taken by the moral motive, are of equal value.

There remains the question of the value of an action which accords with the agent's strongest desire at the time but is not done wholly from that desire but partly at least out of respect for the moral law. By "strongest desire" I do not mean the desire which prevails but the desire which is felt most strongly at the time. In this sense of "strongest" it is certainly not an *a priori* necessary proposition that I must always act from the strongest desire. People have confused the tautology that I can only act from the desire which prevails with the synthetic and not in the least necessary proposition that I can only act from the desire which I feel most keenly, and have consequently raised quite unnecessary difficulties. There is no more difficulty in denying that there is a causal law according to which my actions are invariably determined by or correspond to the felt keenness of desire than in denying any other causal proposition the denial of which is warranted by experience. Now, suppose the moral motive happens to be accompanied by another desire which will also be fulfilled by acting morally, and suppose this other desire is felt more strongly at the time than any conflicting desire. Does the action possess no moral value in that case, or is its value diminished? It is not quite clear what answer Kant would give to this question. It is generally assumed by critics that he would hold the moral value of the action to be at least diminished, but I am not quite sure that this is so. He certainly commits himself to the view that we cannot in such cases tell whether the action has moral value or not,² either when it is another's or even when it is our own action that we are judging; but this might be simply because we could never know in these cases whether the moral motive would have been sufficient to lead to the act without the other desire, and it need not preclude some such actions in accordance with desire from really having moral value, though we could not tell of any particular actual one whether it had it or not. Nor need it necessarily preclude them even from having the same degree of moral value as they would have had if the desire had not been present, provided only the moral motive was sufficiently strong for it to be the case that it would have produced action even in the absence of that other desire. This is one possible interpretation of Kant's words.

But, even if we ascribe to him the extreme view that such actions never have any moral value at all, he might make quite a good case

¹ Leon, *Ethics of Power*.

² E.g. Abbott, p. 13.

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for himself on the basis of common-sense ethics by contending that it cannot be a mark of any special merit to do just what one wants most of all to do. On that view moral value would belong only to actions against the strongest desire—(not to actions prompted by no desire, for there are no such actions,¹ unless we, like Kant, refuse to class the moral motive as a desire). And I should certainly accept the more moderate view that, other things being equal, the moral value of an action is increased if it is done against the agent's strongest desire. We do admire a man more for an action in which he has to overcome a really strong temptation than we should if he had not felt the temptation, though we may in some cases think the worse of his previous acts because he has lived in such a way as to make himself liable to this temptation, and it seems to me that this admiration is perfectly justified. The action of a man who on moral grounds refused to give false witness against somebody else without having any motive to do the opposite would, though morally impeccable, have little or no positive intrinsic value; but, if he were threatened with the rack by a tyrant for not doing so, if he were implored by his parents, wife, and children to yield because the tyrant had threatened otherwise to wreak vengeance on them, if all his friends were persuaded by lies that he was really to blame himself for the punishment which befell him so that he was completely disgraced in the eyes of the world as the result of his morality, and yet he persisted in doing his duty, the moral value of his action would surely be greatly increased. We should no doubt deplore the state of things as a whole most gravely, involving as it would both moral evil on the part of the tyrant and great suffering on the part of others, but, if we took the victim's action by itself and assessed its moral value, we should have to give it a very high rank indeed, while the action of a man who told the truth because he thought it right, when there was no temptation not to do so, would not deserve any special praise whatever. Indeed, it might be doubted not only whether it had much intrinsic value but whether it had any at all. To take another case, I know that I ought to pay, say, 2d. for a bus ticket if I use the bus, and I pay automatically without any conflict against a desire to evade payment. Has my action any intrinsic value at all? I doubt it. Yet if I were a child brought up with scanty pocket-money in a home where honesty was regarded rather lightly, and paying the 2d. meant going without a bun or not having enough money to go to the pictures, there might be considerable moral value in the act of payment just because there was a strong temptation not to perform it. Almost everybody performs countless similar actions for which they could not claim

¹ Excepting purely habitual behaviour, and I should not call cases of this "action."

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any moral value but which would have great moral value if they were done in spite of a strong desire for something incompatible with them. It might be objected that in the cases where the actions have no moral value they are done merely from habit and not because they are right. No doubt this would apply, e.g., to most cases in which I pay for bus tickets, but as I have chosen this example it is quite likely that the next time I pay for one I shall remember it and be consciously aware that I morally ought to pay the money, so that the cause of my paying in that case will be not habit but the awareness that it is right. But will this give my action of paying moral value? I doubt it.

It would seem from these examples that an action has no moral value unless there is a temptation not to do it, i.e. unless there is some felt desire which conflicts with it, though other felt desires may support it. This seems perhaps extreme, but it may be defended if we take account of the following points.

(a) I should not go so far as to say that for the action to have moral value it must necessarily be opposed to our strongest desire, only that there must be some felt desire which is in conflict with the performance of it. No doubt if the desire opposing it is actually stronger, i.e. felt more keenly, than the desire or desires in its favour, the moral value of the act will be increased, but this is not, I think, a necessary condition of its having any moral value whatever.

(b) We need not, like Kant, make moral value the only value other than pleasure. The acts in question may be allowed some intrinsic value but not this specific kind of value. Love for another person could still be intrinsically good, but it would be a different species of good from moral value. In that case the assertion perhaps amounts to no more than this, that actions done out of the moral motive in face of a conflicting desire have a specifically different kind of value from any belonging to other acts or to anything else in the universe.

(c) It is a recognized objection against Kant's view that if a man acts morally for long enough the conflict with desire is apt to cease or at least become very much less marked. Thus we are led to the paradoxical result that continued moral action would destroy moral value. Kant would reply that, if moral perfection does imply this, no human being at any rate can attain moral perfection. But further it may be doubted whether even moral perfection would necessarily imply this. It would certainly imply the absence of any intrinsically evil desires like malice, but most derelictions of duty are due not to intrinsically evil but to indifferent desires, which might be felt even by a morally perfect being. It is not a necessary consequence of the notion of a morally perfect being that such a being should like to be roasted alive or even to suffer minor pains, yet it might

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be his duty to expose himself to the pains. Further, it might be the duty of such a being sometimes to give pain to others, for their own or the general good, and his very goodness would make him dislike that. No doubt a man who has, e.g., been addicted too much to drink and reforms himself to such an extent that he is no longer even tempted by it will thereby lose his ability to show moral value in abstaining from drink, but he will have ample opportunity of showing moral value at a higher level in other actions.

It would not even matter very much to a theist if he were forced to admit that, since God is perfect, the acts of God could not have moral value in this sense. He might still say, as Kant did, that what shows itself in us as moral value, shows itself in a far higher but different form in God (the "holy will"), though we cannot know what this is like. It is only reasonable to suppose that the kinds of value which a perfect being would possess would be different from any within the range of such imperfect beings as ourselves. It is indeed essential to a theism capable of giving any religious satisfaction worth having that God's actions should be good and should conform to the moral principles we see to be true, but, while this would imply that God is aware of those same moral principles which we really see to be true, and acts on them in so far as they can be relevant to his actions, his experience in being thus aware of them and in acting on them would not need to be very like ours and so might exhibit quite different kinds of values.

(d) We must distinguish between an action being against the agent's desire and an action being against his interests in the sense of his own greatest happiness. We all want at times very much to do things which are clearly against our own interests. The belief that it will do him harm in the long run if he neglects a certain piece of work or if he vents his anger does not automatically stop a man from desiring to do these things more than he at the time desires the later good which he will forfeit by doing them now. Now Kant certainly holds that, if an action is in the agent's interests but yet conflicts with his desire, the action can still have moral value. In fact, he holds that the world is so ordered that all right actions will be ultimately to the interest of the agent, in a future life if not in this. Only he holds that they must not be done from this motive, if they are to have moral value.

Kant's views are therefore, if not above criticism, at any rate not so unwarranted as they appear at first sight, and I shall have achieved my object if the reader is led to feel that the study of Kant's ethics may be useful at least as an antidote and supplement to the opposite tendencies of the present time.

IS POLITICAL ACTIVITY UNDER A DIFFERENT LAW FROM THAT OF PERSONAL ETHICS?

HILDA D. OAKELEY, D.LIT.

IN the course of his discussion of the work of the Disarmament Commission, in his book on the League of Nations, Sir Alfred Zimmern asks why the British people were so active in sponsoring disarmament. The question arises because, as he points out, the project must evoke proposals in regard to security which they were in no mood to consider. "The explanation," he proceeds, "no doubt is that the eventuality, however obvious it may seem in retrospect, was overlooked in the enthusiasm for what had become for a certain type of British opinion a moral crusade, rather than a realistic political procedure." Why must the two kinds of practical movement thus indicated be radically distinguished and even opposed in their aims and outcome? Why should the "realistic political procedure" show nothing of the spirit which enters into "a moral crusade," with the result that many have justified what would be regarded as crimes before the bar of ethics, because they were committed for political ends?

The main purpose of this article is to consider whether philosophy has been able to throw much light on this problem, whether by showing grounds for the distinction involved between the ethical significance of conduct in spheres described respectively as public and private or by disclosing confusions of thought which lie behind it.

I

In order to make clear the exact issue on which an appeal lies to philosophy, some preliminary analysis seems required. The question which meets us at once may be stated in the following way—Is it a true view of the case, to say that the individual has a different conscience in his capacity as private individual and in that of statesman or of citizen judging the action of the statesman? If this were granted there would arise the further question—Is this difference one of degree, or of the height of the moral standard recognized in the two cases? Or is it a difference of kind, such that a man may be said to pass into another moral order where political action is concerned, or even as the implied opposition suggests, into an order not moral, but outside morality? A modification of the

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second alternative might be formulated in the following way. Granted that the individual must in all circumstances stand under the moral law, there arise in various special fields of conduct further principles of action relative to that field. There may be even contingencies in which the rule or form of practice required may be incapable of rigid subsumption under the generally recognized principles of ethics. There are, for instance, professional codes in which, though the universal characters of right and wrong do not change places, the balance or relation between the cardinal virtues may change. The subordination of the gentler or typically Christian virtues to the sterner qualities may reach the point of a rejection of the Christian requirement. Or in the code of business ethics a less rigid adherence to strict veracity is regarded as permissible. The case of the soldier's rule of conduct in war raises problems of too large and distinctive a character to be included in the scope of this article. If it be allowed that there do exist professional codes affecting ethics in some degree, it must further—as may be argued—be admitted that this holds good above all, and in a more unquestionable sense, in the political sphere. On examination of the question—on what grounds can such distinctions be based, the following aspects of the political career emerge. Even without appealing to psychology, experience and certain common assumptions of ordinary life suggest that in some situations and kinds of activity the individual exhibits a self or personality which is not revealed in the normal procedure of his private life. The political life would show the more extreme form of this modification which at times is almost transformation of the self in a particular environment or set of claims. For instance, the individual who is timid in private life, may show cool courage in a responsible position. The basis for the putting on of this new self would be of much greater weight than in the professional type of case already referred to. In this light the individual is, *qua* moral agent, a person of another kind in his political function. In the capacity of statesman, to take the standard case, he stands for his people or nation, and a new moral situation comes into existence for him. There are two great aspects of his sphere of duties in this position, that of his official relations with the people as community, and that of the interrelations between the community or society with other such societies. For the purposes of the illustration, whilst recognizing that the representative of the state may be either an individual or a number of individuals associated as a government, to simplify the problem we may here assume as typical the statesman as individual or the political life in an individual. As we fix our attention on the significance of the first aspect of his functions a truth becomes clear which is by no means always recognized in regard to the public character of any individual who assumes duties

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on behalf of and affecting the interests of the community in general. The law he is under in his public capacity, far from being lower in its standard than that of private life, is intrinsically higher in that it demands a still greater moral energy, in a field for the most part beset with greater difficulties and where vaster human ends are posited. It appears then that in the court of ethics, it must in the nature of the case be required of political action as the action of the individual or individuals entrusted above others with care for the interests and well-being of the community, that it is guided by the highest principles. This which may seem paradoxical on account of the low esteem, at least in some countries and periods in which the political office is held, yet follows logically from the meaning of the political function. The paradox in fact lies not in the ideal view, but in the degradation of the meaning. When Aristotle declared that if the perfectly wise and beneficent individual were found we could not refuse to make him king, he was referring to despotic rule. But his idea gives symbolic expression to the ideal character and justification of the political office. Without reflecting on the subject in this way the modern community in its normal condition, may be seen to imply such a view in its attitude towards the legislation of its representative assembly, the work of administrative departments, etc. The individuals *qua* acting for the public institutions are assumed to be disinterestedly aiming at the best. Criticism and attack proceed on the assumption that anything else would show them to be false to their office. The true and accepted idea then of the activity of the state within the nation is that it should express the highest value in public action. The organization exists in Aristotle's phrase for the sake of good life. The politician is not excused for falling below this standard, because the temptations of the love of power have for the most part much greater force here than in private life. It is not taken as an excuse for decay of friendship, if as Mr. Lloyd George¹ observes, the political life and rivalries are particularly liable to estrange friends. Nor are those conditions of party politics which are so often deplored intrinsically essential to the exercise of the political function. These facts may be so, but they do not establish the view that the political life requires a different ethical code, or again to quote Aristotle, that "it is perhaps not the same thing to be a good man and to be a good citizen." It is when we turn to the other main division of the political activity, viz. its direction to the relations of the society as "state" with other such societies, that the situation is evident which is inherently responsible for the belief that political ethics, if it is not a contradiction in terms, demands different standards from those of private ethics. It is of course clear that this sphere of action cannot be

¹ In his *Memoirs*.

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completely separated from political activities within the state, and that the outlook in "foreign affairs" may have a deleterious influence on that of the home department. But the lowering of standards which at times comes about in the field of party-politics and elsewhere, whilst excuses for it may be forthcoming, is generally recognized as an infringement of moral principles, or a clouding of the moral atmosphere. The ideal remains, and is honoured even in the breach. It is otherwise in the case of the principles guiding the statesman in international procedure. Here there is not only failure to behave in accordance with the principles of inter-personal ethics, but that this is the appropriate and inevitable state of affairs in respect to the relations between states is defended by a weighty body of argument. These relations, it is asserted, cannot be under the moral law for individuals as such. The questions that here arise lead directly to considerations of a definitely philosophical character. There confronts us at once that of the being of the state. If there is such a genuine entity, by what ethical principles should its behaviour be guided? What is the moral position of the statesman who acts for his country? And what is the relation of the individuals constituting the community, who must under democratic constitutions at least, be held also to be concerned in its policy to that organization of the state which is their face and form towards the outside world? It must in passing be noticed that non-democratic nations cannot truly be excluded from the implications of this question since however difficult the situation of their peoples, they must in the end be held responsible for the constitution under which they live. I think that there are two very distinct views one or other of which may be seen to be implied in the usual standpoints in regard to this question. Either the relations between states are not yet or only very imperfectly conditioned by moral principles, there is no recognized morality in this province. States lag ethically far behind individuals. Only the rudiments of international ethics exist. Or political morality has a different basis from private morals. The standards are different and the motives of the agents. It is other in quality rather than lower in degree. Any moral duty of the state towards other states in so far as such exists is wholly subordinate to its duty to its own people. Thus arises the view usually known by the name of its greatest modern exponent, though in Thucydides' account of the debate of the Athenians with the conquered Melians, Machiavellianism already raised its head. F. S. Oliver amongst recent writers considers the statesman's duty from a Machiavellian standpoint.¹ The love of power and patriotism are declared by him to be the dominating motives of the statesman. The same type of conduct which is vice in private life, may be duty on the public

¹ *A Political Testament.*

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stage. Oliver quotes with evident approval Montaigne's observation: "In every government there are necessary offices which are not only base but wicked. Wickedness finds a place there and is employed in sewing us together, as poison is used for the preservation of our health." Private interest is not worth a great strain upon our conscience, but public interest certainly. Oliver himself writes with contempt of men who are so faint-hearted that they will not sin for their country. Bismarck is his outstanding example of the great-hearted in this respect. In regard to his responsibility for the war of 1870, the treachery which made it appear that France was the real aggressor: "Would not any statesman have rejoiced to do so signal a service to his country by whatever injustice and wrong?" We may here reflect that the mills of history grind exceedingly slow, but have they not ground out for Germany a fatal harvest of Bismarck's wrong? "The laws of the hive," proceeds Oliver, "differ from those that regulate the conduct of human beings one to another, not so much in being less under the rule of conscience as in owing their fealty to a different kind of conscience." This kind he seems to regard as higher. Here there is some confusion in the adoption of the principle that the interests of the whole are superior to those of any member, since the whole is greater and of higher value. Where this principle is accepted by pure ethics, as in Stoicism, the service of the whole nearest to us logically leads on to the service of greater wholes, all humanity, the cosmos. The principle has no limits. But the standard of hive morality which seems to find some favour to-day, applies to a narrowly limited whole and is a degradation of human ideals. It appeals to the lowest instead of the highest idea of the living whole.

II

From the beginning of political philosophy the question whether the state is an ethical institution has been, whether openly or by implication, a critical issue. Plato whose *Republic* has been regarded by a long succession of students as a fountain-head of moral idealism does not, when we make the effort to think free from the philosophic tradition, speak to us with so certain a voice as we had imagined ourselves to hear. At the outset his close analogy between state and individual demands scrutiny. Identical principles are to secure the completely well-ordered life for both. Reason has the same authority, courage the same strength, temperance or reverence a closely similar relation. Above all, justice,¹ the most essential quality in the relations of men and classes, is also as Plato curiously argues the essential virtue within the individual giving order to the baser

¹ "The doing of one's true work."

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elements of human nature. The manifestation of the good is everywhere for Plato the form of order. Order, the law of the universe, is law also in the soul, and the state in its perfect harmony is image of the eternal good. Yet if this state were realized, would it be more than a second or third best? From the outset it is founded on a "noble lie." The men who believed that they were composed of inferior metal would not be "class-conscious." The idea that perfection is in the whole is so ruthlessly carried out that to the best men, the philosophers is assigned an impoverished life, without freedom, home, or the consolations of philosophy to any extent until age releases them. Aristotle will not sacrifice his best man. Let the latter contemplate truth, apart from the world in glorious self-sufficiency.¹ For this is possible, but the best state (as the major part of his *Politics* testifies) is not possible. Is Plato's political ideal that of a man who knows human nature too well in Athens and Syracuse, or even in the Academy, to suppose that true freedom can be won except by the very few? His state must be always "laid up in heaven," and for us it is a beautiful myth, accompanied by bulwarks of profound philosophy and poetic genius. The greatest value of the myth is in its symbolism of order in the soul. This is ethically beautiful because it is a personal unity. The identical type of order is not ethically beautiful in the state because its unity is not of the personal type, since its different elements or classes are collections of different persons. Here there can be no ethical principle without freedom. It is noteworthy that the question of international morality is hardly touched by Plato and then only in respect to the interrelations of the Greek city states. Modern philosophical attempts to conceive the state as a real being, a kind of super-person, have fallen into greater contradictions than that of Plato, partly no doubt because it is impossible to put forward a consistent philosophy of the state in the modern world, which ignores, or does not give full value to the existence of many states. The outstanding example is the Hegelian state which has influenced many thinkers and directly or indirectly some men of action. Hegel's state, the expression of reason based on logic, is a paradox of extreme form. It seems logically incontrovertible that if we appeal to the principle of universality as the reason and basis of the state, the principle invoked must take us beyond the limits of particular societies, whether cities, nations, or empires to the most universal community of rational beings, that of all humanity. The particular state is not the creation or product of reason. It is the creature of history, objectively viewed, and since there is no *a priori* reason that human society should take this form and empirical evidence cannot prove its universality, it is not impossible that history will leave it behind. That the Hegelian

¹ *Ethics*, X, vii.

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state is not based on essentially rational principles is evident from the fact that any one Hegelian state must deny the value of other states. This is partly obscured by the method which appears to assume that there is only one true state—"The state," as such. "Hegel's views in regard to war," it has been said, "result with absolute logic from his doctrine of the state. If the state is truly the highest expression of the spirit, perfect crystallization of morality—the real God, it is evident that nothing ought to affect its sovereignty. Now war is the highest affirmation of the sovereignty of a people—the moment in which it attains its ideal unity."¹ If war is necessary, then other states are necessary, for Hegel does not argue that the opposing societies, lacking true statehood are rebels against the true state. But the result is that reason is at conflict with itself, in its different manifestations. It may be said that it is the gratuitous assumption that war is "the moment in which a people attains its ideal unity" which causes this paradox in Hegel's doctrine. But the chief source of the fallacy is the attempt to base the idea of the state on principles of logic. If the idea and institution of the state can receive a philosophical justification, it can only be in the sphere of ethics. The state is a construct of history, an institution brought into being by historic forces, and a category for historic knowledge. Now history itself, as something more than the natural history of the human species in its struggle for life with nature and other species, and the struggle of different races with each other, is an ideal creation of the human mind through the meaning or value-significance given to the process of events. This meaning is given by men in the course of the struggle from the first awakening of the sense of humanity, continually gaining in depth and elaboration, pervaded by fatal errors but from time to time elevated by genius. When history comes to be written the meaning is emphasized and new ideas which both classify and obscure, ennoble and degrade, added by interpretation of memory and record. The content of history, the values and disvalues concerned, are primarily ethical in character, though with advance of culture, written history becomes more and more a department of knowledge, acknowledging only the value of truth. In the most general sense, the state if we seek for it a philosophical basis, must be a construction required by the moral nature of men in the broadest significance, the nature of the practical being working under the influence of ideas of good and evil. Such a basis, however, cannot be found for it. It has been built up out of the makeshifts of historic contingency, in the devising of instruments for the preservation of social order, instruments seized by men possessed of the desire for power beyond the average. It has been associated with the community as city or nation, falsely

¹ *Les Doctrines politiques de l'Allemagne*, chap. vi, Hegel. Victor Basch.

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assuming and claiming the historic values on which these groupings rest. The nation is not rightly conceived as a personality though the love of its members for it may approach personal love, for a collection of individuals cannot constitute a person. Less harmless and more irrational is it to personify the nation-state, since this burdens history and politics with the idea of a magnified person as theme of the historian, and master of the statesman, a person of lower moral type than the individual. This is the primary source of the divorce between ethics and politics. The ethical ideal is in the perfection of the relations between persons. This perfection cannot be approached without some insight into the nature and worth of other persons. In that order of practice which is signified and constituted by relations between states, the personality of the individuals who are conceived to make up the states is obscured. Each state stands in the way. Individual members of different states perceive each other as it were through a haze or veil that distorts. This of course only refers to the general effect of the division of peoples into states, or the tendencies of this type of classification. The effect is seldom or never completely realized in fact unless in times of war. The state is the extreme case of what Bergson terms a "closed society." That men should form themselves into groups belongs to the nature of humanity universally, and the group as community has been the basis of high values. The existence of diverse national cultures, and national characters has been a gain in the development of the many-sided genius of the human race. The strength of the bonds which make for union in the case of the group as nation need not prevent it from being an "open" society in Bergson's sense¹ if these bonds are not hardened into principles of division from all other societies in the artificial construction of the state. The state does not as such stand for the ideal history of a society. It is the supreme organization of the society in command of power. It has no ethical being of its own. Non-moral, or at best imperfectly moral in its relations with other states, it cannot present the loftiest moral ideal to its own citizens. Does this mean that a poisonous element is thus introduced into its relations to them? To clear up this point it seems necessary to abandon the myth of the state and remember that however masked in institutional organs, in departmental functioning, in ministerial pronouncements, or in that bizarre parody of a universal intelligence the myriad-voiced words of a single man propagated through space identically for all listeners, there is no mind of the state, no will, but only the personal will, and individual minds. The moral burden of the man who in sincerity acts for the community, is immensely greater than that of the private individual. He feels the pressure of all the diverse

¹ *Les deux sources de la religion et de la morale.*

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opinions of his duty or of the national duty held by the men and women for whom he acts. The ideas of past generations symbolized in institutions have to be taken account of, but it is for the minds of the present to interpret them and give them their value for the present. Yet always as argued above, his action is, in a moral light, bound by the same law as that holding for him as private individual. There can be no political law of right inconsistent with the moral, though in some situations the best action may be only a choice between two evils. The degree of moral value which can be achieved may be very low on account of the wide prevalence of the state myth determining the breaking up of humanity into a number of states regarding themselves as absolute in separateness from each other. It becomes difficult for the agents of the state, in the secondary form of being which truly attaches to it as instrument of the will of all its members to present to the outside world their genuine moral purpose. The claim for the state itself as a superior entity to have a kind of personal being may bring about the confusion or suppression of this purpose.

For these reasons it may seem impossible to apply to political action the principle of any absolute system of ethics, such as Kant's Categorical Imperative. This might perhaps be interpreted by the statesman as admitting of a uniquely individual application. "Act only in accordance with that maxim which thou canst at the same time will to be a universal law." Yes—but as he might feel, the maxim he requires could never be rightly followed in a second case because the situation is once for all. History never repeats itself. If it did the maxim would hold I do not think, however, that Kant's rule truly admits of this way out for exceptions. He postulates universal principles making the lie, the theft, the injustice, the broken promise to be always and everywhere against the moral law. Can it then be argued that a different type of ethical doctrine is appropriate in the political sphere allowing of a broader method of application to the concrete case? The ideal as "Greatest Happiness of the greatest number" for instance, inadequate for personal ethics, may be held to have its true province in political or public ethics, where conscience and motive cannot be inspected as by the individual in his own case. To what other ideals can the statesman look, to hold before parliament, chamber, or congress? The truth seems to be that the chief forms in which the ethical end has been stated in different systems have some value as guides in particular situations. They are abstractions from the concrete forces determining individual action *qua* moral in circumstances more or less widely met with. Bentham's "Greatest Happiness" principle, his fundamental law of morals and legislation seems especially appropriate as a guide to legislation. Aristotle's "Energy of the Soul in accordance with Excellence"

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gives an end higher in quality though narrower in extension. The legislator can aim at the happiness of all. He cannot make them a gift of the soul's excellence. In Aristotle's less exalted sounding conception of *phronesis*, practical reason, or "wisdom of life," as I should translate this pregnant word, it seems that a principle is supplied capable of application universally to every unique call for action. The man who has wisdom of life, the "*phronimos*" brings the results of all his moral experience, his knowledge of life and history, his reverence for the greatest ideals to bear upon the particular call for action. He has a kind of intuition or insight into the moral demands of the case, although he has never met one exactly similar, because of his consistent striving to see life ethically. These are not Aristotle's words, but an interpretation of them. A clue seems to be provided to the statesman's principle of action. No static, unchangeable principle is a sufficient guide without qualification, because no such law can be relevant absolutely in every individual case. The moral activity is dynamic in a dynamic course of events. Where the absolute principle cannot be brought surely to bear because the crisis points to two such principles whose application conflicts in the concrete though in the abstract (as Socrates insists) all virtue is one, there remains the hope that the *phronimos* through insight will discover the highest principle of which the actual situation is capable. It is perhaps a dangerous doctrine and it may be well that all the devotees of absolute principles will turn at such moments upon the statesman who has striven to act in accordance with the wisdom of life and history, and overwhelm him with their scorn. For the ideal must not be forgotten, or trampled in the dust.

As regards the contrast from which this article started, between the moral crusade and the realistic political procedure, the conclusion seems to be that the opposition is not inherent in the nature of politics, but belongs to a profound aberration from that nature, favoured by the many contingencies of history which have fed the love of power in individuals and societies. It would perhaps not be difficult to argue that it is because attempts at a realistic political procedure have continuously followed upon one another in European history that the ends at which statesmen were really aiming have so seldom been attained, or otherwise regarded, that if all peoples were concurrently to engage in moral crusades, these real ends would most easily and unexpectedly be achieved. The appeal to history would supply some evidence in support of this contention, even without adopting the device by which Socrates in Plato's *Gorgias* proves that the tyrant never attains the object of his desire, but attains that which he supposed to be his object. The ethical explanation of the corrupting influence of what should be the

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highest type of activity lies, as I believe, in the very nature of personality whose intrinsic tendency to transcend limiting conditions, easily degenerates into a striving to attain power. Hence the paradox of the *corruptio optimi pessima*. This is still more far-reaching than Plato revealed. The corruption of the best individual becomes the corruption of the state. The moral evil appears in its most gigantic proportions in the political, since it is the tragedy of all history.



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PROFESSOR D. T. JACK

IN a recent article in *Philosophy* (April, 1936) Professor Knox makes a plea for a philosophic treatment of economic activity by way of contrast to either the specialized study of economic history or of economic science. The conclusion which was reached was embodied in the statement that "the historical and scientific methods of the study of economic activity leave incompletely satisfied the curiosity of *students*, and reach results which need special interpretation before they can be useful to politicians, let alone to *business men*" (p. 159). Each of these methods is said to involve unreal abstractions which detract from the usefulness of the study. A philosophic approach, on the other hand, is required to (a) promote the investigation itself, (b) add to its usefulness in application, and (c) complete the study of philosophy as concerned with the whole of experience. It is possible to be in general sympathy with the broad conclusion reached by Professor Knox and yet to remain dissatisfied with his method of reaching that conclusion. Moreover, since his concern in the first instance was with the usefulness of economic study to the man of business, it would seem to be necessary to elaborate the manner in which such a philosophic study would increase that particular form of usefulness, and on that point the article in question has surprisingly little to say.

The philosophic parentage of modern economics is well-known; and if the infant has attempted, on reaching maturity, to set up a separate domicile of its own, it has done no more than follow a precedent which had already been established. Among the early Greeks, any discussion of economic problems, slight at the most, was subordinated to considerations of the good life and the perfect state. In the middle ages, economic discussion was subordinated to considerations of ethics and theology. In the eighteenth century, the founders of modern economic investigation—the Physiocrats in France and David Hume and Adam Smith in this country—developed their economic ideas on the basis of larger philosophical systems. And, in the early nineteenth century, even the British classical economists who endeavoured to develop a more scientific treatment of economic problems were directly affected by the assumptions of philosophical utilitarianism, while hedonism has for long exercised a considerable degree of authority over the develop-

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ment of economic theory. The very fact that the study of economics is concerned with an aspect of human conduct makes it impossible to divorce that study at least from certain assumptions of a psychological and ethical character. It is doubtful whether any economist of repute would deny that economic action, being a part of conduct in general, had an ethical aspect at least as regards its end or object. Yet the study of economics has frequently been criticized for its excessive dependence on particular psychological and ethical assumptions. "No one," says Mr. Hawtrey, "would propose to build economics on so shifting a foundation as the theories of moral philosophers";¹ though the same writer recognizes that "every voluntary action in practical life is an essay in applied ethics."

The first problem which arises concerns the advantages and limitations of any attempt to build up a corpus of scientific knowledge with regard to economic problems. The fact that a science of economics must start from certain basic assumptions does not of itself invalidate a scientific approach since every science must proceed along similar lines and the usefulness of science is not therefore destroyed. It is in that way that uniformities or laws are established and the primary concern of the student is with such uniformities. One difficulty which Professor Knox revives is that of formulating uniformities of importance where the forces to be examined are based on human volition. The pliability of human nature as contrasted with the apparent rigidity of the impersonal forces which operate in the external world appears at first to preclude the possibility of arriving at general truths in the social sciences. The difficulty here may easily be overstated. Human nature, despite its varying manifestations, is not devoid of certain definite characteristics which become more pronounced when groups of individuals are examined, and these elements of permanence in the flux of experience are as vital to moral philosophy as they are to any of the social sciences. Without a recognition of these elements of permanence any study of economic problems, whether approached scientifically or philosophically, would be no more than a shapeless catalogue of events. If the difficulty mentioned is a real one it destroys not merely the possibility of a systematic study of economics but also of psychology and of ethics itself.

But the practical validity of any scientific conclusion is governed by the practical validity of the assumptions on which the investigation is based. Formal validity also is governed by initial assumptions, but in this case there is no particular need to examine critically the assumptions which are adopted. Thus it is possible to start from such assumptions as the statement that all men prefer a greater to a lesser satisfaction and to arrive at certain conclusions as to what

¹ Cf. Hawtrey: *The Economic Problem*, p. viii.

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results are likely to follow. These conclusions will be formally valid. Equally one might start from other assumptions such as the statement that all men, being altruists or ascetics, prefer a smaller to a greater satisfaction and arrive at certain conclusions as to what results are likely to follow, and again the conclusions will be formally valid. The character of action will be different in the two cases, just as the moves are different in the orthodox game of draughts and in the unorthodox game of "first off the board." Certain schools of economic thought in their eagerness to attain scientific precision have doubtless exaggerated the search for formal validity by neglecting to examine critically the authority of their basic assumptions. Thus Pantaleoni wrote: "Whether and to what extent the hypothesis of psychological hedonism—from which every economic truth is deduced—is in harmony or at variance with the motives that really determine human actions—either generally, or more particularly as regards the acquisition and disposal of wealth—is not a question that need be solved before we can decide as to the truth or accuracy of the economic theorems that flow from it."¹ In recent years the positive results attained by the so-called mathematical school of economists have been meagre in comparison with the effort expended in pursuing that mode of approach. But this criticism is not applicable to all modern economists. Marshall's remark that "there is no room in economics for long chains of deductive reasoning"² is a timely reminder that something more than formal validity is required in a study which has an aspect of human conduct for its subject-matter.

Thus practical validity, as distinct from formal validity, requires that the economist must be prepared to examine and, if necessary, revise his initial assumptions. But he is not thereby precluded from prosecuting his search for formally valid conclusions. The fact that,

¹ Cf. Pantaleoni: *Pure Economics*, p. 9. In fairness to Pantaleoni, however, it should be mentioned that an attempt is made to justify the assumption of psychological hedonism on the ground that even if altruistic motives governed human conduct the same effects would be produced as those which occur on the assumption of egoism; and "it would probably be convenient to work out the problem relating to it in terms of egoism, just as it is sometimes convenient to invert the signs of an equation in order to solve it" (p. 10). The argument as to the validity of the assumption is in effect that universal altruism neutralizes itself. "Titus, e.g., from altruistic motives, asks much less than the current rate of interest for the capital he lends. In that case, Caius will, from similar motives, feel bound to offer much more than the current rate. Titus is willing to work *gratis* as a labourer, and Caius is constrained by altruism to pay him handsomely. Moreover, in order to realize the maximum altruistic effect, one would have to act in accordance with the most downright egoism."

² Cf. Marshall: *Principles of Economics*, p. 781.

as in Meredith's phrase, "in a high wind a dead leaf will fly like a bird" is no disproof of the law of gravity; nor is the general law of demand as formulated by scientific economists invalidated by the fact that during a period of crisis the amount of a particular demand may be unresponsive to a fall in price. In fact, it is a well-known economic proposition that if there is a general expectation that a further fall in price will occur, as during a period of deflation, the amount of demand may diminish with a fall in price instead of responding in the way suggested by the general law. But first things first. A complex problem must of necessity be broken up if the investigation is to be productive of knowledge. One of the immediate objects of the scientific analysis of forces—of whatever kind—is to discover the ultimate conditions which these forces tend to establish. And in the first instance each force is investigated by itself, on the assumption that its operation is not exposed to interference. The *ceteris paribus* of the theoretical economist reflects not a propensity to evade the issue, nor a simple passion for tidy-mindedness, but rather an anxiety for precision and the avoidance of ambiguity. Professor Knox, however, has in mind an apparent difference between economic laws and the laws of other non-social sciences in so far as it is claimed that the former are alterable while the latter are inexorable. Strictly speaking, of course, it is the forces rather than the laws which appear to be alterable or otherwise. This is reminiscent of John Stuart Mill's suggested distinction, within the sphere of economics itself, between the laws of production which seemed to be akin to physical laws and the laws of distribution which were regarded as social laws and capable of change. But Professor Knox bases his contention as to the alterability of economic laws on the fact of individual freedom of choice so that a generalization as to past experience provides no *a priori* probability as to its future applicability. Surely there is misconception here. The day has long past since it was possible to say that the economist took demand for granted. In his discussion of the problem of value the modern economist has much to say about freedom of choice but he is not called upon to predict what particular desires will be manifested by individuals at some future date, nor to forecast their intensities. Even a philosophical economics, as contemplated by Professor Knox, would be unable to make such predictions, and to that extent presumably would be useless to the man of business. But it is still an appropriate inquiry to consider what implications are attached to a given set of economic desires and what results may be expected to follow from a given change in the character of these desires or in their intensities. It is no part of the business of economics, however treated, to furnish a set of ready-made answers to particular problems which may or may not occur in fact; but it is

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part of its business to indicate how such answers may be obtained given the situations.¹

The advantage of a scientific study of economic problems lies simply in the greater possibility of attaining accurate knowledge by the specialized analysis of a selected field of experience. In this respect there is no significant difference between the scientific study of economic problems and the scientific study of any other group of phenomena. "The physical sciences," wrote Marshall, "made slow progress so long as the brilliant but impatient Greek genius insisted on searching after a single basis for the explanation of all physical phenomena; and their rapid progress in the modern age is due to a breaking up of broad problems into their component parts."² Admittedly, such specialism involves abstraction, but abstraction has its advantages as well as its drawbacks. "A fact," says Professor Schumpeter, "is never exclusively or purely economic; other—and often more important—aspects always exist. Nevertheless, we speak of economic facts in science just as in ordinary life, and with the same right; with the same right, too, with which we may write a history of literature even though the literature of a people is inseparably connected with all the other elements of its existence."³ The very fact of the incompleteness involved in scientific abstraction sharpens its edge as an instrument for the attainment of knowledge.

The legitimacy of a scientific study of economics presupposes the existence of a group of problems with a distinctive character. Such problems arise whenever available resources are limited in supply relatively to the various uses to which they may be put. Thus the fact of scarcity is fundamental even though the degree of scarcity may vary. The same type of situation introduces choice in the allocation of limited resources, and the exercise of choice implies a certain order of preferences.⁴ This volitional action is an essential element in any economic situation. The positive economist, however, is concerned with such activity as a means to an end rather than with the moral legitimacy of the ends themselves. Professor Knox

¹ It would be interesting to know how a philosophic approach to economic study as suggested by Professor Knox would, to take his own example, "help even a politician to decide whether or no to place a tariff on indigo" (p. 158).

² Cf. Marshall: *Principles of Economics*, p. 770.

³ Cf. Schumpeter: *The Theory of Economic Development*, p. 3.

⁴ Modern economic theory has tended more and more to examine the problem of value on the basis of *preferences* as data; preferences being less likely to raise difficulties connected with any particular assumptions as to the ethical or psychological character of desire, and thereby escaping from the earlier dominance of hedonism which persisted in economic terminology after its philosophical implications had been abandoned.

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complains that this "involves abstracting from human conduct as a whole, treating it as behaviour only and not as intention as well. This abstraction in fact reduces action from something that men do to something that happens to them" (p. 155). Such criticism overlooks the fact that the actions of individuals have widespread effects, frequently reaching far beyond the scope of the initial intention, and these effects may have great practical significance. To that extent it cannot be useless to investigate the nature of these effects. Any study which confined itself to an examination of the conscious decisions of individuals would throw little light upon those other results of action which are created by the interactions of a multiplicity of individual decisions. Professor Knox's complaint contains within itself a justification for a positive economic inquiry. The conscious decisions of one set of individuals lead to actions, and these actions are among the things that happen to other individuals.

Professor Knox, however, is more concerned with the frequent neglect of conscious purpose in ordinary discussions of the problem. Thus he refers to the tendency to assume that "prosperity is a matter not of human effort but of economic laws, the outcome of a system of organization or of parliamentary regulation, not something that men create, but something that happens to them, like falling to a stone" (p. 162). If this is a protest against an extreme form of economic fatalism, the criticism may be accepted without demur. But does it not call for some modification or elaboration? For many individuals, prosperity (or adversity) is something that "happens to them, like falling to a stone." The business man has no doubt as to the meaning of "windfall gains and losses"; and many wage-earners may be forgiven if they feel that

Things are in the saddle
And ride mankind.

Systems of organization and parliamentary regulation are not irrelevant to prosperity or adversity. But they remain conditions of prosperity, not causes of it; and they are themselves the results of human action.

Granted the possibility of a positive scientific investigation of economic phenomena, what of its usefulness? This may be considered from the point of view of public policy and from the point of view of business policy.¹ The knowledge of the implications of certain types of public policy cannot be unimportant to the legis-

¹ Incidentally, the description of economic activity as concerned with "buying and selling for profit" (p. 147) even if "interpreted in the widest sense" is surely unhappy and misleading to the untutored mind. Even buying and selling as ordinarily understood do not exhaust economic activity. Neither science nor philosophy stand to gain from so narrow a definition.

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lator. If import duties are to be imposed for revenue or protective purposes the elasticities of demand for the dutiable goods will be relevant in fixing the duties which are to provide the desired result. It is no reply to this to argue that this knowledge may be ignored by that "insidious and crafty animal, vulgarly called a statesman or politician, whose councils are directed by the momentary fluctuations of affairs." Of greater importance is the fact, also recognized by Adam Smith, that economic policy may only be one aspect of public policy so that considerations of economic advantage may be overruled by considerations of another order, as in the famous dictum that "as defence is of much more importance than opulence, the act of navigation is, perhaps, the wisest of all the commercial regulations of England." But if an economic advantage and a political advantage appear to conflict, it cannot be unimportant to understand the magnitude and nature of the economic loss which is involved if the former advantage is sacrificed in an attempt to realize the latter.

Similar considerations are relevant with regard to business policy. The impatience of the business man with the postulates and findings of the theoretical economist proceeds primarily from the fact that the business man is a pragmatist, whereas the chief concern of the scientist and the philosopher is with the truth of the conclusions which are reached. The common idea that there is an unbridgeable gulf between theory and practice completely misses the point. The scientist cannot theorize about nothing; and the business man in executing his policy implies some theory at each and every stage of his conduct. When he alters his methods, he assumes both the possibility and the desirability of a lower cost combination of available resources. When he alters his price policy, he assumes a certain type of response on the part of his customers to that particular change. But it is sufficient for his purpose if his theory "works" in the particular case where it is applied. The apparently irrational element in the business decisions of entrepreneurs of outstanding success—to which Professor Knox draws attention (p. 160)—refers to no more than the place of intuitive judgment in the sphere of economic activity, although why such judgments should be described as illogical is hardly clear except in so far as they do not proceed from conscious syllogisms. Judgments of this type raise no problem for economics that is not raised by intuition in other departments of knowledge and conduct. Certainly theoretical economists have not failed to recognize the importance in fact of special gifts of insight for purposes of business administration, and no one is likely to quarrel with the statement that specialized forms of business training are unlikely to produce more leaders with such natural gifts.¹

¹ Cf. Professor Knox's comments on p. 161. It is not necessary here to produce an apology for instructional curricula for business careers, but some

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The preceding sections of this paper have been concerned primarily with the defence of positive economic investigation against certain attacks to which it has been exposed, and in particular against the notion that the abstraction which is involved in economic science undermines its usefulness. No reason has appeared for endorsing the view that a philosophic as distinct from a scientific approach to economic analysis, as contemplated by Professor Knox, would provide results which would be more acceptable on grounds of usefulness to the legislator or to the man of business. It now remains to consider how far the incompleteness of the scientific approach to economics requires to be supplemented by philosophy.

It has already been indicated that any study which abstracts from within the field of experience must be prepared to subject its assumptions to the critical scrutiny of philosophy, and it is possible for philosophy to make some contribution which will be useful in the further development of the particular scientific investigation. An example may be cited. In the development of the economic theory of value during the last sixty-odd years, emphasis has been laid on the importance of demand; and demand, among other things, appears to express a desire for satisfaction. Moreover, the general law of demand has been based upon the conception of diminishing utility, and in the treatment of this aspect of the problem the tendency has been to regard desires as independent entities and as ultimate data. Thus even Marshall remarks that "there is an endless variety of wants, but there is a limit to each separate want. This familiar and fundamental tendency of human nature may be stated in the *law of saliable wants* or *of diminishing utility* thus: The total utility of a thing to anyone (that is, the total pleasure or other benefit it yields him) increases with every increase in his stock of it, but not as fast as his stock increases."¹ This assumption may be convenient at a certain stage of the investigation, but it raises wider issues which are of philosophical importance, and it is possible that some modification of the assumption, as suggested by philosophical scrutiny, may facilitate the further development of the economic theory of value. Clearly, the various desires of an individual are not independent entities: they are atomic only in abstraction. As the desires of an individual they constitute a unity or system, and in terms of personality it is the system of desires which is important. This conclusion possesses significance for economic theory, because defence is at least possible. The supply of entrepreneurs with outstanding ability is exceedingly scarce and is insufficient to "go round." It may therefore not be inappropriate to train men for business careers even though the ability thus produced is of a lesser order than that displayed by those who are endowed with rare natural qualities which make for outstanding success.

¹ Cf. Marshall: *Principles of Economics*, p. 93.

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the ordinary law of diminishing utility was developed on the basis of the assumed atomic nature of desires, and if the assumption is revised the place of diminishing utility in the economic theory of value may also call for revision. Thus the development of a system of desires may involve increasing as distinct from diminishing utility in relation to particular desires in the system. It may not be the business of economics to examine the active principle in the development of personality, but the unity of personality may provide economics with an assumption which is more appropriate to its own task of analysis.¹

A further consideration may be advanced. Desires have been treated by positive economics as ultimate data and as a-moral. If this assumption is accepted as adequate there can be no *raison d'être* for ethics except as economics under another name. But the assumption is not adequate. Desires are intrinsically subject to change, and cannot in the last resort be statically conceived. Activity, whether economic or not, is therefore not completely considered as concerned with the satisfaction of desires. "Life," says Professor F. H. Knight, "is not fundamentally a striving for ends, for satisfactions, but rather for bases for further striving; desire is more fundamental to conduct than is achievement, or perhaps better, the true achievement is the refinement and elevation of the plane of desire, the cultivation of taste. And . . . all this is true to the *person acting*, not simply to the outsider, philosophizing after the event."² This is perhaps an overstatement. Activity may be an important element in happiness, but only one among others. Hume's account may be more apposite. "Human happiness, according to the most received notions, seems to consist in three ingredients: action, pleasure, and indolence. And though these ingredients ought to be mixed in different proportions, according to the particular disposition of the person; yet no one ingredient can be entirely wanting, without destroying, in some measure, the relish of the whole composition."³

Nothing has been said in the preceding pages which can be interpreted as denying or even minimizing the dangers which arise from a failure to recognize the limitations of a specialized and abstract analysis. The greatest danger occurs where a specialist in one department of knowledge endeavours to construct a philosophical

¹ The possibility of increasing utility was mentioned casually by Marshall in a footnote. Later it was incorporated in an article by Professor Chapman in the *Economic Journal*. It was developed more fully philosophically and economically by Professor W. R. Scott in *Is Increasing Utility Possible?* Further reference may be made to the recent work of Mr. A. L. Macfie, *An Essay on the Nature of Economy and Value*.

² Cf. Knight: *The Ethics of Competition*, p. 23.

³ Cf. Hume: *Essays*, vol. 1, p. 266.

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system on the basis of his own particular set of abstractions. There can be no ultimacy about science. The methods of science are such that any particular science is inherently disqualified from resolving ultimate problems by itself. Physicists, chemists, biologists, and astronomers are frequently convicted on the charge of failing to recognize the philosophical limitations of their own advances. And it is equally possible for the scientific economist to commit similar error. The frequent tendency to construct a system of metaphysics on the basis of the assumptions and results obtained in a physical science can have as its counterpart the attempt to construct a theory of the final nature of society on the assumptions and results of a particular social science. "It is," says Professor Stout, "a leap in the dark to assume that what science can for its own purpose ignore, does not really exist."¹

One aspect of this conclusion remains to be considered. Conscious human activity is by its very nature moral. Philosophers have had little difficulty in demonstrating that the question "Why should I be moral?" is an irrational question. A modern economist has emphasized in another direction this aspect of man's effort. "It is not life that he strives for, but the good life, or at the ultimate minimum a decent life, which is a conventional, cultural concept, and for this he will throw away life itself; he will have that or nothing. He has similar physical requirements with the animals, but has become so "particular" as to their mode of gratification that the form dominates the substance. A life in which bare existence is the end is *intolerable* to him. When his artificial, cultural values are in ultimate conflict with physical needs, he rather typically chooses the former, sacrificing quantity of life to quality, and it is hard to see how he could be prevented from so doing."² Wordsworth's sonnet which begins, "The world is too much with us" does not deny the predominance of cultural values, but merely criticizes the particular set of cultural values in authority.

Surely this means that positive economics must be harmonized with normative ethics, not in the sense that the two are prevented

¹ Cf. Stout: *Mind and Matter*, p. 143. It may be suggested that economists have a better record in this respect than other scientists. This in turn may not be unconnected with the interesting observation that in this country at least most of the leading economists have been trained in philosophy—outstanding examples being Adam Smith, the Mills, Jevons, Sidgwick, Marshall, Pigou, and Keynes; for a training in philosophy should enable the economist to recognize more clearly the limits to his own investigation. In this respect, Professor Knox's plea for a philosophical approach to economics may be entirely endorsed.

² Cf. Knight: *The Ethics of Competition*, pp. 27-8. As Professor Knight adds: "It is of interest that the conduct which men denounce by calling it 'bestial' (in the field of sex and elsewhere) is typically of a sort in which the 'beasts' never indulge."

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from conflicting with one another,¹ but in the sense that they form aspects of the one reality? And an important step can be taken in that direction by regarding economy itself as a value, and as an ingredient in the moral life. If ethics and economics are ultimately distinct, a problem is raised to which no solution is possible without denying the existence either of the one or of the other. But positive economics, useful though it may be in its allotted sphere, is incomplete without a normative economics to supplement the investigation. The problem here has much philosophical interest and importance. Moral philosophers in the past have frequently appeared to fail to come to grips with the ethical problems which arise in ordinary life, and if the man of affairs has been impatient with the scientific economist, he has been no less impatient with the moral philosopher. May it not be that the moral philosopher has on occasion been guilty of abstraction while failing to recognize the limitations of such a method?²

It may therefore be suggested that there exists a field of investigation which is concerned with that territory in which the economic problem merges into the ethical problem and where no sharp distinction between the two is recognized apart from purposes of abstract analysis. The exploration of such territory may be justified for two reasons: (a) that all economic conduct has an ethical reference, and (b) that economy has some claim to be regarded as a value and therefore as falling within the scope of ethical inquiry. The first of these is obvious enough, and calls for no further comment. The second is less apparent, and is frequently ignored.³ Instead of regarding economy as an unfortunate necessity imposed upon man by the parsimony of nature, it may with greater significance be regarded as an aspect of the good life which man seeks to attain, however varied and wayward his attempts in that direction may appear.

¹ Thus Professor Robbins in his *Nature and Significance of Economic Science*, p. 132, speaks of economics and ethics as existing on different planes of discourse. This may make it possible to avoid any conflict between them, but only by a deliberate evasion of the issue.

² It would perhaps not be unfair to remark that to the majority of moral philosophers, the modern development of the economic theory of value has remained a closed book. Dr. Inge, indeed, remarks: "The use of the word value in economics will not be any help to us, though it has been discussed at perhaps unnecessary length by some recent writers on the idea of value" (cf. *God and the Astronomers*, p. 179). But there is nothing in the text which either supports this conclusion or even indicates what the modern theory of value in economics is. On the basis of this view, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that ethics and economics must remain ultimately apart—a conclusion which is clearly intellectually unsatisfactory. Professor Laird, in his *Idea of Value*, is an example of a philosopher who has endeavoured to take account of the contribution of marginal analysis in the theory of economics.

³ The elaboration of this idea has been strikingly worked out in Mr. Macfie's *Essay on the Nature of Economy and Value*.

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Certain aspects of this last consideration may be indicated. In any view of the moral life which recognizes the need to effect some reconciliation between particular virtues which are in apparent conflict, some principle of organization is required, as in the Platonic conceptions of justice and temperance. In real life, as ordinarily experienced, there is no such thing as an isolated value, and in speculative thought isolated values are conceived only in abstraction. From this point of view, conflict is to be regarded not merely in the sense of active opposition—as when “good” encounters “evil”—but as including disharmonies within a system—as when there are excesses and deficiencies of particular “goods”—with active opposition as the extreme or limiting case. Such disharmonies may in turn be related to the dynamic element in the activity which seeks new satisfaction by resolving presently experienced conflicts. Thus the consciousness of disharmony particularizes itself in the form of desires whose satisfaction appears to remove the immediate disharmony which is their occasion.

In so far as these disharmonies within the system of personality imply scarcity and choice, there appears to be no fundamental difference between the problem thus created in the sphere of ethics and the problem which arises in the more restricted sphere which is investigated by positive economics. The economic principle—expressed by positive economics as the realization of equi-marginal satisfactions as the condition of maximum satisfaction from given resources—has its counterpart in the sphere of ethics, so that economy appears as an ingredient in the moral life. But for this purpose it is necessary to break away from the popularly conceived notion of economy as a negative “doing without”—the idea which is stressed during “economy campaigns.” Similarly, is it necessary to think of economy as something more than the structural or architectonic principle which is emphasized in positive economics, even though that is much in advance of the popular conception of the term. The claims of economy to recognition as a direct source of satisfaction have to be examined. Here the appeal to experience is suggestive, for there is no department of human activity in which a given result is not more pleasing when attained with “efficiency” than when attended by “waste.” The apparent difficulty that economy must always remain as an instrument rather than as an objective arises from an overdrawn distinction between means and end. If the moral life can be conceived statically with definite objective ends, the means of attaining these ends may perhaps be capable of clear distinction. But when the moral life is regarded in its dynamic aspect the distinction becomes blurred. The realization of values at one stage is but the means towards the recognition of higher values which may still be attained. What are regarded as “means” may be more

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fittingly described as ends statically conceived, or as ends of a lower order. More important to philosophy than the distinction between means and ends is the notion of a developing system of personality within which values have their appropriate places.' "The values which we experience are members of a system, a system which we have to create and keep in order."¹

The broad conclusion of the argument may therefore be stated in general terms. The ethical and economic problems which are distinguished in real life are essentially dynamic problems which can be regarded statically only for purposes of analytical convenience. Moreover, the distinction between the ethical and the economic spheres of reference is also a convenience which is both useful and important at a certain stage of the investigation, but it has no ultimate justification. The results of positive economics must be re-interpreted in the light of ethics and embodied in a normative economics which involves a larger synthesis. The argument of the present paper has endeavoured to present the view that this larger synthesis can best be promoted not merely by superimposing ethical judgments on the findings of positive economics, but by recognizing economy as itself an ingredient in the moral life, and as one of the values which have to be harmonized in the system of values which expresses the personality of the individual. An investigation into normative economics as thus conceived may claim to be "useful" both to the positive study of economics and to the philosophical study of experience as a whole, and may even be developed in a manner which has significance for "the man of affairs."

¹ Cf. Macfie: *op. cit.*, p. 102. A certain superficial resemblance may appear between the view here outlined and the late Dr. Bosanquet's description of morality as a realm of "claims and conflicting counter-claims" which Professor Taylor has described as a "misrepresentation as grotesque as dangerous" (cf. *The Faith of a Moralist*, vol. I, p. 414). Professor Taylor's criticism, however, is directed against the Bosanquettian doctrine of individual human personality as mere illusion, and he himself insists on what he calls the "relativity of all loyalties except the highest." The co-ordination of loyalties or of values is a problem of practical ethics which constantly confronts the individual in directing his conduct, and the co-ordination which is required is something that cannot be incorporated in any contractual bond. The similarity between the view here advanced and that adopted by Bosanquet is, however, little more than superficial. It has much more in common with the Aristotelian mean.

DISCUSSION

COLOUR: AN ALTERNATIVE STATEMENT

I

In an interesting article in a recent number of *Philosophy* (October 1937) Mr. H. Wallis Chapman examines Colour as one of the commonest illustrations of the universal; and comes to conclusions of a nominalist kind. I desire to propose alternative solutions for the problems he deals with. If my statements seem too dogmatic, or my quotations too brief, the motive is economy of space. I trust that any reader of the present paper will read the whole of Mr. Chapman's.

Mr. Chapman begins by calling attention to the variability of colour. "The colour perceived on any particular occasion is a function of the whole physical situation including the object perceived, the illumination, the medium, and the physical condition of the percipient" (p. 444). What then, shall we say, is an object's real colour? He defines it (447-8) as "the colour seen when the object is viewed by vision of the greatest power of discrimination in circumstances permitting of the greatest discrimination. But this colour is not actually seen, or is seen only by accident. . . . In short, the colour of an object is not perceived, but constructed."

At this point I propose my first, and fundamental, alternative. I take my stand on the fact that our various careful statements ("The object in this light and in these surroundings is bluish"; "As I saw it an hour ago it was almost grey"; etc.) are true statements, and true of the object, and of the object in its aspect as coloured; and that therefore it seems not unfair to say that all these statements (or corresponding statements with some agreed alteration in their wording) shall be taken as true about the object's colour. That is, what we call the real colour shall be, not one particular tint selected from those actually seen or conceivably seen, but something which can appear as each of them and all of them. It shall be a universal whose appearances vary with the situation in which it appears.

Mr. Chapman's real colour (the fixed particular tint) may never be seen, or may be seen only by accident. Mine (the universal) will be seen in every perception of the object, sometimes with a large measure of adequacy (with good eyes under good conditions), sometimes with a very small measure (in the night when all cows are black). No single perception, nor any finite number of perceptions, will allow of complete display, but a few good observations may give us a very fair idea and enable us to forecast others. It is convenient to give to the real colour the same name (green, for instance) that we give to the tints in which under the best conditions it appears. But we must remember that in applying that name to the colour we are applying it to a universal, and must be prepared to say if necessary, "This green, in these surroundings, does not appear as green at all." Instead of giving the short name, we may prefer to give a longer account, and say "The colour is such that in most conditions, and in the best light, it is green, but also such that in the following setting it is bluish and in this other it is grey."

My suggestion is that anything which we pause to study and find out

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about, and designate as "real," will prove itself a universal; or, more accurately, will be caused to exhibit itself in its aspect of being a universal; as an identity which shows itself in different ways with different contacts. "Amongst all these changing moods, which is the real man?" The proper answer is that every mood gives some vision of the real man, though they differ so much in the amount and the importance of what they show of him. Each of these, like each tint which the colour shows, gives some access to the reality. With each meeting, though with some much more than others, our acquaintance improves. As Mr. Chapman well says, "if the object is only seen once, our statement that it has a particular colour is vague and doubtful."

2.

The next question raised in Mr. Chapman's paper is that of the landmarks in our map of colours. "As the geometry of a sphere gives no means for locating any place on it and we must choose a meridian of Greenwich on non-geometrical grounds, so our ordered colour-continuum requires grounds going beyond colour-resemblance for choosing particular regions of it to bear special names. . . . The colour-sensations which group themselves round massive or impressive experiences, the green of the leaves, the blue of the sky, the red of blood, will seem to form natural classes. . . . "Redness" includes the emotional reaction to objects resembling certain typical and important objects; it is by no means a simple term as is sometimes supposed." (450-1). I willingly accept this in principle, and express it by saying that the identity which governs that colour-region is a blend of at least two universals, of which at least one has some emotional importance. A prosaic parallel could be found in the series of integers where the interest of what-one-can-count-on-one's-fingers breaks into equal pieces a procession which might have no break or rhythm in a less practical world; and gives different emotional tones to 7 and to 17. In the first piece of the series pre-eminently the dual universal stands out. "This is what Number-That-We-Can-Handle can do with itself." "These numbers resemble one another not only in being numbers but in being things we can use familiarly and play with."

The nature of resemblance may conveniently be dealt with here. We say that things are similar, I suggest, when (1) they show an identity in spite of their differences, and also (2) the identity to some extent pervades them. A universal which has any practical or emotional importance tends to become pervasive. Names ending in the same letter (unless it were an unusual ending) would hardly be called similar names; but those beginning with the same letter, especially if it is A, do look similar to one another, and dissimilar from names beginning with B, and much more dissimilar from those beginning with W. The A-names are showing not only the same three-line shape at their left-hand extremity, but the universal demand, "Put us near the head of your alphabetical lists," "Deal early with us"; and that universal affects the name as a whole.—Unlikeness as well as likeness rests on identity in difference. Mere disparates are neither like nor unlike, until their disparateness is overcome by our seeing them somehow as the same sort of thing.

Returning to the colour of an object, and the various tints in which, according to the circumstances, it shows itself to us, we may ask, as Mr. Chapman asks in other words (454), whether it ever shows itself twice in exactly the same way;—whether, with the same observer or with another, an experienced tint is ever repeated; or whether two different objects may show on occasion exactly the same tint. Mr. Chapman answers that, in the special case where

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a single observer has two cases simultaneously before him, we must take his word for their identity, but that otherwise we can never be sure. I have no reason to dispute this. "Colour," "shape," "the economic motive," "the scientific study of this problem," "the movement for penal reform,"—all such interesting universals may vary their particulars without end, with each variant a function of its whole situation. We may make mistakes in comparing them;—may discover on further inspection (through renewed perception or through careful remembering) that a difference exists where we thought there was none; between two showings of the same object, or two forms of the economic motive, or two instances of the colour Red. The identity of the universal need not be disturbed by its varying specifications, since that is the way in which a universal is accustomed to exist.

3

I have followed Mr. Chapman in his affirmations of fact (or hope that I have done so), only expressing them in different terms. But when he draws his conclusions I cannot follow him; I lose my footing. In the first place, he feels (454) that the fact which I have described as the blending of universals obliges him to give a nominalist answer to the problem of universals. I cannot see how this follows. A scheme of colour names, as he says, "divides the manifold into a number of regions which are determined . . . by the experience of the imposers of the names in respect of matters other than colour." This will complicate, but surely does not abolish, the identity which displays itself within the region of each name.—In the second place, the fact that colour-memories can be mistaken raises (he considers) great difficulties (455). "These difficulties can be avoided if it is really meaningless to speak of numerical identity or difference between the colours perceived on different occasions, absolute colour having no more significance than absolute position. The fundamental perception will then be, not "This occasion has this or that colour," but "this occasion has more or less colour resemblance to these other occasions." Colour-resemblance will be a specific type of resemblance directly perceived, but as it essentially admits of more and less our former difficulties vanish."—I cannot see this. (a) Error is *sui generis*, and every theory finds some difficulty in rendering into other language the fact that we can make mistakes; but why should mistakes about degrees of resemblance be so much easier to deal with than mistakes about identity? (b) On numerical identity or difference, I may misunderstand his use of the words, but it seems to me that to call them meaningless in this reference (as he proposes) will not suit Mr. Chapman's purpose at all. He needs to be able to say that the colours perceived on different occasions (the perceived tints, as I have called them) *are* numerically different, as much as I need to say that a numerically identical real colour must in different situations appear in these different forms of itself.

I offer now a conjecture which might bridge the gap between us. Mr. Chapman's whole argument is a polemic against false simplicity. With regard to general colour-terms, he has shown that we should lose much of their interest if we tried to squeeze out the emotional shades that are blended with the colours. With regard to specific experienced tints, he has shown that we follow a barren chase if we set store by their unaltered multiplication (454). "There is no appeal from the judgment that two colours seen by the same person at the same moment are the same, but the grounds on which we have come to this conclusion show how little meaning or value it has." He thinks that the two parts of the polemic hang together: (456) "The importance of our

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earlier discussion of colour names is now clear; if they were really simple, as is usually supposed, the theory I have just set forth would be very difficult to maintain, for such simple terms would denote entities of the sort which I have denied; but if 'red,' for example, is a term of extremely complex reference, grounded, not merely in simple perception, but in the whole history of the race, there is no reason why it should denote a simple recurring entity." I cannot follow this link; I don't see why a simple term has a necessary right to recur in experience, nor why a complex one should not have an equal right. But I think that, without depending on each other, both parts of the main argument are sound. Let us reject therefore, as uninteresting if not inapplicable, the conception of an identity which excludes complication and forbids diversity.¹ Absolute colour (says Mr. Chapman) has no more significance than absolute position;—that is, I suppose, there is nothing in either case which can be stated independently of its context. With different situations specified the same object may be described as high or low, dark or light, bluish or greenish; and all the descriptions, with their background understood, will be true.

With the main point we are bound to agree. The only interesting identity is one which can show itself in diverse aspects and behave in diverse ways. Absolute reality, in any sense in which we wish to keep the conception, must be that which we discern as appearing variously but more and more calculably and intelligibly as our knowledge grows. Mr. Chapman's observations ought to lead us, I suggest, to a sane Realism. When you study Colour (he should say), you will find that the reality you are dealing with is complex and appears in varying forms; and so it is with everything to which it is worth while to attend. But to lead us towards this he would have to allow the "real colour" of an object to be a universal, whereas he has previously tied that name to one particular tint out of the whole system of actual and possible particulars;—a tint which may never be seen at all. So in the end, looking for something actually experienced and useful which will maintain identity without difference, he finds nothing except the *name*. But the name itself (I reply), as soon as we attend to it with interested study, will be found to betray us. It may easily never meet us twice with exactly the same sound, or exactly similar marks of black upon white. We cannot work with identity without difference, anywhere.

Mr. Chapman proposes that we should be Nominalists. I propose as an alternative that, adopting his good observations to assist us, we should all be Realists of the right kind.

HELEN WOODHOUSE.

HUME'S DIALOGUES CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION *An Answer to Dr. Laing*

HUME'S *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* are still much with us. What appears to be the definitive edition was published by Professor Norman Kemp Smith in 1935 with a learned introduction which, among other things, assembled a mass of evidence pointing to the conclusion that Philo is to be

¹ Repeated allusions to a phrase of Whitehead's, about colours being "eternal objects . . . haunting time like a spirit," suggest that Mr. Chapman takes this writer to be upholding the blank kind of identity. The reference is not given, but the typical legends of haunting spirits allow their appearance and behaviour to vary much as those of embodied spirits vary, with the circumstances and with the seer.

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identified with Hume himself, and that Hume in the *Dialogues* is deliberately trying to undermine the religious hypothesis. Though these conclusions have been widely accepted, Dr. B. M. Laing, in the April issue of *Philosophy*, strenuously attacked them in an ingenious argument based in part on his already published thesis that Hume's fundamental philosophy is not really the scepticism so long assigned him. Dr. Laing takes the opportunity in passing to indicate his sympathy with the recent position of a distinguished British poet that Voltaire, also, has been traditionally abused in the assumption that on the question of religion he wrote with his tongue in his cheek. The present examination is not designed to inquire into this new mode of making the wicked pious; nor to push the question back from the *Dialogues* to Hume's basic philosophy; nor to press the writer's conviction ["The Enigma of Hume," *Mind*, XLV (July, 1936) pp. 334-349] that not only is Philo to be identified as Hume, but in addition, Cleanthes as Joseph Butler, and Demeca as Samuel Clarke. The present purpose is solely to indicate certain unhistorical bases of Dr. Laing's attack on the more traditional view so ably championed by Professor Norman Kemp Smith.

An adequate reply to Dr. Laing might well limit itself to the refutation of his two arguments brought against Professor Smith's belief "that in the *Dialogues* Hume is deliberately and consciously undermining the religious hypothesis."

First (replies Dr. Laing), the *Dialogues* are concerned purely with Natural Religion, and even for a very large section of orthodox divines in the eighteenth century the arguments of Natural Religion were a sort of heretical argument; and the deliberate exposure of their weakness, an exposure even ending in scepticism so far as that line of reasoning was concerned, would have caused no dismay, in fact would have met with approval, for it would have left their own position untouched, if not strengthened.

What outstanding figures would Dr. Laing place in that "very large section of orthodox divines in the eighteenth century"? Surely not any of the most distinguished Anglican theologians belonging to the tradition which started with Hooker and ran through the entire seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; all Anglican theology of those periods began with Natural Religion. The naturalistic trends of Hooker and the Cambridge Platonists were strengthened by the naturalistic and experimental trends of Boyle and Newton. The Boyle Lectures, founded by the great chemist to defend Revealed Religion, almost invariably did so by way of the New Science; and the Boyle Lecturers include many famous names chosen from among the Anglican theologians of the eighteenth century. Bishop Butler, called by Newman a century later, "the greatest name in the Anglican Church," devoted, as the very title indicates, the first half of the famous *Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature* (1736), to Natural Religion. Butler was trying to convince the Deists or Naturalists, that Natural Religion which they acknowledged, is open to the same objections as Revealed Religion; Butler's purpose was not to invalidate both or either thereby, but avowedly to indicate the absurdity of rejecting either. Is Dr. Laing willing to maintain that Hooker was unorthodox? And what of the Cambridge Platonists, of the Latitudinarians of the seventeenth century? What of Archbishop King, of Bishop Butler, of Bishop William Law, of Dr. Paley in Hume's own century? Has not Dr. Laing confused the orthodoxy of such distinguished names, an orthodoxy fully cognizant of contemporary movements of thought, with the

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perhaps less philosophical orthodoxy of the average parish priest? Hume had no concern, as his letters clearly reveal, with the complete dogmatist. He was directing his *Dialogues* to those divines to whom Natural Religion not only was not repugnant, but represented the most important philosophical bulwark of Revealed Religion itself. Hume's aim was to show how the arguments of even such a distinguished work as the *Analogy of Religion* were basically sceptical in their outcome.

Dr. Laing argues secondly that

Professor Kemp Smith's assertion is made in face of Hume's express declaration in a letter to Sir Gilbert Elliot that "any Propensity you imagine I have to the other side (that is, in favour of the sceptical views of Philo) crept in upon me against my will," and in face of a definite request for assistance in strengthening the case of Cleanthes who, he says, is made the hero of the *Dialogues*. Unless this letter is to be regarded as another piece of artfulness, it is impossible to admit Professor Kemp Smith's assertion.

The challenge may be accepted on Dr. Laing's own terms; it is perhaps even unnecessary to recall that in a letter to Henry Home, Hume openly admits being an "infidel" and sees no ill consequences to having such a reputation. It is sufficient to examine the implications of Hume's statement that the sceptical propensity crept in upon him against his will, but that *it did seize him*. Hume explains to Elliot how in his youth he strove against scepticism with all of his intellectual strength, but to no ultimate avail. Hume's statement regarding Philo the sceptic proves nothing about the character of the finished *Dialogues*, but only gives us a fact concerning Hume's psychology, a fact which no one recognized better than he himself. His request for assistance in bolstering up the argument of Cleanthes was undoubtedly made in good faith, for, he was anxious, he tells Elliot in the same letter, to avoid that vulgar error "of putting nothing but Nonsense into the Mouth of the Adversary."

Perhaps a word ought to be added regarding Dr. Laing's position that Philo's arguments are largely borrowed from previous writers and that *therefore*, unless more credit for originality is given to the position of Cleanthes, the *Dialogues* are reduced to "insignificance." If the romantic notion of complete originality is the supreme test of philosophical "significance," consider how we must lower our estimates of Hobbes, Locke, and Newton, to name but a few eminent English thinkers of before Hume's time. Surely great genius may be allowed to represent its age, to accept the current "climate of opinion." True originality lies often in the individual synthesis of what all accept without question, rather than in the newness of the component fragments. Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* have the stamp of greatness imprinted upon them, and their significance is in no way impaired by late discoveries of the origins of their various arguments. Notwithstanding, the scholar is always glad to know of such origins for whatever comparative information they may render regarding the treatment of similar ideas by different minds. For this research, rather than for his perhaps unfortunate applications, a real debt of gratitude is due to Dr. Laing. For certainly too much can never be known regarding Hume's sources.

ERNEST C. MOSSNER.

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN GERMANY

ONE of the fundamental differences between English and German civilisation which leads to different philosophical problems is their attitude to the reality of history. The English "live" history as if it were nature. They found at least by the thirteenth century their own form of life, of government, constitution, and state, which have lasted ever since through all changes so that a rich system of traditions has developed. Germany did not find a lasting unity as early as that, but, being divided into many autonomous parts, religions, and tribes, it did not reach a strong social or moral tradition. Consequently the "rise of the historical consciousness" and even the wish to awaken the nation as a whole to it is in Germany an intellectual product. But what has been a disadvantage in the sphere of politics has been an advantage to science and philosophy. The German even believes it to be one of their chief contributions to the History of Thought that they have developed a scientific history and all the sciences which analyse its field, and above that the "Historism," a historical *Weltanschauung* or the task of interpreting the whole world from the point of view of history.

In any case that was one of the chief tendencies of W. Dilthey. His posthumous works, under review to-day, bear witness to it. Dilthey's European significance may perhaps be stated thus. If Hegel represents the stage of the self-consciousness of the European Mind, the stage at which this mind, conscious of its own power, remembers its whole history and constructs a system, Dilthey represents the next *stage of the self-consciousness of this self-consciousness*. For he tries (1) to give a philosophy of philosophy, that is to say, he seeks to show why and how the different forms of philosophy take shape, why they emerge from life; (2) believing it impossible to construct a metaphysics of his own, he satisfies himself with a system of possible types of philosophy; (3) he not only sets out to give a History of the European Mind, but includes a history of the historian, and one of his central problems is just the rise of the historical consciousness in Europe; (4) he does not, like Hegel, develop a philosophy of history, but he starts by analysing the moral sciences, the reputation of which he desires to strengthen by showing that they are the basis of the study of history.

But between Hegel and Dilthey lie all the attacks on the Mind (the materialistic attack of Feuerbach and Marx, the positivistic of Comte and Mill, the religious of Kierkegaard); and Dilthey, who has gone through the school of positivistic thought and empirical history and is deeply influenced by both, is faced with the paradoxical situation that his task of writing the history of the European Mind and of producing a theory of its historical appearance, is going on in a period when this mind has already reached the stage of its dissolution. Consequently the positivistic thesis of the impossibility of metaphysics, the historical thesis of the unit of philosophy and history, and the thesis of the relativistic character of each philosophical system are now making their appearance. But more than that, even the basis of the European philosophy of mind, the cartesian *Cogito sum*, is abandoned and

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replaced by the *Vivo sum*. So *malgré lui* a philosophy arises which since Scheler has been called the Philosophy of Life. But if O. F. Bollnow, in his book on Dilthey,¹ represents the whole of his philosophy as a philosophy of life and gives useful analyses of Dilthey's categories of life and theory of knowledge and expression, this must be kept in mind. Even if he were right regarding Dilthey's later period, since 1900; even if Dilthey were a "Philosopher of Life," his Philosophy of Life would not have the force of the theories of Nietzsche and Bergson, which derive their strength from their attacks on the mind; it would be but the result of the dissolution of the mind itself. More important is the publication² on the young Dilthey. It contributes much interesting new material for his development. I only wonder why the diaries are again given in the same abridgement in which they had already once been published in 1915, and that no account is given of the other parts. Perhaps some of them would have been more interesting than some of the family letters. Very impressive is the clear account this book gives of Dilthey's origin and early development, and of the wide range of his studies, which included theology, philology, history (as a pupil of Ranke), the theory of music, physiology. Even as professor at Kiel he took up a course in higher mathematics, in order to understand better the development of European Philosophy since Descartes.

In the closest connection with the above-named problems, Vol. XI of the Collected Papers³ contains chiefly a history of German historiography, characteristics of Johannes von Müller, Niebuhr, Schlosser, Dahlmann, von Raumer, Ranke, Treitschke, Haym, Droysen, Mommsen, J. Burckhardt. It includes even the historians of literary history Gervinus, Hettner, Julian Schmidt. His sketches, based on personal reminiscences, e.g. of Ranke, as the great epic historian, a second Herodotus, and of Treitschke, as the politician, who was neither historian nor orator nor student of political science, but all three at once, are of the highest order. But he did not see the danger of men like Treitschke as M. Weber did. Vol. XII of Dilthey's Collected Papers⁴ contains chiefly the papers on the reorganizers of the Prussian State and a paper on the "Preussische Landrecht." The latter is especially interesting as an example of Dilthey's method, because it interprets this law as the expression of the State of Frederic the Great, marking the transition from the absolute state to the modern constitutional state, in restricting the will of the monarch through laws given by himself. But from a European point of view it is to be regretted that this volume is restricted to articles on Prussian history. In reality both volumes are chiefly drawn from articles which the young Dilthey published in different journals (see the list at the end of Vol. XII). If you examine the original journals the impression you receive is somehow different. The material is vast and unlimited. There are articles on Schleiermacher, Baur, the history of Spain, Kant, Novalis, etc.; some of them, like those on Gibbon, J. S. Mill, Balzac, Alfieri, at least as interesting as those published. The majority of them are occasioned by some chance (e.g. appearance of books on the subject), and written on account of necessity, anonymously or under two or three pseudonyms, often not at all corrected. The number of books which he has reviewed in some of the numbers is so incredible that he cannot possibly have read them. (Not contained in the above-named list is a review of Haym's *Herder* in Vol. 49 of *Westermann's*

¹ DILTHEY: *Eine Einführung in seine Philosophie*, B. G. Teubner, Leipzig, 1936.

² *Der junge DILTHEY: Ein Lebensbild in Briefen und Tagebüchern, 1852-70*, B. G. Teubner, Leipzig, 1933.

³ *Vom Aufgang des geschichtlichen Bewusstseins*, Leipzig, 1936.

⁴ *Zur Preussischen Geschichte*, B. G. Teubner, Leipzig, 1936.

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Monatshefte, which gives in a few words a better character sketch of Herder than many large books, describing him as a spirit who possesses dreams of thought in place of real thoughts, foreknowledge in place of knowledge, and who hardly anywhere succeeds in mastering the masses of thought.)

Very enjoyable and instructive is a volume¹ containing papers on the Germanic ethos, on the medieval epos, on the great German music of the eighteenth century—Bach, Händel, Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven—and on Klopstock, Schiller, Jean Paul. It gives further evidence for the width of Dilthey's conception of the history of the mind, and shows clearly the impossibility of its realization by a single man.

The edition of Dilthey's letters to Rudolf Haym, 1861–1873,² is of interest only to the specialist, not to the general public.

As a sign that Dilthey's school still continues in Germany may be taken the fact that one of his pupils, Hermann Nohl, Professor of Pedagogic at the University of Goettingen, has published the second edition of his interesting and important work³ on the pedagogical movement in Germany. It starts with Dilthey's concept of the reality of education (*Erziehungswirklichkeit*), that is to say, that the realm of education constitutes a peculiar province in the realm of mind. Nevertheless, he transcends this conception in a twofold direction. On the one hand, he arrives at a general theory of education, on the other hand, he sees the chief aim of education in the transformation of the objective values given by one generation into the subjectivity of a new youth.

About thirty years younger than Dilthey, Max Weber, a master in the field of historical research (but considered from a sociological point of view), the most comprehensive and penetrating scholar in this field in the Germany of 1890–1920, is Dilthey's complement. For his strength is the force of the concept, of definition and of the understanding. With his letters⁴ I had a peculiar experience. I was excited about the earlier letters of the schoolboy, which show a really remarkable clearness of observation and certainty of judgment, and I very strongly recommend these. But on going on, I was disappointed. There are so many family letters of no general interest whatsoever, that a large proportion of the book is superfluous. The chief point which this book adds to our knowledge of Weber is this: he is a person without real youth, without a real development. Notwithstanding his regarding practice as his main interest and theory merely as an interruption of practice, his strength is, nevertheless, intellectual, and his intellect is perfect at the beginning. What changes is the situations and occupations and objects of study.

A pupil of Weber's, Karl Jaspers, one of the most original and attractive thinkers of the Germany of to-day, has published two new books, one of them on Nietzsche,⁵ the other one on Descartes. Both of them are interesting and deserve deeper consideration than we are able to give in the short space at our disposal. Jaspers, originally a psychologist, is a thinker of the reflective type and of high philosophical culture. I believe it is right to say that his thought represents a *new stage in the development of the philosophy of the mind*,

¹ *Von Deutscher Dichtung und Musik. Aus Studien zur Geschichte des deutschen Geistes* B. G. Teubner, Leipzig, 1933.

² *Briefe Wilhelm Dilthey's an Rudolf Haym, 1861–1873. Mitgeteilt von E. Weniger. Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Berlin, 1936.

³ *Die pädagogische Bewegung in Deutschland und ihre Theorie*, G. Schulte-Bulmke, Frankfurt a. Main, 1935.

⁴ *Jugendbriefe*, J. C. B. Mohr, Tübingen.

⁵ *Nietzsche: Einführung in das Verständnis seines Philosophierens*, de Gruyter, Berlin, 1936.

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that of its self-dissolution (Selbstverzehrung). Consequently he takes Nietzsche as a mind dissolving itself which constructs no world and leaves essentially nothing behind it (surely a misrepresentation, for nearly every page of Nietzsche contains some sort of insight, very often incoherent, but always elucidating either the problems of his time or his personality). This book is important and interesting perhaps even more through its errors than through its new interpretations. It sees rightly that a new beginning has to be made. But instead of starting with this beginning itself, it seeks an escape. H. G. Wells, in his excellent *Anatomy of Frustration*, escapes to the future, to the idea of a world revolution; Jaspers escapes to Nietzsche. He is right in his assumption that a new start has to be found, he is wrong in his supposing that it is only to be found in Nietzsche. It is very interesting to read Jaspers' account of Nietzsche's central idea of the eternal return of the same, which Nietzsche believed to be the new religion of religions. Jaspers pursues the development of the thought through its different, even contradictory shapes and he sees the emptiness of this idea, which is far from fulfilling the expectations of its author. But he does not succeed in destroying this idea, he does not see that this idea is an expression of the same escape, a translation of the Christian idea of rebirth or better of the "Apokatastasis panton" into the language of ecstatic nihilism. Whereas in the idea of the return of every creature to God a way of redemption is shown, in this compensation-idea the eternal return of the same senseless and unimportant being without any sort of redemption is taught. No, that is not a beginning but an end.

Jaspers is right in establishing a new contact with Nietzsche. As Nietzsche took Schopenhauer in his famous essay as his educator (and I venture to suggest its rereading together with Jaspers' book), Jaspers takes Nietzsche in the same way. But because Nietzsche can be interpreted in more than one way and because Jaspers' situation is very different, he takes Nietzsche in the way of his own philosophy as a man who does not want to teach certain doctrines, but whose chief object is to bring the pupil to his own essence (*Erwecker der Existenz*). But when confronted with the fact that Nietzsche has many aspects Jaspers makes a very interesting effort to reconcile them as different stages of one single dialectic movement, or he introduces into Nietzsche the same movement which is so characteristic of his own thought. Thus he arrives at many unknown connections. As the centre of Nietzsche's personality appears a desire of truth.

The importance of this task lies in the fact that it represents one of the possible interpretations of Nietzsche. It penetrates as far as mere reflection can penetrate. But, nevertheless, the task finds its natural limits because a unity of reflection does not exist in Nietzsche. It is the fate of Nietzsche to have different personalities in himself, or to fulfil in himself the processes of preservation, of dissolution, and of a new beginning as well, and to reach heights and depths above and below reflection. Jaspers' book, very rich in material and quotations, containing a useful bibliography and index, is, without any doubt, one of the best books on the subject.

In Jaspers' second book¹ the dissolution of the self-consciousness is raised to a dissolution of modern consciousness at its beginning. Descartes is considered to be the doom of modern philosophy. His mistake lay in wanting philosophy in the form of modern science. Thus he misrepresented philosophy and did not reach the full meaning of science. He constructs science and neglects all true principles of real research (hypothetical character—but see: Descartes, ed. Adam et Tannéry, Vol. II, pp. 76, 6 ff.—experiment, etc.). In the opinion of Jaspers he lost existence, he lost nature, he lost history, he

¹ *Descartes und die Philosophie*, de Gruyter, Berlin, 1937.

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lost experience. This paper, originally written for the Descartes number of the *Revue Philosophique*, represents an attempt to criticize Descartes from the standpoint of the philosophy of existence. Thereby and by means of elucidating psychological analyses of Descartes's character it attains its unique position in the literature of Descartes. Even if it does not achieve its critical aim (and I am afraid reflection criticizing clear mathematical thinking must always fail), it has a very illuminating, searching, analysing power which leads to much more than merely negative results.

This picture of German research in the field of the philosophical analysis of history would be incomplete without the fundamentally different catholic point of view, represented in a remarkable manner by Theodor Haecker.¹ Here the problems are very different. Here a tradition is given, but not in the sense of profane, but of soteriological history. The problem is here how to understand the first from the point of view of the second, how to comprehend their unity and diversity. Haecker develops consequently a metaphysics of history based on catholic principles. His first thesis is that only those beings have history which have a beginning and an end (neither God nor abstract ideas have history), and his second thesis introduces a hierarchical order of values as the measure of historical movements. A criticism of this book would demand an analysis of its presuppositions.

It would, however, be wrong to suppose that the present stage of German philosophy is to be characterized as being the analysis of the historical consciousness and the dissolution of this consciousness. On the contrary. The wish to overcome relativism and scepticism resulting from the historical approach was the *Leitmotif* in the phenomenological movement of Husserl and Scheler. Therefore I conclude this survey with some remarks on two books which represent this anti-relativistic tendency. The first of them is Herbert Spiegelberg's *Antirelativism*.² I agree entirely with Spiegelberg's determination to reject relativism. I only doubt whether it is not too exclusively reflective. Would it not be necessary to ask: what is the real reason for the present relativism, and does the author really believe that the mere postulation of a moral absolutism (even in the restricted sense which he gives to the word), that a sort of ethical objectivism is sufficient to get rid of this relativism which we all deplore? Is not a deeper change in the subject demanded, without which every form of a postulated objectivism must remain void and powerless? Herbert Spiegelberg's second large book³ contains much valuable material for the analysis of the concept of law and for the study of the difference between practical and theoretical law. His thesis is that we use the word law in an equivocal manner for the two fields, that no common universal concept of law exists, that the practical law is the original one, from which the theoretical is derived. Especially valuable is the second part, dealing with the history of the moral law and of the problem of law in ethics and the philosophy of law. The chief aim in both parts is the demand for an ethics without law based on an autonomous moral order. That such an ethics is possible nobody can deny. Plato, e.g. realized it in his *Republic*, founding it on the common order of cosmos and polis. But where is the basis for such an order in Spiegelberg's thought? I must say I am extremely sceptical of his ontological analysis, of his assumption that the last basis of moral judgment and of moral law is the *ontische Sittenordnung* which he believes is revealed to us by a specific moral intuition. And I am sorry I cannot follow him at all, if he believes that the categorical imperative and

¹ *Der Christ und die Geschichte*, Hegner, Leipzig, 1935.

² *Antirelativismus*, Max Niehaus, Zürich.

³ *Gesetz und Sittengesetz*, Max Niehaus, Zürich.

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every concept of law are unworthy of science and ought to be removed from the realm of ethics. It would be wonderful if man could live without laws; but that could only be accomplished if they would fulfil in themselves the law with such perfection that it was no longer needed. This evidently would only be possible in a society of superhuman beings or angels, which unfortunately we do not find on this dark earth. Therefore I believe it would be a more efficient weapon in our common struggle against the terrible moral relativism of our time to strengthen men's regard and reverence for the moral law than to undermine it by the idea of an ontological moral order which remains a mere postulate if not realized. But this fundamental difference of outlook does not prevent me from acknowledging the intrinsic value of the systematic and historical analyses of this book.

F. H. HEINEMANN.

NEW BOOKS

Order and Life. By JOSEPH NEEDHAM, Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, and Sir William Dunn Reader in Biochemistry, Cambridge. (London: Cambridge University Press. 1936. Pp. x + 178. Price 8s. 6d. net.)

This is a highly technical book, full of specialist knowledge. But it is principally concerned with the question whether the processes of life are ultimately explicable in terms of chemistry and physics. The author begins by criticizing and rejecting two views; one is J. S. Haldane's, that biology must start with the fact of life, and accept certain biological laws as equally ultimate with those of chemistry or physics (cf. p. 10). The other is Driesch's Theory of Entelechies. In opposition to these he accepts the judgment of K. Sapper, that it is "inconceivable that properties should be found in a material complex, which are not the result of the summation of the properties of the components"; and he claims that "although we are still in the earliest historical stages of any far-reaching organization-calculus, we can yet see that biological order, like (but very much more complicated than) crystal order, is a natural consequence of the properties of matter, and the characteristic mode of their manifestation" (p. 165).

"Biological order" may mean several things. There is the temporal order of the processes that make up the life-history of any one organism. There is the temporal order in which species have appeared and perished during the millennia in which living things have existed on the earth. There is the order of affinity between different species, simultaneously or successively existing. And there is the spatial order of the components of any one organization, into which its form may at any moment be regarded as analysable, though, of course, this order is not purely spatial, since its maintenance is compatible with much and continual change in the space-relations of limbs and other parts, which preserve unchanged through these changes their functions in the whole. I think that Dr. Needham's claim includes all these. But I am bound to say, so far as a non-specialist may presume to judge, that in my opinion his book does nothing to help us to see that biological order, in all or any of these senses, is a natural consequence of the properties of matter; though such failure, of course, does not prove that these properties do not account for biological order.

It is true that we are told that "biology cannot now ever be in the strict sense mechanistic"; but it is causal, and "a causal science can, indeed, be nothing if not mathematical, since the ideal axiom at the basis of all causality can only be stated in terms of the mathematical concept of function" (pp. 25-6). Here there seems to me to be some confusion. If there is causality between a and b , where a and b are particulars of certain kinds, and have quantitative features, then the frequency of b , or the amount of some quantitative feature in it, will be a function of the frequency of a , or of the amount of some quantitative feature in that. The displacements of two bodies towards each other may be a function of their masses and their distance. But what causes their approach is not hereby stated. Some have held that science is not concerned to ask this, and, if consistent, have gone on to say that it can dispense with the

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notion of force. Its business then becomes that of discovering formulae, from which, given certain distributions of matter, we may calculate what others will be found, for such and such differences of time and space. The items whose distribution is given or inferred may be comparatively simple, like atoms, or complex to any degree, like men or nebulae. A mathematical formula will thus connect the present numbers of the population and its fertility-rate with the numbers 50 years hence, or the distributions of the nebulae at intervals of so many million light-years one with another. But the latter change is at bottom resolvable into the movements of the components of the atoms out of which the nebulae are constituted; and the former certainly involves the movements of the components of the atoms out of which human beings and their environment are constituted. Now if biological science is mathematical in the same sense as astronomy, we need no more look beyond the laws exemplified in the movements of atoms or their components, at various distances and velocities and complexities of juxtaposition, in the former case than in the latter; and biology will then indeed be in the strict sense mechanistic.

The mathematical work of R. A. Fisher has given fresh support to those who think that a random supply of variations without directional trend may suffice for the modification of species by descent. And the Mendelian theory of heredity offers scope to mathematics in explaining how crossing and in-breeding from offspring of crosses give rise to new and pure strains, and so forth. But we cannot argue freely from phylogeny to autogeny. In the development of one individual are involved neither the "variation and selection" whose effect in the one case, nor the crossing and breeding from the hybrids whose effects in the other case can be submitted to mathematical treatment.

Dr. Needham, indeed, quotes from D'Arcy Thompson's *Growth and Form* the application of mathematical analysis to the differences between certain related animal forms. Conceive an animal to be embedded in a close rectangular three-dimensional network; or, though the network is of lines that have only length, perhaps we should say that the network is embedded in the animal. Now this geometrical system may be subjected to deformation. If the same parts of the animal are centred at the same points of intersection after deformation as before, we shall have a new but corresponding specific form (pp. 35-8). Here the mathematical treatment is admirable for description, but it does not help to explain. We are left asking why, when one part of the animal is modified, all the rest are modified correspondingly, so that the identity of form which mathematical analysis reveals is preserved. Dr. Needham seems to think that Thomsonian co-ordinates have done something to explain this. They have not.

Again, he considers (pp. 49-63) the fact, experimentally ascertained, that in the development of an embryo the "possible fates" of some part may be more numerous than its "presumptive fate." By the presumptive fate of a part is meant what it would grow into in normal conditions; but if the embryo is injured elsewhere, or if the part is transplanted into another embryo, the part may grow into something different; anything into which it may thus alternatively grow is a possible fate. A part of an embryo, when the rest is destroyed, may even grow into a complete organism, so that this is one of the possible fates of the part. But the possible fates of a part become less numerous as the development of the embryo proceeds, and after a certain date, whatever happens to the rest, or into whatever it is transplanted, the part, if it develops further at all, will develop only into its presumptive fate. Now, Dr. Needham describes the part for which divers fates are still possible as

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in a position of unstable equilibrium; after it has lost this "pluri-potency," it is in a position of stable equilibrium. He finds geometrical expressions, in graphs or in models with uneven surfaces, for such facts. Conceive, for example (the example is an application of certain of his figures: see p. 58, and plate facing p. 60), a drop of quicksilver falling along the sloped surface of part of a miniature mountain-massif on to a pass; from the pass it may go right or left, so that this is a position of unstable equilibrium; whichever way it goes, it may come to a lower pass; but finally it reaches a cup or lake, and is in stable equilibrium; it has now no pluri-potency. There is certainly an analogy between this case, and the gradual restriction of the possible fates of the parts of an embryo during the period of its development. But the analogy offers no explanation, because the conditions which explain what is possible to the drop of quicksilver are not present in the embryo.

I take another illustration of the concept of restriction of potentiality by "multiple bifurcation." In Fig. 45, placed before the Index as an addendum, we have a view of a marshalling-yard on the L.N.E.R. "The photograph is taken from above the 'hump.' Up to this the freight wagons are pushed, and from it they run down individually over electric retarders to a number of alternative sidings, where they are ready to be despatched to a fresh destination. The top of the 'hump' corresponds to the totipotent or maximally unstable condition of the egg." Perhaps; but could the railway company marshal its wagons without a hump, without rails, without electric retarders? Are there any of these in an egg? Or would there be more destinations possible to a way on at one point than at another, without some one who is no part of the marshalling yard to vary the switches? And if not, what light does this illustration throw on our problem?

Or consider another analogy offered later in the book (pp. 156-64). It is said that the melting of a solid does not occur suddenly at one temperature, but that the particles acquire freedom of movement successively in each of the three dimensions of the solid at successive temperatures. Now, in amphibia, a limb-bud may be transplanted into another individual, and if inserted front foremost at the place of a left fore-limb, will grow into the limb proper to the place of insertion, whether it was a left or a right bud; not, however, if inserted back foremost. The bud acquires rigidity of development successively in different dimensions, as the solid loses its rigidity successively. Here, too, there is something analogous between the two sets of facts. But I do not see that the considerations which might explain the stages of melting having any application in the biological case.

Dr. Needham introduces in his third lecture the notion of a spatial "hierarchical continuity" within an organism. "A protein molecule in a colloidal particle in a nucleolus in a live cell in a liver in a mammal" is a member of a hierarchy of collections. With this is compared the mathematical conception of sets of points, among which a hierarchical order of so many levels of shells or envelopes is conceived to exist. We may suppose the membership of these levels to be constant, but the values of the co-ordinates of the points in any level to vary on certain principles, with consequent topological changes, but without any of the points in one shell crossing the continuous bounding surface between them and those of another next it. The consequences of any principles of variation can be worked out mathematically.¹ Similarly—if it is similar—we may suppose the constituents of the protein molecule to be determined not only by one another, each by the rest at its own level, but by the successive wholes, or the members of the successive wholes, which form

¹ I believe this is not an adequate account of the problems of topology, but I think it sufficiently indicates the argument of the text.

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the spatial hierarchy. But in an organism, if we are to dispense with the hypothesis of some ordering form or "whole" factor distinct from the parts, the hierarchical aggregates must be as they are in consequence of how the ultimate parts affect each other, and cannot influence these ultimate parts. In a set of points there are no influences and no results. We may choose to regard different points as belonging to successive envelopes, but we cannot really regard the points into which we analyse (or think to analyse) space as themselves moving in space. We can only ask how particles at those points must move in space, if the hierarchical arrangement of envelopes is to be preserved throughout their motion, and what arrangement of them would result. The mathematician working out this problem is not concerned with the question whether particles could be caused to move so as to preserve the hierarchy, and the hierarchy is not a factor in explanation, but something whose maintenance would have to be explained. Dr. Needham observes (p. 142) that "entities which we believe to be intrinsically different can only be brought into the field of scientific discourse by being analysed into their constituent parts." If so, we must go down to the ultimate constituents, and then our hierarchy will have been dissolved.

Dr. Needham employs the conception a "biological field." Of this he accepts (p. 108) C. H. Waddington's as the best definition. "A field is a system of order such that the position taken up by unstable entities in one portion of the system bears a definite relation to the position taken up by unstable entities in other portions." I am surprised that this definition should please him. Every position bears a definite relation to every other. What he wants to say is that what position one entity takes up affects what positions others do. But why? It is useless to say that when this happens there is a field, and then to invoke the field as helping to explain its happening; and to say that a field is a system of order such that this happens amounted to nothing more. He is alive to this objection, for he anticipates that the "individuation-field" may seem "only yet another fig-leaf for our ignorance." I fear it is really no more.

Nor is it the only such fig-leaf decorating the book. He will have nothing to do with theories "which postulate some entity in the living organism *in addition to* the chemical elements C, H, N, O, P, etc., plus organizing relations" (p. 7). But what are "organizing relations"? All elements are in relations, whether they are components of an organism or not. What makes relations organize? We read of "an organizing entity having components standing in internal organizing relations to each other" (p. 74). There is much interesting information about parts whose presence seems necessary in the portion transferred from one embryo to another, if the development of an organ from that portion is to occur in its new host; and these parts are called organizers because without them the organization does not proceed. But the reproduction of form is not explained by discovering something without which it fails to occur. The particulate structure of the chromosomes has been found to be something helping to reveal conditions without which reproduction fails. It has not explained reproduction.

Again, hormones are said to be influences acting upon morphological form (pp. 79-80); but they are bodies, and bodies act on bodies, not on forms. Dr. Needham, of course, knows this; but that he should write what he does seems to me to betray a tendency not to look behind fig-leaves. So elsewhere (p. 95), "we are left with the conception of a sterol-like substance being liberated at a given point in the developing system and 'radiating' its organizing power from that spot." Is this any better than the "faculties" at which he scoffs? Again, can we rightly ascribe activity to a "field" (p. 100), and not

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to the bodies in the field? This is a question which perhaps should be addressed to others as well as to a biologist. We are told that "the 'individuation-field' is a term expressing the tendency of an organizer to rearrange the regional structure both of itself and of any tissue lying near it in such a way as to make that tissue part of a complete embryo" (p. 101). If so, I submit it is name for part of the problem presented by the facts of growth, not for a factor of explanation. "Organ-forming potency falls off from" the centres of certain regions into which an embryo may in thought be divided "in a definitely measurable way" (p. 103). Is an organ-forming potency less mysterious than a "form or, 'supra'-material factor" (p. 165), such as Dr. Needham rejects? It is not a body, nor a collection of bodies thus and thus arranged. And those who would invoke a "form" would admit that the development of an organism so as to display it depends also on certain physical conditions in the organism. When, lastly, we read in the same context (p. 106) that "there must, of course, be some underlying factor, which we could call 'limb-forming intensity,'" we may wonder whether Dr. Needham is really finding sufficient those principles of explanation with which he professes to be content.

This review has perforce failed to do justice to the interest selected and marshalled of the biological facts in Dr. Needham's book. If it is purely critical, that is not because I would deny its value, but because the conclusiveness of a certain line of argument which forms its main theme is the only issue I am competent to raise. In a note near the end (p. 166, n. 91), we are offered a choice between an Emergent Evolutionism "which seems to hold that the specific properties of wholes are conferred on them over and above the specific properties of their parts by a continuous Creativity acting from outside," and a Dialectical Materialism which "seems to hold that the specific properties of wholes result from properties of the parts which are invisible or latent in isolation." The former view is said to be suited to a religious, and the latter to a scientific world-outlook. "The problem of which view is correct, if it is a problem, appears to be extra-scientific and quite insoluble." That what is insoluble is no problem, is a doctrine of "logical positivism," and logical positivism appears to have attractions for Dr. Needham (cf. pp. 78-9). But according to it, a proposition is either a tautology, or rests on induction from observed particulars (unless it is a record of a particular observation); and this induction cannot be justified. This is a position like what Hume adopted for the basis of science; science all rests on causality and causality is a matter of faith. Hume's attitude, as Dr. Whitehead observes, satisfied the Royal Society, but did not satisfy the Church.¹ I will not discuss Emergent Evolutionism; I am ready to say it will not do. But must we therefore accept Dr. Needham's doctrine, if that will not do either?

Is the kind of process, amenable ultimately to mathematical treatment, for which he looks in any development that is to be intelligible, the only intelligible process in the universe? If so, there is no purposive activity in it, or purposive activity is unintelligible; and if the writing of *Order and Life*, or of this review, were not purposive activities, awkward consequences will follow. But if there are purposive activities, though often failing to attain their purposes, then it is not absurd to suggest that growth is such an activity, though how this can take place in a body which does not appear to be connected with its own mind may not be understood. Even to speak of unconscious purpose would be at least no more unhelpful than to speak of the "latent properties" of parts from which the "manifest properties" of

¹ *Science and the Modern World*.

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wholes are to result; for to speak of neither properties were latent like a jack in the box; and if not thus, then how?

H. W. B. JOSEPH.

NOTE.—A few slips may be noticed. P. 98, n. 74, last l. but two, "a laquelle" should be "à laquelle." P. 106, l. 18, Dr. Needham should not say "an excised piece will inhibit," but "the excision of a piece will inhibit." P. 112, l. 2, *ava* should be *ard*. P. 116, last l. but one, the word "meaning" seems misused. P. 127, last l. but two, "should" ought to be transposed to stand before "more." P. 145, l. 16, "along in the direction": one preposition is redundant. P. 162, n. 35, l. 3, for "Leaths" read "Leathes."

The Human Situation: The Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Glasgow, 1935-1937. By W. MACNEILE DIXON. (London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1937. Pp. 438. Price 18s.)

There have been many types of Gifford Lecturer—philosophers, theologians anthropologists, physicists, biologists; but comparatively few have been professional men-about-letters, or, in other words, professors of literature. Again, there are not very many of them who have strayed extensively and deliberately from their official *Fach*. They all have to talk somewhere about natural theology, but most of them approach that subject gradually and very obliquely, sometimes with lagging footsteps. In the third place very few of them, present their excursions and conclusions in a style that is either designed or is able to make a popular appeal. There have been notable exceptions, such as William James, but the exceptions are remarked when they occur. In the main the lecturers remain, in the spirit, in their classrooms and very seldom get beyond the Great Hall of a University either in spirit or in body. They do not address literate but not-too-studious firesides.

In all these respects the present set of lectures by the distinguished Professor Emeritus of English Literature in the University of Glasgow diverges notably from the common run. The subject of his chair is one from which very few have been asked to descend or to ascend to the Gifford rostrum. This man-about-letters has selected a philosophical subject, and has stuck to it, dialectics and high seriousness and all, with gusto and also with transparent honesty ("I propose," he says, "to speak my mind. I cannot believe you would wish me to say what I do not think, or think what I did not say. Nothing is to be gained by concealment or equivocation.") His lectures have the appeal of good literature and of cunning and refreshing rhetoric unempurpled but pungent and urbane. The book, in consequence, is quite unusual. It is vivid without clamour or fury, bright without glitter, brave without bitterness; and, as I have said, it is philosophical from the first page to the last. I do not say that most philosophers should emulate Mr. Dixon's methods. The style is the man. What they can all do is to enjoy him.

"I am not wholly unacquainted," the author says, "with the books of the famous speculators. I delight in their society. Under their subtle and eloquent guidance, I have made many excursions into the Empyrean of the Absolute. I have some little knowledge of the various metaphysical gambits, the opening moves, the Platonic, the Cartesian, the Kantian." That is meiosis. Such a book as this could neither have been conceived nor written if the author had not approached literature with the training and interests both of a classical and of a philosophical education, and if he had not applied the training and sustained the interest in all his consortium with belles lettres. He must always have been a metaphysical *littérateur*. He knows quite a lot about the end-games of philo-

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sophers as well as about their opening gambits, and he knows as much as most philosophers do about the end-games of speculative science. It may be a little more doubtful whether his middle-game in philosophy is quite so convincing. I should have preferred to see more of it in his book; but for the most part he has deliberately developed his theme in such a way that philosophical opening moves, and philosophical end-games receive most attention.

The first ten lectures indeed (i.e. the first series in accordance with the Gifford Trust) is designed to be a set of excursions exhibiting the complexity of the human situation. The lecturer darts to and fro like a puzzled, glittering inquisitive ephemeron. What is a man's mind, his reason, his self? *Nil tam difficile est quin quaerendo investigari possit*. But how begin? With history? Philosophers "would write more convincingly if they had consorted, even in imagination, with cave-dwellers, and lake-dwellers, and tree-dwellers, talked with buffoons and mountebanks, and charlatans, with sadists and pimps and procurers, as well as with priests, prophets and professors." With anthropoid apes whose blood-groups are the same as man's? With the genes? With neutrons and positrons? With cosmogony? The first series of lectures is made up of these forays and sallies; it consists of essays in a diversitarian philosophy, and the essayist's art is everywhere apparent. This includes the art of avoiding tediousness by running away from topics that would have to be developed slowly. It also includes quips, and graciousness, and reverence and happy phrasing everywhere. But towards the close of the first series there is a longer and fuller note. "If nothing be worth dying for, nothing is worth living for." There is horror in the world and there is strife; but there is life too. "The inner truth is that every man is himself a creator, an artist, an architect, and fashioner of worlds. If this be madness . . . none the less it is the lunacy in which consists the romance of life, in which lies our chief glory and our only hope." "So far men are the crown of nature's efforts." "Whatever else you are, says nature to us, be a man."

With the eleventh lecture and the second series we enter upon a straighter road. When we look facts in the face the will-to-live is dominant in the human situation. "Your easy chair is your great breeder of melancholia, yet luxury itself cannot prevail against this inward imperative, this clinging to life whatever its conditions." Bunyan's pilgrim put his fingers in his ears and ran on crying, "Life, life, eternal life." Mr. Dixon reaffirms the emphatic yea of the plain man. "For his simple wisdom, his untutored soul, his shy, inexpressive intelligence, unperplexed by dialectic, unsubdued by failure, I confess an affectionate regard." He can even bear the plain man's plainness when it is not quite so engaging; but he does not like moralists and absolutists. The former he thinks should ask, "How is goodness to be made the object of passionate desire, as attractive as fame, success, or even adventure?" and he detests the categorical imperative. "I would say that to love life is to love the gods, and that in obeying the will-to-live we are obeying divine orders. (But here he is hard upon the categorical imperative which only says that dooty is dooty even when it is drab; and since he also wants dignity and stateliness in one's outlook upon both life and death," it is not so plain that the will-to-live is naturally stately, or that this stately ethics is more attractive, more adventurous or less burdensome than the veracity of Kant's "humble plain man," or even than the dignity of Kant's rational ends in themselves).

A critique of absolutism follows, and, at greater length, a critique of naturalism. The stream, it is argued, cannot rise about its source, and the result cannot outsoar its cause; and the way is prepared for a Leibnizian monadism of living monads. "What is matter? It is, physics tells us, simply energy. And what is energy? It is the expression of will or Being. We can go no further.

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And whence is our idea of energy which gives rise to action derived? From ourselves, who can produce it by willing. Personality is, in its final analysis, simply will or cause."

That is the general conclusion of several lectures in which the middle work is elaborated more sedulously than in most other parts of the book. I regret that I do not have the space to pursue it more closely here. But the end-game, for once, appears to be hurried. If the result cannot outsoar its cause, how can Mr. Dixon outsoar protoplasm, and how can protoplasm outsoar abiological energy? Is anything gained by saying that all is life? Do electric charges obey divine orders when they are called by the name of life, and languish in outer darkness when they are called by some other name? Leibniz, who Dr. Dixon rather surprisingly describes as in the main an *a posteriori* thinker, made strenuous efforts to show with a sort of metaphysical detail conjecturally harmonious with experience that his monads did possess perception and appetite. Their spirituality, however low its degree, was therefore much more than nominal—or else Leibniz was wrong. Despite my delight in Mr. Dixon's work, I would not think of him, and he would not think of himself, as a second Leibniz. Nevertheless, I think Mr. Dixon's solution more verbal than it need have been had he addressed his able and cultured mind to the differences in energy-patterns.

At the end of the book the One is restored to favour. It has had its drubbing, but it is resplendent and eternal in art and in beauty. "In poetry and painting music and sculpture, the necessary and complementary character of Being and Becoming can be in a measure perceived and understood." "May we not say that the charm of all aesthetic experience consists in this, that it, too, presents the storm in the golden frame of peace? That it reconciles the opposites in the arrest or staying of the flux? Nothing is there denied, nothing denied of the tyrannies and injustices, the frets and fevers, the injurious wrongs that tax the intelligence and freeze the heart. Nothing is denied, all is affirmed. Yet as time with its magic wand deals with the past, so the divine arts with the troubles of the world." In the last lecture the miracle of endless personal survival is held to be not less astonishing than other indisputable miracles. Our lives are not a long fool's errand to the grave. "Since I am not prepared to believe the world a misery-go-round, a torture-chamber, a furnace of senseless affliction; since I am not prepared to believe the fiery, invincible soul a by-blow, a lamentable accident: I prefer to put my trust in the larger vision of the poets."

This is a moving, a gallant, and a charming book. I hope to take it down very often from my shelves, sometimes I admit for the joy of its phrases but often for the benefit of my professional occasions. It should beguile many and bemuse none. This I say having reviewed it, but I envy its readers who are not reviewers.

JOHN LAIRD.

Belief and Action. By VISCOUNT SAMUEL. (London: Cassell & Co., 1937. 1p. 366. Price 7s. 6d.)

In this book Viscount Samuel combines his admirable judgment, his vast experience of affairs, his extensive acquaintance with philosophy, and his love for his kind into a mature, restrained, effective, and charming volume. He calls it "an everyday philosophy," designing it to give a glimpse of daylight to Everyman, but it is not every day that such books appear, and if its light is meant to be the light of common day, that, after all, is the best illuminant.

The author's wish is to do something to remove "the mental mists that now confuse us." They are obdurate, he thinks, without a philosophy; so he

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supplies one very briefly. His readers, he is sure, "are only waiting to discover whether, by some unusual happy chance, the author has any constructive ideas of his own to offer." He therefore offers a modestly realistic world view leaving its partial justification to a series of appendices, and so proceeds to his "everyday" construction. Religion, ethics and social adjustment are his chief concern. The great religions, in his judgment, must learn to settle their differences, and must also learn to accept modern "knowledge." A religion that is content to be either geographical or obscurantist cannot be true; and neither mysticism nor miracle is an adequate substitute for pedestrian reason. He admits, however, that there is a place for "intuition," a term which he wisely does not define (the term has a hundred and one philosophical meanings and no consistent ordinary meaning). In general, the author's views on this subject show a breadth and sanity scarcely possible without a varied experience of religion in many lands, and seldom achieved with that experience.

After accepting the fact of evil in an evolving world (but refusing to countenance either pessimism or a cheap evolutionary optimism) the author deals with ethical principles in chapters upon "Right and Wrong" and upon the motives or sanctions to right. Here he offers what I might call an agathetic utilitarianism (i.e. one that is not like Bentham's exclusively hedonistic). The standard is welfare—as it would seem, actual, not probable welfare. "Ideas, principles, laws, customs, actions, are to be judged by their consequences. They are to be accounted right if they will conduce to welfare, and wrong if they will not." This statement seems obscure. Does it mean that no action can be called right until after the event—that is to say never, since consequences go on for ever? It will hardly do to say that certain classes of actions have been successful in the past; for to mention nothing else, conditions might change. Again we learn from one of the appendices that good is subjective. Therefore welfare is subjective. Therefore right is subjective. And as we have seen, it is also prophetic. It does seem to me that further reflection might be appropriate in these regions.

From theory the author proceeds to application and passes in review marriage and the family, property and poverty, liberty, nationality, and peace. It would be difficult, I think, to overpraise the balance, lucidity, and breadth, in a word, the wisdom of these chapters. Whether Viscount Samuel is comparing the romantic felicities of sexual freedom with the solid social advantages of a monogamous union where divorce is rare and the children have a home, whether he is defending the British way of combining advantageous social expedients without making a fetish of a single Plan, whether he is reconciling freedom with discipline, or defending the possibilities of the League of Nations, his discussion is as full of the rarest good sense as an egg is full of protein. Any criticism one is disposed to make is either incidental or dialectical. I shall indulge in a few of these, but not before expressing the most genuine admiration for about a hundred pages of the greatest value (which value, I hope is *not* merely subjective).

Among the incidentals I shall mention only one. It occurs at the conclusion of the chapter on the family, where it seems to be seriously suggested that the children of domesticated parents will be relatively free from a roving disposition in the matter of sex.

Among dialectical points I might mention the following:—Admitting (as I personally believe) that a nation is only an organized group of persons, and is neither an additional person nor an additional entity to its component members so organized, it seems to me that the author assumes too easily that national and private moral codes cannot significantly differ. (He says, e.g., that "since national morality is nothing else than collective personal morality,

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the conduct of nations may only be guided by the same motives as the conduct of persons." Here the word "motive" is vague, but I think the author is inclined to assume, if he does not explicitly state, identity of duties.) His criterion of right is conduciveness to welfare in the past assumed to hold also of the future. Let us take for example the payment of debts, and assume that it has been shown in the past that the payment of debts by private men to one another does increase welfare. Does it follow that nations should pay international war-debts? It is surely casuistical to say that the assumed benefit to private men necessarily applies to the benefit of nations. The proper argument would be that welfare had resulted from the payment of international war-debts—one wonders "to whom." Since no great nations on the modern scale have ever fulfilled such obligations, there is no experience to show whether they or anyone did benefit by such a course, and it is quite possible to argue that the world has benefited by their repudiations, although private men have not benefited from private repudiations. The same kind of argument might be, applied (with a better chance of a certain empirical verification) to the case of the prevalent treaty-breaking of modern post-war States, and I am not trying to give the answer. I am suggesting, however, that in terms of Viscount Samuel's criterion, the answer cannot be as simple as I think he assumes.

In his appendices Viscount Samuel maintains (a) that a realistic philosophy of the external world is more satisfactory than any alternative, (b) that values are subjective, (c) that mind "offers to philosophy a separate subject-matter" from matter, (d) that the modern indeterminists have failed in their attack on the principle of causality, (e) that causation applies universally to mind as well as to matter. He is lucid and careful in each of these, but has, I think, a more lively interest in the last two than in the others. Each of them is stated forcibly, fairly, and in a manner abreast with the time. Hence it is unfortunate that he has allowed himself some loose statements. Thus in what should have been an initial definition of causality we read:—"We find empirically that certain things do follow upon others, and we choose to call the earlier ones causes and the later ones effects; the fact of the sequence we call causation." As the reviewer said about Keats, "This will never do." Again on p. 306 we find the amazing statement that "*we know* (italics mine) that nowadays, in the population of forty million in England and Wales, not fewer than one hundred persons and not more than one hundred and thirty persons will be the victims of murder in any given year." The ridiculous reason for this ridiculous prophecy is that the number of *convictions* for murder has exceeded a hundred for twenty-two consecutive years after 1914 and has been less than a hundred and thirty from 1928 onwards although it invariably exceeded a hundred and thirty from 1914 to 1927 inclusive.

JOHN LAIRD.

Towards a Religious Philosophy. By W. G. DE BURGH. (London: Macdonald & Evans. 1937. Pp. xix + 260. Price 10s.)

In these days when we are being assured in certain authoritative quarters that all metaphysical speculation is merely sound without sense, and when Christian theism in particular is widely regarded as an outmoded way of thinking which merely survives rather than is really alive to-day, it is refreshing to meet with a restatement of theistic philosophy as unrepentant and challenging as that of Professor de Burgh. He disclaims any "attempt to construct a religious philosophy," but that is just the characteristic British self-depreciation, for in this country thinkers are nearly always intensely reluctant to admit that they are venturing on constructive speculation. In this

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book we have at any rate something more than a shrewd survey of the ground and a clearing away from the site of much impeding rubbish. And the reader is made to feel that, whether or no the argument is convincing throughout, it never sounds the note of apology or defensive compromise. The author is (as one would expect) from first to last occupied with carrying the war into the enemy's country.

The fact that the book is made up of twelve essays, many of which have previously appeared in periodicals, inevitably impairs its unity of texture, though, as the author claims, the chapters are all "directed to a single purpose." But if there are repetitions and new beginnings, by way of compensation each chapter makes thereby the more pointed onset and effect.

Beginning with a defence of the wider view of reason as including intuition and faith as well as the processes of logical inference, Professor de Burgh goes on to consider the relation between metaphysical and religious knowledge and in what sense the two may be brought together in a "religious philosophy." Such a philosophy would be excluded if metaphysics were committed to a purely immanentist theory; and accordingly he discusses next two forms of "immanentism" in the doctrines of Spinoza and the neo-Idealism of Gentile, in order to show the inadequacy of a pure doctrine of "immanence." He then proceeds, "by way of selective illustration to show how a religious philosophy would answer certain questions of primary importance," *viz.* those of Time, the World-Order, and Cosmic Teleology. The relation of morality to religion is next discussed, and the latter is claimed to be essentially *theoria* rather than practice, i.e. the knowledge of God. The three concluding essays develop the contrast between the two forms of humanism, the theocentric and the anthropocentric or secular. The attempt to derive an adequate ideal in terms of the concept of "self-realization," which has been so prominent in the idealist tradition, is then examined: it is shown that this gives no sufficient alternative to a frankly other-worldly humanism. Finally the whole argument is brought to bear upon the predicament of the present generation. After a diagnosis of our contemporary malaise and the "menace of unreason," which in one form or another is to-day of such grave import, the author urges that what is needed is a reconstruction in a new and living form (this is emphasized) of the theocentric world-view which gave medieval Christianity its sanity and stability, but to which in its older form there can be no return. In all this we have certainly more than mere "prolegomena," as the author too modestly would call his work.

Being as I am in close agreement with Professor de Burgh's standpoint and general approach, I can only be grateful to him for the admirable vigour and clarity of his exposition and the effectiveness of his vindication. He would be the first to admit that his argument traverses some very familiar ground: the defender of theism is debarred from startling novelty in the matter of his conclusions, though he may—as here he certainly does—requickened an old argument or shed new light upon familiar affirmations.

The title of the book is, I think, an unfortunate misnomer. What Professor de Burgh is commending to us is clearly not a religious philosophy, nor even a *theistic* philosophy, but a Christian philosophy, and I think it would have been better to have put this beyond question in the title. For though he professes a more comprehensive aim (p. 36), one remains perplexed in spite of the discussion in the third chapter what precisely a "religious" philosophy "in general" is. Is it a philosophical system (or quest) which takes religion seriously as an experience which cannot be simply ignored or explained away? That gives a much less specific programme than we require: materialism would perhaps be the only type of philosophy necessarily excluded. Or is it a

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philosophy which accepts as well-grounded certain claims to non-scientific knowledge about a transcendent reality (God) and seeks to correlate these in one interpretation with our "secular" experience? But the difficulty here is that so far as I can see there is no such agreement as Professor de Burgh implies between the *content* of such religious beliefs and claims, even among the "higher religions." Buddhism, for instance, has been called a religion lacking any doctrine of God. And has a religious philosophy which is committed to a doctrine of *Maya* any really essential community with that which is here expounded or commended? It is fairly obvious that in Professor de Burgh's hands the term religion is intended to, or at least tends to, exclude any form of Pantheism and that it is not very hospitable to certain forms of Theism. Is it, for instance, true of every high religion (including, e.g. Islam) or even of every type of Christian belief, that it "finds no contradiction between (God's) all-embracing providence and man's relative independence" (p. 111)? Or that "the *religious* consciousness draws its life from the assurance of Eternal Love as the ground of all that lives and moves? And remembering the many varieties of even Christian experience, can we believe (p. 121) that "contentment and harmony of temper" so signally distinguish "religious men and women"?

Spinoza's philosophy was a *religious* one in a genuine sense of the term, though anything but a *Christian* one. If on our way "towards a religious philosophy" we have to pass Spinoza by, it can only be because it is in the latter sense that we use the term.

On Spinoza Professor de Burgh is all the more convincing because he responds so strongly to the elevation and greatness of the man. But he is surely misusing terms when he speaks of Spinoza's "God's love toward men and the mind's intellectual love towards God are one and the same" as meaning that God "is able to reciprocate men's knowledge and love" (p. 63), or that *sentimus experimurque nos aeternos esse* means that "Spinoza's way of life culminates in personal fruition." For a monist like Spinoza *reciprocation* and *personal* fruition are precisely what must be rejected.

It is a mystery to some of us why a doctrine so extravagant as that of Gentile and his school has been on the whole treated with such consideration. But if the theory had to be criticized at such length this could not have been done more effectively than it is done here. It is excellently said (p. 91) that "philosophies of pure immanence (subjectivism?) have a way of relegating to the realm of appearance what, on their theory of reality, could never conceivably appear."

On a later page (p. 170), however, Professor de Burgh seems to come near to the position he quotes from Gentile ("without evil, no good"; the spirit needing its non-being "as the flame has need of the combustible"). "Where there is no conflict," he says, "there is no longer a place for moral action." It is doubtless true that, as Aristotle saw, where there is friendship there is no need for justice, no need for any system of guaranteed rights. But unless self-sacrifice for another is not "moral action" the opportunity for moral action will not cease so long as transactions between agents are possible. Good does not suffer "euthanasia" in its "complete victory," as flame does over fuel, for it is superordinate to evil, not co-ordinate with or correlative to it, as Gentile (and Herakleitus before him) holds.

I have dwelt too long on minor criticisms and will add but one more. Stoicism is rather too unsympathetically dismissed. It was, after all, a religion

* "The plural," notes Professor de Burgh, "is unambiguous." But a monistic pantheist who is not a Solipist is bound to use plural pronouns even though he disbelieves in the ultimate plurality of persons.

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as well as a philosophical system. The Stoic faith in Cosmopolis was not an anthropocentric humanist conception, and it might have been given some credit for the breaking of the "closed society" of humanist ethics.

But in general lack of sympathy is the last charge that can be brought against the author. His apparatus of learning is formidable and his survey panoramic. And in his last chapters he shows himself wise in his prescription as well as acute in his diagnosis. If these are in truth but *prolegomena*, it is to be hoped that the main *logos* will follow without undue delay.

J. W. HARVEY.

Value and Ethical Objectivity: a Study in Ethical Objectivity and the Objectivity of Value. By GORDON S. JURY. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1937. Pp. 258. Price 7s. 6d.)

Mr. Jury's book is an interesting study of the present position of ethics and of its relation to theory of value. His general object may be said to be that of maintaining the autonomy of ethics—its independence of metaphysics on the one side and of psychology and sociology on the other. He begins with a rather general survey of recent currents of thought about ethics and axiology, and settles down in his second chapter to an attempt, which is one of the most interesting things in the book, to classify ethical theories on a new principle, viz. on the ground of the relation asserted by them to exist between ethical and other values. He recognizes three types of theory, the inclusive, the restrictive, and the exclusive. "By the Inclusive Theory is meant the view that the field of ethical inquiry is co-extensive with that of Axiology though its emphasis is focused upon certain values which it investigates with special exactness." (p. 49). This view is subdivided into two kinds: (a) that which rests on purely axiological grounds without metaphysical implications, and (b) that which rests on axiological grounds with metaphysical implications. On the first view no difference in kinds of value is recognized, the notion of goodness or value being regarded as a simple one. The various groups of valuable things are characterized by non-axiological characteristics; e.g. we may recognize excellences of character or of conduct as a separate set of valuable things, marked off not by having a different kind of value but just by being excellences of *character* or of *conduct*—though at the same time it may be held that to different groups determined by non-axiological characteristics determinate places in the scale of value belong, e.g. that excellences of character or of conduct rank above all other valuable things. This view is further characterized by the fact that ethics is held to be identical with the study of value in general. Prof. Moore is taken as representative of this view, and Prof. Urban as representative of the inclusive view *with* metaphysical implications.

The restrictive view is defined as the view "that moral value is restricted to values of a specific class because of a principle of intensional division within value itself" (p. 64), Prof. Hartmann being cited as representative of this view, with his distinction of situational values as different in kind from moral values, though necessary for the very existence of moral values. Finally, the exclusive view is defined as that which limits "the field of ethical enquiry to moral, values strictly interpreted as having to do with personal character and conduct on the 'inner' side alone" (p. 75); of this view Kant is cited as representative.

The classification is, I think, an original one; and it is worth following up.

The next chapter is, in effect, a criticism of recent views which reduce the meaning of ethical terms like "good" to stating the existence of certain subjective attitudes either on the part of the individual who judges something to be good, or on the part of the society to which he belongs. Mr. Jury makes many

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shrewd comments on this type of view, of which one or two may be quoted as typical. "If what is meant by an ethical proposition is an assertion of personal feeling toward some object or event there need be comparatively little doubt as to what that attitude is; at least psychological analysis would be the means of dealing with doubts of this kind. Scepticism regarding man's ability to form true ethical judgments is not scepticism regarding his ability to have attitudes toward objects or his ability to recognize the psychological nature of those attitudes. It rests upon the assumption that, lying outside these, there is some objective fact in which the ethical character which is to be known inheres" (p. 87). "The tendency to subjectivism in ethical theory thus rests upon a general natural fallacy; that of making the psychological conditions of an object's being experienced at all parts of the definition of the object as it is given in experience" (p. 90). "This, it may be suspected, is the weakness of naturalistic ethics where natural concomitants of ethical characteristics have been taken as defining those ethical characteristics, because there has been failure to recognize the fact that they would never have been known to be concomitants of ethical characteristics if ethical terms had not an import apart from their naturalistic definition" (p. 103). On pp. 97-9 an interesting classification of views with respect to the objectivity or subjectivity of ethical judgments is offered.

The next chapter, on the uniqueness of ethical import, is chiefly occupied with defending the view, which seems obviously right, that it is by the nature of their predicates and not of their subjects that ethical propositions are to be recognized. Incidentally I note on p. 113 the interesting suggestion that Mill in his famous argument for hedonism was not supposing that "desirable" means the same thing as "desired," but was tacitly assuming the synthetic proposition that what is universally desired must be desirable. The chapter contains on p. 133 an interesting classification of the various kinds of proposition in which ethical terms occur.

I have left myself no space to write about the later chapters, on "the meaning of ethical terms," "the formal a priori and the a priori of content," and "the ideal and the characterization of the actual"; but I hope I have said enough to show that Mr. Jury's book is worthy of the serious attention of all those who are interested in the foundations of ethics.

W. D. Ross.

Reality and Value. By A. CAMPBELL GARNETT. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 320. Price 12s. 6d. net)

The main theme of this work, developed in a closely reasoned argument, difficult to abridge, is value; but it will conduce to an easier understanding if the leading term is seen to be *value experience*. Because of this the epistemological discussion which occupies the preliminary chapters is something more than merely incidental, for it is concerned with an analysis of experience in its most general character and thus provides results which have an important bearing on the main theme. This analysis is followed by a chapter on "The Self and the World" of high metaphysical constructiveness, showing how the diverse elements revealed by analysis are concretely related, manifesting the influence of Professor Whitehead and modern scientific ideas, and assigning to Time what some may suspect to be a somewhat mythological function and—an historical curiosity this—the rôle of *principium individuationis* formerly attributed by philosophers to space. There ensues a discussion of the main issues that have to be faced in connection with the notion of value—objectivity, obligation, standards, scales of value, and so on. The work ends with an

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examination of the three traditionally accepted intrinsic values—truth, beauty, and moral value, regarding the status of which there might have been more criticism.

In the preliminary general analysis of experience the author's aim is to elucidate the ultimate data and to clarify the concepts necessary to make the world intelligible to thought in order to establish the reality of value experience and to show that the means are provided for interpreting such experience. Not merely are the ultimate data found to be *sensa*, space, and value, space being cognized independently of but along with and not merely through *sensa*, but also the knot tied so firmly by Hume is undone by the simple expedient of insisting that more is given than Hume admitted, namely an intuition of motion or of the spatial dynamic character of the physical world, and a direct awareness of the self as essentially conation, activity, or a form of will, and thereby an intuitional basis is found for the important categories which provide the logical framework for an inferential knowledge, on the one hand, of physical structure, and, on the other, of mental structure. The result relevant to the main theme is that value experience is found to be just as real as other kinds of experience, *real* signifying "to be what it appears to be" and to be capable of maintaining its appearance upon closer and clearer inspection and fuller knowledge; and value itself is objective primarily in the sense that it is the object of an act of awareness, object and act being the two poles of any experience, and, as such an object, it is an inherent quality of perspectives. This idea of value as a quality and this idea of perspectives provide the material for further interpretation; value as a quality affects the will in such a way as to become a *validity*, an obligation; the idea of value as a quality of perspectives—an idea expressive of an analogy, much emphasized by the author, between *sensa* and value-data—serves to explain the variability and seeming subjectivity of values and raises a question concerning the general conditions affecting the values of perspectives and the specific conditions affecting the perspectives concerned. The thesis formulated and elaborated in reference to this question is that "value experience arises as the mutual effect of the operation of a primary and a subsidiary will." This is a solution in terms closely akin to idealism, and will seem to some at least a very inadequate and logically unnecessitated conclusion to the recognition of the position that the values of perspectives are conditioned and that values are not maintained or attained unless their conditions are fulfilled.

The difficulties and complications peculiarly associated with the term value require the author to make use of his own terminology: he distinguishes between value and value-potentiality, between "are values" and "have value," between "are intrinsic values" and "have intrinsic value," between value as quality and value as validity. But these distinctions do not remove the difficulties and obscurities from his theory. The contention that value has a status as an independently real feature of the objective world, unaffected by the fact that we do not perceive it or feel it, there being such a thing as psychic blindness to value as to other data is not easy—to express the matter cautiously because the connection may be very elusive—to reconcile with the rejection of Professor G. E. Moore's view that value exists independently of anyone's awareness of it or with the declaration that there is no value unless a person is conscious of it. The proposition that value is concretely realized only in actual experience or that consciousness alone has value as content, all other things having value only as a potentiality, as a capacity for affecting value experience, is capable of diverse interpretations; and if such a proposition is considered along with the notion of "obligation to the realization of values" and the notion of value

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as "what ought to be," one interpretation to which they all point is that what is valuable is *experiencing* or *being conscious*.

Nevertheless, in spite of these difficulties and, it may be noted, a few awkward grammatical constructions, such as "there could be no positive value experience arise from making the pursuit, etc." (p. 216) and "there is another value makes its appearance" (p. 306), the book is worthily written on an important subject; and, on the other hand, a philosophical argument that is largely realist, especially in its epistemology, that explicitly rejects a central tenet of idealism and yet ends with an ontology akin to idealism and with an ethical proposition that coincides with one enunciated by Bradley, whatever strange offspring of the brain it may seem to those who cling to rigid lines of demarcation between philosophies, cannot fail to be interesting to-day because of the growing tendency it reveals in contemporary philosophy and to be stimulating because of the high effort at synthesis which it manifests. Those who, noting that specific propositions can claim to be established by different, even opposing, philosophical arguments, find questions rising in their minds about the relevance of such arguments at all to the propositions reached may obtain some answer to their doubts in the concluding words of the author in which he stresses the important bearing of a philosophical argument upon the significance, concreteness, and definiteness of a proposition

B. M. LAING.

The Political Aspect of Religious Development. By the REV. E. E. THOMAS, M.A., D.Litt. (London: John Heritage, The Unicorn Press, Ltd. 1937. Pp. xxv + 274. Price 10s. 6d.)

This is in some ways an able and interesting book, in others a disappointing and even irritating one; and it would be difficult to determine whether its merits outweigh its defects, or *vice versa*. The title would lead one to expect an impartial historical account of the influence of politics on religion; but it is rather a polemic argument for a religion which will draw its contents from, and give value to, life as the man of to-day experiences and appreciates it. The term *politics* seems to be used in the wider sense of *social structure*, and the word *religion* is for the most part confined to the Christian, as the writer has only vague allusions to others. As he is described as the Rector of Marchwiel, one would expect that his treatment would be from the Christian standpoint: but, while he indulges in very severe condemnation of the Christian Church, he does not make clear how far he does accept the common creed of Christendom; and he writes as if in religion there were only human discovery and not divine disclosure. The word *revelation* does not occur in the index. He denies the autonomous character of religion, and makes it dependent on secular changes: "It was the political changes that came first; religious changes came afterwards" (p. 17). The impression which the Introduction gave me was that religion should be the product of the *l'elan vital*. The last paragraph confirms this impression. "We have now come to the end of our task. What we have tried to show is that religion is life, and life is religion. There is no gulf fixed between heaven and earth, between God and man, between the spiritual and the material. Each is formative of the other. Furthermore, the formative processes through which reality shapes itself under the hands of God and man are historical through and through. When, therefore, we look back upon the history of man and trace his endeavours to arrive at fulness of life through political and social striving, we are at the same time tracing his religious development. In and through his political ideals man's religious ideals take form, become clear, and move towards their

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realization. As we look at the present and forward into the future we see how the vast changes taking place to-day, and the intense striving to create political and social principles which shall be adequate to control the greater fulness of life to which the present is giving birth, are having a profound influence upon religion. Religion and the world are being brought into intimate relationship with each other, and religion is being called upon to renew itself at the fire of life and to arise like the phoenix from its ashes" (pp. 266-7). It is no injustice to the author to say that historical Christianity, as the Christian Church conceives it, cannot be fitted into this framework without loss of what is distinctive of it, Revelation, Incarnation, Redemption; and that his doctrine of God tends towards, if it is not identical with, the divine *nîsus* of Alexander's philosophy, or pantheism. The conceptions of transcendence, supernatural, miracle are foreign to his thought. In thinking of God as Creator "man is seeking to give to all that happens within the universe an inward bond of unity the same in kind, though infinitely greater in extent, as that which enables him to bind together all the events taking place within his own life and for which he himself is responsible" (p. 157).

I am not in these pages writing as a Christian apologist, and am neither praising nor blaming the author for offering an alternative, however vague he leaves it, for historical Christianity. I could have read with interest and appreciation an unprejudiced and persuasive argument; but what has tried my patience is that the author indulges in generalities which have just enough truth in them to be misleading, and in quite obvious misstatements. A political source is assigned to Christianity. "In the matter of His moral teaching, and in the matter of His religious claims, and in the matter of His miracles, Christ did not stand out high above the finer minds of His times. Where He did stand out infinitely above any thinkers either Jewish or heathen or Roman or Greek was in His political thought" (p. 15). What then was His political thought? "Not only did Christ express His hatred of the rich; He detested and expressed His detestation of the whole political and social scheme whereby riches and poverty came into existence. . . . He also waged a bitter warfare against the money kings of those days" (p. 21). Any competent New Testament scholar, however modern, would simply be amused at so inadequate a statement. On pages 56 and 57 Christ's divinity, resurrection, and exaltation seem to be unequivocally stated; but the phrase in the Index, "His assumption of Divinity," opens the door to doubt whether the author is stating facts which he himself believes, or is expounding the beliefs of the Early Church. If the former, the account of Christ's superiority must appear still more inadequate; if the latter, he would be more consistent with the account of religion than the Introduction would lead one to expect, and the last paragraph of the book indicates. This is the crucial test.

The account of Luther gives undue prominence to his political thought, and ignores what was destructive of him. He is excused for denouncing the Peasants' War. The statement that "princes ought to rule in the temporal sphere and ecclesiastics in the spiritual" is grotesque in view of his reliance on "godly princes" to set the churches in order (pp. 70, 71). Calvin's dependence on Zwingle and Luther is ignored. The charge that Calvin "was not slow to take advantage of . . . a unique opportunity for a man of strength to make himself dictator" is in flagrant contradiction to his reluctance to take the position of leadership, for which Farvel recognized his fitness. The statement about his "religious creed" as living on only "in remote parts of Scotland and Wales" but not in Switzerland will be read with interest in all these countries, which are witnessing a revival of Calvinism (pp. 74-5). As a Nonconformist who may claim to be at the very centre of its progressive

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interests and activities, I read with surprise this estimate. "Nonconformity stands bewildered and helpless and despairing in a world it cannot understand in the least" (p. 123). The recent conferences of the Christian Churches are a refutation of the libels on all the Christian Churches in which the author indulges.

The second part is on the whole very much better than the first, and contains some valuable discussions of science, history, and religion, although the last three chapters fall below the level of the preceding six. The author's epistemology seems to be a combination of sensationalism and pragmatism; and it shows a lack of discrimination to include Kant with Hegel and Fichte in one condemnation. In seeking to verify my references I have discovered how defective the Index is. I have not directed my criticisms against the author's own positive conclusions; but against the serious defects of his method of argument, of which I have given only a few instances. The author has certainly not observed the golden rule of doing unto others as he would be done unto. I accept his contention that religious development is and must be affected by the environment; but he exaggerates the primary importance of what he calls "the political aspect."

A. E. GARVIE.

Thought and Reality: Hegelianism and Advaita. By P. T. Raju, M.A., Ph.D. (Calcutta), Sastri (Government Sanskrit College, Benares), Lecturer in Philosophy, Andhra University. Foreword by J. H. MUIRHEAD, LL.D., F.B.A. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 285. Price 10s. 6d.)

In one of his class-lectures Hegel expressed his opinion of Indian idealism in the following not very complimentary way: "Individuality, indeed, is not elevated to personality, but the power unfolds wildly enough as inconsistency of the passing over to the opposite; *we are in a realm of unbridled madness* (wir befinden uns auf einem Boden zügelloser Verrücktheit) where the commonest presence is directly raised to (the status of) something divine and the substance is imagined as existing in finite form, and no less immediately what has form is sublimated into the formless."¹

The sources on which this judgement is based must be the same translations and essays on Indian philosophy which were then available in Europe and at the same time or little later evoked the enthusiasm of Hegel's contemporary and antagonist Schelling, as of W. von Humboldt. They were few but included already both the Bhagavadgītā (London, 1785; Bonn, 1823) and the Upanishads (Strassburg, 1801-2, Latin translation from a Persian translation). This shows how utterly unable Hegel was to find in Indian thought anything congenial to him. But then, next to nothing can have been known to him of the systematic Indian philosophy, and it is hardly possible to believe that he would have upheld his sweeping condemnation, had he become acquainted, e.g. with the Sāṅkhya-kārikā (1837) or with Śaṅkara's famous commentary on the Brahmasūtras (1851 first incomplete, 1887 first complete translation).

For Hegel philosophy is the science of the Absolute, and it is the very same thing, viz. *brahma-vidyā*, for Śaṅkara. And Hegel is, or at least was until recently, paramount in English philosophy. Sufficient inducement, then, for Indians to try a comparison of the two. This is, of course, possible only within narrow limits, and the task is no easy one. It has, however, been carried through in a really scientific manner by the author of the book before us. He has the double qualification required for it: a sound knowledge of both Indian and Western

¹ *Gesammelte Werke*, 1932, vol. xii, p. 440. Translation ours, also italics.

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methods, and, though acquainted with Hegel from translations only and works on his system, may be said to have made himself thoroughly familiar with him. An interesting feature of the book has thus become the combined use made therein, against Hegel and the Hegelians, of the critical apparatus of Western philosophy and the instruments, as supplied by Śrīharsha and others, of Indian dialectics.

The book is inscribed "To my teacher Professor Sir S. Radhakrishnan," and the author's aim in writing it has been "the clarification of Śāṅkara's philosophy in the light of Western systems, so that it may be made the basis of logic" (p. 253), i.e. "of the logic of supra-rational Absolutism" (p. 11). It has five parts (with up to twelve chapters each) entitled respectively. "The Absolute as a Coherent System," "The Problem of Negation," "The Problem of Truth," "The Self and the Mind," and "The Philosophical Method," and in each of these we are being led *from Hegel through Bradley to Śāṅkara*. Bradley has been chosen not so much as the greatest British Hegelian but because "of all the great Hegelians or Neo-Kantians Bradley comes nearest to Śāṅkara" (p. 254), viz. through his "fundamental view that thought is inadequate to reality" (p. 254).

The following very incomplete survey must suffice for giving an idea of the comprehensiveness of this important work: *Part I* (eight chapters) is engaged in explaining that the Absolute cannot be the Infinite as understood by Hegel; can be no organism nor a system of individual selves; cannot be conceptual or logical; can have no manifestation of something new; and cannot be dynamic. *Part II* (five chapters) discusses Hegel's application, to the Absolute, of his principle of negation, further the meaning of negation and of difference, etc., and denies (with the Advaita) that negation has any ontological validity. *Part III* (twelve chapters) Identity of the nature of truth and reality. Criterium of thing to be based on its nature. Defectiveness of the coherence and the correspondence view. Status of the object of illusion; error wrongly believed by Hegelians to be absorbed by reality. Necessity to admit the principle of inexplicability (*māyā*, *avidyā*) advocated by Śāṅkara. Non-contradiction wrongly identified with coherence. Truth as its own criterium. Universals not ontologically real. No distinction to be drawn between existence and reality. The objects of our knowledge are not ultimately real, but they are not mere ideas (Śāṅkara's realistic idealism). *Part IV* (five chapters): Hegel's conceptual thinking explained and criticized; thought lifted to real Absolute Knowledge must disappear. Mind is not the Self, and intellect not the only form of experience; at the bottom of thought there is intuition through which alone the supra-rational and supra-relational Absolute can be experienced (in Self-consciousness): not, of course, as identity, but as non-difference; for "intuition is that consciousness in which distinctions are not found." "Intellect cannot exist without intuition" and may serve as a corrective of intuition, but "existence is known only through intuition." *Part V* (three chapters): the moving principle of the transcendental (- philosophical) method is the principle of non-contradiction, not that of coherence. Limits of syllogistic reasoning. Defence, against G. W. Cunningham, of the argument *a contingentia mundi*. Defects of Hegel's method: his thesis and antithesis are not contradictories, not even contraries, but differentials; the lower categories cannot be deduced from the higher; the Absolute, as also the individual, is not coherence but integrality.—After this there is still a "Conclusion" (pp. 245–274) which is really an Appendix consisting of supplementary notes (as on the defectiveness of the dialectic as a process of life, on Śāṅkara and Plotinus, etc.) hurriedly arranged in nine chapters without title and not bearing throughout the stamp of mature consideration which distinguishes the body of the work.

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*Turning logic into metaphysics is not wholly unknown in Indian philosophy, yet not more than a tendency to it can be pointed out, as e.g. in the inconsistent pluralistic realism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. On the other hand, the idea of the Absolute as a system or an organic whole, though absolutely rejected by Śāṅkara, who allows no distinction whatever in it, not even that of substance and attribute, is familiar enough to Indian philosophy. Rāmānuja, e.g., holds that souls and matter are the "body" of God stretched forth, as it were, out of him and withdrawn again to its "subtle" condition in an endless series of cosmic "days" and "nights." But God being perfect, here as in every Indian system that has room for him, manifestation is but the ever repeated *divina comedia* (*līlā* "play") without the production of anything really new,¹—which shows the contrast to Hegel's Infinite always remaining in a process of accomplishment. A conscious Self is not, as might appear from our book, universally assumed in India. It is most emphatically denied already in a late Upanishad where (Māndūkya-Up. 7) the Absolute is defined as "neither inwardly conscious nor outwardly conscious nor bothwise conscious; not a mass of consciousness;² neither conscious nor unconscious (torpid)"; and in both the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā systems consciousness is a mere accidental attribute of the soul which disappears completely in Liberation. Let us remember also that the most ardent admirer of Śāṅkara in the West, viz. the late Professor Deussen of Kiel University, felt compelled to state with regret that Śāṅkara has been unable to resist the widely spread anthropocentric belief that the "innermost being of man and of the world, the Brahman, the Principle, the Deity could have some similarity or analogy or identity with what we find to abide 'behind man's silly forehead' as consciousness, as thought, as spirit." It is in this way, indeed, viz. as some higher kind of consciousness, that the Absolute is understood by the large majority of Indian thinkers, including Śāṅkara (and even the commentators of the Upanishad quoted above), and also by Hegel. But while for the latter it is even rational, it is supra-rational for Śāṅkara and for our author. For, says Dr. Raju, we have *intuition* which alone gives us the idea of existence opposing thought (p. 212), and the highest form of intuition is Self-consciousness—experience of the Absolute (p. 218). Now, this is certainly a correct interpretation of Śāṅkara's standpoint, and we agree with Dr. Raju that our idea of persistent, identical things is not a mere fiction of the intellect for the purposes of life, as held by Bergson (and the German Vitalists), but rests on an intuition that precedes reason and points to a reality which is just the opposite of Time. But we do not see the force of the argument (p. 200) that this reality cannot be unconscious and therefore must be supra-rational—*for, is not supra-consciousness one more possibility?*—and, on the other hand, find it difficult to believe that those who pretend to have had direct experience of it (as, e.g. Plotinus) have actually succeeded in descending to the deepest depth of our being. We do not mean to say that the idea of such experience is absurd. It is not so, because, even admitting duality in intuition, the Absolute, being necessarily present in both the subject and the object of our ordinary experience (as there can be nothing outside the Absolute), may as well at any time *also*, and occasionally *only*, be in an analogous way conscious of itself *without* the accompanying empirical consciousness. We cannot know what is possible or impossible for a supra-rational*

¹ Not the former alone, as stated (by an oversight, no doubt) on p. 56 of our book.

² The exit of the liberated soul from the cycle of births being merely the realization of its own true nature.

³ "Mass (or Lump) of consciousness" (*prajñāna-ghaṇa*) is, in the older Upanishads, a description of the Absolute understood as pure consciousness in which subject and object are "unified."

⁴ *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. i, part 2, p. 121; cf. *System des Vedānta*, pp. 145–146.

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entity and should rather say that for the Absolute as the Perfect nothing should be impossible. But the experience of "cosmic consciousness,"¹ or rather several kinds of it, is familiar even to atheistic Buddhism, and we must be allowed to ask whether such experience, so far as it is not purely subjective (as is, admittedly, that, e.g. of "Infinite Space" as distinguished from the "real" experiences mentioned below) is not merely the experience of some higher yet intramundane, consciousness which is at the back of our own, or of the highest personal god (Brahmā, not the neutral Brahṁā) of Śāṅkara's cosmology, the ruler of our "Brahman-Egg" (which is, in developed Vedānta, only one of an infinite number of galactic systems).² Buddhism teaches eight dhyānas (meditations) leading to ever higher cosmic realms, e.g. the third grade of the first to the realm of Brahṁā, the sixth to the realm of "Infinite Consciousness," etc., but none that leads to a supra-rational Absolute or any Absolute at all. The Buddha, while teaching an escape from the world of phenomena, is, on principle, silent on the noumenon, because "where all ideas are expunged, all paths of speech are also expunged" (Suttanipāṭa 1076). Śāṅkara, on the contrary, emphasizes our conviction of the permanent self (ātmapratyaya) as the only thing we are sure of and is not even afraid of speaking on the relation of the world and the Absolute. Having established "non-distinction" in the Absolute and herewith the phenomenal nature of the individual as of any plurality, he can, without getting involved into Hegel's contradiction (of the one in the many with the latter as an *essential* part of the former) bridge over the gulf by means of his theory of *māyā* (illusion) = *avidyā*, *ajñāna* (ignorance) or, as our author calls it, the *principle of inexplicability*. This is perhaps most conveniently introduced to the West from the Greek habit of conceiving the world, when contrasted with Being or Ideas, as compounded, as it were, of Being and Non-Being. As there can be nothing outside the Absolute, the world, must be also the Absolute, but with a sort of veil over it which both hides it and makes it appear as many and changing. This double function of *māyā* is, in later Vedānta, styled its "hiding power" and "projecting (or: dispersing) power," *āvarana*- and *vikṣhepa*-*śakti*. Śāṅkara combats subjective idealism: things and ideas are equally real for him; but both of these are, in regard to the Absolute, *māyā* "illusion," which, however, does not mean that they are "ideas" of and in the Absolute (as with Hegel)—for the Absolute is without distinctions or divisions—but that they are unimaginable both as existing in as outside the Absolute. *Māyā* is, therefore, declared by Śāṅkara to be "undefinable both as truth and what is different from it." It is, as Dr. Raju, "an inexplicable entity" by which we, i.e. "as intellect," "are permeated" (p. 155). But Intellect is *māyā*, and the Absolute is also inexplicable; we should therefore prefer to reverse the statement and say, somewhat in the way of Karl Jaspers: existence is the ground that carries consciousness by shining through the latter with a glimmer of it; it is not entirely outside consciousness but is obstructed in it by the inexplicable entity called *māyā*. Bergson and the Bergsonians are, of course, right in saying that our ego projects its own identity into the stream of becoming, but they are wrong both in calling this identity a mere fiction of the intellect and in condemning the projecting as illegitimate. For, our conviction of identity is based on something more elemental than reasoning, viz. intuition; and the object must be metaphysically of the same nature as the subject, i.e. it must be an

¹ On the Brahmanic view of which there is an excellent little book inspired by James's *Varieties of Religious Experience*, viz. *Cosmic Consciousness, or the Vedantic Idea of Realisation or Mukti (in the light of Modern Psychology)* by M. C. Nanjunda Row (a physician), Madras, 1909.

² Cf. the "encaptic" view of Professor Karl Groos of Tübingen, in his work *Die Unsterblichkeitsfrage*, Berlin, 1936; also Goethe's monadism.

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integrality the breaking up of which into the form of subject and predicate ("the rose is red") can be only due to the process of *māyā* (p. 70). This process by which the Absolute assumes the forms has been styled *vivarta*, which term, meaning also "illusion," is used in contradistinction to *parināma* "transmutation," viz. of God into the world in the pantheistic systems, as to any system trying to explain by causation the relation of the Absolute to the world. It therefore does not mean any imaginable process at all, but points to the Absolute as that which transcends rest and movement as any relation we can think of. All of the many objections raised to the theory by Indian philosophers and constantly renewed until to-day are therefore futile. They "carry the contradictions of the lower level to the higher" (p. 85) by ignoring the absurdity of an explainable Absolute. There exists, as seems to me, something akin to *vivarta* in Western thought, viz. the "creation from nothing" of Christian theology and its philosophical echo in Scotus Erigena and the German mystics.

Our author concludes his work with two small paragraphs on the idea of freedom in the Advaita. He might have been more explicit here as to the problem of *free-will* which he merely hints at with the words "Because of this freedom," viz. of the Absolute, "there is inexplicability in the world." Śāṅkara seems to have nowhere dealt with it (except from his "lower" theological point of view, viz. in his comment on Brahmasūtra II, 3, 41-42), but would probably agree with the following: We are, as the transrelational Absolute, free from willing, and, as will, subject to causality, but by projecting our feeling of absoluteness (*ātma-pratyaya*) to the will (which as part of the *antaḥ-karaṇa* or psychical apparatus is *māyā*, not Self, *ātman*) produce the impossible thing called *liberum arbitrium*.

The book is practically free from misprints, but the transliteration of the Sanskrit in the foot-notes leaves much to be desired and must in a future edition be made to accord with the practice followed by orientalists. On p. 156 (bottom) *twlāvidyā* should be *sthūlāvidyā*, and "snake" (*ibid.*) is a lapsus for "rope"; and on p. 274 the "play of God" is erroneously attributed to the Upanishads.

F. OTTO SCHRADER.

The Focus of Belief. By A. R. WHATELY, M.A., D.D. (Cambridge: at the University Press. 1937. Pp. x + 191. Price 8s. 6d. net.)

This is an interesting and valuable contribution to Christian theology, but it is often difficult to read as the author does not allow himself room for an adequate exposition of his original ideas, and the reader often remains uncertain whether these ideas are true as well as new. It is evident that he has been very strongly influenced by the theology of Karl Barth. He does not attempt to prove Christian theism, but assumes its truth, and then seeks to show how, when accepted in faith, it authenticates itself. After an Introduction stating the subject and method, five chapters are devoted to *Faith* as the organ for receiving and responding to the reality of God as revealed in Christ; it is related to Will, Reason, and Intuition (a direct apprehension of truth), and to Science and Philosophy, Ethics and Theology. All human thought remains inconclusive till Faith completes it. Reason may *comprehend* what Faith as Intuition *apprehends*. Christian theism needs to have a *focus*, and that focus is the redemptive action of God in Christ. Nine chapters are devoted to the exposition of this subject.

I find unsatisfactory the author's attempt to galvanize into apparent life the doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin as quite unnecessary for a doctrine

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of Redemption, which can be more adequately stated in modern terms. His view of the Incarnation as an assumption of a human body only seems to me virtually, despite his exposition, to deny the manhood of Jesus. A few sentences from his last chapter *Retrospect and Conclusion* afford a clear summary of his argument. "The aim of this book has been to understand the Christian faith as a focused unity: to commend this presentment, not by coercive demonstration, but by releasing an intellectual intuition that, in its turn, once truly realized, must take control of the natural processes that assisted its emergence. It is our conviction that the whole context of the Christian meaning of Redemption is one inclusive and indiscerptible whole—that Redemption and Revelation may, from the side of either, be brought under one formula—however little we may have succeeded in bringing this home even to sympathetic readers. Further, we are sure (though this could not be worked out in a small space) that this conception gives unity to our general philosophy of life, reality, and knowledge by breaking up illicit or provisional unities that Philosophy has formed within itself, and opening out *from the other side* its convergent blind alleys" (p. 178). Reason is thus subordinated to Revelation, reason to intuition, philosophy to theology, Redemption is not only the focus of belief, but the clue to all reality. The argument is worth considering.

A. E. GARVIE.

Towards the Twentieth Century: Essays in the Spiritual History of the Nineteenth. By H. V. ROUTH, M.A., D.Lit. (Cambridge: at the University Press. 1937. Pp. x + 392. Price 21s.).

The False State. By HILDA D. OAKELEY, M.A., D.Lit. (London: Williams & Norgate, Ltd. 1937. Pp. xii + 211. Price 6s.)

These two books are both concerned with individual personality in relation to social structure; and though the subject of one is historical and of the other political, a similar predominantly moral outlook is common to both.

Dr. Routh deals with the failure of the great Victorians to satisfy the moral needs of their age: he discusses the reasons for their failure, and suggests how the legacy of spiritual aimlessness they left to us may be and is being overcome. The earlier part of his book is more successful than the later. On the early Victorian prophets he writes with elaborate mastery. It is an old story perhaps, but retold freshly and with imaginative insight. His general conclusion is that they failed because they "were still living on the inspiration of the romantic movement," and because "they tried to adjust ethics to metaphysics" (p. 134). This seems to me true and important; and the whole argument of these middle chapters has a strong philosophical interest. But I found the later ones less satisfactory. There are some strange omissions. Thus while the "philosophy" of George Moore is discussed at some length, such writers as William Morris, Bernard Shaw, and H. G. Wells are barely mentioned. Moreover there is to me an obvious unfairness, and artificiality, in judging writers like Hardy and Conrad in terms simply of their "message"; and the contrast between Hardy's tragic sense and the "anti-pessimism" of the Greeks is a good deal less than adequate. Nor can I agree with Dr. Routh's conclusion that "after a century's controversy and research Physics has displaced Metaphysics in the quest for ultimate reality" (p. 377), nor in his selection of J. S. Haldane, Jules Romains, and Thomas Mann as leading prophets of the new dispensation.

Dr. Oakeley's much shorter book is a philosophical attack on the conception of the totalitarian state, and particularly the ideals of it as set forth in the work of Mr. and Mrs. Webb on *Soviet Communism*. Few, I hope, will disagree

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with her in her dissection of this "gigantic fallacy" which "has reduced the life of men and women to unreality in the present era." It is well to insist that the tendency to regard the events of history as "objective spirit" leads naturally to a conception of the state as a super-personal "power," and that this hypostatization of an abstraction supplies the ideological excuse for the exercise of arbitrary authority by an individual despot. Her attack on the concept of the "mass-man" is no less salutary; and she well points out the logical contradictions involved in Mr. and Mrs. Webb's use of the word "freedom." But it is a pity that Dr. Oakeley cannot express herself in clearer English; for the clumsiness of her style continually blunts the edge of her argument. And there is surely some deeper confusion in her argument that the state is not "a necessary historical development."

The special philosophical interest of these two books is that they both voice, in rather different terms, the strong present-day reaction from the romanticism and absoluteness of Hegelian metaphysics. In Victorian days Hegelianism stood for a necessary corrective of a rampant individualism. But the remedy has proved worse than the disease. We need to-day another sort of philosophy, less grandiose and wordy, and more respectful of individual personality. There is the citadel of freedom, and there the source of all our values.

ADRIAN COATES.

The Philosophy of Love (Dialoghi d'Amore). By LEONE EBREO. Translated by F. Friedeberg-Sceley & Jean H. Barnes. With an introduction by Cecil Roth. (London: The Soncino Press. 1937. Pp. xv + 468. Price 15s.)

Although the work here translated from the Italian has passed, in one language or another, through some twenty editions since its first appearance in Rome in 1535, it is probably unknown to most students of the history of philosophy and of literature. Strange though it is—a medley, though a very charming one, of astrology, biology, and ethical and religious idealism—it deserves to be more widely known. No idea runs through literature, at any rate poetic literature, so prominently as that of love, and anyone who would trace its ways and guises from the intricate *rime* of the troubadours to the passionate lyrics of the Romantics will find the *Dialoghi d'Amore* an outstanding landmark and a finger-post to much that came after it. Its distinction of love and desire, and its substitution of metaphysical form as the essence of beauty in place of the contemporary Italian insistence on proportion, bring the book within the purview of the historian of aesthetics, as Croce has recognized. In the history of philosophy Leone is an interesting transitional figure. By taking love metaphysically, as the ground of creation and the principle of cosmic unity, he places himself with the neo-Platonizing Florentines; but, without losing his theism, he secularized the principle much more than Ficino and Pico della Mirandola ever did, and thus prepared the way for the naturalistic study of Nature which soon ensued and which itself gave birth to natural science. This subtle link between Leone and, for instance, Vesalius, may be of less interest to some possible readers than the link with Spinoza. Both were Jews, both mystics, both set a *nisus* at the heart of Nature, and both used and emphasized the same phrase, "the intellectual love of God": and a copy of the *Dialoghi*, in Spanish, was found among Spinoza's books after his death. It is striking that love was given a fundamental place by two unfortunates, the one exiled for being a Jew, the other for not being an orthodox one.

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The publishers are, therefore, to be warmly praised for making this very characteristic product of the Renaissance at last available in English, and, it may be added, for giving it a beautiful external form (the printing is by the Curwen Press). The translators have not had an easy task, yet the version is smooth and idiomatic in a really distinguished prose which it is a joy to read. As for its accuracy, so far as I have tested it, it inspires confidence. I only regret that the text from which the translation has been made has not been indicated: it would be a help to know whether it is, for example, Santino Caramella's recent recension (1929, Bari) or Gebhardt's handsome facsimile of the first edition in the *Bibliotheca Spinozana* (Tom. iii, 1929).

The introduction is regrettably brief, being restricted to an outline of Leone's life. Some sketch of the various interest of the book, even if only as bare as the one given above, should have been added, seeing that there is no account in English (so far as I know) to which readers could be referred. The readers who are thus left to search for themselves for any further information about Leo the Jew might at least have been told, for guidance through catalogues and indexes, that his family name is variously spelt—Abarbanel, Abrabanel, and Abravanel.

T. E. JESSOP.

The Self and the Ideal. An Essay in Metaphysical Construction on the basis of Moral Consciousness. By RASHVIHARI DAS, M.A., Ph.D., Professor of Metaphysics and Indian Philosophy in the Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner. Reprinted from the Journal of the Department of Letters, vol. xxvii (Calcutta University Press, 1935. Pp. 251.)

Four more words should have been added to the sub-title of this work, viz. "and of Sāṅkhya metaphysics." For, though this comes out only in the last but one chapter, it is undoubtedly the most interesting feature of the book. We have here a renewal of a philosophical system, the oldest probably of all in India, which became extinct long ago but has left its traces in almost the whole realm of Indian thought. The classical (atheistic) Sāṅkhya, as will be remembered, teaches a metaphysical "dualism" of (1) Nature (*prakṛti* = matter with mind) as a single principle comprising three forces (*guṇas*) which pass alternately through huge periods of equilibrium = rest and disturbedness = psychophysical evolution; and (2) an infinite number of souls or spirits (*puruṣas*, lit. "men") which, being in themselves pure (objectless) consciousness, omnipresent, and "inactive," enable Nature to evolve by shedding their "light" on her, and are liberated through getting free from the illusion of their identity with mind. Now, this dualism is by our author upheld but transformed. He (1) removes the inconsistency of a plurality of pure subjects differing from one another in nothing whatever by declaring pure consciousness or the pure subject (undefinable, because comprehensible in itself only) to be one and the same in all "selves"; and (2) makes Nature the unconscious (though not lifeless) other half, as it were, of the Absolute: its *māyā* as he also calls it with the Vedāntic term, though not with its meaning "illusion." Not only, therefore, are the selves the Absolute in disguise (as in Advaita), but their double nature also reflects (as against it) a *real* dualism in the Absolute. The self, then, is a unity in variety, i.e. a real unity of a permanent subject with changing elements, in contradistinction to both the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta who deny any real connection of pure consciousness with anything else. *Prakṛti* remains also when the world is not there, viz. in its "unmanifest" condition called *mūla-prakṛti* "Root-Nature" in the Sāṅkhya. "That means that it remains identified with the *Puruṣa* or the ideal" (p. 229). This is, we may add here, in accordance

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with the most ancient Vishnuistic system, the Pāficarātra, which teaches that the withdrawal of the world is, or rather results in, the "over-embrace" of Viṣṇu and Lakṣmi, the highest male and the highest female principle. And *love* is, indeed, insinuated by our author as the whole purport of the world-process looked at as the "play" (*līlā*) of God. For "the play has to be there because the principle of love, which may be supposed to hold together Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, sometimes in absolute union and sometimes in partial separation, can express itself only through this play" (p. 231). "Ultimate reality" is what never needs to change itself, i.e. the pure subject only, the unchanging principle of knowledge. This remains the same also during the world-process which requires it as its permanent background. The ground does not contain the world, not even in a germinal state, but "the form and character of the world are determined by it" (p. 226). To account for the origin of the universe we have to assume that the identity or perfect union of the ground with its other is somehow *disturbed*. This corresponds to what in the Sāṅkhya is termed *kṣobha* (shaking, concussion) and there means only the disturbance of the equilibrium in primitive matter (Root-Nature) implying not alienation from spirit, but, on the contrary, a new entanglement of the (unliberated) spirits in Nature.

This whole view appears in the book before us only as the final result of a long (and rather too lengthy) search after the ideal satisfying the demands of moral consciousness, the latter being taken as an indisputable fact. Moral consciousness means the duty felt to become "good" and act accordingly. What is the highest practicable standard of goodness? Not the idea of the good in the Platonic sense (ch. v) nor the transcendent or transcendent+immanent God of theism (ch. vi) nor an incomprehensible and really unknown Absolute (chs. vii-viii), but an ultimate reality which must be, as in the Vedānta, *saccidānanda*, i.e. "ultimate satisfaction (ānanda) with perfect knowledge (cit) guaranteeing absolute existence (sat)" (ch. xii). Moral consciousness demands a world which is both real and appearance (=changing), and a highest reality which, without containing the world, is its very self and the ideal to be increasingly realized in its history (p. 216). To understand moral obligation we have to suppose a "fall from the ideal," a self-differentiation of the ideal opposing itself to itself, and thus look at the world as "the self-alienated ideal," with the ideal, however, remaining "the ground and support of the world and thus the very self of its alienated part" (pp. 224-227).

The introductory chapters of the book (i-iv) deal with "Metaphysics and Ethics," "The Validity of Moral Judgments," "The Objectivity of Value," and "The Ideal"; the Conclusion (ch. xv) with freedom, evil, immortality, and the personal highest God of religion, the "world-spirit (Brahmā, masc.) "whose visible form is the universe" and whom "metaphysics does not deny," though taking care "to point to what lies beyond him."

The book shows remarkable independence, lucidity of thought, and great literary power, but also rather too much of the verbosity of the class-lecturer.

F. OTTO SCHRADER.

Yoga Vasishtha, translated from the Sanskrit by HARI PRASAD SHASTRI.
(London : Faval Press, Ltd., 1937. Pp. 170. Price 3s.)

Yoga Vasishtha comes as a valuable addition to the already extensive Yoga literature of the West, and we welcome this publication especially since it is not an ordinary work which is made accessible to the English reader in this shape, but a philosophy which in the opinion of experts is "one of the greatest productions of the Indian mind," to use the words of Professor

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B. L. Ātreya (*Yogavāsishtha* and its Philosophy, lectures, 1st series 1932, 2nd series 1934).

There is hardly anything in the whole range of Vedāntic literature which can rival the depth of mystic feeling, strength of argument, and beauty of expression with which the universal essence of the individual soul as God-consciousness and master of the worlds is described as in the *Yogavāsishtha* stanzas. They set forth the fundamental truths of all philosophy and any student at any time or place who in the deepest depths of his aspirations is confronted with the "*Magnalia Naturae*" will find perfect consolation in *Yogavāsishtha*, since here the problems of reality and illusion are indeed solved, or—speaking a little less boldly and a little more Westernly—at least represented in such a way as to convince him that he *can* find the solution within himself. It is this universality of the Vedāntist and its up-to-date significance which tempts one to look for corroboration among leading European philosophers—a task which Professor Ātreya has successfully undertaken, and it is from this aspect that we would ascribe to Professor Shastri's translation more than a passing interest. His English rendering is clear and adequate and rises to poetical heights. We would perhaps not agree with the author's opinion on the chronology and literary criticism of the work translated; but we forgive him for that as he is a man who is convinced that the force of the spirit is more important than that of the letter.

The extracts from the teachings of *Yogavāsishtha* (called by Professor Shastri "*Holy Vāsishtha*") are preceded by the beautiful story of Queen Chudala who figures as a model of Yoga attainment. She is indeed a perfect embodiment of that serenity and happiness which is the fruit of true mystic contemplation.

W. STEDE.

Man as Psychology Sees Him. By EDWARD S. ROBINSON. (New York and London: The Macmillan Co. 1932. Pp. vii + 376. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

This is a book with a wide general appeal, popularly written but by no means superficial. The ground traversed is familiar, and there is nothing very new in the argument except in so far as the author succeeds in bringing the facts together in a rather striking way. The book is well worth reading even by the professional psychologist.

In Part I of the book, which is entitled "*Man*," the author discusses heredity and environment, motives, learning, and reason. Most of the wider problems of modern psychology, more particularly those with a definite social or educational bearing, are touched upon in an illuminating way, and without ignoring the views of any of the leading schools of psychology. In the last chapter of Part I we are given an interesting discussion of the mind-body problem.

Part II is entitled "*Psychology*" and begins with a consideration of the nature of the science, from which the author passes to a discussion of its development from philosophy, and then to an examination of the reasons for its position in the public mind to-day. The various cults characteristic of modern psychology are then dealt with in a suggestive and rather epigrammatical way. "*The professor of psychology*," says Robinson, "*loves a cult.*"

The book can be heartily recommended.

J. DREVER.

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CONGRÈS INTERNATIONAL DES SCIENCES ANTHROPOLOGIQUES ET ETHNOLOGIQUES

Copenhague. 1^{er} au 6 Août 1938

LA deuxième réunion du Congrès International des Sciences Anthropologiques et Ethnologiques sera placé sous le Haut Patronage de S.M. le Roi de Danemark et d'Islande. Au Congrès seront présentées toutes les recherches qui se rapportent aux races, aux peuples et à leurs genres de vie, c'est à dire ce qui concerne l'étude scientifique de l'homme.

Il est proposé de diviser les travaux du Congrès en sections de la façon suivante:

- A. Anthropologie physique.
- B. Psychologie.
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- D. Ethnologie.
- E. Ethnographie.
- F. Sociologie et religion.
- G. Linguistique et écriture.

Si, comme nous l'espérons vivement, vous avez l'intention d'assister au Congrès, nous serons heureux de recevoir aussitôt que possible votre adhésion. En remplissant le bulletin ci-joint veuillez l'obligeance d'indiquer si vous désirez recevoir ultérieurement les programmes détaillés.

Les bulletins d'adhésion et les cotisations doivent être envoyés au Trésorier du Congrès International des Sciences Anthropologiques et Ethnologiques, Nationalmuseet, 10 Ny Vestergade, Copenhague K, et toute autre communication doit être adressée aux Secrétaires Généraux du Congrès International des Sciences Anthropologiques et Ethnologiques, également au Nationalmuseum.

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Kaj Birket-Smith,

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John L. Myres.



CORRESPONDENCE

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

SIR,

The main points of Professor Ushenko's letter in the October issue of *Philosophy* are sufficiently impersonal to call for reply. I think that if he had realized that my review of his book, *The Philosophy of Relativity*, was addressed dispassionately to the readers of *Philosophy* and not mockingly to himself, he would not have written the more extravagant passages, and I will therefore not comment on them beyond defending myself against a charge which, if it were just, would disqualify me for what I have always felt to be the serious and responsible work of book-reviewing. Professor Ushenko states that my review "contends that this book, although 'undoubtedly worth reading' for philosophers, is not a 'valuable contribution' to science. The reviewer might, of course, have made it clearer that I had no intention of contributing anything at all to science." What I said was not that the book was not a valuable contribution to science, but that "we cannot regard his book as a valuable contribution to its professed subject." Its professed subject I had already stated in these words, for which there is almost verbatim justification in the Preface: "This book, which is intended primarily for philosophers, may be described as an attempt to review the nature of physical reality in the light of the theory of relativity. To the physicist it is recommended as a possibly new interpretation of his equations." When, therefore, Professor Ushenko goes on to say that, according to me, "to say that philosophical speculation about the concepts of relativity does not contribute anything to the science of physics, is the same as saying that it is irrelevant to an understanding of the nature of physical reality," he ascribes to me notions which arise entirely from his own imagination.

But the main point is Professor Ushenko's claim that my statement (really mine this time) that "The relation of any scientific theory to philosophy is simply the relation of science in general to philosophy, and that is not at all affected by the advent of relativity" is "simply not true to facts," because "In the history of philosophy before 'the advent of relativity,' the philosophies of events in spatio-temporal relations as contrasted with the philosophies of substances in mutual transactions were not, and could not be, heard of." True: and before the advent of the electromagnetic theory of light the philosophies of electromagnetic ethers as contrasted with those of mechanical ones were not heard of; nor were the philosophies of atomic as contrasted with those of continuous energy heard of before the advent of the quantum theory. These facts do not affect my statement, which is simply that the concern of philosophy is with the procedure of science and not with the particular products which happen to be in vogue at the moment.

Professor Ushenko, for some reason which I do not understand, regards my last-quoted statement as inconsistent with my admitting "the relevancy of science to philosophy." He then proceeds to argue that relativity and solipsism are incompatible, in opposition to my statement that they were conformable with one another. This point is really important, and I venture to discuss it very briefly, since Professor Ushenko's understanding of relativity seems less complete than I was formerly willing to assume. In the language of relativity, the metric

$$ds^2 = g_{\mu\nu} dx^\mu dx^\nu, \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad (1)$$

where the values of the g 's are unspecified, represents *any possible* mechanical system whatever, described in terms of *any* system of coordinates. Now give the g 's a particular set of values. Then the resulting equation represents *one particular* mechanical system, described in terms of *one particular* system of coordinates. Next, make any mathematical transformation of coordinates (I am ignoring irrelevant

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mathematical minutiae, and writing in rough, but for this purpose accurate, terms), thus obtaining an equation with different values for the g 's. Then this equation represents the *same* mechanical system as before, described *either* (i) by the same observer using a different system of coordinates, *or* (ii) by a different observer using the "same" system of coordinates. The remaining forms of equation (1), in which the g 's have values *not* obtainable from the chosen ones by mathematical transformation of coordinates, represent *other* mechanical systems.

Now relativity makes no distinction whatever between (i) and (ii). If you are a solipsist you choose (i); if you abhor solipsism you may choose (ii); but the choice, if any, is made on grounds entirely outside physics. That is why I say that relativity is conformable with solipsism, and hold Professor Ushenko to be in error in saying they are incompatible. His remarks on "space-like and zero-intervals which cannot be observed by a solipsist for the simple reason that they transcend observation" are meaningless. The "zero-interval" between an event on the Sun and my perception of it is about $8\frac{1}{2}$ minutes and 93 million miles in the usual coordinates. It has been observed, and therefore cannot transcend observation, and in any case it has nothing whatever to do with solipsism.

Professor Ushenko's final argument shows the falseness of his position still more clearly. He says, "I can change from time to time my coordinate systems, but if I do I am not the same percipient event after such a change . . . tantamount to a rejection of the thesis of solipsism." Does Professor Ushenko really believe that if I decide to measure lengths in metres instead of in centimetres, I become another person? That is what in effect he says, because it is an essential feature of relativity that this simple change of coordinates is identical in principle with the most complex change, corresponding to the most complex motion, conceivable. Moreover, if I can change my identity in this way, who on earth am I? Professor Ushenko must surely know that according to relativity there is no one coordinate system peculiar to any one observer, but that all possible ones are (apart from convenience, which varies with the problem considered) equally legitimate. But it is unnecessary to follow the implications of this argument because it is clear enough that, true or false, this thesis concerning percipient events has nothing to do with relativity. It is held, if at all, on quite independent grounds and then applied to relativity. That is the characteristic of most of Professor Ushenko's book, and that is why I said that it was not a valuable contribution to its professed subject. It is not a philosophy of relativity; it is relativity uncomprehendingly considered in the light of an independent philosophy.

Yours faithfully,

HERBERT DINGLE.

IMPERIAL COLLEGE,
LONDON, S.W.7.

(This correspondence is now closed.—ED.)

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*.

DEAR SIR,

In his notice of Professor F. M. Cornford's important *Plato's Cosmology* in your last issue (p. 482), Professor G. C. Field accepts Mr. Cornford's exegesis of the difficult Platonic words (*Timaeus* 37c6) in which the $\sigma\upsilon\beta\rho\alpha\nu\acute{o}\varsigma$ is called $\tau\acute{\omega}\nu \alpha\iota\delta\iota\omega\nu \theta\epsilon\omega\nu \gamma\epsilon\gamma\omicron\nu\omicron\tau\omicron\varsigma \delta\gamma\alpha\lambda\mu\alpha$ as final. He agrees that the meaning is that the heavens are a *shrine* inhabited by "everlasting gods," who are the stars and planets. In the hope of possibly having an answer either from Professor Field or from Professor Cornford, may I state briefly the difficulties which make me still hesitate to accept the interpretation? (1) At the point which *Timaeus* has reached in his narrative, nothing has been said as yet of the existence of either stars or planets? How then can a reader be expected to guess (or how were the imaginary auditors of *Timaeus* to guess) that the "everlasting gods" means neither of the only beings who have so far been called "god" in the dialogue (the "Demiurge" and the Universe) he makes, something hitherto

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unnamed? (2) If the text of your MSS. is correct, there is clearly an intentional antithesis between *διδίων* and *γεγονός*. It is meant then that the "gods" in question have a better right to be called everlasting than the "shrine," which is by contrast with them called a *γεγονός*. But how can the stars be opposed in this way to the "cosmos"? (3) While it is, of course, true that those commentators who have assumed the *δγαλμα* can mean nothing but an *image* are wrong, is there sufficient warrant for giving it, in any passage of classical Greek, the sense Mr. Cornford puts on it, *shrine*? Where *δγαλμα* in classical authors does not mean image, it seems to bear the sense of (a) *ornamentatum* or (b) *delicias*. That it could mean *shrine* is just what needs to be shown. I should be very willing to accept the interpretation if these difficulties can be met. If they cannot, I fear I shall still impenitently think the words of the passage probably corrupt (in which case the mention of "gods" is pretty certainly part of the corruption).

A. E. TAYLOR.

EDINBURGH,
October 1937.

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

SIR,

Although not a logical positivist, I, as a physicist, have come to take up a somewhat similar view,¹ and it was, therefore, with the greatest interest that I read Professor Muirhead's criticism and Dr. Lamont's article in the October number of *Philosophy*. The more I read, however, the more I am convinced that philosophers will one day have to wear the hair shirt of science, i.e. they must define their terms. I admire Professor Muirhead's youthful attitude in refusing to give up the search for "the best," but I fail utterly to see how, without defining the word "best" we can ever get anywhere.

It has always seemed to me that "good" and "bad" applied to actions are learned when we are children and mean, roughly, "pleasing or displeasing to Papa or Mama or Nanny" and that, when we grow up, we drop Mama and Nanny and change Papa into God. But God, being a hypothetical entity, can be made to like what we please, and has, in the past, for instance, liked human slavery. At the present time it is not quite certain whether this hypothesis likes birth-control. . . . Therefore, even for those who believe in theism the question of what is a good act degenerates into the question of what is pleasing to a hypothesis, and to those who do not require this hypothesis it is meaningless.

To avoid difficulties of this sort I have found it useful to add the word "for" and use only "good for" and "bad for." Thus "Is cycling good?" (meaningless) becomes "Is cycling good for . . . ?" and then educated higher apes (such as philosophers and physicists) cannot resist the habit of completing the sentence and we get, say, "Is cycling good for the digestion?" or "Is cycling good for the bank-balances of those who have shares in cycle companies?" both of which have a meaning, since there is a large measure of general agreement as to the difference between good and bad digestions and shares.

I am entirely in agreement with Dr. Lamont that the moral philosopher is not concerned with what ought to be done ("ought" is another word with a meaning only in the nursery), but to show "how your use of this standard, or your thinking this particular type of action good, is related to other facts about your life and social and material environment" (p. 441).

This object clearly requires the establishment of true facts and relations and thus ethics becomes a part of science, and the inducto-deductive method of Francis Bacon becomes the most fundamental activity of our branch of the higher (= more complex) apes, of which a humble member subscribes himself.

Your servant,
G. BURNISTON BROWN

HAMPSTEAD,
November 1937.

¹ Cf. *The Limits of Science, Science Progress*, 116, p. 729. April 1935.

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The EVENING MEETINGS for the Lent Term of the Session will be held at University College, Gower Street, W.C.1, at 8.15 p.m., on the following dates:—

Tuesday, January 18th: "The Rational and Empirical Elements in Physics." Herbert Dingle, D.Sc., A.R.C.S. (Assistant Professor of Astrophysics, Imperial College of Science).

Tuesday, February 15th: "Philosophy and the Common Reader." Professor L. S. Stebbing.

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MORAL POSITIVISM AND MORAL AESTHETICISM

E. F. CARRITT, M.A.

MR. AYER, in *Language, Truth and Logic* (p. 161), says: "Sentences which simply express moral judgments do not say anything. They are pure expressions of feeling and as such do not come under the category of truth and falsehood. . . . Aesthetic terms are used in exactly the same way as ethical terms."

This, I think, is one instance of a tendency to confuse the facts of moral and aesthetic experience which has been disastrous for both ethics and aesthetics. Its direct parentage is confessedly to be found in Hume, with his famous saying that "Morality is more properly felt than judged of," by which I suppose he means that what we call moral judgments would more properly be described as statements about or expressions of feeling. Butler, when controverting such views in the *Preface* to the Sermons, traces the confusion back to Shaftesbury, with the aphorism that "Beauty and Good (which in the context seems to mean moral goodness) are still the same" (*The Moralists*, Pt. III, § ii, 67). Butler says: "The not taking into consideration the authority [i.e. obligation] which is implied in the idea of reflex approbation or disapprobation seems a material deficiency in Lord Shaftesbury's *Inquiry Concerning Virtue* (Bk. I, Pt. III, § iii; *Characteristics*, ii, p. 69). . . . Take in then that authority and obligation which is a constituent part of this reflex approbation, and it will undeniably follow, though a man should doubt of everything else, yet, that he would still remain under the nearest and most certain obligation to the practice of virtue." I want first to consider the view, surely a paradox in terms, that "moral judgments or the sentences expressing

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them do not say anything." For those who hold this cannot be expected to listen patiently to a discussion whether moral judgments say something (as Hume thought) about feelings or about some other facts, and if the latter whether they are ever true. If it can be shown that this view of Mr. Ayer is groundless and that moral judgments do assert something, it would be possible to go on to argue next that what they assert is not a state of mind of their maker or of anybody else, and lastly that they can be true. Indeed, if Mr. Ayer's view that "moral judgments assert nothing" can be refuted, we should have already converted at least him to the view that they assert something other than the existence of feelings. For he tells us that he was at first attracted by the view that moral judgments are really statements about somebody's state of feeling, and only when he saw this view to be clearly untenable, resorted to his own paradox as the sole remaining escape from what he calls "an absolutist view of ethics which would undermine the whole of his main argument" (*ibid.*, pp. 156-7). And if it can be shown not only that moral judgments assert something, but that what they assert is (as Mr. Ayer agrees) no state of anybody's mind, but rather a fact independent of anybody's thought or feeling about it, we might finally maintain that there is no reason to doubt that such assertions are sometimes true. Aesthetic judgments, assertions, i.e. that things are beautiful, also, I think, generally *mean* to attribute to the thing a quality independent of anybody's thoughts or feelings. But so far as they do assert this, there are reasons for thinking that perhaps none of them are true in the sense in which they are thus meant. But whether these reasons for denying the truth of aesthetic judgments, except as statements of feeling, are sound or no, they do not apply to moral judgments. Mr. Ayer at least would not pretend to show that moral judgments are false. It was just because his general theory would not allow him to hold any opinion about their truth or falsehood as regards independent facts that he was attracted by the view that they only asserted a state of mind, and when he found that untenable was driven to assert that they assert nothing. The steps of my argument then should be to show:

- (1) That moral judgments, as the word judgment implies, assert something.
- (2) That what they assert is not the existence of a feeling in myself or others, but, as they profess, a fact which is not a feeling.
- (3) That once granted moral judgments do assert such a fact, there are no more valid reasons for doubting the possibility of their truth than that of other types of judgment, the motive for doing so being not any consideration of their own nature,

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but the desire to support a peculiar view of truth. And, in particular, we should try to show that certain arguments against the truth of any judgment which asserts beauty to belong to things independently of any feelings about them do not apply to moral judgments.

The first point, then, is that moral judgments assert something.

I

Mr. Ayer says (p. 158): "If I say to someone 'you acted wrongly in taking¹ that money' I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said, 'you took that money.' In adding that this action is wrong I am not making any further statement about it. I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it. It is as if I had said 'you took that money' in a peculiar tone of horror, or written it with some special exclamation marks. The tone or the exclamation marks adds nothing to the literal meaning of the sentence. It merely serves to show that the expression of it is attended by certain feelings in the speaker. If now I generalize my previous statement and say 'Taking money is (in certain circumstances) wrong,' I produce a statement which has no factual meaning, that is, expresses no proposition which can be true or false. It is as if I had written 'Taking money!!' with two notes of exclamation to show, by a suitable convention, that a special sort of moral disapproval is the feeling which is being expressed." But let us take Mr. Ayer's language in this passage seriously. He says that if I say "you acted wrongly in taking that money" instead of saying "you took that money," the only difference (which he will not allow to be a difference of meaning) is that I *evince* moral disapproval, and again, he says that the sentence "stealing money is wrong" *shows* "by a *suitable convention*" that a special sort of moral disapproval is the feeling which is being expressed." But the evincing a feeling, or showing to others that I have a feeling, may be a voluntary act. And when I "adopt a suitable convention" for doing so, it certainly is. I clearly may tell or show a man, or evince to a man, that I feel disgust at what he is doing, though in fact I do not feel any, and he may believe me and alter his conduct in consequence. Evidently Mr. Ayer does not really think that to say "you ought not to take this money" is a mere involuntary symptom of disgust, as sweating may be of pain; it is a deliberate attempt to *show* or convince my audience of something by a *suitable verbal expression*, i.e. to *tell* them something, true or false. And what Mr. Ayer really, for all his protests,

¹ He says "stealing." I have substituted "taking" as he is clearly not entitled to a dyslogistic word.

² My italics throughout.

has said is that it tells them that I am feeling a certain disapproval or, as he says, that "a special sort of disapproval is the feeling that is being expressed." But unfortunately Mr. Ayer clearly recognizes that the two sentences, "I feel a special sort of moral disapproval for stealing" and "Men ought not to steal," cannot be substituted for one another, since he says that Professor Moore has pointed out there is no contradiction in asserting that stealing is wrong and that I do not have any feeling of disapproval against it, or, as I should prefer to put it, it is a perfectly intelligible question whether an act for which I feel moral disapproval is in fact one I ought not to do.

Just because Mr. Ayer had been convinced by Professor Moore on this point, he has to find some other account of what the statement "stealing is wrong" means. And he only sees two alternatives. He must either admit that when we say "taking such money is wrong" we mean (however mistakenly) that a man ought not to take such money, or he must resort to saying that we mean to assert nothing whatever, but are involuntarily symptomizing horror. It is hard to see how he can avoid the first course. For he grants that people do *think* that they have obligations, or, in his own Kantian language, "Moral precepts *present themselves to some people as categorical commands*" (p. 169), and "they have for some people *the force of inexorable commands*," where he cannot be using the word "command" literally, since moral judgments may apply to myself or to a third person or to past time. So when such people say they have a duty they in fact mean (however mistakenly) just what they say; yet Mr. Ayer argues that nevertheless the sentence they pronounce cannot mean what he allows they want it to mean. In the same way he says (p. 20) that a scientific sentence may be a pseudo-proposition (i.e. unmeaning) to one person, but not to another, since on him it may have the effect of making him believe *its* truth (p. 84) or at least assume its truth. But in that case what is "it"? We cannot either assume or believe the truth of a sentence which means nothing. For instance, Mr. Ayer says the sentence "*p* is a law of nature" may give rise to "a belief in a certain orderliness of nature." Yet he apparently holds that such beliefs, like moral beliefs, owing to a mysterious "rule which determines the literal significance of language," are incapable of being significantly expressed or stated to exist. I am at a loss about the nature of this rule or who issued it, or why it is called a rule rather than a fact. It can hardly be of the type "*Ought* in English means much the same as *Sollen* in German" or "*Ought* means the opposite of *ought not*." So I am driven to fear that it was issued by Mr. Ayer, and that it is precisely the type of "rule" whose validity he is claiming to vindicate, such as "*Ought* means nothing," "*Law of*

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nature means nothing." If then "there are laws of nature (or obligations)" and "there are no laws of nature (or obligations)" are both unmeaning, they are not contradictory.

We are led to the curious conclusion that there are a large number of beliefs commonly held but incapable of being formulated in any sentence, and, by a strange coincidence, also a large number of sentences commonly supposed to formulate just those beliefs, but really incapable of meaning or asserting anything. It is a cruel law which debars these potential employers and potential employees from mutual accommodation. Again, if such sentences as "There are laws of nature" or "One ought to keep a promise" cannot mean what those who use them mean them to mean, namely, what Mr. Ayer admits they in fact believe, how did he come to know, or convey to us, what these beliefs are? He tells us men believe there are laws of nature and obligations, but "there are laws of nature (and obligations)" is an unmeaning sentence. Perhaps he remembers that he once held these beliefs and that, when he held them, he "evinced" the fact by certain unmeaning sentences which he then thought asserted what he believed. So he now conjectures that those who utter similar unmeaning sentences hold similar beliefs; and he hopes that when he tells us that "some men believe they have obligations," although "they have obligations" means nothing, we, too, shall recognize the meaningless sentence as a symptom of a belief which cannot be expressed.

But, as I said before, though we cannot sweat in order to prove that we are in pain, we can always utter these symptomatic noises and so "by a *suitable linguistic convention*" induce others to believe *something*, either, for instance, that we have obligations or that we think we have. Of course, the fact is that when Mr. Ayer says such sentences as "stealing is wrong" have no meaning, he does not mean by his statement what other people would mean by it, or understand him to mean by it. Indeed, he tells us that he means by it that the sentence "stealing is wrong" "cannot be translated into sentences which refer to sense-contents," or, in his other words, "it cannot be indicated how the proposition expressed by the sentence could be empirically verified." So that all he means when he says "stealing is wrong means nothing" is that it does not mean that the obligation has any sensible qualities such as colour, smell, taste, sound, or shape. And this would be true of some sentences which, I suppose, he would admit to express genuine propositions, if only about the speaker's state of mind, such as "I never understood that before" or "unverifiable sentences are meaningless." The view really implies, though Mr. Ayer would not admit it, that what a sentence means to assert is the possibility of obtaining sense-data which might verify or refute "it." But what then is "it"? Not

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surely, unmeaning sounds, for they cannot be verified or refuted. "It" must be the belief which the sentence means to assert and which another sentence may assert is verifiable in a certain way. If a belief, and therefore the sentence which expresses it, are about sensible things, then the sense-perception of those things might tend to refute or to verify that belief and sentence. But a belief cannot be that it is itself verifiable, and the same simple sentence cannot both assert what is believed and also how the belief can be verified. Yet surely the belief itself must be capable of being expressed and the sentence which expresses it must have a meaning. If a conjuror says, "There is a mouse in that box, but by the time you open it it will have disappeared without traces," he may be lying, but he is not making unmeaning sounds or even evincing feelings, and some people may believe him. That the sentences usually called moral judgments are not mere ejaculations which would be incapable of truth or of contradiction and are not even merely statements about the speaker's own feelings, is, I think, satisfactorily shown by Hume (*Enquiry*, IX, 1). "When a man denominates another, his *enemy*, his *rival*, his *antagonist*, his *adversary*, he is understood to speak the language of self-love, and to express sentiments, peculiar to himself, and arising from his particular circumstances and situation. But when he bestows on any man the epithets of *vicious* or *odious* or *depraved*, he then speaks another language, and expresses sentiments, in which he expects all his audience are to concur with him. He must here, therefore, depart from his private and particular situation, and must choose a point of view, common to him with others; he must move some universal principle of the human frame, and touch a string to which all mankind have an accord and symphony. If he means, therefore, to express *that this man possesses qualities, whose tendency is pernicious to society*, he has chosen this common point of view, and has touched the principle of humanity, in which every man, in some degree, concurs." Hume plainly thinks that if I say X ought not to have taken that money from Z, I can be contradicted, and that not merely by saying "I doubt if you really feel the disgust which such noises usually express," or even by saying "Hurrah for X," but rather by saying, "In taking that money from Z, X behaved in a beneficent way, and *therefore* in a way universally or generally agreeable to human contemplation." Indeed, the suggestion that so-called moral judgments assert nothing is so palpably false that I wonder Mr. Ayer did not try rather to bring them under his theory as what he calls tautologies. At least one type of moral judgment, "I ought to keep my promise," seems to be of the kind to which he should on his own theory give that name. It is indisputable that men use the expression "I promise," and I do not see how, when they do so,

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it could be maintained that they are either lying or deceived. For, of course, to say "you don't intend to keep your promise" is not to say "you don't promise." And other people understand what we mean when we promise and often alter their behaviour in consequence. Yet it is hard to see what a promise is if it is not, as Hume said, "binding oneself to the performance of an action." A man could not without self-contradiction make a promise while explaining that he was under no obligation to keep it. Possibly this is what Kant really *meant* when he said that to will universal promise-breaking involved a contradiction. If he did, we should have to suppose that by his phrase "willing universal promise-breaking is contradictory" (a phrase I have never understood) he meant "denying the obligation to keep a promise which you have made is contradictory." Curiously enough, Hobbes seems to have held this view (*Leviathan*, XIV): "When a man hath abandoned, or granted away his Right, then is he said to be OBLIGED, or BOUND, not to hinder those, to whom such Right is granted, or abandoned, from the benefit of it: and that he *Ought*, and it is his DUTY, not to make voyd that voluntary act of his own: and that such hindrance is INJUSTICE, and INJURY, as being *sine jure*; the Right being before renounced, or transferred. So that *Injury*, or *Injustice*, in the controversies of the world, is somewhat like to that, which in the disputations of Scholers is called *Absurdity*. For as it is there called an Absurdity to contradict what one maintained in the Beginning; so in the world, it is called Injustice and Injury, voluntarily to undo that, which from the Beginning he hath voluntarily done."

II

To come now to my second point. If we agree with Hume that Mr. Ayer is wrong in saying that moral judgments assert nothing, we must agree with Mr. Ayer that Hume is wrong in saying that what they assert is the prevalence among mankind of a certain pleasure or distaste, arising from sympathy, in the contemplation of human dispositions and of the acts in which they issue. Just as I think Hume satisfactorily refutes Mr. Ayer's view, so I think Mr. Ayer satisfactorily refutes this of Hume. Mr. Ayer says:

"We reject the subjectivist view that to call an action right, or a thing good, is to say that it is generally approved of, because it is not self-contradictory to assert [he might have added it is quite natural and usual to assert] that some actions which are generally approved of are not right, or that some things which are generally approved of are not good. And we reject the alternative subjectivist view that a man who asserts that a certain action is right, or that

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a certain thing is good, is saying that he himself approves of it, on the ground that a man who confessed that he sometimes approved of what was bad or wrong would not be contradicting himself" (p. 153). In other words, it is as absurd to translate "I ought not to steal" into "Most men (or I) disapprove of stealing" as it would be to translate "There are canals in Mars" into "I (or most men) think there are." Mr. Ayer then satisfactorily refutes Hume. And what is perhaps almost as interesting is that Hume himself is unable consistently and comfortably to maintain this position. His general view, no doubt, is that there is no such fact as obligation, but only general feelings of pleasure or uneasiness in the contemplation of felicitic or pernicious dispositions and acts. He equates good and evil with pleasure and pain (*Treatise*, II, iii, 9). He denies that acts are really right or wrong (III, i, 1). "The distinction of moral good and evil is founded in the pleasure or pain which results from the view of any sentiment or character" (III, ii, 8). "It is the nature and indeed the definition of virtue, that it is a *quality of the mind agreeable to or approved by every one who considers or contemplates it*" (*Enquiry*, VIII). The only difference between parricide and the choking by a sapling of its parent tree, lies in the different feelings with which we regard the two (*Treatise*, III, i, 1). Such, I say, is Hume's general view, but he is too candid to stick to it. He continually, however inconsistently, insists that all who do not condemn acts done in the belief that they are pernicious and approve those done in the belief that they are beneficent are not only exceptional, but in fact wrong. Since benevolent acts and dispositions have in fact a tendency to promote felicity, they always *deserve* the approval of human beings, which they obtain from all those who have any "rectitude of disposition" (*Enquiry*, App. I). The rules of justice arise from the aversion to doing a *hardship* to another (as distinct from merely harming him) (*Enquiry*, App. III). A promise is described as a form of words by which "a man binds himself to the performance of any action" and thereby "subjects himself to the penalty of never being trusted again in case of failure." At last, in the *Enquiry* (IX, 2), Hume is constrained to face the question of what is meant by saying we "ought" to be honest if we think it not the best policy. He "confesses that if a man think this much requires an answer it would be a little difficult to find any which will to him appear satisfactory." He discredits the holders of such "pernicious" views by suggesting that their "practice will be answerable to their speculation." "*Ingenuous natures*" have "an antipathy to *treachery* and roguery." "Consciousness of *integrity* . . . will be cultivated by every *honest* man who *feels the importance* of it." Here Hume is trying to defend what he calls our "interested obligation to virtue," and finds he can only

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do it by maintaining, against Hobbes, that we all have a disinterested (moral) liking to contemplate acts tending to the welfare of others, just as we have a disinterested (aesthetic) liking to contemplate *things* useful to them. Yet he can only make this a plausible account of obligation by substituting for "liking" "approval," and by insisting that those in whom it does not prevail are not merely abnormal, but base, villainous, depraved, rogues—language which would be silly if applied to a taste for sherbet or Edgar Wallace. To say that honesty will be cultivated by every honest man who feels the importance of it is either to say that if you like being honest you like it, or that you ought to be honest. The whole argument is only one of those, in Hume's own words, "sufficient for discourse, and serving all our purposes in company, in the pulpit, on the theatre, and in the schools" (*Treatise*, III, iii, 3). Arguing against the view that moral distinctions are artificial or arbitrary, he says: "Had nature made no such distinction, founded in the original constitution of the mind, the words *honourable* and *shameful*, *lovely* and *odious*, *noble* and *despicable*, had never had place in any language; nor could politicians, had they invented these terms, ever have been able to render them intelligible, or make them convey any idea to the audience." He should have asked himself whether philosophers would have been more successful had they invented the term obligation.

Holding, as he does, that what we call obligation is merely the liking for those acts whose felicitic nature gives us a sympathetic pleasure, he finds strange the fact that "a convenient house and a virtuous character cause not the same feeling of approbation, even though the source of our approbation be the same and flows from sympathy and an idea of their utility. There is something very inexplicable in this variation of our feelings." I suggest the explanation that the sources are in fact, as Hume would say, "pretty different."

Adam Smith, in his *Theory of the Moral Sentiments* (1759), seems to be troubled at this inconsistency by which Hume, while asserting that a moral judgment is merely the statement that men have a feeling of a certain kind, also tries to justify that feeling by asserting that we are stating it to be a feeling aroused by the intended utility of the action, i.e. that we are stating some fact about the action or the agent. Accordingly Smith abandons the reference to utility. "The idea of the utility of all qualities of this kind is plainly an afterthought, and not what first recommends them to our approbation" (I, i, 4). What then is it that so recommends them? He answers: "To approve of the passion of another, as suitable to their objects, is the same thing as to observe that we entirely sympathize with them. . . . His own sentiments are the standards and measures

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by which he judges of mine. . . . In the suitableness or unsuitableness, in the proportion or disproportion which the affection *seems* to bear to the cause or object which excites it, consists the propriety or impropriety, the decency or ungracefulness of the consequent action" (I, i, 3). That is to say, an action is *really* improper if it springs from a feeling which *seems* to me improper. This is Hume reduced to consistency. It is clearly intended to put moral approval into the same category with aesthetic approval. For it has been often and not unplausibly held that we approve works of art and scenes of nature when they express a feeling with which we sympathize or with which they succeed in making us sympathize. But no more than Hume can Smith be quite content with such moral subjectivity. To this account of "the decency or ungracefulness of an action" he inconsequently appends a quite different account of its "merits." "In the beneficial or hurtful nature of the effects which the affection aims at, or tends to produce, consists the *merit* or *demerit* of the action, the quality by which it is *entitled* to reward or *deserving* of punishment."

So far, then, I have tried to maintain (1) that judgments about obligation *are* judgments; that is, they assert a fact and can be intelligibly contradicted. This, I think, Hume shows. And (2) that they do not assert anything about our own feelings or those of others, but a fact, namely an obligation, which though it may depend upon somebody having or being capable of some feeling, is not itself a feeling. And this, I think, Mr. Ayer shows.

III

It now remains to ask whether there is reason to think that all judgments thus asserting obligations must be false because on reflection we see that what we took for obligation is in fact a feeling. The answer seems to be that there is no such reason apart from the *dogma* that no judgments are true, or that there is no reason to think them so, unless they either could be sensibly verified or merely "state our intention to use language in a certain way."

The chief *argument* that moral judgments must be untrue is derived from a false analogy drawn between them and aesthetic judgments, which are assumed to be untrue if intended to assert an objective beauty. But just as I think the view that so-called moral judgments are meant to state the feelings of those who make them or of others is false, so I think the view that on reflection we see that consequently they are untrue, and that we must substitute for them judgments which do state the feelings of ourselves or others about actions is also false. And this latter false view, I believe, is closely connected with the venerable failure to distinguish moral

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and aesthetic experience. Plato used the epithet *καλός* without misgiving of *νόμοι* (meaning just and beneficent laws, which we ought to enact), of *ψυχαί* and *ἐπιτηδεύματα* (meaning just, brave, and temperate conduct and character, not those which are dramatic or arresting), and also of pottery and animal bodies. And he explicitly maintained that beauty, if not identical with moral goodness, is what conduces to it. No doubt he thought both beauty and goodness were real qualities independent of human feelings about them, but his confusion of the two was probably connected in Greek as in modern thought with the accompanying failure to distinguish clearly the fact of obligation from feelings of attraction or repugnance. At the renaissance of moral and aesthetic reflection in this country in the eighteenth century, the identification of beauty either with moral goodness or with moral edification became a commonplace: aestheticians perhaps thinking thereby to recommend their subject to the puritan, and moralists theirs to the world. The arts were often criticized merely by a didactic standard, and obligation was reduced to mere sensibility. Since most people find a certain satisfaction in contemplating a so-called moral action and a so-called virtuous character, it was overlooked both that they also get aesthetic satisfaction in contemplating the very opposite, and also that the very nature of a moral act is to be done from a belief that we are obliged to it. The question is whether that belief can be true.

A moral judgment (e.g. that I ought to pay this money) means something and can be significantly contradicted. But it is not contradicted by denying that I or the majority of people take any pleasure in contemplating the payment. The creditor's claim cannot vary with sympathies, or debts could be cancelled by propaganda. The judgment "he acted morally" no doubt generally *implies* a feeling of approbation, but it *states* that he did what he did because he believed it his duty; and this belief was not about feelings but about obligation.

It is by no means so clear that judgments like "The Alps are beautiful" or "Pope's *Odyssey* is less beautiful than that of Voss" truly assert any real quality of things other than their relation to human feelings. It is not clear that the Alps always had a quality of beauty though everybody had so far loathed the horrid sight, nor that the second statement could be consistent with asserting that everybody who knew both preferred Pope. And whatever our decision on the point may be, it is a significant fact that what by reflection becomes clearer about the moral judgments becomes less clear about the aesthetic.

It has been long recognized that an object beautiful to the naked eye may seem ugly under the microscope, and that the colours, shadows, sounds, and scents, which play so large a part in aesthetic

experience, must be very different to beings with different organs, and can hardly be said to exist as such when they are not being experienced. More recently we have come to believe that even the configuration and movement of what we call physical bodies are very different from anything that we ever perceive. It may be replied that, though people are mistaken in attributing beauty, as they do, to physical things, yet it can be truthfully attributed to sensible appearances,¹ which may be beautiful though nobody observes it. But there still remains to notice a much more interesting characteristic of beauty, suggested already by the Alps and Homer. The beauty of sights and sounds depends, at least very largely, on their "meaning" for us, and this meaning is different for different persons; in fact, "it is not they but we who mean." So "what I hear" may not only be different from "what you said," but may affect me differently according as I more or less know the language and your personal idiom and according to the associations I myself have with the words used and the things mentioned, or according to my mood. And if I should hear exactly similar sounds twice, but, owing to such differences, think them beautiful once but not again, it is hard to say at which time, if either, I should be wrong.

This is pretty obvious in literature; hardly less so in painting and sculpture, since the artist seldom denies himself all reference to natural objects, which affect us differently according to our sex, colour, climate, training, and religion; and it is not really doubtful about a great part of music and architecture. Sir Donald Tovey, on Beethoven's *Mass in D*, says that in the *Dona Nobis Pacem* "trumpets and drums are heard with martial rhythm." This can hardly help affecting one way or another the beauty which a hearer ascribes to the music; yet it must depend on what he happens to know and feel about warfare. At any rate, different systems of harmony are conventional.

Something of the same sort must be true of much natural beauty, and not that only of human face or form. The reason of the almost universal distaste for mountains in the seventeenth century and the almost universal admiration for them in the nineteenth must have been that men had different associations with them or went to them in a different spirit. Ruskin² has described with eloquent candour the change in his aesthetic experience of the same visible scene when he discovered that it was not a mist-wreathed Alp but a glass roof behind blue smoke.

Not only may the same sound or vision be beautiful to a man

¹ Or to "some more complex whole." It is hard to discuss this suggestion till it is made more explicit. It may mean just what I do.

² *Mod. Painters*, IV, x, § 8.

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and not to another, or to himself in a different mood, but it may also have entirely different beauties, depending upon his mental habit or condition.

Thou'll break my heart, thou bonny bird,
That sings upon the bough;
Thou minds me of the happy days
When my fause Love was true.

Not only must this have much more beauty to a reader whose own sorrow has been set to bird-song, but the song itself must have had a very different beauty to Burns, or to the girl he speaks for, when love was false and when it was true.

No doubt our attitudes to nature and to works of art, especially to recent ones by known artists, are different. To admire mountains is equally legitimate whether they are thought of as awful solitudes or as happy playgrounds, though the "beauties" so seen must be different. But an artist *meant* to express something, and we have a historical interest in knowing what it was, as well as a well-founded suspicion that so we shall get the best aesthetic experience out of his work. Yet we do not trouble whether the "beauties" we find in a ruined cloister or a primitive ballad were intended, or were found there by their first admirers.

Kant¹ tried to exclude all such elements in beauty, which depend upon some conception or meaning or association, from pure or free beauty, and called them dependent beauty. Pure beauty is exemplified only in arabesques, figures, and inorganic objects whose contemplation pleases us by their mere form, such as ripples and perhaps clouds and flowers abstracted from all the sensuous charm of colour and from any thought of adaptation to purpose or of resemblance to other things. It has been questioned, by the Empathy school and by Croce, whether even such things as these do not get their beauty from our natural or acquired tendency to read into them some significance, some correspondence with our own activities and affections. But, however that may be, Kant, though rejecting any such hypothesis, cannot allow that beauty is an objective quality of external phenomena or their relations. It is merely the pleasant feeling aroused in us by the consciousness of a harmonious free play of our perceptive faculties in apprehending the object: "The judgment of taste is not scientific but aesthetic, by which I mean that it is a judgment for which the ground can only be subjective. . . . All our ideas can refer to objects, except those only which refer to the feelings of pleasure and pain. Here nothing is indicated in the object, but we have a feeling of ourselves as we are affected by the idea" (§ 1).

¹ *K. d. U.*, § 16.

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I quote Kant as one who, having tried to eliminate from beauty proper all its more obviously subjective elements, all secondary qualities, and all associations or conceptions of use or resemblance, was naturally averse from any expressionist theory. Yet, though he believed that we claim agreement from all men in our judgments about this pure beauty, he was convinced that "Beauty apart from relation to our feeling is itself nothing" (§ 9).

Even if the simple perception of form apart from any significance were the sufficient stimulus for a genuine aesthetic experience, I should still agree with Richard Price:¹ "It seems impossible to conceive objects themselves to be endowed with more than a particular order of parts, and with powers, or an affinity to our perceptive faculties, thence arising; and if we call this beauty, then it is an absolute, inherent quality of certain objects; and equally existent whether any mind discerns it or not. But, surely, order and regularity are, more properly, the causes of beauty than beauty itself."

It must be allowed, as the Provost of Oriel² points out, that we commonly *mean* by "beauty" (as we do by "pleasant" though not by "strange") a quality belonging to an object apart from relation to minds; but I agree with him that, on reflection, we see that the things called beautiful or pleasant may not have any common character (as "surprising" things have not) except the power to produce in some persons a particular kind of experience. "The actual occurrence of the enjoyment depends on conditions in the experient as well as conditions in the object." So if one man calls the object beautiful and another ugly, both are wrong if they are asserting it has either independent quality; both may be right if they only mean that it is capable of exciting genuine aesthetic enjoyment and repulsion in different persons.

This view is not inconsistent with Kant's claim that we *demand*, though we do not find, universal agreement with our aesthetic judgments—if only the object could, as it never can, have precisely the same emotional significance to all men. Nor is it inconsistent with the distinction of good and bad taste. Bad taste is the incapacity or narrowly limited capacity for pure aesthetic experiences. A man who enjoys contemplating nothing which does not soothe or profit or edify him, or gratify his pride or malice or appetites and affections, has bad taste. He may use the word beautiful, but he has few or no aesthetic experiences. The more capacity a man has for pure aesthetic experiences the better his taste, whatever the objects which arouse them.

Similarly a man is more *moral* (as distinct from being naturally

¹ *Review of the Principal Questions in Morals.*

² Ross, *The Right and the Good*, p. 128 n.

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virtuous on the one hand and correctly behaved on the other) the more moral experiences he has; that is to say, the more acts he does because he believes them to be his duty. The character of what he does in no way affects his morality. There are no acts moral or immoral in themselves apart from the agent's beliefs about his obligations. It is perhaps this analogy between morality and good taste which has contributed to the confusion of moral and aesthetic judgments. But the vital difference for which I have been contending remains. Moral judgments are of two kinds: "That act was done because the agent thought it his duty," and "A given situation involves an obligation on rational beings to act in a certain way." Both types of judgment seem to be true or false whatever people may think or feel about the acts in question. At least none of the arguments which we have been considering, as tending to show that what is called beauty is a subjective state, seem to apply to obligations. Obligations are not secondary qualities, nor indeed qualities of things at all. They arise out of the relations of persons, and there is nothing of whose reality we are more certain than persons. Kant, indeed, held that obligations or, as he oddly called them, the moral law, are the one kind of facts about which, and on the ground of which, we could make synthetic judgments *a priori* that could be true not only of what he calls phenomenal reality but of things in themselves. Nor is Price less emphatic in his condemnation of the "moral sense school."

One may have the pure moral experience in robbing the rich Peter to feed the starving Paul, and another in like situation might have it in resisting the temptation. And this difference may be due, like tastes in scenery, to their environment or upbringing. But once convince them that they have no duties to their neighbours and they could have no moral experience at all. On the other hand, Coleridge does not seem from his *Ode to Dejection* to have valued aesthetic experience less for being convinced that beauty lives in seeming.

Hitherto, for brevity and clearness, I have used the words obligation and duty in a general and popular sense. But certain objections, which might be suggested by the last paragraph, require to be met, and I believe can be met, by a more careful distinction. I do not feel these objections to be serious for my main point, but no doubt they have contributed to make plausible the view that obligation is a misnomer for peculiar feelings of pleasure in contemplating certain acts and characters. To begin with, obligations are in one sense mind-dependent in that they would not exist if there were no minds. They are not physical things, nor the relations of physical things or of animals to one another, if our idea of animal consciousness is correct. They arise out of the relations of

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persons to one another or to other sentient beings. Secondly, there is also a sense in which they depend upon feelings, or rather presuppose that the beings in question have feelings and desires. As Hume pointed out, if all sentient creatures were secure of satisfaction for all their desires, or if they had no desires at all, at least most of our more obvious duties would disappear. I do not see, for instance, how it would be possible to owe anybody anything. At any rate, *what* we ought to do for people must largely depend upon their feelings and wants, and these will to some extent depend upon their beliefs. But since in fact there are sentient beings, some of whom are rational persons, in various relations to one another, the obligations which arise out of these relations are facts whatever anybody may feel or think about them. Thirdly, there is a more subtle sense in which our obligations might be said to depend upon our beliefs. It seems that a man cannot be morally bound to do what is impossible for him. It cannot be a surgeon's duty to give anaesthetics if none are procurable or to fly to the patient's aid if there is no aircraft. But what makes it impossible to do something may be our ignorance. Nothing else prevented our ancestors from supplying surgeons with morphia and planes. It seems more natural to say that it is our duty to give a man the dose which, after the best inquiry, we think most likely to cure him than that it is our duty to cure him. Perhaps we may say that the duties to which situations give rise are always duties to *try* to alter or maintain those situations. There is nothing subjective about this. A little more puzzling is the fact that our duties depend upon our beliefs about the situation. If I believe a man is ill, it may be my duty to try to cure him though in fact he is shamming. So, strictly, our duties would be to try to maintain or alter situations which we believe to exist; and one element in all situations which we should try to alter would be our conscious ignorance of other elements in our situation the knowledge of which might give rise to obligations. And here, too, there seems nothing subjective about the obligation. It is true that when I remind a man of a debt I am more apt to say "You owe me" or "You ought to pay me" than "I can tell you something which will make you owe me." But I should not say, "You ought to have paid me though you did not know of the debt"; rather perhaps, "You ought to have been more careful to remember." We should certainly be prepared to say that I never ceased to have a right to be paid, and it has been suggested that it would be convenient to speak of "responsibilities" or "claims upon me," of which I may be ignorant and which, when I become aware of them (in the absence of any stronger conflicting claims), give rise to duties. In none of the situations described does my duty depend upon my belief that it is my duty (which would be

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absurd) or upon my feeling about the situation or the change in question. There is nothing here analogous to the doubt if beauty does not depend on thoughts and feelings. None of these considerations seem to me to make it at all plausible that, when we speak of an obligation to do something, all that is true is that we or others have a particular feeling about acts of the kind. Nor can I think of any other arguments directed to that end.

My conclusion is that our moral and aesthetic judgments differ fundamentally in this: It is at least very questionable if, on reflection, we can believe that things have what we call beauty whether anybody is affected aesthetically by them or not. All that may be true is that some or all things are capable, under certain conditions, of affecting persons in that way, as they may also be capable of affecting them with surprise or pleasure. And if this were true we should have no less reason to enjoy our aesthetic experiences or to distinguish them from other experiences or to value them in proportion to their purity. On the other hand, reflection on our moral judgments more and more convinces me that the relations in which we stand to our fellows are in objective fact grounds of real obligation. And if we could really cease to believe this, and be persuaded that when something is called our duty all that is true is that some people have certain feelings about it, the moral experience would become impossible for us. If we really sometimes are under obligations, there is goodness in acting from the belief that we are so on a given occasion; if not, not. And it seems to me undeniable that there is. But the goodness of aesthetic experience does not depend upon beauty being a quality of objects.

THE RATIONAL AND EMPIRICAL ELEMENTS IN PHYSICS¹

PROFESSOR H. DINGLE, A.R.C.S., D.Sc.

It is a platitude that thought implies a subject and an object: the subject is the thinker, or the thinking mind, and the object is that which is thought about. This is probably the most elementary fact of consciousness, comprehensible alike to the child, the unreflecting man of affairs, and the philosopher, and it forms the natural starting-point for philosophy. And indeed, one of the great divisions between philosophical systems is that which separates subjectivism on one hand from objectivism (more often called by the indefinite and overburdened name, realism) on the other. Subjectivism professes to interpret the object in terms of the subject, and objectivism professes to interpret the subject in terms of the object.

It is perhaps *ultra vires* for one who is not a philosopher to make a comprehensive statement about philosophical systems, and I do so with full consciousness that my knowledge of the history of philosophy is lacking in both extension and depth. Nevertheless, even a superficial survey is sufficient to show that, as a general rule, the difference between so-called subjective and objective systems does not correspond to the difference between the subject and object which are the necessary elements of thought, but relates to alternative methods of dealing with what is entirely objective. For example, the duality of mind and matter—thinking things and extended things—introduced by Descartes is generally considered to have originated two opposite schools of thought, *idealism* and *realism*. The idealists sought to explain matter in terms of mind, and the realists sought to explain mind in terms of matter. But both mind and matter here are, with respect to the process of thought, objective. They both belong to the complex of things about which the philosopher thinks. They are together set objectively before him, and if he elects to give mind the more fundamental status in his philosophy, and thereupon calls himself a subjectivist, he no more brings the objective field of his mental operations into his own subjective self than does his brother, the materialist, who makes the opposite classification.

The reason for this anomaly is not difficult to see. By "mind" we

¹ Lecture delivered to the British Institute of Philosophy at University College, on January 18, 1938.

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do not, when speaking of the Cartesian duality, mean the mind of the thinker, but something which is manifested in many individual examples, and is distinguished from matter mainly by the fact that the thinker apprehends it by other faculties than those (which we call "the senses") which reveal matter to him. Even to Berkeley there were A's mind, B's mind, . . . and the mind of God, which served, equally with his own mind which thought of them, to guarantee the existence of extended things. But mind, regarded as the subject of thought, is simply the mind of the thinker. All other so-called minds are objective to him, and therefore should not, for the purposes of philosophy, be regarded as precisely equivalent to his own mind. It is only the thinker's mind that is the subject of thought: it is the aggregate of all minds that is set against the aggregate of all matter in the Cartesian system.

The first step towards unconfused thinking, then, is to distinguish the mind of the thinker from the objective aggregate of minds about which he thinks. It is not, however, the final step, because the thinker can think of his own mind, and in that act he must therefore be both subject and object. This confusion can be removed only by analysing the mind of the thinker into subjective and objective elements. The objective elements can then go into the general objective world, where they must stand on a par with the minds of other people, and the subjective elements alone must form the subject of thought.

This analysis is made automatically by *Time*, which makes possible all consciousness, including self-consciousness. When "I" am thinking of "myself," the subject, "I," is always at the present moment, whereas the object, "myself," about which I think, is in the past; "myself" is simply the past states of "I" (or what we call the "future" states if I care to speculate). Time makes an inevitable separation of the subjective "I" from the objective "myself"; that part of my mind which (to use a familiar metaphor) travels with time is the subject, "I"; that part of my mind which remains behind in the past, and which "I" remembers, is the object, "myself." As such, myself belongs to the same class of objects as other persons. They also are separated from "I" in time, for since they are necessarily at different places, my knowledge of them, like my memory of myself, must refer to a previous instant of time, when the messenger—light, sound, or whatever it is—which brings me that knowledge issued from them.

This division, of what is usually regarded as the unity of my mind, into an eternally present subject, "I," and an objective "myself" consisting of its past states, enables us to regard the process of philosophizing in definite relation to the subject-object duality. In philosophizing, the relevant part of the subject, "I," is the logical

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
faculty, the reason, and the objective world about which "I" thinks consists of his past experience and whatever he can, as we say, "infer" from it by rational processes. This corresponds to the fact that the principles of logic, like the subject, "I," are timeless; they are eternally present. We do not say that $1 + 1 = 2$ at some particular time, and we do not regard a man as even possibly a prophet who says that next Christmas $1 + 1$ will be equal to 3. The principles of logic are true *now*, and "now" is the eternal characteristic of the subjective "I." On the other hand, everything about which "I" thinks, on which he exercises logical thought, has a location in time. Each of the experiences which I include in "myself" occurred to me at some moment or finite duration of time. A man who tells me that next Christmas the objective "myself" will be in Egypt is not obviously talking nonsense. All my experience, as soon as it becomes the object of thought, is elsewhere in time: "I," with the rules of logic, am always now.

This subject-object distinction must be preserved consistently in our thinking if we are to avoid contradictions. We cannot think without implying this distinction, and we must therefore be careful not to confuse the subject with the object in the system of thought we create. What I am suggesting is that, when we philosophize, logic (or reason) is the subjective element; and experience, out of which we form our notions of ourselves and other people and things, is the objective element; and that the two elements are automatically distinguished by their relation to time, which is a necessary condition of consciousness. On one hand we have subjective reason, with principles which it is obviously nonsense to regard as located in time; and, on the other, objective experience, which happened at more or less definite times, and which the rational subject, in the process of forming a philosophy, tries to bring into a rational system.

I want you, then, in order to make the ideas as definite as possible, to form a mental picture of these two elements in philosophy as distinct entities. Subjective reason, with its timeless rules of thought, is the active agent, bringing rational order into the passive chaos of experience. Experience is passive because, however vivid it may be as spontaneous experience, it is dead memory of experience when reason begins to operate on it; it has had its day, its location in time. Other experiences may occur like it, but the experience which is the object of thought is essentially past. Out of that chaos of past experience reason constructs myself, you, tables, chairs, stars, and the rest of the world, and tries to set them all in order. The various bits of experience are like the pieces of a jig-saw puzzle. The solver, reason, fits them into position, starting at many different points and obtaining many isolated groups of connected pieces, which he calls the various sciences, theology, aesthetics, and so on. The state

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of the pattern at any moment is the state of his philosophy. The complete pattern is the final philosophy at which he aims.



Drawn by Mr. R. N. SEDDON

“Look here upon this picture, and on this.” The first is the picture we have just seen. The second picture, so far as it can be clearly delineated, represents the unsatisfactory philosophical framework into which we ordinarily try to fit the achievements of science. There is again a duality: On one hand we have *mind*, and on the other *the external world* divided into two parts by an opaque curtain. Mind tries to apprehend the external world. The part of that world in front of the curtain it has already apprehended; the part behind is the unknown, and the operations of mind consist in pushing the curtain back so as to bring more and more of the external world into the foreground of the known. We must suppose the curtain permeable by the objects which make up the external world, because mind cannot move them or alter their essential nature in any way; it can only “know” them—that is, push the curtain through them. Some objects may not be able to pass through the curtain. They remain permanently on the far side, and are called “unknowable.” They may, nevertheless, be there just as truly as the objects which are known. The position of the thinker and his fellows is ambiguous in this picture. They are included in mind, because it is they who seek to know the world, but also they are a part of the world, because they seek to know themselves and each other. This was a source of perplexity to Professor Macmurray in the last lecture of this series; it is the confusion already noted, that must occur when the subject-object duality is associated with the incompatible duality consisting of mind and the external world. Further, the distinction between the thinker and other persons is not, and cannot be, represented; he is included with them in the pusher, and his distinctive subjective quality is lost.

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The contrast between reason and experience, which is fundamental to the first picture, is not inexpressible in terms of the second, but, when delineated, it is inconspicuous. Reason and experience are there simply alternative instruments by means of which knowledge may be obtained; they are the two hands with which mind can push the curtain back. In other words, we may get to know the external world either by observation—experiencing it—or by logic—reasoning about it. There has been much discussion concerning which is the more trustworthy instrument, and the battle between empiricism and rationalism has been waged with an intensity rather out of proportion to the importance of a question about a mere choice of methods. It seems as though the combatants were subconsciously aware that they were concerned with something much more fundamental than the “mind-matter” view of the philosophic problem would imply.

The thesis I want to uphold in this lecture is that the intellectual activities which we call science and philosophy can be properly described only in terms of the first picture, and that what scientists and philosophers have actually been doing has been generally misrepresented by the attempt to describe it in terms of the second. We are so accustomed to regarding ourselves as minds learning as much as we can of a pre-established, independently existing world of mind and matter, and our language has shaped itself so completely to meet the needs of this view, that it is pedantic, except in fundamental philosophical or scientific discussions, to speak otherwise than in conformity therewith. Nevertheless, if we are to solve our present problems we must do so. If we examine the scientific situation, for example, we find that the difficulty is not in going ahead or in knowing what to do—there never was a time when progress was so rapid—but in understanding what it is that is being done. What I want to show is that this is a difficulty only because we try to understand it in terms of the second picture instead of the first.

Psychology is perhaps the branch of science in which this is most readily seen. In terms of the mind-matter picture, psychology seems almost impossible. It is defined as the study of the mind; but mind is that which studies, and we are at once in confusion. This consideration has prevented even the beginnings of a science of psychology until our own day, and even now, when such a science is actually in existence, its incompatibility with the second picture leads able philosophers, such as Professor Macmurray, to maintain, like the sceptical spectator of the hippopotamus, that there is no such animal. But in terms of the first picture the situation is simple. The psychologist employs his reason to examine his experience. He does not examine reason; it is no part of the psychological problem to criticize the law of contradiction. He forms himself, as well as

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other people, out of experience, and does not hesitate even to form several "himselfs" if the concept of multiple personality helps to make his experience rational. All this is quite unintelligible in terms of the mind-body duality.

But I am concerned this evening, not with psychology, but with physics. Here also it is the first picture that is most simply and naturally adapted to the history of the subject, but until quite recent times it has been possible to express the progress of physics in terms of the second; and physicists, I think without exception, have done so. The subjective agent, the physicist, pushes back the curtain to reveal as much as he can of the physical world. The growth of the scheme of physics is the bringing of more and more of that world into the known foreground, and the objects which successively appear there are all alike in being parts of the same independently existing structure. Two hundred years ago the planet Uranus and the atom were behind the curtain. The physicist pushed with the right hand of experience, and Uranus came into view; he pushed with the left hand of reason, and the atom appeared. But he saw no essential difference between Uranus and the atom, corresponding to the fact that they had been revealed by different means. They were of the same nature—the nature of the physical world, as Sir Arthur Eddington calls it in a description in which he treats them as having precisely the same status in the physical scheme.

As I have said, this view of the matter involved no insuperable difficulties until recent times. So lightly, in fact, had we come to regard the distinction between experience and reason, that if a physicist, chosen at random, had been asked by which instrument the electron was discovered, the chances are heavily in favour of his answering, "By experience," because its discovery was associated with a physical experiment. The fact that what the experiment showed was not electrons, but such things as green luminosity on glass tubes, would have been held to be trivial, and anyone bold enough to hint at it would have been dismissed as a tiresome quibbler. But now the whirligig of time has brought in his revenges. This electron, this bit of the physical world cognate with the immortal stars, is a wave on Mondays and a particle on Tuesdays; it is too small to see with one eye, while to the other it oscillates throughout the whole of space. There is only one thing to be done if the second picture is to be saved. These appearances must be explained away as mere protuberances on the surface of a mainly inscrutable "real" electron. They are able to pierce the curtain, but it is impervious to the rest of the structure, and further embarrassment is avoided by denying the possibility of knowledge of what the electron is in itself. Why we should think it worth while to push when "reality" is inaccessible is a question that is still in the category of quibbles.

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But this is merely a particular example of the incongruity of the second picture. There is a much more general difficulty, arising from what has been called "the principle of uncertainty," according to which not electrons only, but the whole of the physical world is unknowable because the act of knowing necessarily changes it in an unknowable way. Eat of the tree of knowledge, and Paradise is no longer Paradise. The protuberant superficial particle, as well as the hidden real electron, escapes us, for we cannot know where it is until it is elsewhere. When an object passes from behind the curtain to the front, it becomes something else, and knowledge is no longer knowledge but transmutation. To such a pass have we been reduced by the attempt to express the progress of physics in terms of a gradual discovery of an independent world by means of reason and experience. And all the time we are learning more and more, and bringing more and more of our observations into a rational system.

In order to understand these anomalies we must describe the first picture in rather more detail. We have the active agent, reason, fitting together into a regular pattern the passive bits of experience which form its raw material. Let us first of all identify these bits of experience, which are unalterable in themselves, the function of reason being restricted to the establishment of relations between them. We often say that what we experience—what we "observe"—in physics are objects such as stones and metals and stars, but that is not so. The physicist takes no interest in a material object as such; he is concerned primarily with the sense data which go to compose the material object, and he deals with them separately, quite ignoring their common-sense association into stones and such things. Consider, for example, two pieces of matter, such as a drop of ink and a piece of chalk. For simplicity we can ignore most of their qualities, and regard one simply as a black fluid and the other as a white solid. But physics does not so treat them. It does not take a black fluid and a white solid as two unit pieces of the puzzle and try to fit them into position. It takes instead the blackness of the ink and the whiteness of the chalk, and fits them into a partly completed portion of the puzzle which it calls "the science of optics"; and, similarly, it takes the fluidity of the ink and the solidity of the chalk, and works them into another partly completed portion of the puzzle which it calls "kinetic theory." It constructs laws of optics which show a rational relation between the blackness and the whiteness in terms of the optical properties of some external source of illumination and such things; but it forms no laws of ink which show a rational relation between the blackness and the fluidity of that substance. The common-sense unity of the ink and that of the chalk are ignored, and the component sense data which go to form those objects are separated out and re-associated in quite a different way. We must

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regard the individual pieces of the puzzle, then, as sense data—sights, sounds, motions, tastes, and the rest—and not as the familiar material objects of the world of common sense.

We now come to an important detail in which our analogy of the jig-saw puzzle must be slightly modified. In those subtle devices for wasting the philosopher's time, the pieces fit directly into one another, with no connecting medium at all. That is not the way in which the physicist correlates sense data. He does not join the blackness of the ink directly with the whiteness of the chalk. He forms an auxiliary concept called "light," which he defines in such a way that it gives rise to the sensation of blackness in one set of circumstances and to the sensation of whiteness in another. Similarly, he forms concepts of "molecular forces" which are responsible for fluidity and solidity. These concepts must be clearly distinguished from the sense data themselves. Light is not a sense datum; the sensation of sight is the sense datum, and light is the agency which we postulate in order to "account for" it. The postulation of light is an act of reason, but sense data are given to us in experience.

We must regard our puzzle-solver, then, as having at his disposal two kinds of things. There are, first, the unit pieces of the puzzle—sense data—which he must accept as they are. He cannot alter them in any way, and his object is to connect them together into a rational unity. And, secondly, there are other pieces—clips, if you like—which he can use for joining the sense data together in rational relationship. These he creates for himself, and he can alter them in any way he wishes so long as he does so consistently; that is to say, if he alters the character, the definition, of the clip called "light," for example, to facilitate the connection of blackness with whiteness, he must make that same alteration in all the clips called light in the partly completed section of the puzzle called "optics." It may happen that this is embarrassing—that, for instance, he may find that one definition of light will connect half the sensations of colour together, and another definition will connect the other half. He must then separate the two groups, go on adding sense data to each as far as he can, and wait for further progress to show how the clips may be modified so as to unite the groups again.

These two types of entity—the pieces and the clips—are respectively the empirical and the rational elements in the objective world of physics. The pieces are the individual sense data of the physicist—unchanging, unalterable, "impotent pieces of the game he plays." The clips are concepts; they include light, space, physical time, electrons, mass, and many other familiar elements of the physical scheme, and they are created and modified and destroyed at the will of the physicist acting as subjective reason.

The fundamental difficulty of understanding modern physics

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comes from the fact that, because we have grown so accustomed to the second picture, these two elements have become hopelessly confused. In terms of that picture there is only one kind of element—the ordinary material object, which may be revealed by either reason or experience or both, the labour being suitably divided. Individual sense data, as such, are ignored, and the material object as a whole is taken as the type of all that is physically significant. An electron and a star and mass and space and all the rest are alike things existing independently in the objective world, and we strive to understand their nature, although we have proved that it is incomprehensible. The suggestion that an electron and a star are not of the same nature—that one is a pure creation of reason and the other an association of a few sense data clipped together by concepts such as space and physical time—is rejected because, although obviously true, it does not conform to the picture.

And yet, if we could only become simple-minded enough, there is nothing that is easier than to distinguish the elements of experience from those of reason. The former are simple sense data which we cannot change because the passage of time immediately removes them from our control, and the latter are ideas which we form and transform at our discretion. A particular sensation of green or of sourness is just what it is; we cannot alter it—we can only try to “explain” it, i.e. connect it rationally with other sensations. Concepts, on the other hand, we alter with absolute freedom within the bounds of reason. Light is a wave or a particle or whatever we want it to be in order to correlate our experiences. Space is Euclidean, or Riemannian, or Lobatchewskyan, or what not, according to the same necessity. Physical time is one thing to one “observer” and another thing to another. Electrons are goodness knows what, and I have no time to enumerate all the things they have been. And mass—according to the second picture the one fundamental, inviolable property of the material object—is first made a dependant on velocity, and then, in general relativity, abolished altogether. All this is history; it is not a hypothesis about what *may* happen; it *has* happened. And it has happened by rational action on the part of the physicist. He did not look at mass—get experience of it—in order to change it; he changed it spontaneously by his own rational act, in order to connect experiences together.

We can now see quite simply, I think, what the modern physical paradoxes mean. Take the difficulty that the electron must be both a wave and a particle. This is only a difficulty so long as we regard an electron as an independently existing physical object whose pre-established nature we try to discover. If that were true there would, of course, be a real difficulty, because the properties of waves and those of particles are incompatible. But the electron is not an

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independently existing physical object. History tells us that we have invented it; it is a clip, and not one of the pieces of the puzzle. When we say that it is a wave, we mean that the concept of a wave is a suitable clip for connecting together a large number of pieces of the puzzle; and when we say that it is a particle, we mean that the concept of a particle is a suitable clip for connecting together a large number of the other pieces of the puzzle. But that is quite normal; we have never expected the same concept to connect all experiences together. That is perhaps an ideal to be aimed at as the completion of physics, but in working towards it we are content with light for optics, with space and time for kinematics, and so on. The whole difficulty, then, with the wave and the particle is simply that we have given them the same name: call them by different names, and the difficulty disappears.

The conclusion that the famous paradox of modern physics exists only because we have called different things by the same name may seem too simple to be true; yet I do not think it can be avoided. In saying that the experiences rationalized by the two concepts are different experiences, I am not inventing an explanation; I am simply stating facts which are generally acknowledged by physicists. Here, for example, is a quotation from Professor C. G. Darwin¹: "If we devise an experiment which shows the wave properties, that experiment debars us from observing the particle properties at the same time, and *vice versa*." Or, in our own terms, the experiences which are connected together by the concept of a wave cannot be connected together by the concept of a particle, and *vice versa*.² And again: "An electron is a particle 'and/or' a wave. We must be ready all the time to think of it as either or both, but we must not mix the ideas." Nothing could be clearer. But when Professor Darwin goes on to say: "There is nothing of the same kind anywhere else in scientific thought" (p. 83), I cannot agree with him, because I think there is nothing of any other kind in scientific thought. We can think of "light" as the etherial wave which makes possible sight, or as the aerial wave which makes possible hearing, but we must not mix the ideas. We do not, of course, mix these particular ideas because we call the second kind of "light," "sound"; but that is the only difference between the two cases. Light is used to rationalize certain sense experiences, and sound to rationalize others. Similarly, the wave electron is used to rationalize certain sense experiences, and the particle electron to rationalize others. Give them different names, and the correspondence with light and sound is complete.

Of course, there is a reason why we gave light and sound different names, and the wave electron and particle electron the same name: it is not simple imbecility. The reason is that the sense data rationalized

¹ *The New Conceptions of Matter* (1931), p. 80.

² *Ibid.*, p. 82.

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by light and by sound are obviously of different kinds, whereas those rationalized by the concept of electrons appear at first to be of the same kind. Consequently (speaking in terms of our jig-saw picture) we started from the beginning to build sights into one pattern and noises into a quite different one, and the clips suitable for these two isolated portions of the complete design were not expected to be the same. The history of the electron, however, is somewhat different. We began to correlate certain sense data by means of the particle electron, and quite a respectable pattern soon grew up. A time came, however, when other sense data, apparently of the same kind, could be joined on only by clips with different properties—those of waves. The proper thing to do, of course, would have been to start a new group, disregarding the superficial similarity between the sense data, and keeping the pattern made possible by the particle clips separate from that made possible by the wave clips. But physicists could not do that because they were obsessed by the second of our pictures, according to which the electron was a definite, independent, unique thing. Rather than take the traditional scientific course, therefore, they elected to regard it as a contradiction, and, making a virtue of necessity, many of them congratulated themselves on having discovered scientifically that the universe was essentially mysterious.

I wish it were possible to trace out the history of the electron, to show how it is that sense data, apparently of the same kind, could require to be separated into different groups needing different concept clips to hold them together. The process is far too complicated, however, for brief treatment, but fortunately it can be illustrated by a simpler example in which precisely the same thing has happened, except that physicists have not in this case fallen into error, but have actually formed the separate groups required. I refer to the case of motion of free bodies. We observe movements, and these constitute our sense data, the unit pieces of our puzzle. We then form certain concepts—space, time, mass—by means of which we can bring them into a system: the arrangement of the connecting clips for this purpose is known as the "laws of mechanical motion," and the pattern includes the movements of the planets, of falling bodies, of projectiles, and many other things.

But now, there are some movements that do not fit into the scheme: to take an example, there are the movements of magnets in a magnetic field. I describe them in these terms so that you shall understand at once what I am talking about, but, simply as movements, they are indistinguishable from the movements of falling apples; and, apart from the laws which we have had to arrive at by exercising our reason on the sense data, we should not know one kind of movement from the other. Now these magnetic movements

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will not join on to the group of mechanical ones. You can take a magnet, measure its mass in the approved fashion, give it a definite, known velocity at a known place and time, and calculate the movement which the laws of mechanics require; and you will find that it will not exhibit that movement.

Physicists have therefore kept these magnetic movements apart from the purely mechanical ones: they have created additional concepts of "magnetism" and "magnetic field," and started to form a new pattern in which these new concepts are used as connecting clips. And the essential point in all this is that there is no justification whatever for this separate treatment of similar sense data except that it works. Magnetic movements bear no label to distinguish them from mechanical ones. We cannot look at a magnet and observe its magnetism, or at the surrounding space and observe a magnetic field. There is no evidence whatever for the reality of these things except that they enable us to bring order into certain movements which disobey the laws followed by others. We are, in fact, busy now trying to abolish magnetism. For many years Einstein and others have been trying to formulate a "unified field theory" which will include magnetic and electrical movements in the laws of mechanics, and if they succeed, "magnetism" and "magnetic field" will pass into nothingness.

All this is meaningless in terms of the second picture. According to that picture we are engaged in learning all we can about magnetism, which is some entity existing in its own right, and which is now partly behind and partly in front of the curtain. The fact that we have never had any experience of it, and that all that we can say about it is derived from our attempts to make our experience of movements rational, is regarded as unimportant; it merely means that we are discovering it by pushing the left hand instead of the right. The fact that when we have brought more of it to the front it may all disappear, as mass did when general relativity came into view, can only, in terms of the second picture, be regarded as another example of the essential mysteriousness of the universe.

Now let us compare this example of magnetism with the case of the electron. In the former we have movements, originally indistinguishable, which we can fit together if we divide them into two groups, one connected by the clips, mass, space, time (or space-time alone in the latest arrangement), and the other by these same clips with the addition of others. We have condescended to make this division, and have made much progress in consequence. In the other case (that of the electron) we again have experiences, too complex to describe briefly, but again of a single kind. Here, however, we have not divided in order to conquer. Although one group can be correlated by means of the concept of a particle, and the remainder

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by means of the concept of a wave, we persist in keeping them all together, even at the expense of making the common connecting clip a monstrosity: we say the electron is both a particle and a wave. If we had treated movements in the same way, we should have said that matter was both magnetic and non-magnetic, instead of that some matter was magnetic and some non-magnetic.

I do not want to stray too far beyond the boundaries of my subject, but at this point it seems fitting to refer to one of the great problems of philosophy which owes one of its commonest forms to the progress of physics. I refer to what has been called the nineteenth-century nightmare of universal determinism. The influence of physics on our attitude to this problem is well enough known; Professor Whitehead's condensed statement will serve for the purpose of setting it before us. Speaking of Tennyson's *In Memoriam*, he says: "Tennyson goes to the heart of the difficulty. It is the problem of mechanism which appals him.

'The stars,' she whispers, 'blindly run.'

This line states starkly the whole philosophic problem implicit in the poem. Each molecule blindly runs. The human body is a collection of molecules. Therefore, the human body blindly runs, and therefore there can be no individual responsibility for the actions of the body."

I think it is one of the most remarkable examples of the human power of self-deception that this argument should ever appear other than absurd, for the whole practice of physicists, even in the nineteenth century, gave it the lie direct. They had found laws which correlated certain movements—mechanical laws. Other movements violated those laws, so they were released therefrom and different laws were formed for them—magnetic laws. Still other movements obeyed neither mechanical nor magnetic laws; they were excused both and given a fresh set—electrical laws. A fourth set of movements—animal movements—obeyed none of these laws, and in this case no one succeeded in finding any laws which they did obey. And what happened? Instead of saying, "There may be no such laws, and these movements may be free," physicists and philosophers and everyone else refused to grant them even the freedom given to magnetic and electrical movements. Instead, they said mournfully, "There is no escape from the conclusion that these movements, which obviously defy the laws of mechanics, are in complete subjection thereto."

The true answer to the determinist riddle is that there is no riddle to answer. The whole difference between mechanical movements and others is that the former obey certain laws and the latter do not; there is no other difference. If, then, mechanical movements

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are called blind because they can be predicted, movements which cannot be predicted must not be called blind. Molecules have nothing to do with the matter; they are conceptions introduced to correlate phenomena other than movements. What we are concerned with are the movements of pieces of matter like human bodies and stars, and we find that we can predict the movements of dead human bodies and stars, but not those of living human bodies. A child could have silenced Tennyson's Maid of Sorrow by reminding her that she was no star. Perhaps in those days children were too genteel for that; if so, Victorian gentility has no greater crime laid to its charge.

The reason for this ghastly illusion is again the domination which the false second picture held over the minds of everyone. In terms of the first picture, where the actual experiences, the observed movements, are taken as given, and laws are created by reason to bring the movements together into a rational system, it cannot even be expressed. Laws are valid just so far as they fulfil their purpose of rationalizing experiences, and no further. But in the second picture, laws are objective existences which we bring to light by pushing back the curtain; and matter, which they control, must be all alike in its subjection to them because it forms, dead and living alike, the objective element of the fundamental duality. Hence, if some matter appears lawless, that is only because we have not yet pushed the curtain back far enough to reveal its laws completely. This was a pure assumption, of course, but there had to be something corresponding to our hope that all experience is rational. The tragedy of the second picture is that that hope can be realized only by making us the slaves of alien forces, for we ourselves, the pusher of the curtain, are also matter in the objective world. But in the first picture the forces which control our objective selves are not alien, but of our own creation, and we, as subjective rational agents, stand outside them. We can escape the submission of our objective selves to them when we wish—by becoming irrational. For my own part I have no desire to do so.

The extent to which the second picture still perverts our thinking is nowhere more evident than in the recent attempts to solve the dilemma by an appeal to the principle of uncertainty. It is said that because we cannot predict the mechanical movements of matter with absolute precision, our wills may be free. But the principle of uncertainty is essentially a restriction on what we can *know*, not on what actually *is*, so that it really has nothing to do with the matter. This ostrich method of escape from an imaginary problem is one of the most curious features of modern mental activity.

I want to refer in conclusion to another very important question concerning the rational and the empirical, which can be elucidated

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immediately when considered in relation to our first picture. There is a tendency among some modern physicists to regard the business of science as the discovery of laws of nature by pure reason, apart from experience. Readers of *Nature* may remember that about six months ago this question was discussed in that journal, and it was, in fact, in the throes of the resulting controversy that I chose the subject before us for my lecture this evening. Perhaps that may be accepted as my excuse for referring briefly to my own part therein.

The point which it seemed to me important to maintain was that the practice of formulating arbitrary principles unrelated to experience, and proceeding to make purely rational deductions therefrom, was not a process which could properly be called science; and that to make use of existing facilities for scientific publication and research in order to promote such practices, was illegitimate. I could have stated my case most simply and clearly in terms of our first picture, but since that is as yet unfamiliar, and almost all scientists think in terms of the second—and since, further, space forbade a preliminary description of the appropriate picture—I could only translate my contention into terms compatible with the second picture—i.e. with the idea that science is an attempt to discover the character of an independent objective world assumed to be governed by independent objective laws. In the ensuing discussion, certain points were raised which could not be properly answered in such terms because they were really concerned with the inadequacy of the second picture itself. I want, therefore, in the more advantageous position in which I am now situated, very briefly to reconsider the question in both sets of terms.

If we choose the second picture, the point does not seem of fundamental importance. Whether we push back the curtain with the right hand of experience, or with the left hand of reason, is rather trivial so long as it is pushed back and the nature of the physical world is revealed. The chief reason which is then available for insisting on the claims of experience is a historical one. The beginnings of modern science were characterized by a very successful effort by the extreme right, that which was brought into view by the left party being shown to be illusion and not knowledge. For example, reason formulated principles such as that the heavens were incorruptible and unalterable, while the earth was corruptible and variable; that a circle was the most perfect figure; and so on. From this it followed that the Sun must be spotless, and the orbits of the planets circular. That was what was brought into view by pushing back the curtain on the left. Pushing on the right, however, showed that the Sun was not spotless and the orbits of the planets were not circular. It is the second revelation, and not the first, that we now universally call knowledge.

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It is precisely this same controversy that is now revived. To take a particular example, Professor Milne, of Oxford, has formulated a principle which may be expressed briefly as requiring that observers everywhere in the universe observe, on the large scale, the same course of events, so that it would be impossible for anyone to know where he was. There is no evidence for this principle, for we do not know even that there are any observers other than terrestrial ones. The principle is therefore precisely equivalent to the principle that the heavens are incorruptible, and derives the same *a priori* plausibility from the present terms of physical theories that the other principle derived from the climate of mediaeval thought. Professor Milne than proceeds to argue that we may arrive at truth by rational deduction from this principle, or similar ones, without recourse to experience. We are forced to conclude, therefore, that if an observer should be discovered empirically who had a different view of the universe from ours, his existence would have to be denied. The objection which the second picture allows us to make to this contention is that, as a matter of history, Science is the name given to the view which, in such a conflict, accepts the revelations of experience and not those of reason.

But it is in terms of the first picture that the matter is seen in the clearest light. Science is there seen as the arranging of experience into a rational system. Reason can create connecting clips as it wishes, and the particular set of clips which is able to unite a certain group of experiences into a system forms the law of nature appropriate to that group. To say that the system could be formed without the experiences would obviously be nonsense: experiences are the data of the problem, and the clips are created to conform to them. Reason could, of course, form clips (i.e. concepts) without considering the experiences—in pure mathematics, as well as in the act of inventing arbitrary principles, it does so—but in so doing it is engaged in quite another activity, which should bear its own name. To call the blind creation of clips a means of finding out how experiences can be ordered, when the experiences themselves are ignored, is absurd. Professor Milne's cosmological principle is an arbitrary creation of reason, and the forms which its own nature enables it to take may inspire a pleasant logical exercise, but that is something essentially different from science. In terms of the first picture, we have no longer a conflict between different methods for achieving the same end; the question is whether we shall seek to rationalize experiences, or amuse ourselves with fancies. I am not going to discuss the relative merits of the two occupations, but I should like to insist strongly that existing scientific societies were established and endowed for the encouragement of the former.

Sir Arthur Eddington's position in this matter is most interesting.

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He maintains that "there is nothing in the whole system of laws of physics that cannot be deduced unambiguously from epistemological considerations." Like Professor Milne, therefore, he is concerned with reason alone, and not with experience, but, unlike Professor Milne, he does not create arbitrary principles on which reason can operate; he thinks rather that reason, by its own nature, can appear as physical laws—that those laws are not so much created by as shaped out of reason. In terms of the second picture, in which he professedly thinks, we must imagine the left hand, reason, as engaged, not in pushing the curtain back, but in reaching behind it and creating the physical world. The physicist, if he were intelligent enough, could without sight understand, from the movements of his left hand, what the structure of the world was, and when the right hand of experience pushed back the curtain to reveal it, only the superficial colouring would be novel: in the essentials of substance and structure, the mind of the physicist would merely have regained from nature what it had previously put in.

It is not surprising that this conception appears to many as utterly fantastic, and Eddington as the victim of illusions. I am inclined to think, however, that it is evidence of the highest genius. For let us consider how the conception appears in relation to our first picture. Here we see the laws of nature, just as Eddington conceives them, as the work of reason: they are the contribution, not of an external world, but of the physicist, the agent, and are essentially different from experiences, which have to be accepted as they are. This is an elementary feature of the first picture, *but Eddington has deduced it from the second*. In spite of the limitations and essential defects of that picture—which, so far as I know, no other scientific philosopher who adopts it has succeeded in transcending—he has seen into the heart of the matter, and has dared to become a fool that he may be wise. He has even, according to his latest pronouncements, realized that not only laws of nature, but also such things as protons and electrons, are creations of reason, and, as he puts it, are not parts of an objective universe. How he has seen through the intricate and obscure convolutions of the second picture that so consistently obstructs his vision, and observed this essential fact, I do not know; I can only, with genuine admiration, applaud the achievement.

It seems to me very probable that the *detailed* elucidation of the paradoxes of modern quantum theory awaits Eddington's abandonment of the second picture for the first. When his genius finds a field of operations made to its measure, we may expect enlightenment. At present its activities are not only hindered, but perverted. His realization of the truth that laws of nature are constructed by reason leads him to the error that reason might have constructed them

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without experience. "An intelligence," he says, "unacquainted with our universe . . . should be able to attain all the knowledge of physics that we have attained by experiment." A glance at the first picture is sufficient to show the fallacy here. Such an intelligence could certainly construct the whole of physical theory, but it could also construct a thousand alternative physical theories. It could form the laws of the universe of experience, and also the laws of Professor Milne's universe and of any other universe it was able to imagine; and, without experience, it would have no criterion for preferring one set of laws to another. Eddington's statement is not wrong; it is simply valueless. The possessor of a dictionary should be able to write all the philosophical truths that can be expressed in the English language; but what is the use of that if he cannot distinguish them from errors?

There is much to say on this subject, in which physics and philosophy meet. I would recommend the first of my two pictures to the consideration of philosophers for two reasons; first, because it shows a distinction between the subjective and the objective which corresponds directly to the distinction between subject and object which is necessary to thought; and secondly, because it provides the only philosophical form in which modern physics can be expressed without inconsistency.

WOULD PLATO HAVE APPROVED OF THE NATIONAL-SOCIALIST STATE?¹

PROFESSOR R. F. ALFRED HOERNLÉ.

LIKE all my generation at Oxford, in the far-away years of the turn of the century, I received my first introduction to the Philosophical Theory of the State through the reading of Plato's *Republic*. There followed Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Hegel, Bosanquet—with a disapproving glance at Mill and Spencer. Alongside this survey of widely varying theories there ran a lively interest in the politics of the day under a "democratic," i.e. parliamentary, system of government, with much experience of "democratic" methods in the running of various college and university societies, the officials of which were elected by the members, and the actions of which were determined, after discussion, by majority vote.

If there was any connecting link, on the one hand between the diverse theories themselves, and on the other hand between these theories and our actual democratic practice, it was perhaps this: We accepted the Aristotelian premise that the State exists to make the "good life" possible for its members; we were led on thence to the problem of "knowing" just what the good life in detail is; we found Rousseau saying that the people always wills the good, but does not always know what it is. Looking back from this point at Plato's *Republic*, we found him proposing to secure this knowledge in the persons of his finely bred and highly trained philosopher-kings, who coupled with their knowledge the power to give effect to it in the ruling of the State by having the support of an armed body of "auxiliaries" or "helpers." Looking forward to Hegel and Bosanquet, we found ourselves told that this knowledge is concretely embodied in the established institutions and laws of the State, expressing that "general will" which is, by definition, the will for the good of the community as a whole. Turning our backs, then, on Plato's philosophic dictators, we made a contact between this "general will" doctrine and the current "democratic" theory and practice, by looking upon the machinery of parliamentary government as the institutional organ for continuous adjustment, i.e. for maintaining, or modifying where necessary, the whole institutional

¹ The substance of this paper was delivered, as a Presidential Address, before the Philosophical Society of the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, in April, 1937.

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framework so as to keep on realizing the "good life" in a changing world.

In other words, we idealized democracy in its parliamentary form, and in this mood excused Plato's severe strictures on democracy on the ground that they applied only to democracy as he had known it, i.e. to government by primary assemblies of all citizens. And from his advocacy of an enlightened dictatorship we carried away only the ideals of trained efficiency, devotion to duty, and public spirit overriding the acquisitive motive, which ideals we took to be adequately realized in a healthy Civil Service.

What a dictatorship, even a Platonic one, in practice would be like, and how it would impact on our democratic habits of thought and action, we hardly tried to imagine. Historical examples of dictatorship or autocratic rule looked to us more like what Plato had called "tyranny," in contrast with the rule of philosopher-kings. The last thing we then expected was that we should live to see great modern states governed by dictators, or that once more dictatorship should be deliberately put forward as the salvation of humanity from the evils of democracy. Just here lies the sting: our modern dictators claim in effect to be, not "tyrants," but philosopher-kings; men with a *Weltanschauung*, with a scheme for the spiritual salvation of their peoples, with a formulated theory of what is good for their peoples, or even for humanity as a whole; men who justify their unscrupulous use of force, their ruthlessness in moulding their subjects to the pattern of their ideals and in stamping out all opposition, precisely by the good that they seek to realize, not for themselves personally, but for the peoples over whom they rule.

This present-day historic experience brings Plato's theory from heaven down to earth, and invites us to a comparison which may illuminate his theory by modern practice, and *vice versa*. Hence, the real topic which I wish to discuss under the cover of the title of this address is the theory and practice of dictatorship, making Plato's theory and modern practice mutually throw light on each other. I shall draw my illustrations of contemporary dictatorship from National-Socialist Germany, because I happen to have some first-hand knowledge of the working of dictatorship there. Had I equal knowledge of the Italian, or again the Russian, systems, I might have used either of them just as effectively for the purpose of this study.

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We may conveniently enter upon our study by meeting, at the very outset, a possible but irrelevant objection. I am sure to be asked: "Do you seriously mean to suggest that Plato's philosopher-kings would have been men like Mussolini and Hitler, like Lenin or

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Stalin, or that they would have held the theories of any one of these? And, if you do not mean this, is not the bottom knocked out of your comparison?"

My reply to this objection is twofold. In the first place, I am interested in a comparison of systems, methods, techniques of government; of the devices of organization and education by which dictators, inspired by a *Weltanschauung* (be it that of Plato or any other), impose that *Weltanschauung* on the community over which they rule and secure its acceptance—if not in the sense of conviction of its truth, then at least in the sense of conformity to it in practice.

And, secondly, we have to note that our modern dictators stand to their loyal followers, to those who "believe" in them, in exactly the same position in which Plato's philosopher-kings would have stood to the lower orders in Plato's Ideal State. Plato postulates for the stability and cohesion of his State through the rank and file of his citizen-body the virtue of "sophrosyne," i.e. that "healthy-mindedness" one of the aspects of which is the "agreement" of the citizens that the philosopher-kings are fittest to rule, and that it is the citizens' duty to obey unquestioningly what in their "wisdom" (which is knowledge of what is for the good of the city as a whole) the philosopher-kings ordain. Plato's rank-and-file citizen is, for lack of "reason" and "wisdom," unable to judge for himself the decisions and actions of the philosopher-kings, and he would certainly not have been allowed to do so. This is exactly that same attitude of unquestioning loyalty to a "leader," of absolute faith in his wisdom, which the modern dictators ask and seek to inculcate. We may be sure—though Plato is not explicit on the point—that his philosopher-kings would have disciplined a recalcitrant citizen exactly as he proposes that they should deal with an artist who should refuse to conform to their standards of wholesome poetry and music. Obviously, Plato's philosopher-kings would have regarded such nonconformists as "enemies of the people," *Volksschädlinge* in the German phrase; and whether they would have been killed or exiled or put in concentration camps is a mere detail of technique, governed by expediency. What is the purpose of the armed helpers in Plato's Ideal State, in their relation to the "internal enemies of the city," except to execute, at the behest of the philosopher-kings, such moral and social surgery on infection-spots of spiritual disease?

Thus, it is beside the point to demand a comparison between the actual *Weltanschauung* and policy of Plato's philosopher-kings and those of our modern dictators. We know nothing of these things for the philosopher-kings, except what little Plato tells us; and that little few, if any, of us would be prepared to apply even if we had the power to do so. And it is equally beside the point to reject the comparison on the ground that we personally happen to disagree

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with the philosophy of Fascism, or National-Socialism, or Communism, as the case may be, and therefore refuse to compare any leader who holds one of these philosophies with a Platonic philosopher-king. What we are concerned with is the fact of dictators with philosophies striving to realize these in the lives of their peoples by appropriate organization of their states. It matters not in the least whether we agree with these philosophies and think them true, or not: what matters is that we are confronted by *Weltanschauungen* ("ideologies") *in action*, with all the ruthless driving force and energy of fanatic dictators behind them—ruthless fanatics, just because they conceive themselves to be vessels of absolute truth and through that truth saviours of the souls of their peoples.

The same point may be made, from another angle, by invoking Plato's distinction between the true philosopher-king and the tyrant. Both are dictators, in the sense that they wield absolute power supported by military force. But this is the only point they have in common. For the tyrant is obeyed only because he can enforce obedience by physical force: the philosopher-king, as we have already noticed, is a "leader" who can rely on the loyal obedience of his people. The tyrant has no philosophy, no vision of the good; he uses his power for personal aggrandisement and the indulgence of his private lusts: the philosopher-king knows what the welfare of his State requires and makes himself the selfless instrument of this high service. The tyrant is morally utterly depraved, the slave of his own undisciplined desires: the philosopher-king is master of himself, and therefore fit to be the master of others. The modern dictators may seem to be "tyrants" to those who do not share their philosophies and whom they persecute. But this is not to be a "tyrant" in Plato's sense of the word; for, if persecuting dissenters is being a "tyrant," then the philosopher-kings on occasion have to be tyrants too. Taking the word "tyrant" in the strict Platonic sense, it is obvious that the modern dictators, as apostles of a philosophy of life, are much more nearly akin to his philosopher-kings than to his "tyrants." And so we come back to the point: the philosopher-king of the *Republic* is best understood by analogy with the modern dictator who is, or claims to be, a "leader" and is obeyed by his genuine followers because of their faith in him and the good for which he stands, and which for them, and with their help, he strives to realize.

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Turning, then, after these preliminaries, to the technique of dictatorship, what points of similarity between the Platonic and the National-Social systems can we discover?

There is, first, the *authoritarian* principle in the name of the good

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of the people, which has for its negative side the rejection of government by majority vote as a system which enables the sectional interests of selfish persons or groups to be achieved under the guise of the "will of the people," still supposed to be the will for the good of the whole. In short, according to the authoritarian principle, the good which the people wills is to be interpreted and realized, not by the majority vote at some election or in the lobbies of Parliament, but by the decision and command of a public-spirited dictator who leads the people to their own good.

Look at the Platonic picture in the *Republic*. The philosopher-kings rule with absolute authority. They do not consult the people; they are not elected by the people; they cannot be removed by the people; they are not, in parliamentary language, "responsible" to the people. They are a self-perpetuating body, recruiting themselves by co-option from among the younger men and women whose training through something like thirty years they have supervised; whom they have moulded and tested, harder than iron is tested in the fire, as the Platonic phrase has it. Their rule justifies itself by its supreme efficiency. In detail they rule and are obeyed, because (a) they are "wise," i.e. they "know" what is good for the State as a whole, and their lives are so organized that they have no other interest than to serve the State in this spirit; (b) they have an armed body of trained fighters at their command to enforce their decisions by force, if need be; and (c) they are willingly obeyed by the rest of the community in that spirit of "sophrosyne" of which loyalty to a leader seems the modern equivalent. It is the function of the philosopher-kings in the Ideal State to declare what the welfare of the people requires and to give effect to their judgment by legislation and command. It is the function of the people to obey and to follow. Their consent to particular measures is not asked. For them to think about politics would be to meddle in things beyond their competence. Least of all are they allowed to pursue sectional interests by political pressure through their votes. The philosopher-kings and the helpers (the two highest classes in Plato's State) are roughly the analogon of the modern dictator and the close-knit, disciplined *Partei* (be it the Communist Party in Russia, the Fascist Party in Italy, or the N.-S. Party in Germany) through which the dictator rules.

In this light look at the National-Socialist picture: The supreme leader, assisted by a group of sub-leaders, rules the *Partei*, and through the *Partei* the State. The cabinet (the leader and the most important sub-leaders) makes laws by proclamation. There is, apart from the army proper, the armed S.S. (*Schutzstaffel*) force to deal with recalcitrant and "subversive" elements. It is linked with the *Geheime Staatspolizei* (Secret Police) which noses out and suppresses

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all a-social and anti-social movements, i.e. all movements whatever which, like even Freemasonry, are regarded as hostile to the N.-S. *Weltanschauung*. It isolates all enemies of the people in concentration camps, unless they have incurred the death penalty. The rest of the *Partei* functions as a leaven for moulding the attitude of the mass of the people. Each individual member has the function of being a leader in his own small circle: a living point of faith, communicating itself from him to those around him. He has to guide, to watch, to exhort, to warn, to denounce, as the case may be. He is responsible for the spiritual health (according to N.-S. prescription) of his social environment, at once a pattern and a stimulus and a censor. If we think of National-Socialism as a religion, of the Party as a church, of the leaders in various grades as the clerus, all this will begin to wear a familiar look, and we shall realize that we have once more before us the experiment, already so often tried in history, and especially in religious history, to propagate a faith among a people, and whilst doing so to maintain at once its burning fervour and its orthodoxy. Every such faith, whatever outsiders may think of it, is accepted by its adherents with the conviction of its absolute truth. It is to them the one thing that gives meaning to life; the one thing that "saves" them; the one thing that will save others too, if they will but accept it. That is why its adherents persecute dissenters with a good conscience as enemies of the truth and the light. That is why they make themselves contented servants of the authoritarian principle.

Would it have been otherwise in Plato's Ideal State, if that could have been realized on earth?

It is, of course, true that occasional "elections," really popular *referenda*, have been, and will no doubt continue to be, held in Germany, to which there is no parallel in the Platonic State. At these elections the people are supposed to have an opportunity of expressing whether they are satisfied with the present system and its policy, or not. But in fact the questions put, which have to be answered "Yes" or "No," have always been such that an affirmative answer was a forgone conclusion; and, anyhow, intensive propaganda and other forms of pressure have been employed to secure an almost 100 per cent affirmative poll. It is said that when the time comes for a successor to Hitler to take over, the new leader will similarly submit himself to popular approval. No doubt on that occasion again skilful propaganda will do its work; and it should be obvious that these carefully prepared and staged *referenda* are merely an additional device in the service of the authoritarian principle.

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In respect of the *details of the organization* of Plato's State, the

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parallel with the National-Socialist State is, on the face of it, not very close. Nor is this to be expected when we bear in mind the great differences between the Athens of Plato's time and a modern nation-state of over sixty million inhabitants. There is nothing exactly like Plato's three classes of citizens, each with its own function and "virtue." Even the comparison made above between the *Partei* and the two highest classes in Plato's Ideal State, which do in fact the work of government and administration, is only true in a loose sense, in that there are countless officials of all kinds in Germany who do not belong to the *Partei*, though they have to carry out their duties according to its principles, and under the control of superiors who are members of the *Partei*.

But, in one respect, the parallel is close, viz. in that Plato's governing classes are conceived as a selected *élite*, and this is exactly what the *Partei*, too, is one day to be. It is not that *now*, unless we choose to say that anyone who is heart-and-soul convinced of the N.-S. faith thereby shows his superiority to the rest of his *Volks-genossen*. But actually, as Hitler himself has repeatedly admitted, the membership of the *Partei*, even at the moment of *Machtuebernahme*, contained a majority of individuals who, however sound and zealous in the faith they might be, did not possess the technical qualifications for responsible positions in the government service. This, as well as fear of the dilution of the *Partei* by the accession of numbers of insincere time-servers and careerists, are the reasons why admission to the *Partei* by way of application for membership has for some time now been discontinued, and the *Partei* of the future is to be built up by selected recruitment from among the young people who in the various youth organizations have shown themselves to be of the right physical, mental, and moral calibre. It will take a generation to effect the transformation of the present *Partei* into the desired *élite*, but ultimately it is to consist of men—and presumably women, too¹—who have shown under rigorous tests that their faith in the principles of the *Partei* is like a rock; that their devotion to the leader is beyond doubt; and that their *Leistungen* (the quality of their work), physically and mentally, are first-class. Then, and only then, will the *Partei* fulfil the ideal of being a perfect instrument of government in the service of the ideals of National-Socialism. And then it will correspond very closely indeed, in its quality and function, to Plato's governing classes, especially if we include among the functions of its members, not

¹ Though there is a *Reichsfrauenfuehrerin*, and though the *Partei* has women members and uses them for its work, still the supreme body of leaders is intended to consist of men only, and the N.-S. ideal for women is the *Hausfrau*, the wife and mother.

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merely specific administrative and legislative duties, but also the task of being at once guardians and propagators of N.-S. faith.

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And this brings us to a third point. Whatever else Plato's Ideal State may be, it is a *school*. Its major function is to *educate* its citizens, i.e. to train the successive generations of growing boys and girls in those preferences and aversions, those moral and aesthetic principles of conduct, which, once acquired like an "indelible dye"—surely a memorable and revealing metaphor, this!—will thereafter govern their lives and make them model citizens, according to the pattern of human perfection envisaged by Plato. It is a commonplace for students of Plato's *Republic* that the aim of his elementary education is to inculcate "character," defined as "holding fast to the beliefs" by which, as citizens, men and women are to live. In other words, Plato proposes to mould the souls of his citizens to a scheme of values to which ever after they shall be true. He proposes to give them what every great religion has sought to give its adherents, viz. a *Weltanschauung* which shall be not merely a theory about the universe, but also, and even more urgently, a working faith to live by.

Now this is exactly what every modern dictatorship is also trying to do. Hence, every one of them—Communist, Fascist, National-Socialist—is first and foremost a vast educational enterprise, seeking to dominate and mould to its pattern the minds of growing youth, and fighting with all its power any rival claimant for this all-important office. The middle-aged, who have grown up in a different *Weltanschauung* and are no longer open to conviction, are generally left alone by these dictatorships so long as there is passive acquiescence and no open opposition. Death will in due course remove the present generation of inward dissenters, of those who are half-hearted and half-convinced, of doubters and critics. All our modern dictatorships look to the future and seek to conquer that future by rooting themselves securely in the minds of the growing generation.

It was exactly in this spirit that Plato proposed to envelop the minds of the young in a "health-giving" atmosphere; and to that end to censor all art and literature and, in short, the whole cultural life of the people, in order that the young might be taught to believe in, value, work for, fight for, die for, the things which he held to be "good" and "beautiful," and to avoid, abhor, reject, destroy, all things "ugly" and "vicious." Is not all this repeated precisely in the educational efforts of our modern dictatorships, except that the "good" and the "beautiful" receive varying interpretations, according as the context is Communist or Fascist or National-Socialist?

At any rate, in National-Socialist Germany we find the greatest

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emphasis on *character*-education as far more important than the training of the intellect. We find the Platonic conception of "character" as unshakable firmness of belief, or faith, in the right, i.e. the N.-S., principles—a firmness which shows itself not least in unquestioning readiness to act on these principles, be the cost what it may. We find the Platonic emphasis on systematic physical education, both for its physical and its moral effects—for the building of healthy constitutions and for the development of a spirit of hardness and grit in the face of pain, danger, and obstacles that tax the last resources of strength and determination. It is, in fact, character in the sense which in the Great War we learned to call "morale," which is the aim of Plato's education, no less than of that of N.-S. Germany.

In the same spirit the campaign for the "purification" of literature and art in N.-S. Germany runs on Platonic lines, with just this difference of nuance that, whereas Plato distinguishes only between what is, from his point of view, morally good and morally bad, N.-S. censorship applies a second standard of judgment, often in practice coinciding, but not logically identical, with the first, viz. the standard of what is "racially" germane to the German soul as against what is *volksfremd* and *artsfremd* (alien to the essential nature of German *kultur* and to the soul of the German people). Inevitably the range of application of such a policy of moral censorship is far greater than it was in Plato's time. There are not only books, periodicals, the daily press to be kept free from morally infectious matter; or music of a non-German, or even non-Nordic or non-Aryan, type to be eliminated from concert platforms and opera houses. There are also museums to be expurgated, films to be censored, and the content of broadcasting programmes to be kept in line. Nor is it enough to be negative, merely to prevent evil from slipping in. The good is to be positively propagated, by educational films, educational broadcasts, doctored news services, special exhibitions to warn the public against the horrors of Communism or the dangers of the falsification of German literature, music and art, by Jewish influences. Whatever literature is issued by the *Partei*, whether for its own members, or for use in the organizations, like the *Hitlerjugend*, through which it strives to spread its spirit, is full of this moral propaganda. Texts out of Hitler's *Mein Kampf* are regularly made the basis of moral instruction among the members of the S.S. Indeed, quite literally that book takes the place which the Bible holds in a Christian scheme of education. One of the most curious and most insidious forms of this educational propaganda consists in its inculcation of the modern German race theories, seeking not only to instil aversion and hostility to Jews and other non-Aryans, but positively to encourage an admiration for the "Nordic" type

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and a desire to multiply Nordic features by selective breeding (*aufnorden, Aufnordung*). Anti-Semitic papers, like the notorious Streicher's *Stürmer*, with its repulsive representations of Jewish types, belong here just as much as many other papers with pictures of fair-haired Nordic men and women, to serve as models of the qualities which young men and women should look for in their partners for marriage. The German people are being taught to be race-conscious to an ever-increasing degree. More and more are coming to look, in themselves and in others, for the physical marks of one or more of the four to six "races" (the experts differ somewhat in their enumeration) which are included under the general concept of "Nordic" or "Aryan" race. It is no uncommon experience to be told by some race enthusiast that one belongs, e.g., to the "faelische" race with a slight "dinarische" *Einschlag* (admixture), or whatever else the combination of race marks may be!

To return, however, to the topic of education: whether we call the effort to communicate or spread a faith or a *Weltanschauung* "education" or "propaganda" is a question of words. In any case, the *Partei* is—as Plato's governing classes would have been, too—an organization, not merely for translating a certain *Weltanschauung* into practice, but also and even more for backing this practical achievement by the corresponding set of beliefs in the minds of those who have to live by its pattern of values. Hence, the air in Germany is full of the word *Schulung* (schooling). The *Partei* schools its own members, every one of whom has to attend, at least once a year, a *Schulungstag*, at which speakers, officially trained and authorized by Goebbels' Propaganda Department, address the members on topics of internal and external policy from the point of view of *Partei* principles. In a sense, these meetings may be said to serve the purposes of "revival": devotion to *Partei* principles is confirmed anew and freshly stimulated in an atmosphere which seeks to vivify *esprit de corps*, and thus strengthen the cohesion of the members among themselves and their loyalty to the leader. Plato mentions nothing similar, but we can hardly doubt that, among the many details which he proposed to leave to his philosopher-kings for determination, they would have found it necessary to devise an analogous technique for keeping the flame of faith burning brightly. There are *Schulungslager* for Civil Servants, for employers and employees, for school teachers—in short, for all and sundry who, though not members necessarily of the *Partei*, are none the less through their work in a position to advance, or counteract, the practical application or theoretical inculcation of National-Socialist principles. And as for the future leaders themselves, the proposed arrangements for their rigorous selection and elaborate training in a succession of *Burgen* ("castles," or rather castle-schools) are too

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complicated to be briefly summarized here. This scheme does not repeat Plato's proposals for a sound training in the sciences to be followed by a training in philosophy. But it does agree with his scheme in the two fundamental features of the strictest possible selection of the human material to be trained, and a course of training which will make them fit champions of the *Wellanschauung* by which they have to live, which they have to propagate, and in the light of which they have to administer the affairs of the German people.

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In one very important respect, the emphasis of modern National-Socialism is very different from that of Plato. It can hardly be denied that Plato wished his two governing classes (collectively called "the guardians") to be definitely segregated and set apart from the great bulk of the citizen body—the economic classes, the farmers, artisans, traders, etc. The lives of the guardians were to be lived on lines even more completely different from the lives of the common people than are the lives of the Roman Catholic clergy different from the lives of the laity. Dwelling apart from the rest of the citizens in barracks; joining in common meals; sustained by maintenance grants sufficient for their needs, but eliminating the acquisitive motive from their lives; deprived of family life and called upon to mate, regardless of personal preferences, so as to beget well-bred offspring to inherit the desired guardian qualities—the guardians are clearly conceived as a *caste* apart from, and above, the other citizens. Not so in National-Socialist Germany. It is, perhaps, because the leaders of National-Socialist Germany are keenly aware of the latent hostility, suspicion, even fear, with which large numbers of Germans of the older generations regard the *Partei* and all its activities, that they appreciate the danger of the *Partei* developing into a caste apart, a secret society the members of which are bound to each other by exclusive loyalties and enjoy exceptional privileges. At any rate, efforts are being made to prevent the distinction of *Parteigenosse* and *Volksgenosse* growing into a complete split. No doubt the *Partei* is to be an *élite* in order to be fit to carry on its work for Germany. But its members are not to lose touch with the non-Party rank and file. Family life is maintained. Most of the members have to earn their livings by the exercise of some profession. They are to continue to feel one with the people and the people one with them. There is to be *Kameradschaft*. They are to form an integral part of the *Leidensgemeinschaft* of the German people—of one blood with them, of one soul with them, suffering together with them the historic fate of a people encircled by enemies. In every possible way the *Partei* seeks to keep itself before the

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people and to get the people, if only as spectators and flag-waggers, to share in its parades and processions, its ceremonials and rituals. The *Partei* is ever explaining itself to the people, in a way which one can hardly imagine that Plato's guardians would have found necessary. The whole *Bewegung* is almost frantically anxious to assert its character as a popular movement, a German movement, a movement by Germans for Germany. There is something demagogic about its propaganda methods in this respect which it is inconceivable that Plato's guardians should have adopted. And yet, though the technique of solution might have been different, Plato's guardians, too, would have had to face the problem of gaining, and retaining, the "agreement" of the people to their rule. For a disgruntled people rendering unwilling obedience does not make a stable State.

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Lastly, in respect of *economic policy*, one point of similarity at least may be noticed in that the leaders of National-Socialism are, like Plato, alive to the threat to the internal unity of a State which lies in extreme differences of wealth in the population. A city some members of which are very rich, whilst others are very poor, is, says Plato, a city divided against itself; is really "two cities" under the outward form of one. National-Socialists reject, as is well known, the Communist theory of class-war. But they are keenly alive to the fact of class-war itself, and have, in their particular type of Socialism, their own recipe for overcoming it. This is not the place to go into the details of N.-S. policy by which they justify their title to the name "Socialism," i.e. into the measures by which they seek to secure a greater measure of social and economic justice for the working classes and thus to strike at the roots of the "class-war," by removing, or at least alleviating, its causes. Let us note merely that part of their moral propaganda is an effort to appeal to the fellow-feeling of Germans for each other as a solvent of the antagonism between employer and employee; that their slogan, *Gemeinnutz vor Eigennutz* (common good before private good), and their constant calls on the *Opferwille* (will to make sacrifices) of all sections of the people, do touch responsive chords in many hearts, even in circles which are otherwise reluctant to surrender to the N.-S. gospel. No doubt, reality, here as under other systems, falls far short of the ideal professed. But it would be a grievous mistake to overlook the countless organized social welfare activities, which are largely run by the voluntary labour of men and women whose public spirit and love of their own land and people have been freshly aroused, and which are conceived in the spirit of *ciner fuer alle und alle fuer cinen*

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(each for all and all for each). At any rate, whilst we do not know just how Plato's philosopher-kings would have discharged the task laid upon them of guarding the city against great wealth and great poverty for the sake of greater internal stability and cohesion, we must note that National-Socialist Germany is trying to develop its own technique for dealing with this very problem, and that in its appeal to *national* feeling it has a resource at its disposal which, so far as we can judge, would not have been available to Plato's philosopher-kings.

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In conclusion, it may not be irrelevant to draw attention to the fact that three N.-S. thinkers of very different type have tried to relate their N.-S. thinking to Platonic *motifs*.

The first is Theodor von der Pfordten, who would seem to have been easily the most highly educated and able of the sixteen "martyrs" who lost their lives outside the *Feldherrnhalle* in Muenchen, on that fateful Ninth of November, 1923, when Hitler's attempt to seize power by a *coup d'état* was defeated by the machine-guns of the police and garrison of Muenchen. Together with his fellows he now lies in a bronze sarcophagus in one of the two open-air temples on the *Koenigsplatz* in Muenchen. In his lifetime he appears from his writings to have been the best type of German Civil Servant, *pflichtbewusst*, i.e. profoundly convinced that he owed to his work for the State and, through the State, for the German people, the very best that he had it in him to give; and hence a hater of all incompetence, charlatanism, and the unscrupulous wangling of ambitious climbers. One of the few articles which he has left behind him is entitled (in translation) "Plato's Ideal of the Civil Servant (*Beamte*) and its significance for the present time." In it he reviews the proposals of the *Republic* and estimates, with the shrewd common sense of the experienced administrator, the practicability or impracticability of their application in modern Germany. Characteristically, he comes to the conclusion that there is no remedy for the many post-war ills of Germany other than to be ruled by men who should have a definite conception of the measures and policies by which Germany's recovery from the wounds of the War and the Peace might be secured, and who should dedicate their lives to her service with the same selfless devotion and efficiency which Plato had pictured in his philosopher-kings. Such was at least one German's path into the ranks of the followers of Hitler.

The next is Hans F. K. Guenther, well known as the most prominent of German race-theorists. He has devoted a special booklet, *Platon als Hueter des Lebens*, to an interpretation of certain

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features of Plato's theories, especially in the *Republic*, in terms of his own emphasis on the importance of blood purity, race purity, and the dependence of high intellectual and moral qualities on superior blood or race. The sub-title is sufficient indication of the orientation of the argument: "Plato's thoughts about breeding and education and their significance for the present time." He begins by emphasizing the analogy between Plato's philosopher-kings and the modern "leaders," and hence the importance of the problem of securing leaders of the right innate, or inherited, quality and then giving them the right training. But from this point onwards he gives to Plato's suggestions for breeding for quality, and to Plato's warnings against mixing superior and inferior stocks, a definite twist in the direction of his own race theories; and at the same time he enlarges the scope of the principle beyond the relatively small leader group, so as to apply them to the whole population, as a racial group out of which the leaders have to be born and selected. He justifies this twist very ingeniously by the suggestion that, though Plato did not talk in the language of race differences, this is none the less what, in fact, he must have had in mind, in the light of the deterioration of the population of Greece which Plato must have himself observed. What had happened in Greece, according to Guenther, was that a superior race of Nordic invaders, the Hellenes, had established themselves as lords over an inferior aboriginal population, and that this superior race then partly destroyed itself in war, especially in the Peloponnesian war, and partly corrupted its quality by intermarriage with members of the inferior aboriginal race. It is this phenomenon against which he takes Plato's theory of the inherited differences in the natural endowments of men and his scheme for the selective breeding of future leaders to be directed. In short, Plato is really for Guenther an advocate of *Aufnordung*, who would have selected for his guardian class the purest Nordics in the population, compelled them to breed among themselves, and segregated them as completely as possible from the mass of the citizens of inferior racial type and endowment. It would be extremely interesting for some competent scholar, who both knows his Plato and has studied the problem of race, to examine Guenther's argument in detail, in order to determine how much, if anything, there is in his suggestion. I have neither the space, nor do I feel competent, to do so here. Hence, I will content myself with the abstractly logical point that, even in a racially homogeneous population, there will be a sufficiently wide spread of innate ability to allow of the classification of this group, *ex hypothesi* pure in blood, into classes differing in quality, and thus of the application even to such a group of the Platonic sorting-out of citizens according to ability and function, and the Platonic proposals for mating the superior individuals with

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each other. In other words, Plato's scheme can be read in a purely biological and psychological context, without bringing in any "racial" interpretation at all. I do not say that such an interpretation would be logically inconsistent with Plato's scheme: but it certainly seems to be logically independent of it.

Thirdly, there is H. A. Grunsky's *Seele und Staat*, which in its very title announces that it borrows its main *motif* from Plato. But Grunsky, whilst adopting the Platonic principle that the structure of the soul reflects the structure of the State and *vice versa*, gives to this principle an entirely novel application. Instead of Plato's three "elements" or "forms" in the soul, Grunsky has four "poles" or dynamic tension-points; and instead of Plato's three classes in the State, he acclaims, as the correlates of the relations between these four poles, various political and social relations taken from contemporary life, such as the relations of "leader" to "followers," of artist to his public, of man to woman, of child to father and to mother, etc. It would take too long here, and be moreover hardly relevant to the main argument, to describe these poles in detail; and without detail the analysis might well appear so artificial and even fantastic that no justice would be done to the good points in it. Suffice it to put the main point—the moral, as it were—of the whole enterprise: the four poles give Dr. Grunsky ample scope for postulating various degrees of harmony and disharmony, of tension and dominance, between them, to each of which degrees some actual type of "soul," *Weltanschauung*, and culture is then made to correspond. The range of variation of which the scheme allows is such that it has room for the differences between the "souls" of different peoples or nations and of different races (like the Aryan and the Mongolian race, instanced by the author); even of different *Weltanschauungen*, such as that of the National-Socialist, the "bourgeois liberal" and humanitarian, and the Communist, leading to the conclusion that the National-Socialist type of soul is the only truly healthy and well-balanced soul, and that the Communist soul is of all souls the most unhealthy and corrupt. The external parallel to Plato's ladder of descent from the soul of the philosopher-king to the soul of the tyrant will readily be recalled. In both cases, the degeneration is said to be from order in the soul to disorder, from mental and moral health to moral sickness.

These references to the writings of National-Socialist thinkers may at least show how curiously the leaven of Platonic thoughts is working in the medium of experience and reflection coloured by the National-Socialist outlook. Even Grunsky's argument, though it may seem at first like a mere persiflage and caricature of Plato, is offered seriously as a modern reapplication of Plato's profound truth of the parallelism of Soul and State: and not without reason has

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the author been entrusted with a Professorship for the presentation of N.-S. *Weltanschauung* at the University of Muenchen.

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Returning from this digression in conclusion to our starting-point, let us repeat the question: What would Plato have thought of the National-Socialist State, or of any other modern dictatorship, were he able to return and witness it? Would he have approved of the authoritarian principle; the destruction of democratic institutions; the denial of freedom of thought and belief (at least in all matters touching the prescribed *Weltanschauung*); the transformation of education into an instrument of propaganda and indoctrination; the control of all literature, art, press, even universities, in the service of an official orthodoxy; the suppression of all criticism and opposition? Would he, perhaps, have said that his philosopher-kings would have much to learn, as regards the technique of moulding minds, from the National-Socialist system, but that, of course, they would apply it in the service of a widely different *Weltanschauung*?

My own view is that Plato, regarding his philosopher-kings as possessing, *ex hypothesi*, the absolute truth, would hold that the absolute truth justifies dictatorial methods of maintaining and propagating it, and that nothing else does so. I would hope, however, that his absolute truth would be free from the excessively *nationalistic* temper of Fascism and National-Socialism, and free too from the *racial* temper of the latter. Whether Plato, in addition, would have held, reviewing the present state of Europe and comparing it with that of Athens broken by the Peloponnesian war, that there are crises in the lives of states when any faith is better than none; when any order is better than chaos; when any rule which restores unity, and the strength which comes with unity, is better than drifting and being at sixes and sevens; when any cause which offers to men the chance of escaping from selfishness and self-indulgence into the service of a supra-personal ideal is better than further demoralization—this is a question which I need not here attempt to answer.

But, all of us who still retain our faith in the value of individual freedom, and the corresponding "democratic" organization of society, will do well to learn the lessons of the challenge thrown out to us by the new dictatorships and their "ideologies." These lessons seem to me to be at least three. First, our own faith in democracy must be militant, not only in words, but in deeds. We must guard against the acknowledged defects with which human nature afflicts the practice of democratic principles. We must make democracy *work* more successfully than it has often worked in the past. And this requires more public spirit in all of us; more readiness to subordinate

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private to public good, than easygoing democratic ways usually exact from us. Secondly, we must realize that a democracy which cannot, through free institutions, control the economic order of society in the cause of justice between classes and races, at least as well as this or that dictatorship attempts to do it, or professes to be doing it, has no claim to survive. And, thirdly, we must bear in mind that we have undertaken the most difficult enterprise which men living together in complex modern society can attempt, viz. to elicit unity of will and firmness of decision out of the varying and often conflicting interests and opinions of a large body of people. To do this by authoritarian methods, backed by organized force, is relatively easy: to do it by discussion and vote makes the greatest demands on men's resources of good sense and good will. If dictatorships come to prevail and democracy passes from the world, it will be, not because it is in principle an inferior method of government, but because human nature proved unequal to its demands

SOME MERITS AND DEFECTS OF CONTEMPORARY GERMAN ETHICS

(*Materiale Wertethik* in Scheler, Spranger, Nicolai Hartmann)

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To preach morals is easy, to ground them difficult. I think this saying of Schopenhauer is quite true. In the writings of the moral theorists we meet with ample enthusiasm for the beauty and the loftiness of moral principles. But even the best moral sermons are certainly no substitute for philosophical reasoning. To-day more than ever before we need the soundest foundation for a truly fixed ethics. For, to-day there is not a single affirmation in morals, which is not contradicted by its opposite. Eduard von Hartmann, for instance, could in the beginning of the twentieth century still maintain that the differences of opinion in ethics are concerned with questions of general principle, rather than with the concrete application of these principles. But Edward Westermarck in the strictest contrast holds that the concrete moral customs differ radically amongst different nations, especially among the primitive peoples, and that agreement of opinion is found only as regards general principles.¹ Moreover, the whole of Christian ethics is to-day opposed as a slave morality, because its highest values are humility and love. And in extreme opposition to this a consistent Christianity is never compatible with the thoroughgoing master-morality, whose supreme value is sheer power.

¹ See E. von Hartmann: *System der Philosophie im Grundriss*, Bd. VI, *Grundriss der ethischen Prinzipienlehre*, 1909, p. v: "Die verschiedenen Systeme der Moral . . . zeigen . . . in ihren konkreten Detailausführungen mehr Ähnlichkeit miteinander . . . als die Verschiedenheit und Gegensätzlichkeit in ihren Prinzipien vermuten lässt." E. Westermarck: *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, 1924, vol. ii, p. 742: "The moral ideas of mankind . . . present radical differences. A mode of conduct which among one people is condemned as wrong is among other people viewed with indifference or regarded . . . as a duty . . . But at the same time . . . the general uniformity of human nature accounts for . . . similarities." Or see G. E. Moore: *Ethics*, 1912, p. 94: "If we look at the extraordinary differences that there have been and are between different races of mankind and in different stages of society in respect of the classes of actions" and "particular actions" "which have been regarded as right and wrong it is . . . scarcely possible to doubt that in some societies actions have been regarded with actual feelings of positive moral approval towards which many of us would feel the strongest disapproval."

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Therefore I think it is to be welcomed that now new efforts are being made in English and German ethics to give moral philosophy a more fundamental basis. And the latest extensive movement in German thought which has this particular purpose in view is styled "materiale Wertethik," that is, concrete, material ethics of values. One of the leaders of that group of philosophers proclaimed that only this kind of ethics can solve the most difficult problems we meet in Kant and Nietzsche as well as all the profoundest ethical questions of ancient and modern times.¹ Can this ethics indeed make good such ambitions?

I propose to examine these contentions in at least a few points.

I. Max Scheler, promulgated this new ethical doctrine in 1913 and 1916 in the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, in a treatise of considerable length entitled "Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik." But it would lead too far afield to analyse the more subtle distinctions between the *strict* phenomenology of Husserl, the master of Scheler, and Scheler's own thought. For the analysis and critique of the ethics of Scheler it is indeed more necessary to consider first the very revealing contrast between this new moral philosophy and that of Kant. For Scheler himself has explained his doctrine in its widest aspects as in opposition to Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*. The subtitle of the first and most important part of his essay reads: "With special reference to Kant's ethics," and again the term "Formalism" in the very title of his essay designates just the "colossus" of "Kant's moral philosophy."

It is interesting to observe that the first reaction against positivism and against all forms of hedonism in ethics was both in England and in Germany in the nineteenth century a return to Kant. Thomas Hill Green in England and precisely at the same time Hermann Cohen in Germany, found salvation from positivistic ethics primarily in the direction of Kantian philosophy. For ethical positivism or utilitarianism put in place of universal imperatives of ethics empirical observation, namely that all men strive for shifting forms of pleasure, whilst the deepest and the most important tendency of Kant is to show that there is one absolutely universal ethical law, valid without any reference to empirical, changing feelings. The utilitarians hold that ethical values are *a posteriori* only: that is, that ethical values differ entirely with the different inclinations of persons and at different epochs. But Kant in the sharpest opposition to such a view wanted to stabilize ethical right as strictly *a priori*. Here lies—in its most general historical connection—the point of contact between Scheler and Kant. Scheler agrees with Kant that the ethically valuable can only be given for us *a priori*, not *a*

¹ N. Hartmann: *Ethics* (translated by Stanton Coit), 1932, vol. i, p. 17.

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posteriori by empirical altering occurrences. And Scheler further agrees with Kant and with Neo-Kantianism that knowledge *a priori* is not an inborn, innate knowledge, to be found in us earlier than all other experiences. The *a priori* is not prior in time, but precedent in logical significance. For instance, if we contemplate the famous syllogism: because all men are mortal, therefore also the man Socrates is mortal, we have not at first an event that all men die and then the event that Socrates dies; but that all men are mortal is only a reason which logically precedes the death of Socrates. And it is only in this logical sense that Scheler and Neo-Kantianism use the word *a priori*. A value *a priori* is therefore not a value we know already at our birth before we know other things; but a value *a priori* is a value which can never be depreciated, which can never become valueless by any new experience. Thus, both Scheler and Kant seek after absolutely firm ethical principles of this kind, for ethical principles *a priori*, which show a self-evident value, comprehensible in themselves. And such an ethical law Kant found only in one quite abstract, formal principle, namely in his categorical imperative in contrast to all hypothetical laws.

Now, Scheler considers that Kant erred therein. We are not compelled to accept such a purely formal and abstract law as the only fixed rule in morals. We are also able to find concrete material values *a priori*. Kant was only justified in rejecting *concrete goods* or concrete *ends* in *a priori* ethics. However, in contrast to these concrete empirical goods or ends, there are still concrete values *a priori* which Kant failed to recognize as such. For example: A good lunch is surely a good. And it is certainly a moral end to offer such goods to others. But not always. To a sick person such a good might be a serious evil: for him a bitter-tasting medicine would be a good. Goods, accordingly, can never have an unchanging value in our moral actions. But also concrete ends without concrete goods can never reach the level of an absolutely invariable principle. To give some goods to others—although it must remain uncertain as to which goods in particular—even this end is not always a moral one; for, it is sometimes better not to give anything to a friend neither a lunch nor medicine nor any other goods, but to let him fast. Thus neither concrete goods nor concrete ends can be referred to strictly universal ethical principles. An entirely different conception is here called for, namely the conception of concrete values. The goods we had to give to our neighbour may vary; and even the whole end, the whole purpose to give anything may be wrong from the moral point of view. Only one conception has been ever present, and only this conception has rightly guided us in these elementary reflections, namely the idea of the well-being of our friend, the value of the life of our fellow-man. This vital value

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remained the same. The different goods may some day lose their moral meaning, and may even become evil; and also all the different ends and concrete aims; there remains unchanged and unchanging a distinct number of concrete values.

These values retain an absolutely eternal moral significance, and they fall into four groups: (1) the values of the agreeable and useful; (2) the values of vitality; (3) intellectual values, by which are meant the values of truth, beauty and justice; (4) the religious values, the values of the holy. Nobody can deny—as Scheler explains—that the useful, for instance, is necessarily of moral value for all people and at all times. The goods which are useful are often very different for different men and in different ages. And also the ways and means and goals, by which we want to bring the useful into existence. But the value of the agreeable itself remains throughout the same; it can never be changed to a non-value.

And Scheler has also given some explanations of why the importance of these concrete values has always hitherto been overlooked. Thus he has explained that a man who is really helpful does not help because he wants to realize some vital value in the life of his friend. On the contrary, his intention is to do some *concrete* work for his friend. If a man only does good works, not because he wants to help, but because he wants to be moral, then his work is in truth not purely moral. On the contrary, it would be pharisaism in the bad sense, in which this phrase is in general used, if we never helped for the sake of helping, but only did it to realize moral values. Thus in the specifically ethical acts we do not directly have moral values in view; and these values do not appear in the ends at which the acts aim. The moral values appear, as Scheler says, only “on the back” of our acts.¹ Therefore we can understand why the philosophers have never analysed these concealed values, which are in general never the express ends of our acts. But these values are never to be identified with any ordinary end or any real good or any real thing of value.

These values are pure essences, *Wesenheiten*, *essentiae*. They have a purely ideal existence. But none the less this ideal existence is for us at least as important as the existence of real things or events. And we have an immediate insight *a priori*, into what is the meaning of such ideal essences as vital or intellectual value. There is in us an *ordre du cœur* or *logique du cœur*, as Pascal has called it.² In this emotional order we have an immediate “sensing

¹ M. Scheler: *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*, II, Aufl. 1921, p. 22; compare N. Hartmann, *Ethics*, 1932, vol. ii, p. 31.

² *Ibid.*, 1921, p. 59; compare N. Hartmann, *Ethics*, 1932, vol. i, p. 177.

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of value,"¹ a quite evident inner vision, a clear "beholding"² of what these pure ideas mean. These ideas of values are not given us in the form of rational conceptions; but nevertheless we have of them a concrete, not formal perception *a priori*.

Moreover Scheler is even convinced, that we are able to recognize *a priori* a definitely strict gradation in the scale of these values. We discern always at once that the value of the holy is higher than all aesthetical, all intellectual values and much higher than the vital values or the values of the agreeable. And so we find finally in Scheler's Ethics—perhaps as the most important result—the following scale of values: the lowest value is the value of the agreeable. The type of person who is only realizing this value, the artists of pleasure, never reach such a high moral level as the heroes, the men who build up the best form of vital value. And the vital value of the noble in its contrast to the common, the quality of this heroism, has always a higher moral importance than the merely agreeable and useful. The third place in this scale is occupied by the intellectual values of truth, beauty, and justice. The type of person who realizes these values, the genius, stands again morally higher than the hero and than the artist of pleasure and usefulness. And a community of culture and law is higher than a community solely of "life" or than a society of business men. But at the top of the scale of values remains the value of the sacred. All that which is connected with this religious value stands also in Ethics in the supreme place: the religious "reaction of response" as belief or adoration always stands higher than esteem or respect in the intellectual field or than the feeling of courage in the vital sphere. The religious state of blessedness always weighs ethically heavier than intellectual delight or vital gladness or agreeableness in the sphere of the useful. Scheler emphasizes continually the fact that people very often take extremely unholy things for holy and very unintellectual thoughts for intellectual. But nevertheless, the value of the holy in itself remains absolutely constant as does also the superior rank of the holy in comparison with the intellectual, the vital, and the useful objects.

In this way Scheler hoped to solve the oldest difficulties of Ethics; and therefore it is not astonishing that these and similar fundamental ideas of his have exercised a very large influence in Germany not only in Ethics, but also in Sociology, Pedagogy, and even in Psychology; and also in Spain on Ortega y Gasset, in Japan, or in South Africa on H. G. Stocker, a pupil of Scheler.

II. More especially Eduard Spranger in one chapter of his *Lebensformen* (1921), has given to several theses of Scheler some

¹ See these terms especially in N. Hartmann: *Ethics*, 1932, for instance, vol. i, p. 185.

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development and some corrections of very wide-reaching effect. Spranger distinguishes six different types of carriers of values: the economic man, the theoretical man, the aesthetic man, the social man, the man of power, and the religious man. Thus the sphere of intellectual value mentioned by Scheler is here quite rightly divided into the very different forms of theoretical and aesthetic values. And what is much more important, it is here also well brought out, that in the vital sphere and in the whole social order there is a deep difference between the manifestations of power and the manifestations of love. In this whole vital sphere of public life we find very often represented under the same name two distinctly contrasted ideals: the ideal of a life and of a community of social love and on the other hand of a community of specific political power. But besides that, for both Spranger and Scheler the highest value is the religious and the lowest in general the useful, here called the economic value. Only in regard to the scale of the other values Spranger is—I think again quite rightly—much more careful than Scheler. He attempts to eliminate the difficulty which he sees in so strict and simple a graduation of all values, namely that one of his six values has to be always the highest. He urges, therefore, in the problem of the rank of values that we are obliged to consider not only distinctions of higher and lower, but also distinctions of stronger and weaker values. Values are not only at a different height, but also often of different intensity, different force. For instance, according to an example of Spranger: the understanding of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* can be for us a much higher value than the earning of money, but none the less we have often to prefer—even as ethical persons—a lower value, if this value can claim in the circumstances a much stronger intensity.¹ And therefore we have also to think in every moral decision not only of the height but also of the present strength of values.

III. Finally, we find quite a similar critical supplement of Scheler's teaching in the most extensive and latest German work about material ethics of values, in Nicolai Hartmann's *Ethics* (in the second German edition published 1935). Hartmann was in the first stage of his development a keen adherent of Hermann Cohen and Neo-Kantianism. It was only later on that he approached Phenomenology. And thus also Hartmann started by building up his whole theory expressly on the phenomenological foundations of Scheler. Hartmann rejects—as Scheler does—all Ethics of goods and ends; and like Scheler he begins by asserting that there are different ethical values as pure essences and that they possess an ideal existence—according to Hartmann even an absolute “self-

¹ E. Spranger: *Lebensformen*, 1930, p. 315.

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existence,"¹ a definitely ontological independence. And only if we bring these ideal essences *a priori* with us to the observed objects are we able to speak of valuable facts *a posteriori*.² Further Hartmann agrees in general with Scheler's phrase, the values appear "on the back of the deed," not in the goal it aims at. But he then adds the correction: there are *some* moral actions in which we are able to strive directly for a moral value, for example in the case of moral education of oneself or another.³ And it is clear that not everyone, who does something with the direct wish to realize a moral value, is therefore a pharisee in the bad sense in which Scheler uses the term.

Finally, however, in the most important and in the most difficult problem of Ethics, namely in the question of the number and of the gradation of values, there are in Hartmann as in Spranger some departures from Scheler, which are more serious. Hartmann here thinks it necessary to distinguish and to give broad descriptions of many more values even than those which Spranger describes. He therefore begins by giving an analysis of a group of fundamental values, which in his words "condition contents" (*inhaltlich bedingende Grundwerte*); they are life: consciousness, activity, but also suffering, which can often become a value, strength, foresight, and happiness. And there is a second realm, of fundamental moral values, which in contrast to the first are in a special relation to freedom: here we find the good in general, the noble in contrast to the common, the richness of experience and, in some contrast to this richness, purity. Hartmann then distinguishes three further classes of special higher concrete values. The first group comprises the four Platonic virtues, justice, wisdom, courage, self-control, supplemented by Aristotelian virtues of the golden mean such as magnificence, magnanimity, the sense of shame. The doctrine of Aristotle is here used in a very interesting although a rather disputable interpretation. The second group of special values presents the more Jewish and Christian virtues, such as brotherly love, trust and faith, modesty, humility, aloofness, and truthfulness, with the problem of the necessary lie. Finally the third realm of special values brings such more modern Nietzschean values as the love of the remotest (*die Fernstenliebe*) in contrast to brotherly love, "radiant virtue," that is in Nietzsche, *schenkende Tugend*, and, as highest special value, personal love.

But still more instructive than these detailed pictures of virtues is Hartmann's attitude towards the problem of the gradation of values. He does not assume that there is only one dimension of values from lower to higher, but he speaks explicitly of a multiple

¹ N. Hartmann: *Ethics*, 1932, vol. i, p. 225 et seq.

² *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 365 et seq.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

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dimensionality¹ of the whole valuational space,² and even of more than three dimensions.³ Thus, for instance, Hartmann expressly develops the view that perpendicularly to the scale of grades or levels of values there exists in addition a relation of *co-ordination* among different values upon the same level. This means that the order of gradation is shown to be at the same time also differentiated "laterally."⁴ Thus, for example, the value of richness of experience would according to this theory not be higher than humility but approximately co-ordinated.⁵ With it we find also in Hartmann as in Spranger the values ordered not only according to their grade but also according to their intensity, or as it is here called according to their strength. Thus, for instance, the love of the remotest—that is the love for a higher type of man in the future—this "ethos of progress"⁶ is the higher value and brotherly love is the lower one.⁷ But nevertheless love for our fellow-man—near us in our life—remains always the more urgent, the stronger value. And besides all this, Hartmann frequently emphasizes the fact that in all ages man has been able to see only a small part of the whole of this "firmament of values." And even in this small section of the whole "heaven of values," which we know, we are, according to Hartmann, not able to recognize in *every* case which value is to be preferred in certain complicated moral conflicts. We have to be content for the present, that we can decide quite clearly that brotherly love is, *a priori*, evidently higher than justice, bravery higher than self-control, faith and fidelity higher than bravery and "radiant virtue," or personality again higher than fidelity.⁸ But obviously in all these decisive questions of ethics we find here again in Hartmann much more caution and resignation than in his predecessor Scheler.

IV. These are some main motives of this concrete Ethics of values. And certainly we must do justice to the very careful and extensive descriptions of moral phenomena we find in these three authors. Not only in such analyses as those I have glanced at, but also in many discussions of Scheler and Hartmann about the conception of personality, in many analyses of the structure of ethical acts and intentions in Spranger's ideas of a *geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie* and its significance for Ethics or in Hartmann's long analysis of freedom obvious merits are displayed. But I think that in many other points these theories still remain unsatisfactory.

Thus in the first place this material *a priori* does *not*, as Scheler hoped, succeed in avoiding the defects of the formal *a priori* of Kant. It is true that the pure formal *a priori* of Kant is applicable only to a very small realm of ethical problems, whilst the new material

¹ N. Hartmann: *Ethics*, 1932, vol. ii, pp. 50, 51.

² *Ibid.*, p. 78.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 408.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 50, 51.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 387.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 319.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 387.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 387.

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a priori of the latest German ethics concerns a much wider field. But nevertheless—as we could observe already in the results of Spranger and Hartmann—this new material *a priori* has no longer the same *universal* validity as the Kantian formal *a priori*. It can never be legitimate to call the concrete values in the same sense *a priori* as a purely formal ethical law.¹ Hartmann even confesses that all theoretical and moral *a priori* has something “puzzling”²; yet such an *a priori* has surely nothing any longer in common with Kant’s theoretical *a priori*.

But further—and that leads to points of much more importance—evidently it has to be one of the most serious ambitions of all ethics, and it was also the aspiration of Kantian ethics not to move within the circle of purely analytical judgments, that is to say, in the circle of empty tautologies or pure definitions independent of all real facts. Kant placed in the centre of his whole system the rule that the cardinal questions of philosophy have to be expressed in synthetic judgments, that is in judgments in some way concerning reality; and that these synthetic cognitions should be kept from any confusion with purely analytic deductions. Also in his ethics Kant tried at least to face everywhere the synthetic significance of the cardinal problems of morality and to answer them by synthetic judgments, although here he did not succeed. But Nicolai Hartmann renounces deliberately any attempt at dealing with such most important synthetic difficulties inasmuch as he points out that “we must entirely leave out of consideration what has been understood by the ‘doctrine of virtue’; to such a doctrine belongs not only a description of the virtues, but even instruction as to their actualisation. Instruction of this kind . . . everyone of morally fine discrimination has always dismissed . . . as a trifling with what is highest and most serious, as that which degraded even the words ‘moral’ and ‘virtue’ into something tiresome and half ridiculous. . . . The moral values themselves permit of being simply pointed out within the limits of the current valuational vision without reference to their practical tendencies.”³ But here obviously two different questions are to be distinguished. Of course, the question of how to become a good man through instruction and practical exercise is not a problem of any scientific and theoretical ethics. But this question of moral exercise is not to be confounded with quite another one, namely the purely theoretical question, why have certain moral synthetic valuations *a priori* validity for empirical actions? N. Hartmann has here, as it seems, tacitly identified the first with

¹ See D. Baumgardt: *Der Kampf um den Lebenssinn unter den Vorläufern der modernen Ethik*, 1933, p. 59 *et seq.*, where I have tried to clear up these questions in as full detail as possible.

² N. Hartmann: *Ethics*, 1932, vol. ii, p. 276.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 226.

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the second problem; and because the first one is to be excluded from a purely theoretical science of ethics, he and Scheler underestimated also the significance of the latter problem for theoretical ethics.

If we wish to illustrate the meaning of these ethical inquiries by comparing them with some corresponding questions in the theory of nature, we could do so for instance in the following general form: it is a purely theoretical question to ask, why have some laws of nature (for instance the law of causality, but also more special laws) validity in empirical processes of nature? This problem is strictly to be discriminated from all practical questions of so-called technics: how to use causal natural processes to satisfy the various desires of human civilization. By eliminating the questions of technics evidently no philosopher or physicist can be allowed to neglect the first main problem, the inquiries concerning the validity of laws of nature for empirical natural phenomena.

But finally these first major problems are still very often confused with questions of a third kind. This third form of research is specifically concerned with the "description" and definition of laws and of conceptions *a priori*. And these investigations were primarily cultivated in *a priori* metaphysics before Kant and Hume. Here we find frequently the quite conscious identification of such analytic definitions and descriptions *a priori* with our first synthetic problems. For instance, here in this metaphysics *a priori* we find the following basic conviction: by the purely analytic definition, by the pure essence of the conception of "cause" the synthetic conception also of causality, it is maintained, is already proved as valid for the reality. Kant and Hume fought against this confusion very convincingly. But in modern concrete ethics of values the corresponding confusion is even to-day not sufficiently faced or it is wrongly denied that there is any confusion, as that was tried in the metaphysics *a priori* of the seventeenth century.

Hartmann, of course, concedes expressly that in theoretical knowledge "the proof of 'objective validity' for categories *a priori* (in their relation to *a posteriori* objects) is of most fundamental importance."¹ But concerning the corresponding problem in ethics he prefers to content himself occasionally with the statement: the proof of the objective validity of values "is not to be found in any agreement with the real."² "Non-agreement with the empirically given" (or the "actual") is no criterion which could be cited against the validity of valuations."³ But here again, as before, the term "the actual" covers quite different problems. It is naturally to be admitted, that we do not need in moral questions an agreement

¹ N. Hartmann: *Ethics*, 1932, vol. i, p. 190.

² *Ibid.*, p. 191.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 192.

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between values and empirical conduct which is already actualized, because ethics deals to a large extent with actions which have perhaps never been realized but could be realized in future. Yet this definitely does not mean that in the description of any concrete value we could be allowed to renounce all agreement with *realizable possible* empirical conduct. If thus much is to be renounced, then we shall not be able to avoid at least the following dilemma: either we then have no guarantee that our values are not fantastic ideals which are even perhaps contradictory in themselves;¹ or we remain in the description of our concrete values *a priori* in the sphere of purely analytic judgments and we find then in these conceptions *a priori* only what we have slipped into them already in our definitions. But then neither the basis of our valuations nor the empirical conduct of man remains morally understood.²

Or: the insufficiencies we have to notice in these ethics of concrete values could be elucidated in connection with some other historical and systematic motives. This system of ethics itself has designated its conceptions of values as Platonic ideas;³ but Plato himself always insisted upon the necessity of clearing up the problems of the *μεθεξῆς* of ideas *a priori* in the empirical facts and the necessity of demonstrating their validity for those facts. Therefore it is certainly unsatisfactory, when for instance N. Hartmann wants here essentially to restrict himself to the pure descriptions of the values *a priori* "without reference . . . to their actualization," without any "agreement with the real."

Of course no ethics has the task of dealing with every detail of casuistry. Similarly the natural sciences are not able to discuss in their theories every individual natural phenomenon. But they give us at least a much clearer insight into the inter-relations of reality and ideal laws than any modern ethics hitherto. All the questions of most interest here carry beyond the researches of Scheler and Hartmann.

We may agree with these theories that the love of the remotest is higher than brotherly love. And certainly, as Hartmann declared, honour is morally more valuable than advantage and duty more than pleasure,⁴ according to the definitions of these values. But all these are analytic judgments; and the characteristic marks

¹ And such fantastic ideals, moreover all that "contradicts . . . conditions of actualization," every "ethically fabulous world" are quite rightly rejected by Hartmann (see *Ethics*, vol. ii, p. 324).

² See some further systematic researches on these problems of connection between ethical *a priori* and ethical *a posteriori* in my essay, "Über einige Hauptmethodenfragen der modernen Ethik," *Logos*, 1930, and especially in a larger book prepared (as the last systematic volume of my history of modern ethics) under the title *Theory of the Meaning of Life or Ethics*.

³ N. Hartmann: *Ethics*, 1932, vol. i, p. 185.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. ii, pp. 188 f.

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developed in these descriptions *a priori* are absolutely insufficient to distinguish in reality even between a life of honour and a life for advantage. There are too many people and nations who are convinced that they fight for honour and who are able to persuade other people to the same belief. But their adversaries are on quite the same point convinced that the others fight for pure advantage masking itself as honour, or that they pursue pleasures masking themselves as duties, or that they avoid duties masking themselves as phantasms or as superfluities or even as crimes; and vice versa. And there are other people who confess honestly that they feel obliged to think in such a case of their advantage and who go perhaps in spite of this confession more the way of honour than the others with their much prouder declamations.

But obviously, then, the conclusion is here always necessary that we do not find in all these descriptions of values *a priori* any true distinguishing mark which separates the moral conduct from the immoral, honour from advantage, pleasure from duty and so on. And such definitions not containing any distinguishing mark are certainly scientifically not satisfactory definitions. Thus it is very characteristic that the most consistent idealism, namely that of Hegel, and the most consistent empiricist ethics, namely that of Bentham, agree entirely in this point of insisting that not the description of virtues but the cardinal problems of moral casuistry are the most serious moral problems.¹ The modern concrete ethics of values on the other hand as well as Kant only evade these questions in affirming that the mere striving for honour, for duty, for justice, or for other high values is valuable, even if there is no striving for true honour or true justice.² But evidently also this form of a pure ethics of intention cannot show here any way out. For I think especially to-day nobody can deny that with the best intentions, in the name of duty and justice and of many other values, the most immoral actions are done in the present time and have been done in the past. And it would be quite impossible to call such extremely

¹ See Hegel: *Werke*, 1838, Bd. I, p. 245: "Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems"; and see Bentham: *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, chap. x, § 30: "Would you do a real service to mankind, show them the cases in which sexual desire *merits* the name of lust; displeasure, that of cruelty; and pecuniary interest, that of avarice." But "those rhapsodies of commonplace morality, which consist in the taking of such names as lust, cruelty, and avarice, and branding them with marks of reprobation" are "empty." "Applied to the *thing* they are false; applied to the *name*, they are true indeed, but nugatory."

² N. Hartmann: *Ethics*, 1932, vol. ii, p. 233: "The will to justice is right even, when intention is objectively wrong, when the . . . law (in German, "Der Sachverhaltswert des Gesetzes") has been misunderstood—exactly as it is right independently of the consequence."

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horrible deeds ethical, simply because the intention in them was a good one.

Therefore it is only too comprehensible that this concrete ethics of values tried to find yet other ways to escape such embarrassments. Thus, for instance, N. Hartmann wanted to give to this ethics of pure intention still another basis by the following time-worn reflection: if in certain phenomena, as for instance in resentment, "a gainsaying" of the character of values takes place, then there is here a "doing of violence" to the sense of value in question, an "habitual untruthfulness, manifested as a falsification in the evil conscience of the resentful man."¹ If our conscience could decide in so simple a manner about the moral value or the immorality of every action, we should in fact not need any further discussions about the synthetic actualization of values *a priori* and the question of consequences of actions in ethics. But obviously there have been in all times even very great men of great resentfulness with an astonishingly good conscience (as Nietzsche had already pointed out); and there are morally excellent men without resentment with a very bad conscience. Therefore all this ethics of pure intention and infallible conscience is in urgent need of correction by much deeper researches as well about deafness of conscience and "value-blindness" as about the consequences of ethical or immoral actions.

As a matter of fact also the concrete ethics of values speaks sometimes of the phenomena of value-blindness (*Wertblindheit*).² Here again, however, we may observe some shortcomings of this whole ethical theory in a specially concentrated form. Namely the phenomenon of value-blindness is here quite rightly compared with colour-blindness. But then it is only assumed that the problems of distinction between abnormal and normal vision of values is not more difficult than the problem of distinctions between normal sense of colour and colour-blindness. Yet here again just as in the comparison with some problems of natural science we are able to indicate the weaker side of this ethics. For, it is quite obvious, that we have objective physical criteria of the distinction of different colours, independently of the subjective normal or abnormal perceptions of them. But in the case of concrete values we have still to find such objective criteria. There certainly are such; yet the criteria found hitherto are far from being exact enough to decide in any concrete case. And this becomes evident in every application of these criteria in complicated questions. But even in the most simple cases the same difficulties are only hidden, not solved.

¹ N. Hartmann: *Ethics*, 1932, vol. ii, p. 60.

² N. Hartmann speaks even of "blindness to the rank of a value" (see *Ethics*, vol. ii, p. 189).

AN OUTLINE OF AN ORDER PHILOSOPHY

ARNOLD H. KAMIAT

I

THROUGHOUT the history of philosophy the concept of unity has presented a problem. What does it mean to say that the cosmos is one, that a thing is one, that an organism is one, that a nation is one, that mind and body are one, that knower and known are one? Exactly what is it that is denoted when unity is postulated of anything? And when two or more entities are conceived as subsisting in unity, exactly what is the relation between that unity on the one hand, and its correlative duality or plurality on the other?

At first glance, it would seem as if the difficulties associated with the concept of unity lay in its apparently undefinable character. But if the concept of unity has hitherto defied definition, if the unity of anything has seemed to be such a tenuous, gaseous, mystic affair, the fault may lie with the mode of approach. And those who have approached anything in the spirit of monism have traditionally held to a substantial notion of unity. Unity has been conceived as a substance, an essence, a spirit, a soul, an entelechy, an *elan vital*, a mind. It has been a mystic something that contained many things within itself and united them in a whole. On the macrocosmic level, the "unity" of the cosmos has been conceived as its spirit, mind, *elan vital*, or substance. Or the "unity" of the cosmos has been envisaged as a divine something called the One, perched on top of the universe, with everything in the universe an emanation from the One. Unity has thus been abstracted, substantialized, and hypostasized. And being so treated, it has been removed from out of the realm of the knowable. It thus shares the fate of all substance. In acquiring a stuff or an "inside," it acquires incomprehensibility, at least as far as reason and perception are concerned. The human knower occupies a point external to the noumenal substance; he cannot intellectually or perceptually penetrate to its "inside." This is the case even when he is himself an emanation or expression or mode or creation of the ultimate One; he stands at too great a remove from the One's innermost essence. Recourse is then had to faith, intuition, or mystic experience. This, however, is not too satisfactory an arrangement. Neither faith nor intuition nor the mystic experience yield anything that can be termed intrinsically valid. They are not self-validating. Faith cannot exercise a check

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upon itself; neither can intuition, and neither can the mystic experience. All three are too naïve to be of much use as unaided instruments of cognition. Nor is the case much better from the side of extrinsic validation. The mystic experience is incommunicable. So is the intuition as such. The latter becomes articulate when it gets to be restated in terms of a proposition or a set of propositions. It can then be subjected to rational criticism. Similarly with the object of one's faith. When it becomes the subject of a proposition or a set of propositions, it can be placed under rational scrutiny. But then reason, being external to the noumenal substance, is judged to be helpless before it. Faith, moreover, is not really an instrument of cognition. It is an attitude of receptivity toward the content of a proposition. Faith reveals nothing concerning the proposition, or the existents, real or alleged, to which it refers. It reveals nothing more than a state of mind.

Some notion of the havoc produced by the substantival notion of unity is furnished by the history of theology. Theologians have been wont to conceive the deity as a simple, undifferentiated, immaterial principle or substance, without parts or attributes. But theologians have been equally insistent upon imputing to this same deity such attributes as omnipotence, eternity, omniscience, benevolence, creative activity, love, mercifulness, and so on. Recourse has therefore been had to some fancy juggling to reconcile absolute simplicity with a high degree of complexity. The same sort of juggling has been resorted to by the theologians who have striven to reconcile the idea of a divine absolute with that of a deity limited by his attributes. Matters would come to a head when the divine unity would be given such comprehensive dimensions as to include all existents of whatever character, including those of the most contradictory variety. Recourse would then be had to the formula of a divine being in whom all contradictions are somewhat reconciled; with this would go the "assurance" that human minds could apprehend the manner of this reconciliation if only they were equipped with the necessary powers.

Things have not gone much better with the philosophers. Metaphysics has been dominated by the substantival concept. Now every attempt at a substantival interpretation of the cosmos seems destined to find its way barred by insurmountable obstacles. The spiritual substance protagonists—those who posit an absolute, a transcendent mind, a cosmic soul, spirit, will, *nisus*, *entelechy*, or *elan vital*—have been unable to furnish an empirical warrant for their beliefs. Analysis of reality does not reveal the presence of any of these, nor, as will be seen, does a synthetic view of things require any of them. Their acceptance requires a large measure of faith; but faith, as has been seen, is not an instrument of cognition. And

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if the spiritual cosmic substance be conceived as real, it must also be conceived as unknowable. No way exists for grasping or entering into it, perceptually or intellectually. Its "inside" lies outside of us. Nor are matters greatly improved when the insides of our minds are held to be expressions and likenesses of the cosmic spirit. No way exists of validating this view.

The materialist metaphysicians, in their turn, fare no better. The explanation of the universe in terms of matter being of the reduction-to-nothing-but type, materialism has experienced the utmost difficulty in accounting for the presence in the cosmos of life, mind, and value. The failure of materialism in this regard moves those who subscribe to the substantialist tradition to reintroduce the spiritual substances into philosophical discourse: vital substance, *elan vital*, *entelechy*, soul, and so on. Materialism thus places thought in a dilemma where the choice seems to lie between inadequacy and mysticism.

Not the least of the evils wrought by the substantialist metaphysics has been the disrepute into which metaphysics itself has fallen. If the universe can be talked about only in terms of some ultimate, noumenal, transcendent substance, mind, spirit, or will, the nature or "inside" of which is itself inexplicable, then metaphysics is a self-defeating enterprise. And on at least three significant occasions, modern philosophy stood on the brink of a more comprehensive scepticism—and for each of these crises the substantialist viewpoint was responsible. The three occasions are represented by the names, Hume, Kant, and *Vaihinger*. Each of these philosophers was a child of the substantialist tradition. All three were impressed by the idea that the mind cannot penetrate into the substance, the "inside" of the perceived object. For Hume the mind cannot go beyond its impressions. For Kant phenomena are the boundaries of perception. Beyond them lie the noumena. These being substances, and the human mind occupying a locus external to them, they are unknowable. For *Vaihinger* concepts are fictions, they being unable to communicate the natures of the objects conceived. They cannot reproduce and communicate substance or process.

Now neither theology nor substantialist metaphysics have been entirely in error. Guilty they have been of abstraction and a consequent one-sidedness. Substance and energy and mind have been abstracted from their correlative and never-absent patterns and organizations. Unity has been treated as if it were a pervasive and etherlike substance in which all things "lived and moved and had their being," or of which they were all emanations. But this is the awkward way in which the thought of the past has sought to lay hold of the fact of that which all reality exhibits—order. The thought of the past has not failed to apprehend the fact that this universe

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exhibits cosmos in all its forms—order, structure, system, integration, pattern, organicity, coherence, regularity, law. It even termed its substantial deity order, law, principle, and so on. It almost stumbled on what appears to be a more adequate conception of unity. But it did not quite stumble, thanks to the substantialist tradition. The latter required that order be substantialized; further, the religious tradition required that it also be personified. Order had to be a substance and a person.

II

A philosophy that would come as near as possible to an adequate account of the character of reality must take note of the fact that reality is an order, or a congeries of orders. Existences of every kind seem to exhibit one kind of order or another. Nothing can be explained in terms of substance alone, or energy alone, or quality alone, or consciousness alone, or value alone. And nothing is explicable in terms of order alone. But energies, substances, qualities, conscious processes, and values are always disposed in certain definite ways. They always enter into certain sets of relations—into systems, structures, organizations, integrations.

Order may be set down as a category, a generic trait of existence. The known universe exhibits order throughout, though whether all that exists constitutes a single order is a moot question. But this much seems clear, the known universe is at least a congeries of orders of many kinds. Of monism and pluralism it may be said that each of them is in one sense useful, and in another misleading. Pluralism is useful in calling attention to the reality of particulars. It misleads when it treats them apart from the structures by which they are comprehended.

Monism, as has been seen, misleads when it posits a single, immanent, pervasive substance. It is useful in emphasizing the reality of unity. It misleads when it substantializes and hypostasizes unity. Unity is apparently neither a substance nor a fundamental subsisting under things. Any existent unity is a very concrete sort of affair, being a pattern or organization of energies, substances, qualities, conscious processes, and/or values.

An order philosophy makes possible a synthesis of monism and pluralism. In an order, unity and plurality are reconciled. The order is one, but its ordered elements are many. If all existences in all time and all space could be demonstrated to constitute a single system, cosmic monism and cosmic pluralism would become reconciled. But there is no sufficient evidence to prove that the congeries of systems of all kinds that enter into human experiences constitute a systematic whole.

Is order eternal? If not, and if it had a beginning, whence did it

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come and how was it begotten? Has the universe an order-giver, and if it has, what is his purpose? Place these questions under the head of the apparently unanswerable interrogations of philosophy.

Suffice it to say that order seems to be ubiquitous and enduring. No spot in the sea of being seems to be without order. This is not to say that all being is one system; but the universe is at least a congeries of orders of many kinds. There is no evidence that being ever failed to exhibit order, and there is no sign that it ever will fail so to do.

To the question, how order was first imposed upon the primordial energies of the universe, a two-fold reply can be made. Firstly, if such an event did take place, the question of the how of it is probably an unanswerable one. Secondly, the question separates energies and their structural patterns, and is therefore not in the spirit of the order philosophy, which refuses to separate the inseparable. In terms of the order philosophy, reality consists of ordered existents of many kinds, and existents—energies, qualities, the elements of consciousness, relations, ideal elements—are never to be found without order. There appears to be no warrant for the assumption of a primordial dichotomy into a formless, chaotic matter on the one hand, and an ordering principle on the other. Nor, for that matter, is it clear that there is any warrant for the assumption of a realm of essences mediating between human minds and a chaotic material flux.

Evolution, however, seems to be a process of continuous contemporary creation. Evolution is a synthesis of innovation and persistence. The tendency that Spinoza noted in every entity to preserve itself is probably the tendency of every stable organization to become fixed and habitual. Every stable organization of elements of any kind tends to become an institution. An organization that owes its origin to properties intrinsic to its constitutive elements will tend to persist as long as these properties do. If organization imposes a division of labour upon the constituent elements a sustaining factor is found in the shape of their mutual dependence. Here organization itself becomes a stabilizing factor.

Evolution is also a reformation or dissolution of old, and a coming to birth of new organizations. The alteration or dissolution of an organization is a result, either of internal instability, or of an external pressure of some sort, or of the elimination or death of one or more of its constituent parts. New organizations are generated in response to properties intrinsic to the organizing elements. These elements need not, of course, be primary. They may themselves be systems or hierarchies of systems.

What accounts for new types of elements? How account for the appearance, at a certain stage of evolution, of the elements of

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consciousness? How account for the appearance of material and vital elements? These questions, too, may very well be unanswerable. But there are elements of other kinds, the origin of which can be made the subject of investigation. Social, cultural, and value elements belong to this class.

III

An order philosophy makes possible a sensible conception of basicity. There are no words more badly abused than the terms *basic*, *ultimate*, and *fundamental*. The meaning of these terms usually suffers a perversion imposed by a segmental outlook. The result is a fallacy that may be termed the fallacy of abstraction and integration. Given the integration of mutually dependent entities, the fallacy operates by the selection of one of them as basic. Stress is placed upon the dependence of all the other related entities upon the selected segment; its dependence upon these same entities is either ignored or treated as of secondary significance. The favoured segment is regarded as integrated with all the other segments when it is a matter of delineating its influence upon them; it is treated as if it had an existence apart from its integrations when it is a question of the influence exerted upon it by the other entities. In other words, the lines of influence between the selected segment and all the other segments are given a one-way orientation.

The *isms* of philosophy, science, religion, and politics are constructed in just this fashion. The conflict between *isms* is usually a struggle between abstracted segments, each of which puts forward a claim to a preponderant position in the economy of the whole of which it is a part. Personal elements enter into the conflict when the champions of the several segments feel their social status to be bound up with the fate of their respective segments. In every conflict of *isms* the thought of the contestants suffers from a psychological as well as a logical handicap. Personal bias unites with the fallacy of abstraction and integration to lower the quality of thought.

What would constitute a true concept of the basicity of an entity? Any thing is basic with reference to whatever is dependent upon it. Any part of an entity is basic to the extent that it, the part, functions as fundament to any other part, or to the entity as a whole. This is an inclusive, as opposed to an exclusive conception of the basic. It precludes the dramatic discovery of some one of the many integrated parts of a complex entity as *the* basis thereof. This means less drama, but more science and philosophy.

If anything be constituted of ordered elements, then either these elements or their order can be said to be basic relatively to that which they constitute. This is simple and obvious, but the partisans of *isms* will have none of it. Yet it must be apparent that an interpre-

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tation in terms of an integration and interplay of constituent elements is juster than one that conceals the dependence of some favoured element upon co-ordinate factors, while it over-emphasizes their dependence upon the element in question.

That which is interpreted in terms of its constituent elements and their order may itself be an element, set in a larger order. Its adequate explanation would then require a recognition of the basic function of that more comprehensive system.

There thus issues a conception of an organizational basicity. The structure of an entity becomes as basic to that entity as any or all of its constituent elements. And one of the fundamentals on which anything that is itself a member of a more comprehensive system rests is that system itself.

This discussion of basicity brings to view one of the merits of an order philosophy, and that is this, that it makes for the total, as against the segmental or isolated view. The apprehension of an order requires that it be grasped as a unit. And the locus of an order is the total field in which the order is exhibited. Thought in terms of order is therefore fatal to the kind of abstraction that involves the explanation of an existent or a process without reference to the system of which it is a part. Organization comes to exercise a heuristic function. Understanding the part in terms of the whole comes to mean the comprehension of an existent or a process in terms of its comprehending system.

IV

The body-mind problem has constituted an exercise in substantial futility. Two substances, mind and matter, have been thought to be in juxtaposition, if not indeed in a more intimate unity of some sort. In some way quite inconceivable they interact. But how a solid, weighty substance like matter could act upon, or be acted upon, by an imponderable, "unsubstantial" substance like mind, no one can tell. Or their unity has been conceived as external to them both—their actions are parallel. But this only adds to the mystery. If parallelism is not interaction, then it is miracle. Leibnitz, Malebranche, and Geulincx come forward with doctrines such as occasionalism and pre-established harmony, thus increasing the number of substances to three, God being the third. This latter is invoked as the source of a magic potency that assures parallel action, and therefore individual history.

If one does not wish to burden oneself with three, or even with two substances in an attempt to solve the body-mind problem, one can turn monist. According to one's predilection, one chooses spirit or matter. If the choice falls on spirit, the body becomes an illusion; if it falls on matter, the mind becomes an epiphenomenon.

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In either case, the monism is a counterfeit, and the irrepressible dualism breaks through. The body may be an illusion, but it is an illusion that no one can get rid of. One just has to accept the illusory body, to live as if it were a real thing. Nothing is done, and nothing is changed by terming it illusory.

If mind is an epiphenomenon, it is none the less real. Terming it epiphenomenal does not lessen its reality; it merely makes it seem less important. The materialist really evades the body-mind problem—mind is contemptuously classed as merely a by-product of an aura around material facts. Epiphenomenalism is an evaluation, not an explanation. It does not dispose of the dualist problem.

An order philosophy might offer, as a contribution to the body-mind problem, the hypothesis of the personality as an organization of elements subsisting on more than one level of being. A personality is a systemic totality, a structured being, exhibiting a certain degree of coherence, and sometimes a striving for a more thoroughgoing unity. The constituent elements themselves are familiar—cells, organs, thoughts, feelings, sentiments, emotions, impulses, memories, images, percepts. These are united in lesser systems, called habits, complexes, behaviour patterns, cultural patterns—so that the personality presents an aspect of organizations within a containing organization—a system of systems.

It is not at all essential to conceive of the constituent elements of a personality as qualitatively alike. They need not all be material, and they need not all be mental. It is one of the characteristics of organization that it often unites entities that are qualitatively distinct. An organization is often a synthesis of quantitative monism and qualitative pluralism. A human society is a synthesis of material, mental, social, and cultural elements. An artistic product unites ideational, affective, and material elements. Union does not require a joining of like to like. And so, it is quite unnecessary to conceive the human personality as all material, or all mental, or all social. The personality is not organized matter, nor a mind with an illusion of body, nor a point in space at which social influences converge to create an individual out of nothing but themselves. But the personality is an organization of sub-organizations of material, mental, and cultural elements. This organization, the personality's general framework or pattern, is the enduring self that Hume so vainly sought to find. It is that which constitutes the character of a person. It is that which acts, and it is that in terms of which a person assimilates whatever he does assimilate—and what he can assimilate his organization will determine. The maintenance of this integrity is health. Disease is disintegration, partial or entire. Healing is re-integration. But health and healing require also that the personal organization shall enter as a constitutive element into

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social relations and organizations of a character conducive to the integrated function of the personality.

What the organism seems to point to is the fact that the physical, the living, and the mental can subsist and function together in organization. How organization can bring this to pass is a question that is perhaps insoluble. But there is no doubt that it does.

V

How can an order philosophy resolve the epistemological problem? This problem has concerned itself with the dualism of knower and known—how can this dualism be overcome? How can knower and known enter into the intimate unity of knowledge?

What does the knower know? What is it that is known?

What is known is a structured, patterned reality. And knowledge is itself a type of structured reality. The knowledge-content, however, involves two kinds of order. There is an internal order, this being the organization and the coherence of the knowledge-content itself. This is the type of coherence that receives its most perfect expression in a system of philosophy. But it is not only the philosopher's knowledge that is organized. Everyone's knowledge exhibits a certain framework with reference to which every item of knowledge is oriented, and into which every new cognition is assimilated.

It is the reality of this internal organization of knowledge that the coherence theory of truth has succeeded in grasping. Now whatever other distinguishing marks a body of true ideas may have, coherence will have to be one of them. Coherence is one of the tests of truth.

Knowledge exhibits another type of order. This time it is one of an external sort. It is the order that unites the knower to the known. Knowledge apprehends and symbolizes the order exhibited by the universe and the things within it. The process is mediated on the psychological side by percepts, mnemonic images, concepts, and systems of concepts. Perception appears to be a process by which the pattern and structure of things and processes is more or less literally apprehended. This may lie beyond demonstration, but it is at least highly probable. In practice, everyone proceeds on the assumption that perception does just this. And if perception is accompanied by action, which is the rearrangement and creation of patterns, and the action results in the emergence of desired configurations, perception is held to have been accurate and adequate. Here both the correspondence and the consequence tests of truth receive their confirmation.

The concept is a universal. It comprehends all the particulars

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that belong to a class by virtue of their possession of a common pattern. The concept symbolizes that pattern. The concept is a result, not of the summation of all the percepts of the members of a given class, but of the abstraction from all the members of a class of a recurrent pattern. While the pattern of any member of a class is itself a particular, the pattern common to all the members of a class is, thanks to its generality, a universal.

The definition of knowledge as the apprehension of structure and configuration renders unnecessary and superfluous the conception of truth as useful fiction. As long as reality is conceived as either a substance with a mysterious and impenetrable "inside," or a restless, chaotic, elusive flux—so changeable that the mind cannot dip twice into the same universe—some sort of a plausible argument can be made out for the fictive doctrine. Truth can then be defined as a system of myths that make the world appear as if it possessed a knowable and manipulative order, and which thereby render possible the acquisition of a degree of control over that world. I do not know whether any champion of the fictive doctrine has ever explained how a mythical representation of a chaos as order can ever operate to render it controllable. A controllable chaos must possess regular and constant features, in which case it is not chaos any longer, but structure. Nor do I know whether any defender of the doctrine under consideration has explained how one portion of the crazy flux can impose any degree of control over any other portion, as man is said to impose a control over nature.

Be that as it may, an order philosophy renders superfluous the magic doctrine of fiction-truth. The order philosophy conceives reality as neither an impenetrable substance, an irrational surd, or a hopelessly wild maelstrom. Reality is a congeries of patterns and systems. Patterns and systems are cognizable. They can be perceived, envisaged, traced, manipulated. Where the strength of men is adequate to the task, patterns and systems can be reproduced, controlled, created. The commerce between man and the rest of reality is therefore intimate and direct, requiring no magic intervention of a middle realm of myths, essences, or fictions.

VI

What can an order philosophy say about values? The realm of value is the realm of ideal order. This is the same as saying that the world of values is the world of conation, for to purpose is to entertain an ideal scheme, and to attempt to execute a purpose is to endeavour to impose an ideal order upon a situation that is in some way unsatisfactory or incomplete. Hence that is valuable which creates, sustains, or exhibits an order desirable to some one. Value is therefore

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a function of the relation between a person and an ideal order, sought for or attained. This is not a hedonistic conception of value. It does not locate value in the mere satisfaction of wants, however refined. In order that there be an experience of value, it is required that there shall be an ideal order in process of creation, materialization, or appreciation. Hence value is neither in the object—ideal order—solely, nor solely in the subject. It is a function of a relation between both. It requires both, and in a certain relation to each other.

Logical, aesthetic, and ethical values respectively make for or exhibit truth, beauty, and goodness. These three always involve a reference to certain types of ideal order. The ideal order connoted by truth has to do with the relation between ideas, and between ideas and the objects they have reference to. A proposition or system of propositions is true when it apprehends and symbolizes the structure and pattern of that to which it refers. A system of propositions that succeeds in doing this will also reveal an internal consistency. A system of propositions is also true if its grasp of a configuration of things is such as to facilitate its reshaping to suit the demands of an ideal order. The truth of a system of propositions thus involves an internal and an external order: the order of terms and propositions within the system, and the orderly relation to the set of external objects to which the system has reference.

In every work of art, some experience that possesses significance for the artist receives formal expression. The latter is essential if the experience in question is to acquire communicability and permanence. If the form is not achieved, the experience, however intense, remains nothing more than a formless and fleeting blotch in the history of the experiencer. Form is implicated in the very notion of expression, for to be expressed is to receive definiteness in some degree. The expression is artistic if it is able in some degree to reproduce in others the artist's experience. This reproduction will require the imposition of appropriate patterns upon material media. If the pattern functions not only to communicate the artist's experience, but also to satisfy the appreciator's sense for form, it is termed beautiful. Beauty is not completely definable; but the kind of patterning denominated by such terms as rhythm, symmetry, balance, harmony, seems to be a necessary condition of beauty. Beauty seems to be a function of the relation between a form so qualified and its appreciator.

What can an order philosophy say about goodness? An order philosophy views human beings and societies as structured entities. Every personality and every society is an organization of elements of many kinds. Every person and every society shares the tendency of all things to maintain its integrity. The good for the individual consists in the maturation of the several elements of the personality.

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the acquisition and maintenance of an integration of these elements, the activity of the whole ordered self, and the enjoyment of this activity. The good for society consists in the growth, the free activity, and the integration into one comprehensive order of the varied elements that enter into its composition.

Thus the good is dependent upon the sustained existence of certain kinds of order. There must be ordered personalities, ordered societies, ordered physical environments. Those types of order are useful which aid in the achievement of what has just been defined as individual and social good. It is not, however, necessary to debate any such question as whether it is the individual or social good which is prior. The two are inseparable. The question, does the individual exist for society, or vice versa, is contrary to the spirit of the order philosophy. There do not exist two separate entities called society and individual, such that the good of the one requires the absence or the diminution of good in the other. A society is its individuals organized in a certain way, and the goodness of the one is continuous with the goodness of the other. A society is good if its individuals are. A society exhibits order to the extent that its individuals possess integrated personalities, personalities integrated internally and well-adjusted externally.

The history of all persons and that of all societies exhibit, nevertheless, only a partial integration. Conflict—the internal conflict of a personality, the external conflict of person with person, the conflict among societies and between groups within a society—is a universal phenomenon. Its correlative phenomenon is exploitation of human by human—a kind of anthropophagy, since it involves an effort to achieve the maturation of an individual or group at the expense of the maturity, and perhaps the life, of another individual or group. In the history of humanity, conflict and exploitation have made possible the growth of some societies and some individuals. Conflict and exploitation have thus been the necessary condition for the growth of these individuals and societies. But conflict and exploitation are never able to effect a pure integration. They are very much more effectual as disorganizing factors. And it is not only the defeated and the exploited whose integration is thwarted, and who experience disintegration. The victor and the exploiter, in their turn, suffer from thwarted maturation, a limitation of the degree of personal and social integration, and eventual personal and social disintegration, partial or entire. Conflict is katathymic in character. The fears, hatreds, and anxieties that it generates are physiologically, psychologically, and socially disintegrative, in the victorious as well as in the defeated society or individual. Exploitation is, of course, destructive of the exploited, but it turns back destructively upon the exploiter in at least three ways. First, energy

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that might have been expended on the integrative ordering of the self is diverted to the subjection of the exploited. Second, exploitation is katathymic for exploiter as well as exploited. In both, fear and hatred give birth to a paranoid mentality. Third, in subjecting human beings to exploitation, the exploiter deprives himself of a necessary condition of his own completer growth and maturation: intercourse with matured and well-integrated personalities.

The problem of modern life is that of the displacement of katathymic conflict and exploitation by instrumentalities capable of effecting a purer and more widely distributed integration, personal and social. It is impossible entirely to avoid destructive conflicts, those internal to society as well as those internal to the individual. But conflicts can to some extent be eliminated and assuaged by the reorganization of life among democratic lines, democracy being defined as an order in which human groups and individuals are related in such fashion that the maturation, integrity, and abundant function of each depends upon, and contributes to, the maturation, integrity, and abundant function of the others.

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PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY

IN 1920 Bignone published an Italian translation of the writings and fragments of Epicurus in Laterza's library of Ancient and Mediaeval Philosophers which in many respects added to and improved upon Usener's classic collection of *Epicurea*. He has since then zealously prosecuted these studies, and arrived at some very interesting conclusions which he has given out in two volumes published lately.¹ His starting-point is the observation that the writings of Epicurus often have a polemical tone, and not only rebut the accusations of adversaries who misinterpret the new doctrine, but are often directed also against those preceding philosophers who denied to pleasure a stable and certain nature on which a system of ethics could be based. Bignone has set himself the task of particularizing these anonymous predecessors, and thereby bringing the Epicurean polemic into more striking relief. It was easy and safe to start from the standpoint that Epicurus in his rehabilitation of pleasure had to oppose Plato and the Platonists, but at what Platonists in particular did he take aim? In answering this question Bignone has been able to make use of recent Aristotelian studies, especially those of Jaeger, which have thrown much light on the first phase of the Stagirite's philosophy, of a purely Platonic inspiration. As is well known, some exoteric dialogues belong to this phase, such as the *Eudemos*, the *Protrepticon*, and *On Philosophy*, which have to a large extent disappeared, though it has been found possible to reconstruct a few scattered fragments of them. The great scholastic works which reveal the full independence and maturity of Aristotle's genius have eclipsed them in the memory of posterity. But originally there were only these dialogues, the only ones published, to make Aristotle's thought known to the public outside the peripatetic school. The scholastic writings on the other hand remained unknown until the time of Sulla. What wonder, then, if Epicurus, in combating Platonism, had in mind these dialogues, which give out the fundamental conceptions of Platonism in a more decisive and dogmatic form than that of the Platonic dialogues?

This was the starting-point for Bignone's researches. In the carrying out of his plan he has discovered or rediscovered an enormous mass of evidential material, and he has been able to use it ingeniously in a two-fold fashion, making use of the references of Epicurus and the Epicureans to add to our knowledge of the lost writings of Aristotle, and utilizing this knowledge in order to bring into sharper focus the fragments and testimonies relating to Epicurus. Thus his studies end by bringing to light a greater knowledge of both Aristotle and Epicurus.

It is clearly impossible to summarize in a few lines the contents of more than a thousand pages of laborious and learned investigations. This notice is only intended to be a recommendation to the reading of the work itself, which, from a formal point of view, is an excellent example of accurate and patient philological criticism, and, from the point of view of results, allows us to visualize with greater amplitude and colour a historical era of transition

¹ ETORE BIGNONE: *L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro* (La Nuova Italia editrice, Firenze, 1930, 2 vols., pp. xvii, 410, 633).

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between classicism and hellenism. In addition, it affords us the minor advantages of seeing many passages which formerly seemed obscure in commentators and critics cleared up in the light of the conflict of ideas between the philosophical schools as revealed by Bignone. It is opportune to add, however, that in so great a harvest of rediscoveries and reinterpretations not everything is pure gold. It happens sometimes to Bignone, as to every discoverer, to explain too many things in the light of his discovery, forcing the sense of some text, and in particular making the lost Aristotle the perpetual target of all the arrows of the Epicurean polemic, while in some cases it would be simpler and more natural to admit that they were directed against the Platonic Academy in general or even against some Academic philosopher nearer to Epicurus whose works have equally been lost.

The relationship between Bacon and Machiavelli, evidenced by frequent quotations from the latter in the works of the former, has not escaped the attention of historians, even in the past. But now for the first time it has formed the subject of a separate study by N. Orsini,¹ who, besides carefully scrutinizing the Baconian citations, seeks also to trace an ideal derivation of Bacon's practical philosophy from that of the Florentine secretary. Orsini's work is therefore of less interest to students as an investigation into origins than as an attempt at a genetic reconstruction of the Baconian ethics—that is, of that part of the system which is generally neglected by historians.

There is a famous passage in the *Advancement of Learning* in which Bacon affirms "that we are much beholden to Machiavel and others, that write what men do and not what they ought to do. For it is not possible to join serpentine wisdom with the columbine innocency, except men know exactly all the conditions of the serpent." This passage reveals clearly enough in what sense and within what limits Bacon is disposed to accept the realism of the Italian politician—not as the total expression of human nature, but as a shrewd characterization of an elementary and fundamental aspect of it, from which it is not possible to separate the other aspect (the columbine innocence) in which morality properly consists.

However, it often falls to Bacon, as a politician, to lay excessive emphasis on the former aspect in comparison with the latter, and consequently to concede to Machiavelli more than he would be disposed to grant him in the matter of principle. Thus the *Faber Fortunae* and the *Essays* are all compounded of pure Machiavellism, and Machiavellian also is the advice that Bacon, in his ministerial capacity, gave to Queen Elizabeth with regard to the policy to be followed towards the Catholics. He suggested to the Queen that if she wished to leave them powerful she should make them more satisfied, and if she wished to leave them discontented she should make them weaker, while the worst course to follow would be to make them powerful and dissatisfied. But apart from all this Machiavellism in detail, Bacon's whole conception of politics is of purely Machiavellian inspiration, comprising as it does the military view of the state and of virtue, the policy of expansion and naturalization, the idea of bringing governments back to first principles in order to strengthen and maintain them, and other similar maxims.

There is, however, in Bacon the other aspect of the practical problem. The individual is not only himself, hence he ought not to seek only *bonum suitalis*; but he is also part of a whole to which he is subordinated. Consequently *bonum comunionis* is superior to *bonum suitalis*. But how are egoism and morality to be reconciled in a single view of life? Orsini devotes the whole of the second part of his essay to this problem, and perhaps shows himself disposed to attribute to Bacon a much clearer awareness of the

¹ NAPOLEONE ORSINI: *Bacone e Machiavelli* (E. degli Orheri, Genova, 1936, pp. 209).

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distinction and agreement between the two sides than he had in reality. It does not seem to me that the passages he quotes go beyond an empiric eclecticism, still unaware of the conflicts latent between the two forces, which may be concealed under an apparent reconciliation. Bacon's view is certainly interesting that "the referring all to a man's self is more tolerable in a sovereign prince, because themselves are not only themselves, but their good and evil is at the peril of their public fortune." But here Bacon is reasoning as a politician, and the common good he has in mind has no moral value, although it has an utilitarian value. On the other hand, when he reasons as a philosopher and not as a politician, the formula at which he arrives is neither more nor better than a compromise: "Divide with reason between self-love and society, and be so true to thyself as thou be non false to others, specially to the king and country."

On these and other similar fragments it is not possible to base a distinction and a speculative agreement between egoism and morality. And it is not to be wondered at that it is not possible; it is enough to consider that all the rich flowering of English "moralism" of the eighteenth century, from Shaftesbury to the elaborators of the ideas of their predecessors, has not in this respect gone beyond the Baconian compromise. The fact is that the deeper problem which lay concealed under the facile agreement was still very immature and premature.

GUIDO DE RUGGIERO.

(Translated from the Italian by Constance M. Allen.)



NEW BOOKS

Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy, Vol. II. By C. D. BROAD, Litt.D., F.B.A. (London: Cambridge at the University Press. 1938. Part I, Pp. lxxv + 513. Part II, Pp. 281. Price 45s. net.)

A reviewer's principal business is to tell his readers what to expect, and here I find myself in a certain difficulty. I find it hard to conjecture what expectations most readers are likely to entertain, although I can be pretty sure that their attitude, in most instances, is rather different from mine. I, along with Mr. Broad, was a pupil of McTaggart's when he made the first adumbration of his new philosophical system—then called "The Dialectic of Existence"—in a series of college lectures supernumerary to the official programme. Like puppies, we exercised our teeth upon his arguments, but we probably did less damage than puppies commonly do. Nevertheless, I have a rather special interest both in the later forms of McTaggart's great metaphysical adventure, and in the opinions about it that Mr. Broad has formulated in his distinguished maturity.

Let me then say certain things in general. McTaggart's *Nature of Existence* and Mr. Broad's *Examination* of it together comprise about a million words in the proportion of rather more than three of Broad to two of McTaggart. That is a lot of metaphysics. Indeed, when Mr. Broad, in the preface to the present (concluding) instalments of his work, congratulates himself upon being able to turn to other matters after the completion of his Five Years' Plan, and says that "enough is as good as a feast," one is tempted to suspect that he has rather Gargantuan notions of sufficiency. But of course there is a place for feasts, and the fear of over-nutrition may be baseless. Mr. Broad is very thorough but seldom, if ever, prolix; and thoroughness is a welcome quality.

The situation as a whole is full of interest. Mr. Broad is the most eminent of contemporary middle-aged British philosophers and he is examining one of the three or four outstanding British philosophers during the first quarter of the present century. Elaborate commentaries by eminent philosophers upon contemporary or near-contemporary philosophers of comparable eminence are rather rare although they are not unknown. One thinks, for instance, of Leibniz's *Nouveaux Essais* or, on a lower but still upon a high plane, Mill's *Examination of Hamilton*. For the most part, however, elaborate commentaries deal with the great who have been dead a long time, but whose works continue to live. Most commentaries upon contemporaries or near-contemporaries are written by lesser men and are either polemical or provisional or both. Here we have precisely the opposite case. Mr. Broad aims, if not at finality, at something as near to finality as any detached, industrious and able commentator has ever aimed at, and his book, although severely critical, is not a polemic. The conditions of its origin favour piety and not polemics. Polemics are roused by books of wide influence that (in the enemy's view) are dangerous if not positively pernicious. That is not what happens here. McTaggart, according to Mr. Broad, was remarkable for his dialectical skill and virtuosity even when compared with men of Leibniz's stature or of Hegel's; he had certain other marks of philosophical greatness in a high degree; but his influence has not been and is not likely to be very great even

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among the *élite*, to say nothing of the rabble. Consequently he could not be very dangerous or very pernicious even if he had been mistaken in ways rather hard to detect.

The point invites pursuit. Why should McTaggart's philosophy be examined so sedulously by such a remarkably efficient commentator? Mr. Broad's fuller answer would seem to be, in effect, that the eminent clarity of McTaggart's dialectical skill gives other philosophers an unusual metaphysical opportunity. Very little time has to be wasted in discussing what the author may conceivably have meant. The argument's the thing, and it is nearly always quite plain what the argument is. Again, McTaggart was almost unique among the more ambitious dialecticians in exposing the cards that his system required him to play. Where Hegel or Bradley were content to suggest that certain paradoxical conclusions (such as the timelessness of reality or the spiritual transparency of apparently clouded sensory fact) *must* be, McTaggart tried to show in something like detail, what the thing that *must* be also *would* be. Hence a close examination of his philosophy has the signal merit of telling the world what a man lets himself in for if he accepts a metaphysical view that is apt to attract because it seems to be mystical and inspiring. Further, even if McTaggart's philosophy is top-heavy with dialectic, and thinnish about the keel because of its author's ignorance of natural science and contempt for history, it is still one of the best examples of an attempt to elicit consequences of great speculative and practical pith from *a priori* premisses that so far as may be are self-evident. Mr. Broad suggests unkindly that "speculative" philosophy is always a barren virgin unless she has clandestine intercourse with science or history; but many have thought the contrary.

The first two of these claims have a great deal of weight. The third seems slighter. In the first place its conclusion would be freely and generally accepted at the present time—perhaps too freely and too generally. There does not seem to be any urgent need for pointing this moral so very sedulously. Still, nails should be driven home, even when they seem pretty firm. It may therefore be expedient, although it may look a little officious, to fortify a principle that is very widely held; and that may be the case even when it is remembered that McTaggart's system was based very largely upon principles for which he did *not* claim self-evidence although he invariably claimed that they were ultimate. The distinction does not greatly affect his conception of the method and the possible power of metaphysical weapons. In the second place, however, it has to be remarked that McTaggart's failure as a philosophical architect (if such failure could be shown) would not prove that his conception of metaphysics was mistaken. It would only show that yet another grandiose metaphysics of this type had fallen by the way, despite the astonishing virtuosity of its designer. That would be a depressing result to certain hopeful people, but it need not have a very catholic significance.

At this point (I think) I may give the reader a little more information (and I admit that, up to the present, I haven't given him very much). One of the inevitable disadvantages in most philosophical systems that are at all elaborate is that the designers have to take so much pains about the internal technology of the system without any apparent net gain of a more general kind. Since nothing else is possible, nobody is entitled to complain. It is difficult, however, to retain a perfervid interest in such problems if the whole system sags, and, more particularly, if it cannot be restored by a technical reconstruction along similar lines. Unfortunately this difficulty is quite strikingly apparent in the present instance. McTaggart professed to be able to prove a great deal that was very important without the aid of his Principle of Determining Correspondence, but if that principle has to be abandoned the highest towers

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of his imposing system become radically insecure, and Mr. Broad demolished the principle so thoroughly in the first volume of his *Examination* that I at least have no wish to attempt to restore it in any way at all. Consequently a great part of the eight hundred pages of this second volume is engaged in shadow-boxing, and in exercises of an anatomical kind that are subject to the objection that they are dealing with a chimerical organism that never was and never could have been viable. Mr. Broad (as he says) may have found much intellectual profit (and he has certainly displayed immense intellectual ability) in examining a broken lock that he knew to be broken and how. Where he has gained so much his readers, in a smaller way, may also gain. Indeed, anyone who follows his arguments closely has by that very circumstance attained a high-grade logical level. The benefit may therefore be considerable, but it is largely indirect, and there might be other and less oblique ways of learning to keep one's head.

I shall now try to answer a natural if a rather naughty question. Readers of Mill's *Examination of Hamilton* (let us say) might reasonably expect to learn a good deal from that work even if their knowledge of Hamilton himself did not appreciably exceed what the book said about him. Readers of Suarez upon St. Thomas might similarly learn a good deal without severe concurrent study of that doctor. Such an attitude on the reader's part is, one admits, regrettable in certain ways and is manifestly unfair to Hamilton or to St. Thomas as the case may be. Nevertheless, an adequate study both of McTaggart and of this commentary is a pretty big job. It is therefore of some moment to ask whether a reader of this *Examination* (and more specifically of the second volume of the *Examination* now under review) could expect a fat dividend if he had only a general knowledge of McTaggart's attitude, and read this book for its separate individual delectability.

On that I should report somewhat as follows: McTaggart was thoroughly dissatisfied with most of the attempts to prove ontological idealism (i.e. the spiritual constitution of reality), but he believed that he had found a better way to demonstrate that conclusion. This new way was arduous and involved a highly complicated metaphysical argument. The foundations were supplied in the first volume of *The Nature of Existence*, to which the first volume of this *Examination* corresponds. McTaggart's second volume (to which Mr. Broad's second volume corresponds) reaped the fruits of the first volume, and saw to it that the fruits were mature before the harvest. This harvest, as Mr. Broad says, may fairly be described as both exciting and complex. It involves a drastic re-analysis of the current psychological conceptions of conscious and of subconscious experience, a closer investigation than is common of the nature of selves, the rejection of time and its supplanting by eternity, a detailed review of human error, its genera, its cause and its cure, a prolonged examination of the pre- and post-existence of the human selves that now appear to exist, of the nature of value, of eternal love, and of optimism. These are all exciting topics, as metaphysicians count excitement, and those who are not metaphysicians should leave McTaggart and his examiner quite sternly alone.

Thus McTaggart's second volume contains the play to which the first was an extensive prologue, and the examiner taxes his remarkable powers to their fullest extent in consulting the reader's legitimate wants. He excels in exposition. For the most part he explains McTaggart's views in a lucid and compact independent statement; and he does not hinder the reader's itinerary by more than the necessary minimum of references and of quotations. He does not refer retrospectively to his own or to McTaggart's first volume except upon very rare occasions when he has no choice in the matter. McTaggart's second volume

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may be read with profit and interest without more than a general (if accurate) recollection of the first. The same is true of the second volume of the *Examination*. In abundant stretches this volume is exciting and valuable for any philosopher. On the other hand, there are also long stretches necessarily concerned with McTaggart's technology. Mr. Broad has invented a much simpler notation than McTaggart's, but still a notation that requires close attention and is always ready to eat up the pages. Therefore most readers who are looking for honey would find plenty of it but would also find a lot of scentless vegetation. I am therefore rather sorry for such a reader. If he neglects the technological discussion he will miss more than he can afford to miss. If he gives his mind to it he may doubt whether the reward is proportionate. So his case is hard. However, there is at least a very full and a very accurate synopsis as well as clear general directions and properly labelled paragraphs. Readers of this type are treated as well as they could be treated, and can have no ground for complaining. The book was not written for them but it does not shut them out.

To say these things is to say that the book is in substance what it professes to be, viz. a commentary. It is also (as I have said) an untendentious commentary without an ulterior purpose. Therefore it has the limitations of its genre. So long as a commentator speaks to his brief he is, so to say, a tied philosopher. His author calls the tune. He pipes and dances to it, perhaps improving it vastly; but he is still its obedient servant. This state of affairs, when the commentator is the author's equal, tempers the reader's satisfaction. The commentator stops when the reader would like him to proceed. If the commentator is thorough (and Mr. Broad is devastatingly so) he elaborates each point of substance as and when it turns up. The justification for so full a treatment must often be only that the author treated it very fully. When Mr. Broad finds what he calls a "rookery of mares' nests" he has to fire separately upon every mare's nest in the rookery. The efficiency of the marksmanship does not always tempt a spectator to linger. It is not very thrilling. When we have found, for example, that McTaggart was fond of talking about quantity and measurement without having much more than a dangerous half-knowledge of that subject, we may be excused for having a certain impatience with the detailed exhibition of his defects in this particular, even if we ourselves share his taste and also his weakness. The policy of "Thorough" has certain drawbacks.

Speaking generally, however, it appears to me that Mr. Broad's second volume is more skilfully constructed than his first. The first volume seemed to stick rather too closely to MacTaggart's words and ways. When Mr. Broad made definitely independent contributions he marked them with a star. These constellations seemed sometimes to have a rather arbitrary origin, and some of their members were more dwarfish than the others. To our joy Mr. Broad has abandoned all that in the present volume, and has chosen instead to give us a steadier view of his own opinions. Sometimes he says, "I shall discuss this subject in my own way and apply the result to McTaggart's theory. Sometimes he says, "I shall put McTaggart's views in my own way and then say what I think about them." Both methods are somewhat unusual in a commentator, but they sensibly diminish (although they cannot overcome) the restraints to which a faithful commentary is necessarily subject. Hence the reader's interest is proportionately stimulated, and Mr. Broad has all the qualities that are necessary for his very diversified task, usually in an exceptionally high degree. There are few, if any, in the country who can match his skill in presenting a phenomenology of perception and of temporal process. His grasp of what used to be called psychology is firm and arresting. He has

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a mastery of abstract logic and of the foundations of the quantitative sciences greatly superior to that of most contemporary philosophical writers. He is quite well versed in the thicket of puzzles in which what is called "value-theory" lurks to-day. Hence his arguments and conclusions have frequently a vivid interest largely additional to anything that McTaggart may have said.

If these remarks convey the impression that it would have been desirable to have had still more of Broad and far less of McTaggart, I hasten to supply the necessary corrective. There are parts of the subject in which Mr. Broad's views are more valuable than McTaggart's, and Mr. Broad is often crippled by being what he sets out to be, a commentator. Also (as I have said) McTaggart's ship was wrecked and, concerning parts of it, there is not an absorbing source of interest in the question whether it is broken up by a skilled workman, or is left to disintegrate in more casual ways. A failure in demonstration need not point the way to a better demonstration or, in the alternative, show that no healthy proof is possible. It may be, in substance, a dead loss. But McTaggart set himself a great task that few would conceive and fewer would execute. Hence his commentator is led into many discussions that he might not have raised had he developed an independent philosophy, and we, the readers, may gain in consequence. Something of the kind, I think, has happened in the present instance. The examination has forced the examiner to discuss much that, *sibi permissus*, he might reasonably have avoided. Again, to mention a point of considerable importance, it is illuminating to have these problems discussed by a pair of philosophers, both of whom write admirably, although in vastly different styles. I shall not try to compare their merits in this respect. I have always thought McTaggart one of the best writers on technical philosophical subjects in the entire history of the English language, but the complementary excellences of Mr. Broad's very characteristic style are a constant source of pleasure and of profit.

Having said so much I may further be asked whether I expect the reader to show what, to parody one of Mr. Broad's phrases, might be called "full expository acceptance" of this commentary. On that question I have already indicated my general opinions. It would be almost impossible for anyone to take more trouble over another man's ideas than Mr. Broad has done here. Had McTaggart been alive I have little doubt that he would have accepted the accuracy of Mr. Broad's account of his philosophy both in larger and in smaller matters and would have gladly admitted the legitimacy and value of his criticisms. That is not to say that he might not have replied very effectively to many of the criticisms; but lacking McTaggart's powers, I am afraid I am unequal to the task of venturing upon a counter-examination.

For myself, however (to mention no other matters), I confess that I should very much like to have some inkling of the views of McTaggart's post-existent spirit upon Mr. Broad's account of the Specious Present, and upon the distinction between continuants and occurrences in its relation to absolute becoming. On the former point I am substantially on Mr. Broad's side. The way in which McTaggart and many of his contemporaries and successors spoke of the Specious Present seems to me to have been an open scandal, and I greatly admire Mr. Broad's attempt to remove the scandal (together with his similar remarks upon the perception of spatial boundaries). Nevertheless, I doubt whether a presented temporal stretch does appear "to tail off uniformly from a maximum at its later boundary." I think we have to distinguish between what is ostensibly "going" and what is ostensibly "gone." The former is presented (although in part strictly past), but it seems to me that the appearance of "going" does not occur until the presented entity is very nearly gone, and so that a part of the presented stretch (although strictly past) does

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not even seem to be "going." As to continuants and occurrents, I admire Mr. Broad's confidence in the ultimate metaphysical validity of this distinction, but have to confess that I do not share it. Indeed, I believe that McTaggart was in the right and his examiner in the wrong. What is the "absolute becoming" of a continuant except an occurrence? What is a continuant except its history? What ultimately is the distinction between what Mr. Broad calls "quasi-continuants" and genuine ones? I am also very doubtful about what Mr. Broad repeatedly says about "dispositions." I allow that in talking, e.g., about a self we include hypothetical propositions about what it would do or might have done. That is a legitimate way of speaking, but it does not prove that a self at any given time is more than its history up to that time (unless the "history" is a set of propositions about it) or that it is a (developing?) "continuant" that in some mysterious way takes to itself a "history."

But I must stop. I cannot, without arbitrariness, select such smaller questions for separate discussion, and *sub specie temporis* must acquiesce in the frustration of my desire to do so. I would only say that if any reader detects traces of what Mr. Broad would call "fulfilled aversion" in reading this review, I beg him to neglect my halting efforts and go to the book itself. He will have no fulfilled aversion if he reads as much of it as appeals to him, and then the rest (if any).

I have noticed very few misprints, or other instances of what I take to be slips. On page 19 (last line), (i) should be (ii). On page 148, l. 17, "discretely" should be "discreetly." It seems to me that on page 309, lines 30 and 32, "last" should be "first" and "first" should be "last." In the neighbourhood of (and including) page 334 there is an eruption of the word "presently" that, although a Scot, I find puzzling. On page 785, "include" should be "includes."

JOHN LAIRD.

A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz. By BERTRAND RUSSELL, New impression with a new preface (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. xxiii + 311. Price 12s. 6d.)

This book originally published in 1900 by the Cambridge University Press has been out of print for some time. It is now reissued by Allen & Unwin without any modification either of type or of paging, but with a new preface. The only thing that is changed is the paper and the binding.

The reissue is to be welcomed. Mr. Russell's discussions are always suggestive, however much one may disagree with his interpretation; and as the book has taken its place among the small number of influential expositions of Leibniz, it is very desirable that it should be generally accessible.

The main thesis of the book can be stated somewhat as follows. Any philosophy which is based on the notion of substance must be either a monistic pantheism, such as that of Spinoza, or a monadistic atheism (pp. 172, 185). A philosophy of substance cannot be theistic. Now Leibniz expounds a philosophy of substance which is both monadistic and theistic. The whole of the theological part is, however, not merely inconsistent with his philosophy, but extraneous to it, and can therefore be cut out from the main exposition of his philosophy. When this is done, the purely monadistic part can be shown to follow from five premisses, three of which are mutually inconsistent. Leibniz's philosophy is then inconsistent with itself, but his greatness as a philosopher is due to the fact that his work brings out clearly the inconsistency of his premisses.

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I can only touch on a few important points. The first of Mr. Russell's premisses is, that every proposition has a subject and a predicate, and he thinks that this premiss is responsible for what he considers Leibniz's mistakes in the treatment of relations, aggregates, space, and time (pp. 12-15). He interprets Leibniz as holding that relations between terms are accidents of the mind contemplating the terms, that propositions about number are mental, that abstraction is falsification, and that space and time are subjective. For none of these entities can enter into strict subject-predicate propositions. Hence Mr. Russell regards the epithets which frequently occur in Leibniz, "a purely ideal being," "a being of reason," "a mental entity" (or more frequently, "a semi-mental entity") as "abusive epithets" (p. 129).

In all this, I think, Mr. Russell fails to do justice to Leibniz's treatment of ideal entities, and he fails because his first premiss really includes two distinct principles, which ought to be stated separately. The first of these can be called purely logical. It is that every proposition can be treated as a complex entity containing a number of notions, and asserting that one set of notions is contained in another set. This Leibniz holds of every proposition, however complex. In this sense he would agree that every proposition can be treated as having a subject and a predicate. But from this principle nothing of an ontological character would follow. For that we need a different principle, which is ontological. It is that nothing can be strictly said to be real which is not a substance. All entities not substances are ideal, and have when considered in themselves no existence, but are derived by some process, of abstraction, comparison, aggregation, etc., from substances. Though not real, they are, however, not nothing, and their consideration is important for the understanding of substances. They are akin in nature to eternal truths.

By including both these principles under the single principle that every proposition has a subject and a predicate, Mr. Russell can easily show that Leibniz's metaphysics follows from his logic. It would be equally easy to show that Leibniz's logic follows from his metaphysics. I believe that the whole dispute is futile, and that the two sides always went together in the thought of Leibniz.

Mr. Russell's third premiss is that "true propositions not asserting existence at particular times are necessary and analytic, but such as assert existence at particular times are contingent and synthetic." He admits that Leibniz does not use the terms analytic and synthetic, but he introduces them in order to make distinctions not clearly made by Leibniz, and argues that the use of the single pair, necessary and contingent, prejudices the issue in Leibniz's favour.

The reply to this is that the use of the new pair involves a misinterpretation of Leibniz. According to Mr. Russell, Leibniz holds that every true proposition referring to mere possibles is analytic and necessary. Contingency comes in only in regard (a) to propositions asserting that something exists, and (b) to propositions asserting a connection between various actual predicates of a particular substance. Mr. Russell puts it (p. 28): "All the predicates are necessarily connected with the subject, but no concrete predicates are necessarily connected with each other." The first part of this statement is incorrect. It misses the distinction Leibniz makes between metaphysical necessity and hypothetical necessity. Again, if by a synthetic proposition is meant what it meant for Kant, viz. one which asserts of a subject a predicate not contained in the notion of the subject, and if all contingent propositions are synthetic, then all Leibniz's discussions regarding contingency become nonsensical. For precisely what Leibniz asserts in those discussions is that there are two distinct ways in which a predicate can be contained in the notion of a subject

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—two distinct kinds of *inesse*—one of which makes the proposition asserting the connexion necessary, the other makes it contingent. This second kind of *inesse* is found in the realm of possibles, as well as the first kind, and the proof of the connection—even within the realm of possibles—involves an unending process which is as different from that by which metaphysically necessary propositions are proved as the number 1.414 is from $\sqrt{2}$. It is just this difference which is the mark of contingency. There are thus two points in which Leibniz's account of contingency is in conflict with Mr. Russell's premiss: (i) it applies within the realm of possibles, (ii) contingent propositions are not synthetic.

Again, there are some statements in Leibniz which would give colour to Mr. Russell's view that propositions asserting actual existence are synthetic, but this view is nevertheless quite out of keeping with the main tendency of Leibniz's philosophy, and there are far more passages asserting the contrary. A synthetic proposition would, in fact, be a proposition which asserted a connection between *S* and *P* without any ground in the nature of *S*. And it is just this which Leibniz always denies, on the basis of his principle of sufficient reason. There are, of course, many difficulties involved in Leibniz's treatment of actual existence, of which the critical one is seen when it is asked in what way the notion of a substance considered as possible differs from the notion of the same substance actually existing. If there is no difference, then existence is not a predicate. If there is a difference, then existence is a predicate not contained in the notion of the substance considered as possible. Mr. Russell thinks Leibniz accepts the second alternative, and considers that he ought to have accepted the first. Thus Mr. Russell uses the second as the basis of his account of contingent propositions as synthetic, while pressing the first against Leibniz's ontological proof of God's existence. Leibniz was himself aware of the difficulty, and tried to meet it by defining existence as a predicate, but as a predicate different in character from ordinary predicates, and as having a different meaning as applied to God from the meaning it has as applied to created substances. A discussion of this would involve an article in itself; but one illustration will serve to show the trend of Leibniz's thought, and at the same time bring out a feature which occurs several times in Mr. Russell's treatment of Leibniz.

In his new preface (p. vi) Mr. Russell quotes a sentence from a paper of 1686 printed by Couturat in his *Opuscules et Fragments Inédits de Leibniz*, which he translates as follows: "I say therefore that the existent is the being which is compatible with most things, or the most possible being, so that all coexistent things are equally possible." Mr. Russell then proceeds to show the strange consequences which follow from this if it is taken as a definition of existence in the strict sense: no act of creation would be needed, no divine decree, and so on; and he concludes: "Here, as elsewhere, Leibniz fell into Spinozism whenever he allowed himself to be logical; in his published works, accordingly, he took care to be illogical."

Now the reader who turns up the passage in Couturat (p. 376) will find a curious fact. The sentence quoted is immediately succeeded by, "Or, what comes to the same thing, the existent is what pleases an intelligent and powerful being"; and then Leibniz goes on to note that this presupposes such a being to exist, so that the attempted definition will not do as it stands, and he goes on to modify it.¹

Mr. Russell's treatment is a good example of what I may call the *malicious* school of historical interpretation, which consists in the neglect of contexts

¹ For a discussion of some other passages, see Couturat, "Sur la Métaphysique de Leibniz," *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, Jan. 1902, p. 13.

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and backgrounds. In its context, Leibniz's suggested definition is an attempt to meet the difficulty already mentioned about the relation between possibility and existence. § 71 of this paper (p. 375) came to the conclusion that when we say *A* exists we mean that existence is contained in the notion of *A*. But then (§ 73) the question arises, what existence can mean beyond possibility, i.e. beyond essence. And Mr. Russell's quotation is the first provisional answer. By taking it out of its context, Mr. Russell gives it an interpretation it cannot bear in its context. For in its context it is restricted to created or dependent existence; by taking it out of its context Mr. Russell gives it the air of a definition of existence without any restriction.

Mr. Russell has made no alterations in his 1900 text, so that on page 124, note 1, the error is still repeated that the term monad was used by Leibniz for the first time in 1696, and on page 188, note 1, the conclusion drawn by Stein from this erroneous date, viz. that Leibniz probably derived the term from van Helmont, is still accepted. Leibniz used the term monad in a letter to de l'Hospital dated 12/22 July 1695 (G.M. II 294). The only modern writer of a book on Leibniz who is aware of this, so far as I know, is Iwanicki, in his *Leibniz et les démonstrations mathématiques de l'existence de Dieu* (1933). (I pointed it out myself in the Proc. Arist. Soc. 1922-23.)

The shadow of Spinoza lies over Mr. Russell's Leibniz. This is partly due to Mr. Russell's belief that if Leibniz wanted a God he had no logical right to any but Spinoza's; but there is also a general suggestion that Leibniz borrowed a great deal from Spinoza without acknowledging the debt. Mr. Russell is here, I think, too much influenced by Stein's *Leibniz und Spinoza*, a book which is in my opinion a very bad one, though very cleverly written. The only safe way of dealing with Stein is to look up the contexts of all his references, and to refuse to draw positive conclusions from negative evidence. Mr. Edwyn Bevan, in his *Stoics and Sceptics* (1913), mentions Stein's *Die Psychologie der Stoa* as "the worst book upon Stoicism which I know," and warns those beginning the study of the subject against it (preface, p. 6). I have the same feeling about his *Leibniz und Spinoza*. It is still needed, however, for some of the letters by and to Leibniz printed in the appendix. The Berlin edition of Leibniz is, e.g., misleading in regard to the correspondence of Schuller with Leibniz concerning the distribution of the copies of Spinoza's *Opera*, not printing the letter of February 6, 1678, in which Schuller definitely says he has dispatched a copy to Leibniz. It was on the basis of the Berlin edition of Leibniz's philosophical correspondence (forgetful of the letters printed in Stein) that I allowed myself to play with the idea that Leibniz might have received his copy in November 1677, in an essay which I contributed to the recent volume of *Seventeenth Century Studies*, presented to Sir Herbert Grierson. The point was not of any importance for my purpose; but it illustrates the unfortunate position of the student of Leibniz in regard to his sources. He must not permit himself to depend on any single collection of Leibniz's works. From a somewhat similar point of view the collection of passages printed in Mr. Russell's appendix should not be regarded as anything more than a set of signposts to the fuller passages from which they have been excerpted. For Leibniz, of all people, contexts and backgrounds are important.

In his new preface Mr. Russell cites Couturat's *La Logique de Leibniz* and his collection of the *Fragments Inédits* of Leibniz as fully confirming his own views. Couturat's view of the metaphysics of Leibniz is to be found in the article in the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* for January 1902, to which I have already referred. Like everything Couturat wrote, it is of very great value; but an examination of it would be out of place in this review.

L. J. RUSSELL.

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Philosophy and the Physicists. By L. S. STEBBING. (London: Methuen & Co. 1937. Pp. xvi + 295. Price 7s. 6d.)

Professor Stebbing's book is intended to assess the philosophical value, if any, of the numerous works in which certain eminent scientists have expounded to the general public what they consider to be the implications of recent developments in mathematical physics. The writers whom she mainly discusses are Sir James Jeans and Sir Arthur Eddington. She complains, with some justice, that they both "approach their task through an emotional fog," and both "present their views with an amount of personification and metaphor that reduces them to the level of revivalist preachers." This is a severe judgment, but it appears to me to be amply borne out by my own experience in reading their works, and by the quotations which Miss Stebbing gives. I find myself in complete agreement with her remark on p. 18, that "the fundamental objection to the modes of expression so dear to Eddington and Jeans . . . is that such writing obfuscates the common reader whilst pretending to enlighten him."

The two writers under discussion are, as Miss Stebbing recognizes, of very different calibre when considered as contributors to philosophy. There is no evidence that Jeans has any serious contribution to make, and Miss Stebbing disposes of his puerilities in a couple of chapters. This massacre is too much like knocking down a sitting bird to be of much interest, and Miss Stebbing devotes the rest of her book to the more sportsmanlike exercise of peppering Eddington as he flits from one metaphor to another. No one who has read Eddington's works can doubt that he has a genuine interest in philosophical questions, and one suspects that he may have something of importance to say about them. But any philosophically trained reader is troubled by two defects. The first is stated by Miss Stebbing on p. 55. "He has nowhere expounded his philosophical ideas in non-popular language." It is therefore very difficult to know whether his ideas are as confused as his language often is. The second defect, which Miss Stebbing does not explicitly mention, is this. Most of the problems which Eddington discusses lead at the first or the second move into territory with which professional philosophers have long been familiar. This is full of linguistic and other pitfalls, many of which have been discovered, mapped out, and fenced round by philosophers in the course of ages. Anyone who enters these regions without having studied the most recent maps, and without knowing and using the technical apparatus which philosophers have devised in order to reduce the risks of exploration, is almost certain to fall into fallacies himself, or to lead his followers into them. Now there is no evidence in Eddington's writings that he has made the least attempt to prepare himself for philosophical investigation by studying the work of experts in the subject. (His naïve use of the mouldy old metaphor of the "telephone-exchange," e.g., is a case in point.) Of course no one can blame a man for not studying a foreign subject when he has been engaged in making the most profound and original contributions to his own science, which has been changing and advancing with unprecedented rapidity. And no one wants Eddington to stick entirely to his last and renounce his interest in philosophy. Still, the fact remains that his lack of technical philosophical training, however excusable it may be, is a most serious handicap to him in his excursions into philosophy.

The result of all this is that Eddington does lay himself open to very serious criticisms from a competent and clear-headed thinker with a thorough knowledge of contemporary analytical philosophy, such as Miss Stebbing. And it is very difficult to believe that all the *verbal* confusions which she

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undoubtedly detects and points out are *merely* verbal. In order that the reader may judge of this for himself, I will now go rapidly through Miss Stebbing's book, mentioning briefly the more important of her criticisms.

The book is divided into four parts. In Part I Sir James Jeans is disposed of, and we need not linger to dance over his corpse. Part II is entitled *The Physicist and the World*. It describes, in four chapters, Eddington's views of the relation of physics to the external world, and to human sense-experience. In the first of these, *Furniture of Earth*, Miss Stebbing deals severely with Eddington's talk about his "two tables," the familiar and the scientific one; with the statement that the table is not "really" solid; and so on. She suggests that it is as meaningless to talk of a "scientific table" as to talk of a "familiar electron or quantum." And she contends that, unless tables and floors were "really solid," we should not understand what was being said when we were told that certain other things or collections, e.g. a swarm of flies or the duckweed on a pond, are *not* really solid.

The second of these chapters, entitled *The Symbolic World of Physics*, contains an attempt to elucidate Eddington's statement that the aim of science is to "construct a world which shall be symbolic of the world of commonplace experience." Miss Stebbing begins by explaining Eddington's contention that there are three kinds of law—identical, statistical, and controlling. She then makes some criticisms on points of detail in Eddington's attempt to construct, from the minimum of data, a mathematical scheme in which the metrical, gravitational, and electro-magnetic fields are all included. She ends, however, by admitting that "given the provision of adequate building material, such an inclusive construction could be made." But she attacks Eddington's conclusion that such laws as the conservation of mass, energy, momentum, the law of gravitation, and Maxwell's equations, are mere truisms and not controlling laws. I think that her doctrine can be stated as follows. Beside the three kinds of law distinguished by Eddington, there are certain observable regularities in human sense-experience. She proposes to call these "natural laws," as contrasted with Eddington's "laws of Nature." Eddington pays lip-service to the importance of these, but Miss Stebbing thinks that he fails to take them seriously. Actually the concepts of mathematical physics were constructed and the laws of Nature were formulated in view of these natural laws. And, even if it had been possible in theory to start from the other end and construct an abstract system of mathematical physics in which the concepts and the laws are so interconnected that the laws are truisms, there is no guarantee whatever that anything would have been found in our sensible experience to answer to the concepts and to obey the laws.

An important point which Miss Stebbing makes in this chapter is that there seems to be some kind of mystification in Eddington's writings due to the metaphorical word "building." There seems to be a suggestion that, because physical scientists "build" the system of concepts which is theoretical physics, therefore in some sense everyone of us "builds" the external world to which these concepts apply.

In the next chapter, *The Descent to the Inscrutable*, Miss Stebbing tries to discover the senses in which Eddington uses the phrases "the familiar world," "the external world," "the scientific world," "the physical world," "Nature," "the world of physics," and "the spiritual world," and how he supposes that these worlds are related to each other. What she finally condenses from clouds of metaphor may be roughly summarized as follows. The *external world* is known only as that which is capable of "sending messages" along nerve-fibres to people. These fibres are themselves part of the external world, and one end

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of each fibre leads into the brain of some person, which is, presumably, also a part of the external world. Each person's mind is inside his head, and the inner end of each fibre is "in consciousness." Each mind thus "receives the messages" which are conveyed from the external world through nerve-fibres to its brain. It then and there, without being conscious of doing so, "transforms" and "dresses up" the messages in spatial, substantial, coloured, scented forms. And finally it becomes conscious of these products of its own unwitting action. The *familiar world* is the world of chairs, tables, trees, and the common things of daily life. But, in consequence of the theory about the external world, the messages, the transforming, and dressing-up, etc., Eddington concludes that the familiar world is a delusion, spun by the mind of each of us for himself under the mistaken impression that he is just translating messages from the external world. The two phrases, "the *scientific world*" and "the *world of physics*," are almost certainly synonymous. But it is extremely difficult to know what is meant by "the *physical world*," and how it is related to "Nature" and to "the world of physics." Miss Stebbing quotes a number of passages which show the difficulty in discovering what Eddington means by these terms. The most plausible view of his meaning seems to be that the physical world is a complex of metrical symbols, that these symbols "shadow" the familiar world, but that experience as a whole contains more than can be shadowed by metrical symbols.

Naturally Miss Stebbing has little difficulty in making hay of all this talk of "messages," "mind-spinning," "editors," "shadowing," and so on. Eddington seems never to have asked himself the question: "If the relation between the external world and the familiar world and myself were as I have stated, how could I possibly *know* or have *any rational ground for believing* it to be so?" He seems never to have considered seriously what is involved in the metaphor of "messages," "symbolizing," and "decoding." I think that it is in this part of his philosophy, more than in any other, that his lack of familiarity with the work of competent professional philosophers has let him down.

These criticisms are carried further in the next chapter, called *Consequences of Scrutinizing the Inscrutable*, which Miss Stebbing prefaces with a cryptogram concealing a quotation from Eddington's writings. She begins by pointing out, quite correctly, that "Eddington has not attempted, and has never felt the need to attempt, to deduce religion from modern physics, or to base religion on scientific discovery." His contention is that physics itself, as a science, requires a certain supplementation which the physicist as such cannot provide. Physics is concerned only with "pointer-readings" and their interconnections. These correspond in certain ways to sensible objects in the *familiar world*, but the latter are merely products of "mind-spinning." It seems obvious to Eddington that the pointer-readings and their interconnections must, as he puts it, be "attached to some unknown background" in the *external world*. E.g. colours, which he regards as mental products, symbolize electro-magnetic waves in the world of physics, and electro-magnetic waves in turn symbolize something in the external world whose intrinsic nature is unknown.

Miss Stebbing naturally asks: "How, on Eddington's own principles, can he know or even suspect that physical entities symbolize anything whatever?" She carefully analyses Eddington's examples of the antiquarians who discover a book of completed chess-games, after all knowledge of chess has been lost; of decoding cryptograms; and of assigning certain call-signals to certain wireless-stations. She points out that in every such case it is essential for the deciphering individual to have certain detailed knowledge to which

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there could be no analogy in the case of an individual who treats a physical entity as a symbol of an unknown something.

Lastly, even if one did somehow acquire the idea of an "unknown background," and did somehow come to believe that physical entities symbolize items in it, how could one hope to learn anything further about the items which they symbolize? Eddington's answer seems to be as follows. There is one sensible object, viz. one's own brain, such that the pointer-readings which correspond to it in the world of physics symbolize something that is known to oneself *directly* as a thinking and willing subject. The suggestion is that this can be generalized and extended to the objects symbolized by other sets of pointer-readings. Miss Stebbing's criticism is as follows. No one is aware of *his own* brain either as a sensible object or as a set of pointer-readings, though a person may be aware of *another's* brain as a set of pointer-readings. Each person is directly aware *only of himself*, and never of another, as a thinking and willing subject. Hence no one is in a position to make the identification which Eddington postulates.

Part III is concerned with Causality and Human Freedom. In the first chapter Miss Stebbing explains how the problem presented itself to Huxley and to Mill. (There is a delightful misprint in the Bibliography on p. 288, where a synthetic "eminent Victorian" is exhibited under the name of "Thomas Hill Huxley." Miss Stebbing confesses that she cannot abide Huxley, and I should like to believe that this is what has caused her to conflate him with Green.)

In the second chapter Miss Stebbing explains what is meant by a "deterministic scheme of law," with reference to the Laplacean ideal calculator. She explains that it has room for statistical laws, but that it regards them as derivative from deterministic laws. She then gives an account, first of Bohr's model of the atom, and then of Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle; and shows how they are incompatible with a completely deterministic scheme of law. In quantum phenomena the Laplacean calculator could not begin his calculations, because he could not know the initial conditions precisely, and this lack of knowledge would not be due to any defect in his mind or his instruments, it would be inherent in the very nature of physical measurement. We have now to accept statistical laws which are not derivable from deterministic laws. She ends the chapter by saying that "the discovery of the uncertainty relations does involve a considerable change in our attitude to determinism," and by expressing a doubt whether it has precisely these philosophical consequences which Jeans and Eddington believe it to have.

In the next chapter Miss Stebbing considers the consequences and tries to justify her doubt. She reduces the inquiry to the following three questions: (1) Is there any sense in which it is true to say that science *has been* based on determinism? (2) What is the connection between determinism, prediction, and rationality? (3) Why should there be such glee, in some quarters, and such gloom, in others, at the rejection of determinism?

The discussion of the first question is lengthy, and not, I think, very well arranged. In the course of it Miss Stebbing says that she herself feels difficulties in the notion that statistical laws are fundamental; that she is not sure that these difficulties may not be due to prejudice; that she is open to conviction; and that this notion will not become clear until it has been associated with a satisfactory theory of probability in general and of *a priori* probability in particular. This seems to me to be a good point. Next she observes that we did not need to wait for the Uncertainty Principle in order to know that all prediction by means of physical laws is uncertain. Even if we could have kept to the deterministic scheme, our belief in any alleged law would have

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been at best highly probable opinion and never certain knowledge. She thinks that Eddington has made statements which are likely to mislead his readers on this matter. Then she enumerates and discusses four different alternatives in connexion with the interpretation of Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle. She thinks that Eddington accepts the third of these, and Heisenberg the second, which, in her opinion, excludes the third. The fourth is her own suggestion, and I must confess that I do not understand it. In two successive paragraphs on p. 202, referring to this fourth alternative, she says (a) that it would be generally admitted that space and time, "in any ordinary sense," *have no significance in the microphysical domain*, and (b) that "we encounter only bodies that are *very large compared with an electron*." It is not easy to reconcile the clauses which I have italicized in these two statements. Lastly, Miss Stebbing makes a severe, and in my opinion wholly justified, criticism on the extremely confused and confusing use which Eddington makes of the word "inference," with special reference to his statement that "the world of physics is populated with *inferences*," and to his muddled remarks about "the shadow of the moon on Cornwall in 1999" being "already in the world of *inference*." All these discussions are interesting and important; but I am not left at the end of them with any very clear idea of Miss Stebbing's answer to her original question, viz. "Was science ever based on determinism?"

After this long discussion of her first question, Miss Stebbing considers that she is justified in answering her second question in a few lines. I gather that she agrees with Eddington that intelligibility is not bound up with a scheme of deterministic laws, and that it is quite compatible with the Uncertainty Principle and with the ultimate laws of physics being statistical.

Her third question may be taken along with the next chapter, entitled *Human Freedom and Responsibility*, for "the glee of some" at the recent setback to physical determinism is due to the fact that they think that physics now leaves room for freedom and responsibility, whilst formerly it did not.

The point with which Eddington is specially concerned here is the following. Certain bodily movements, such as intelligent speaking and writing, express the conclusions of processes of reasoning. Others are actions or abstinences which accord with a resolution which has been made after a considerable mental struggle. Now Eddington is concerned with the possibility that such bodily movements are not *completely* determined by physical causes. He assumes that, if they were so determined, they could not be *also* determined in any degree by the mental processes, such as reasoning and resolving, which led up to the experience which these movements express. If, on the other hand, they are not completely determined by physical causes, these mental processes may have been essential factors in their causal ancestry. This is, of course, the view of common sense, and it seems to be part of what we mean when we hold ourselves responsible for our speaking, writing, and keeping or breaking of resolutions.

Now Eddington admits that the Principle of Indeterminacy does not leave nearly a wide enough loophole to make any practical difference here. He has to postulate a measure of *macroscopic* indeterminacy in the case of human brains and nervous systems, which the principle will not guarantee. Miss Stebbing insists on this fact, and considers that Eddington is altogether on the wrong line. She holds, so far as I can understand, that the only hopeful line of attack is to show, *not* that physics can be reconciled with the fact of responsibility, but that no reconciliation is needed because there is really no conflict. She is inclined to think that Eddington tacitly accepts the uncritical dualism of the plain man; that this leads to pseudo-problems; and that what is needed is a radical discussion of the notion of a psycho-physiological person

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and of the distinction which a person draws between himself and his environment.

In the earlier part of Chapter X Miss Stebbing discusses the notion of responsibility on her own account, and mentions and criticizes recent attempts by Mr. Wisdom, Prof. L. J. Russell, and the present reviewer to analyse it and to trace its implications. Mr. Wisdom's treatment is described as "curiously old-fashioned"; and a criticism on it by Miss Helen Smith, which may be annihilating in its full context, but is certainly not very convincing as quoted by Miss Stebbing, receives extremely high marks. I think we may summarize this part of the book by saying that Miss Stebbing here confines herself to "warming the teapot," but that she does this with such virtuosity that we are encouraged to hope for another book in which she will make delicious tea.

Lastly, she is inclined to think that the Uncertainty Principle and the correlated changes in physics have one and only one legitimate bearing on the question of freedom and responsibility. They reinforce, in a particularly obvious way, a fact which is well known to all competent philosophers, but is constantly ignored in popular discussions on free-will and determinism, viz. the fact that "compulsion" is no part of the meaning of causal determination. And they give the quietus to the notion of the physical world as a kind of machine, an image which has often been carried over to human beings, and has played an important and detrimental part in the free-will controversy. "Nothing could be a more inadequate image for a human being," says Miss Stebbing, "than a pot or a machine, unless it be a hazy collection of qualities accidentally collocated and labelled with a name."

The fourth Part, which concludes the book, is entitled *The Changed Outlook*, and consists of two chapters. The first of these is concerned with the Second Law of Thermodynamics, and with Eddington's suggestion of an "entropy-clock" in the human brain, which gives us our notion of the direction of temporal process. Miss Stebbing considers that this suggestion is a silly solution of a meaningless problem. She asks the pertinent question: "If increase of entropy is the criterion of the distinction of earlier from later, how was it discovered that entropy increases *as time goes on*?"

The last chapter deals in a deservedly destructive way with the attempts of some foolish people to extract a tonic for their religious or ethical ideals from the latest speculations and discoveries of physics.

In conclusion, I would express the opinion that we owe a debt of gratitude to Miss Stebbing for absenting herself for a while from the felicity of her own proper studies in order to do a much-needed work of intellectual scavenging. The labour itself cannot have been particularly pleasant for her, and she must often have felt that she might be better occupied than in clearing up the messes made by amateur philosophers. But at the end of it she must have enjoyed something of the exhilaration of a good housewife who has at last completed her spring-cleaning; and, were it not for the ill-omened associations of the phrase, we might congratulate her and her readers on the house being now "sweet and garnished."

C. D. BROAD.

Time and its Importance in Modern Thought. By M. F. CLEUGH. (London: Methuen & Co. 1937. Pp. x + 308. Price 12s. 6d.)

This work was written as a thesis for the degree of Ph.D. in the University of London. Happy is the university that can extract such learning from its candidates for research degrees!

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The scope of the thesis is a general survey of contexts in which "time" crops up, such as psychology, physics, logic, prediction, irreversibility, and it includes a critical discussion of the views of Kant, Bergson, Alexander, McTaggart, Broad, Dunne and others, strange bedfellows as some of these make. Whilst there is some sitting on the fence, and some prolixity of illustrative examples, the whole of the work is of interest. Perhaps the essential telling conclusions and views are somewhat buried in the mass, but they are always refreshing.

It is a pity that writers on time are not forbidden the use of the word "time" altogether. We should perhaps then be surer what is being talked about—whether instant, the temporal sequence, interval, duration, becoming, the moving present, memory, simultaneity, periodicity, and so on, and we could thus avoid what Dr. Cleugh so often calls the hypostatization of time. Part of the trouble of the reader in studying Dr. Cleugh is to know when she is subscribing to this erection of time into a thing-in-itself, and when she is taking the more positivist view that there is no entity "time" with which we have any acquaintance but simply an ordered happening of events *at ourselves*. If only Dr. Cleugh had emphasized, in her own mind and for the benefit of the reader's, this prime fact of experience, how many circumlocutions and daisy-picking pathways back to her starting-point she would have saved herself! For example, in the chapter on physics she pays at least lip-service to the result of relativity that the simultaneity of two *distant* events is a matter of convention; in the chapter on logic she states that "the theory of relativity does not affect the certainty of the observer that two events, to him, took place at the same time; hence the great importance of drawing a particular distinction between experienced simultaneity and simultaneity in the sense or senses in which it is used in physics." But "experienced simultaneity" refers to events in the observer's consciousness, *at the observer*, a simultaneity which is assessed by an immediate judgment, and it is used in this sense in physics, *for events at the observer*; physics shows that it is the simultaneity or non-simultaneity of two events not at the observer which is conventional. Yet on p. 213 (rather late on in the book) she says that "objectively it must be true that they (i.e. two events) are simultaneous or that one did in fact happen before the other, and it is this 'happening' which is absolute and fundamental—and which is entirely unaffected by any stellar traveller." What does she mean by "objectively"? We have only different observers' different assignments of simultaneity or non-simultaneity to the two events. I suspect that she has not really understood the master-discovery of Einstein, or grasped the importance of the circumstance that judgments as to simultaneity can only be made by the observer for events *at himself*.

Again, on p. 5 there occurs the sentence "the problem of time is one of the hardest with which the philosopher has to deal," but what is meant by "the problem of time" we have not yet been told. Even to ask this question is to indulge in that hypostatization of time which the author so often condemns, and rightly. If the problem is "What is time?" the author gives her answer on p. 278 by saying that "we are bound to take time as an ultimate datum and to take a very simple view of it as being the name we give to the happenings of events." But this is a definition, not a problem. We should first define time, then state a problem arising out of the definition. The author expands her meaning by saying that "A happens, and then B happens, and both 'happening' and 'and then' are to be taken as ultimate." But this misses precision. As above, "and then" applies only to happenings at the observer, as an immediate judgment. A little later she answers her question "What is

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time?" in a single phrase as "the alogical element in the universe," which is a metaphysical judgment, in contrast to the former psychological one. There seems to the reviewer to be no justification for the imputation of alogicality to time; it seems to derive from the view that static or timeless geometry is the furthest extension of logic. But geometry is just logic working in a field where the axioms are axioms of order, and it can be properly extended to a field in which the element "point" is replaced by the element "event" and events are ordered according to an axiom assigning a temporal sequence at the observer. The analysis of moving sets of points is just as logical as that of stationary sets. The author maintains (p. 282) that logic, in the sense of abstract consistency, is seriously insufficient by reason of its exclusion of time. But I am unable to understand what is meant by this "time" which logic is held to exclude, more especially as I appreciate the many wise things the author has to say as to the merely grammatical appearance of time.

After these criticisms it is a pleasure to recognize the author's strong common sense on the subject of irreversibility. "I am inclined to think that the question of irreversibility is in a sense almost irrelevant to time, and that what we mean by the unidirectionality of time is not a matter of 'musts' and 'cannots' but just a matter of fact. It just happens so" (p. 223). Again, "we are enabled to take the very simple and, I think, correct view that the happening of events is ultimate and transcends any talk of reversibility. As far as time-order is concerned it seems to me unmeaning to ask if it could be 'reversed.'" Apart from the hedging "in a sense," this is admirable; if we mean by time-order a sequence at the observer, then the events just *have* this order—if we take them in any other, it is not the time-order.

To go back to the "problem of time," the reviewer concedes at once that there is much more to our temporal cognitions than simple awareness of a simultaneity or of a before-and-after relation for events at the observer: there is the immediate awareness of a distinction between two rates of change as viewed, and its integrated form in the immediate awareness or impression of one interval being greater or less than another, however the impression may be related to the corresponding physical measures; there is the impression of something more than the element "instant" in the "specious present"; there is the consciousness of something real in the vague notion of a "future" event; there is the greater blurredness (or sometimes acuteness) of more distant memories; and so on. Any comprehensive metaphysic or psychological treatment must fuse these together. But it is important to recognize that physics by itself can be constructed on the basis of one of these judgments alone—the before-and-after relation for events at the observer. This axiom of order amongst events proves ultimately to be adequate for setting up satisfactory schemes of time-measurement, but of course only after considerable analysis. One example of such analysis is contained in the work of Robb. An analysis of a more general kind can be constructed on the following lines.

The crude, older view was that we measure time (that is, the physicists measure time) by using a periodic phenomenon. The trouble then is that we have no test by which we can assess a phenomenon as strictly periodic, unless we use laws of mechanics stated in terms of the very time-measure we are anxious to fix, so that we have no absolute means of knowing the laws of mechanics to be true. Clearly no fundamental analysis can be carried out along this circular route. We must attempt to erect a scheme of time-measurement on the sole basis of our axiom of order. Here the reviewer parts company with his author. "All measurement," she says (p. 39), "of whatever kind, depends on the use of a standard unit." This is to be in far too much

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of a hurry. Primitive systems of measurement rarely depend on the use of a unit; they depend on the use of ordinal numbers. For example, primitively *visibility* is measured on a scale of one to ten; *winds* are measured on the Beaufort scale; *earthquakes* used to be measured on the Rossi-Forel scale; and there is an ordinal scale of *hardness* described in the most used collection of laboratory tables. The most familiar example of an ordinal scale is the empirical temperature scale—Fahrenheit or Centigrade—which arbitrarily assigns equal steps of temperature to equal increments in the expansion of a column of mercury. True, equality of increment is tested by comparison with a standard length (say 1 mm.), but the resulting measure of temperature is essentially ordinal; the equal subdivision of the standard length, even when this has been satisfactorily defined, affords no guarantee of equal subdivision of the degree of temperature. Such thermometer readings are ultimately made "absolute" by an appeal to a law of nature—the second law of thermodynamics. These examples suggest that for time-measurement, where the observer is *par excellence* in a position to arrange events in an order, an arbitrary ordinal measure of time is the logical starting-point. An arbitrary correlation of events at the observer with members of the well-ordered continuum of real numbers may be said to constitute a *clock* for that observer, arbitrarily graduated.

Having got thus far, and defined a clock, we can propound genuine problems as opposed to our author's "What is time?" The first fundamental problem of this kind is now this: given one observer A with his clock (arbitrarily graduated), can he convey information to a second observer B not coincident with A (and so possibly "moving" in any manner relative to A) so that B can graduate *his* clock (or temporal experience) in such a way that a meaning can be attached to saying that the two observers possess clocks identically graduated? And, if so, how? For these questions to have a meaning, it must be possible for the two observers to communicate with one another; for in the absence of intercommunication each observer could graduate his clock arbitrarily. Such communication amounts to the transmission of light-signals. Assuming no properties of light save that a light-signal dispatched from A and reflected back by B returns to A at a clock-reading *later* than the clock-reading of dispatch, this problem can be solved. Its solution depends on a study of symmetry relations, but the space of a review does not permit the solution to be reproduced here.

The second problem then is: if A, having arbitrarily graduated his clock, conveys information to B, C, D . . . so that each graduates his clock in the same way as A has done, what are the restrictions on the "motions" of B, C, D . . . relative to A (i.e. what conditions are satisfied by A's observations of B, C, D . . .) for B's clock now to be identical with C's, and so for each possible pair? This problem can also be solved. When all these conditions are satisfied, the class of observers A, B, C . . . possess a common measure of time. Out of this class of observers various kinematic entities can be constructed, analogous to "figures" in geometry. The third problem is to determine the theorems which state properties of these (moving) figures—in other words, the dynamical laws which will be followed in the presence of such kinematic constructs. This is another technical problem, but it can also be solved by using sufficient logical pressure, and it can be shown how to construct kinematic entities which actually obey the laws of dynamics inferred to hold good in their presence. The fourth problem is: can we find a *regraduation* of A's originally arbitrarily graduated clock such that the restatement of the inferred laws of dynamics in terms of the newly graduated time-scale coincides with the statement of the laws of dynamics known to empirical

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physics? This problem, again, can be solved. We can then make an appeal to experience and identify the mode of time-measurement constructed by purely logical processes, as regraduated, with the time-measure τ of ordinary physics. We are then able to *account for* the origin of this measure τ of physical time if the universe as a whole exhibits the character of that kinematic entity in the presence of which the "laws of nature" in question were inferred to hold good. Modern astronomical research—we make our last appeal to experience—shows that the system of the nuclei of the extra-galactic nebulae may be identified with such a kinematic entity. The universe is thus fundamentally its own clock; and the distribution in it of matter-in-motion provides it with both a system of time-measurement and a set of dynamical (and gravitational) laws, and we thus realize Mach's ideal of ascribing gravitation and the laws of mechanics to the actual content of the universe. I should add that we cannot of course assess the motions of the contents of the universe by to-and-fro light-signals. Instead we observe red-shifts in spectra, and the investigation has to be completed by inferring certain of the laws of optics. The wheel of investigation comes full cycle: we end with the optical laws which will hold good amongst our observers' observations of the atomic absorption and emission processes at one another, and so verify that the constructed kinematic entity is realized in nature.

It is of course impossible to convey in this article any of the details of the foregoing investigation.¹ Nor is it possible to explain the distinction between the τ -scale of mechanical laws and a closely allied regraduated t -scale in terms of which *optical* phenomena find their simplest description. In the t -mode of description, the universe appears as expanding and spectral red-shifts are understood as Doppler effects; in the τ -mode, the universe appears as non-expanding, and red-shifts are due to a secular acceleration of atomic frequency at the observer as compared with the atomic frequency which was emitted long ago by the distant atom. The time-measure τ of an event proves to be an invariant, the same for all fundamental observers, wherever situated, and so leads to an absolute Newtonian assessment of simultaneity by these observers, on the τ -scale.

This final result may comfort those, Dr. Cleugh amongst them, who have a hankering after "objective simultaneity." I can only hope that they are in a more enviable position than that of the mathematical physicist chronicled in the rhyme:

"A mathematician of piety
Was relativist to satiety,
But he mixed in his mind
Each different kind
Of meaning of simultaneity."

E. A. MILNE.

The Realm of Truth. Book Third of "Realms of Being." By GEORGE SANTAYANA.
(London: Constable & Co., Ltd. 1937. Pp. xiv + 142. Price 10s.)

I must warn the readers of these few lines (if there should be any readers) honestly at the outset that what I am here setting down is not a *review* but a "grouse." My excuse for this proceeding is that, after more than one reading, I do not feel competent to review Professor Santayana's book, because, thanks

¹ In which the writer has been materially helped by Mr. G. J. Whitrow.

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perhaps to my own imbecility, I do not understand it at all; but I do feel equal to a "grouse" which I think is justified. What I first want to complain of is exactly what I know will recommend these pages to some readers, the amount of "fine writing" they contain. I mean writing which, in its way, not merely seems fine, but is fine. There is a dainty preciousness about the author's diction, and a perpetual recurrence of picturesque metaphor, which remind one at some times of the style of Agathon's encomium of Eros in the *Symposium*, and at others of the nobly born English writer who expressly calls his most ambitious essay a *Rhapsody*.

Mr. Santayana's style is, indeed, better than that of either Shaftesbury or Agathon; it recalls Walter Pater and not Gorgias. But the trouble, to my mind, is that I do not believe philosophy can be written successfully in the manner of Pater, however excellent that manner may be for some other purposes. Urania, if it is she who presides over philosophers, is, in Plato's phrase, one of the "severer Muses." It is not for her to charm us by the ingenuity of an egg-dance among bewildering metaphors. As I was wrestling with Mr. Santayana's pages, I turned sometimes for refreshment after one of his chapters to St. Thomas Aquinas, and words will not describe the relief I got by doing so. The "ox" of the Dominican order cannot trip it like Mr. Santayana; his tread is neither "light" nor "fantastic," and the compiler of *morceaux choisis* could never be likely to include any extracts from him in an anthology of the beauties of European prose. And yet I think that a *φιλόσοφος*, at any rate, will feel that there is a beauty about a piece of exposition by him which is regularly misused by writers on philosophy who are preoccupied with the anxiety to produce *littérature*. I mean the austere beauty which comes from the single-minded desire to say what you believe to be true and why you believe it to be true as straightforwardly as a man may, without one thought of verbal graces and adornments. A writer with Mr. Santayana's native gift of expression could clearly do the same thing if he would, and do it beautifully. Why does he impair the effect of his own work by his incessant quest after picturesque metaphor? Why must I, as I try to read him, find myself over and again, like Hamlet, praying that he would "leave" his no doubt graceful "faces and begin"? What have I really learned about truth, for example, when I have read (p. ix) that it is "a furrow which matter must plough upon the face of essence"? Or what is really contributed to the understanding of the moral judgement when we are told (p. 73) that "the cry *How beautiful!* or *How good!* may be sincere, and it may be applauded, but it is never true? If sincere, such a cry is also never false."

I suppose that my distaste for the picturesque metaphors in which the author indulges himself so freely is, at bottom, largely due to a conviction that the metaphors are something more than metaphors; they are pieces of a myth, and a myth which impresses one as false. All through the chapters which deal with the different varieties of truths (commonly so-called) Professor Santayana, like the Socialist park-orator in *Punch*, is not so much "arguing" as "telling us." It is assumed that we know already from his earlier volumes that there is a "boundless realm" of essences, and that only some of these essences are "exemplified" in "existence," those of them, namely, which have been seized upon, apparently very much at haphazard, by "matter." That "matter" should have made just the selection which it has made has apparently to be taken as a merely inexplicable fact which lies outside the plot of the story the philosopher has to tell, much as Aristotle says the reasons why Iphigenia is a priestess among the Tauri, and why her brother comes to the spot are outside the plot of a "typical" *Iphigenia* (which is concerned

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only with the brother's danger of dying by his sister's hand, the mutual recognition, and the escape). But what if to a reader like myself this whole presupposed story of the boundless realm of essences, and the random selection (if you can call it so) of some of them for "exemplification," appears just as fantastic as any of Blake's monotonous stories about Urizen, or Orc, or Albion? Then we may appreciate, as I hope I do, a great many of the writer's *obiter dicta*, or admire his fecundity in metaphor, but we shall come away disappointed to have learned nothing in principle about the "realm" of truth.

This is just the predicament in which, whether by my own fault or not, I find myself. For the whole notion of a "boundless realm" of essences about which I can apparently know what they are and what their relations with each other are, though they are and eternally will be without any "exemplification" in existence, seems to me the veriest fairy-tale. If there is such an infinity of essences without "exemplification," for the life of me I do not know whether it was by a voyage of exploration into that realm that Lewis Carroll discovered the Jubjub and the Bandersnatch, or not. How does one distinguish a poet's imaginative flight into the æther of eternal "unexemplified" essence from the merest ravings of delirium?

It is, I take it, not without sound reason that so many philosophers, and those not the least among that goodly band, have dwelt on the thoughts that the *essentia* of a thing is not *id quod est*, but *id quo res est*, that possibility presupposes actuality and the like. Is not an *entirely* "unexemplified" essence *ex vi termini* an essence of nothing at all, and is not that a contradiction in set terms? In words Mr. Santayana comes very close to admitting the point. "The truth," he says, is "the whole ideal system of qualities and relations which the world *has exemplified or will exemplify* [*italics mine*]." His "unexemplified essences" then do not belong to the sphere of truth. But he is still haunted by the notion that we can and do make valuable excursions beyond this sphere into the "boundless" world of pure essences. If so, on the assumption that these pure essences have a being prior to and independent of the accident that "matter" embodies them in examples, how, to repeat my question, does one distinguish between such fruitful exercise of the poetic or mythopoeic imagination and the babblings of the veriest lunacy? Or are all such excursions equally fruitful? If they are not, then, it seems to me, there is a primordial something (Mr. Santayana's eminent colleague, Dr. Whitehead, has named it the primordial "nature of God"), which eternally discriminates real possibilities from the really impossible, and this something is no pure essence, but a *res quæ est*, a primary existent, and the supreme business of metaphysics is with this "necessarily existing being."

Naturally these remarks mean that in my own opinion the foundations of philosophy have been wrongly laid in the two volumes to which the present book is a sequel, and that by inevitable consequence the discussions of the present volume, however happy they may be and are in incidental observations, present us with a picture of the "realm of truth" which is out of focus. My dissatisfaction involves, of course, no disparagement of the author's high abilities, and as I cannot, in dealing with this volume, take issue with the real source of my disagreement, the doctrines of its precursors, my expression of dissatisfaction has, as I said, to wear the appearance of a "grouse."

A. E. TAYLOR.

NEW BOOKS

Nature and Mind. Selected essays of FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE. (New York: Columbia University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford, 1937. Pp. x + 509. Price 18s. 6d.)

This volume contains thirty-seven essays selected from the author's writings (a bibliography of which is appended) and presented to him by Amherst College on the occasion of his seventieth birthday. The "Confessions" (reprinted from *Contemporary American Philosophy*, 1930) is followed by nineteen essays under the heading, "Metaphysics and Logic," and these by twelve under the heading, "Consciousness and Cognition." A final section contains five "Addresses." The order of presentation in each section is chronological. But no one, it is to be hoped, would make the bad mistake of trying to read them as an orderly development of a system of doctrine. Their consistency lies in the consistency of temperament, and their development in that which is appropriate to the sense of philosophical values.

So many foolish things have been said concerning the relation between a man's philosophy and his temperament that the more circumspect are content to leave the topic alone. But if ever a serious study of the subject should be made, this volume will afford an invaluable source of suggestions. In one of the most delightful of the essays, the author writes as follows on the doctrine of Creation: "There is about it a simple yet subtle beauty, which the imaginative are quick to appreciate and which even the dull may feel with a vague sense of mystery too high for them. Its aesthetic quality is so high that a connoisseur in doctrines might wish to keep it a precious possession, even when he did not embrace it as his faith." These essays are the writings of just such a connoisseur, and of one whose intellect and temperament so harmoniously co-operate that he suffers no conflict in his soul when he appreciates a doctrine without accepting it as true. Here, then, is a refutation, if refutation be needed, of the naïve psychologizing which would have us believe that the effect of temperament upon philosophy lies in the predetermination of irrational beliefs. It is, on the contrary, precisely our author's temperament which leads him almost passionately to declare what his reason coolly apprehends: "We cannot suppose, and there is no reason to suppose, that by the constitution of the mind we are obliged to think of things differently from the manner in which they are."

One of the chief functions of temperament in philosophy, perhaps, is to predetermine selection and synthesis in a field of apparently disconnected truths. It is difficult to believe that rational factors alone have been responsible for this author's synthetic, rather than eclectic, allegiance to Locke, Spinoza, and Aristotle, which is placed on record in the introductory "Confessions." To the influence of Locke he attributes his conviction that "we must go to our senses, not our souls, if ever we are to enter the realm of mind." But if Locke may serve to fortify a temperamental realism, Locke no less may lead us to Spinoza. "The principle of realism, carried out, seems to me to lead repeatedly to at least the implication of structure. . . . And that is why I have joined Spinoza to Locke in my affection. Few philosophers have had the sense of order as supremely as Spinoza had it." In the preoccupation with order and structure many of the essays in this volume find their inspiration. From Aristotle Woodbridge claims to have learned, among other things, to appreciate the philosophical importance of language, and to have derived his convictions that truth "is not a matter of things but of proposition" and that "knowledge is a matter of *saying* what things are."

One might be tempted here to trace temperamental affinities between these essays and the doctrines of contemporary exponents of linguistic

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philosophy; but of course there are differences. In moods of irritation we may be inclined to accuse some linguistic philosophers of a rather puritanical belief that there can be only one criterion by which a way of saying things may properly be judged. But in these essays liberal concessions are made to the principle that the manner in which things are said must be determined not only by technical considerations but also by reference to the all-too-human needs of communication. It is hard to believe that something has been rightly said when no one comprehends what is meant. We live in a strange world, and it may be necessary at times to talk philosophical nonsense in order to be understood. So often philosophical slogans help us not so much to see what their authors mean than to sense the direction in which they have set their course.

A not too remotely connected point concerning the way that things are said arises in the essay on "Experience and Dialectic." The question is posed: "Why should we comment on great philosophers, and tell the world what they have thought, when they have already told the world themselves?" It would be much too simple to suggest that we merely elucidate. The truth, in part, is that through philosophical commentaries doctrine may undergo a sort of temperamental differentiation in expression; but Woodbridge develops this idea in an epistemological rather than in a purely psychological way. His answer amusingly suggests that the original philosophical exposition is a kind of *ding an sich* which can only be apprehended through the "phenomena" of the commentators' views. This is a little perturbing. One begins to wonder how the history of philosophy would fare if the principles of a thoroughgoing phenomenism were applied to this particular case.

Perhaps the most significant of temperamental symptoms are to be seen in an attitude to philosophical "problems." Our author writes: "I have never been interested in the 'problems' of philosophy. . . . I cannot remember ever having been seriously worried about them. . . . The cry for a just God in a naughty world I have heard. But it all seems to me, speaking quite frankly, unfortunate and absurd, and sometimes abominable."

This surely is a variant of an attitude which pervades all the more radical, positivistic, empirical, realistic, and naturalistic schools. Such attitudes range from simple "healthy mindedness" to those that are apt to be characterized as downright flippancy or worse. They include that peculiar ambivalent tendency which finds expression in those who seem anxious to proclaim that philosophy is tremendously important but that its importance lies in the ruthless exposure of the nonsense that all philosophers talk.

In the divergent attitudes to "problems" something much more than matters of opinion are at stake. Those who utter the cry for a just God in a naughty world may be pained by the denial that such a God exists, but they suffer a more fundamental outrage when they are told that the question of His existence is not significant. Even an atheist may be shocked by the irreverence of the suggestion that to deny as to affirm that He exists is literally meaningless.

But no one will be shocked by any of these essays. Empiricist, positivist, realist—all these labels may apply, but the author is above all a connoisseur of doctrines whose sympathies and whose sensibilities are sufficiently catholic to find in almost any view that has been cherished something worthy of possession even though it cannot be embraced as a faith.

There are all too few philosophical essays that can be read for the pure pleasure of reading them as well as for intellectual profit, and in any anthology of such some of those here printed would certainly find a place.

C. A. MACE.

NEW BOOKS

The Concept of Morals. By W. T. STACE, Professor of Philosophy in Princeton University. (London: Macmillan & Co. 1937. Pp. x + 307. Price 8s. 6d. net.)

This admirably written book is an attempt to restate utilitarianism in a form which will be free from the defects with which it was still encumbered in John Stuart Mill. If the thing can be done Professor Stace is the man to do it, and there will be many who, like myself, after reading his book will close it with the words: "Almost thou persuadest me to be a Utilitarian." Leaving for a moment the "almost" and taking first the negative side of the argument, it is a criticism of the two extreme views which he calls respectively Ethical Relativism and Ethical Absolutism. But it is the former which draws his main fire, and is chiefly dealt with in the first two chapters. While it is true that "morality lies in the region of the empirical, the variable, the doubtful, the human," yet there is sufficient normality in the outlines of human nature to give us a valid criterion of right and wrong conduct as that which makes for the "satisfaction" of its fundamental needs, *alias* Happiness. The author thus begins where Mill leaves off in the recognition of different kinds of needs and according different qualities of happiness, and in what he calls a "scale of values, the conception of higher and lower satisfactions." True, it is vain to attempt to arrange these in any precise order, but this does not prevent us from saying that there are some which like friendship, family affections, social intercourse, etc., with the expansion of personality that they bring, stand very near the top, and that disinterested altruistic feeling stands higher still, either at the head or sharing that position with "the exalted religious satisfaction of the mystic." As, however, this last is incapable of rational justification, it drops thenceforth out of view until it is recalled by "Jim" in the charming dialogue of the Epilogue, coupled with the accusation of the "naturalism" implied in the whole theory. What emerges as the main doctrine of the book is first that moral goodness in all its forms has no intrinsic value but ranks as a means to something else, namely happiness, and secondly that these forms (courage, temperance, justice, wisdom, and the rest) are, one and all, included in the virtue of altruism. In the working-out of this thesis in the ten remaining chapters of the book Professor Stace shows himself worthy of the great empirical English tradition which he follows. Nothing is here stale or hackneyed, but everything is fresh minted. Without trying to follow it in detail I will return to my "almost," and attempt to put as shortly as possible the reason why I feel myself still dissatisfied.

My difficulty centres in the vagueness and ambiguity of the two words on which the whole theory rests, namely "happiness" and "altruism." (1) Professor Stace has freed the former from one source of confusion in rejecting the view that it consists in the accumulation of pleasures. But when we have got rid of that confusion the question remains how alternatively it is to be defined. It is this to which what may be called the higher Eudæmonism has sought from the beginning to discover the answer, and so soon as the question is put in this form and a serious attempt is made to answer it (and none here have been more serious than Plato's and Aristotle's), it is found that it consists essentially in a form, organization, or *structure* of life which has to be actualized in the world of time, though in the end it must always remain more or less an ideal. If this is what the author means, I am all with him; but it will involve a change in his view of the virtues as *means*. They will thenceforth take their place not as means to happiness, but as constituents of it, and utilitarianism, as an appropriate name for the

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theory, will disappear. (2) The attempt to reduce all virtue to altruism suffers from a like defect. That all morality is based on the power to transcend the narrow conception of that wherein selfhood consists, which is the mark of the selfish man, is by this time a commonplace of ethics. But to hold this is one thing, to proceed to obliterate the elements of structure in the life which is called good under the blanket-term of altruism is quite another. It is certainly true, as the writer says, that the ultimate rule of morals is that we should do our best in the situation that calls for action. But everything depends on the idea with which we approach the situation as to what constitutes the good life whether for ourselves or others, and the strength of devotion to it which Kant calls "the good will" and places above everything. It is because of the insufficient recognition of the place of this creative idea and the substitution for it of the vague conception of altruism that the utilitarianism here presented, with all its advance upon the old one, seems to me still to fail as the last word upon the subject. What is wanted as the foundation of a more adequate account of the "concept of morals" is a deeper analysis of the concept of value. If, as I believe, this carries with it the necessity of having recourse to something bordering on metaphysic, this ought not to frighten us when we remember William James's definition of metaphysics, as "only an unusually obstinate attempt to think clearly and consistently." We have only to add to this epigram as applied to our present subject that, in order to think clearly and consistently about morals, as about everything else, we have to think of it in relation to the Universe which has begotten it and with whose processes it must in some way be continuous. In this sense of the word our own age is essentially a metaphysical one. Even writers who, like Bergson, are as much out of sympathy as Professor Stace is with any form of ethical absolutism, have found the "closed morality" of social life inadequate to cover the facts or to make room for what the author himself acknowledges under the name of "the religious satisfaction of the mystic" as sharing with altruism the highest place in the scale of values. He is within his rights in passing all this over as to him veiled in a cloud of unknowing. But I think it a pity that he should do so. With the width of sympathy and clarity of vision he here shows himself to possess I am sure that his contribution to what is the chief desideratum of our time, a satisfactory metaphysic of ethics, would be of the greatest value. How far this would involve a revision of the scheme of this book is another matter. I believe that much that is of value in it would remain. It would only require to be set in a wider context.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

Christian Morals. By the VERY REVEREND M. C. D'ARCY, S.J., Master of Campion Hall, Oxford. (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1937. Pp. xi + 196. Price 5s.)

If "morals" means the truth about our duties, and the whole truth, there can only be one, not yet completed; and all qualified morals, such as Greek or medieval morals are but errors or partial truths. Father D'Arcy seems to think there is one and only one Christian morals, and that it is either identical with the one true morals or the nearest approach to it yet achieved. But I am not sure whether he thinks that it differs from other morals in its fundamental conception of duty, or merely that Christians have different beliefs from other people about the situation in which that conception has to be applied. The first interpretation is favoured by his repeated condemnation of other morals as sentimental (i.e. not rational), as humanistic (i.e. merely

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rational, not revealed?), as utilitarian (though he grants that Kant and most moderns are not utilitarian). But elsewhere he seems to base the superiority of Christian morals on a superior "knowledge," which he also calls "faith," of certain "proved facts" such as the reality of God and of human persons, the freedom of the will, which he does not further define, and human immortality. Some of these would be accepted by many philosophers who do not call themselves Christians, some would not, and some would not be accepted by all who do. Perhaps one who thought animals immortal might feel bound to treat them differently. But I cannot detect any changes in my beliefs about my duties to my neighbours when at different times I have thought them probably immortal and probably not; and I think the same might be true of all religious beliefs.

But Father D'Arcy holds certain views on social and political conduct which, though not all very widely held even by Christians, he thinks follow demonstrably from these Christian beliefs; though he sometimes seem to allow they would also follow from an enlightened consideration of the facts accessible to non-Christians. Among these views are: the absolute indissolubility of marriage; the unjustifiability in any circumstances of physical birth-control ("we can leave Nature to look after the question of population"); the iniquity of socialism (on the odd ground of the right of all men to property); the "disastrous consequences in housing, wages, and education"; of "the decline of the family"; the justifiability of some wars, and in particular of the Spanish rebellion. I think Father D'Arcy would attribute the views of those who differ from him on any of these points not merely to errors of fact, though these too he alleges (such as that they thought the Spanish Government was constitutional and likelier than any alternative to secure justice, liberty, and prosperity; or that they thought education, housing, and wages were improving), but rather to the "philosophical error" of generalizing our most obvious duties as those of justice and beneficence. I can see why he might call such a generalization humanist; I am not sure that he is entitled to deny that it is Christian. I cannot guess why he calls it sentimental.

But it is as hard to write, or to criticize, popular philosophy, as to go through the eye of a needle. When that philosophy is immediately applied to burning practical questions where all of us have, in no mercenary sense, vested interests, it is perhaps as hard for us as for camels.

E. F. CARRITT.

Psychology Down the Ages. By C. SPEARMAN, Ph.D., Hon. LL.D., F.R.S.
Two vols. (London: Macmillan & Co. 1937. Pp. Vol. I, xi + 454;
Vol. II, vi + 355. Price 30s. the 2 vols.)

This impressive work in two volumes by Professor Spearman is a most scholarly and accurate treatment of a very difficult theme—the establishing of an historical background to those doctrines in psychology which, in past times, have won common-sense approval, and which, in more recent times, have satisfied the rigorous tests of science. It is divided into five parts.

Part A—"What Psychology Is About" (four chapters)—traces the progress made since the time of Aristotle to formulate a science of mind. The record given of the rise and fall of doctrine is most interesting. Often scientific progress was made by "discovering" what had already long since been approved by common sense. The more the narrative proceeds, the more it becomes apparent that "the treacherousness of the quest for the simple has been evident throughout psychological history." Still the picture is not without its high-lights. For we learn that the fundamentals have been preserved, for

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"apart from all such passing waves, the general tide of psychology seems to have arrived at conceiving the principle of mind, the 'psyche,' as an individual who feels, knows, and acts; . . . disconcertingly similar to what it was originally supposed to be by common sense." Great changes, which conferred lasting benefits on the science, have, nevertheless, taken place. "A great reduction has been effected by handing over its most baffling problems to philosophy, and by making a less reckless appeal for aid to physiology." In addition, the science has increased in maturity and stability by perfecting more precise methods of procedure. To those of introspection and analogy, of former times, have been added the more modern methods of induction, experiment, and mathematics.

In Part B—"What the Psyche Can Do" (seven chapters)—Professor Spearman gives a stirring account of the battles waged on the fields of "Mental Faculty." Both sides come forth from the fray with many scars but few trophies. Certain it is that there has been precious little glory in victory won over straw men. On one side we see the oft-repeated attempts to construct psychology "along the oligarchic pattern of faculties." Thus intellect, intelligence, attention, sense, memory, and the orectic powers have been set up, now and again, as unitary principles to explain human activity. The reasoning by which the several oligarchic doctrines have been reached is shown to be fallacious and devoid of foundation in fact. Nor have the rival doctrines availed much. "The faculties disappear, and we arrive seemingly at anarchic chaos." And all this because men have been seeking for the constituents of mind by inadequate means. "The knowledge required for science must show how the psyche is really constituted; it must be descriptive; and such a quest can only be rendered successful by fine enough analysis together with full enough synthesis."

This more accurate analysis of the psyche into its constituent structures is carried on in Part C—"How the Psyche is Constituted" (fourteen chapters). Among those listed are: "Perceptual Relations and Supplementations. In sensory perception two things are to be noted: 'the one is the matter regarded, whereas the other is the way of regarding.' This distinction between the objective and subjective side of cognition, Professor Spearman maintains, is of the utmost importance, for upon it depends a correct solution of such problems as: Mental Acts and Objects, Vicarious Images, Perceptual Meaning, Mental Quantity, and Perceptual Grouping. The revival of interest in orexis and the role of volition and conation are treated at great length. Other constituents of the psyche are: "Complexes of Behaviour" and "The Unconscious Mind," in both of which much of practical importance has recently been discovered. The problem of "I and Self," always of philosophic interest, is given a new setting in the light of recent empirical findings. The question of "Mental Unity" loses much of the importance formerly attached to it, and becomes nothing more in fact than the "subjective manner of presenting an object to mind." This introduces us to the "Confusion that is Gestalt Psychology" where after a thorough examination of the claim that the "whole" is prior in time to its constituents the conclusion is reached that "the doctrine would appear to have little foundation." Because of failure rightly to appreciate the part played by subjective "wholes," the Gestaltists are represented in the rather awkward position in which "having derived their results from subjective 'wholes,' they erroneously apply them to the objective kind." It is the reviewer's opinion that the Gestaltists conclude their analysis at the point where the work of Professor Spearman begins, and that much of the confusion resulting from the doctrine of "wholes" would be lessened had Professor Spearman shown more explicitly how objective "wholes" are precisely those

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resulting from eduction, whereas the subjective are produced by processes not critically eductive.

Part D—"What Follows What" (seven chapters)—discusses the reign of law in the realm of mind. History shows "no good reason for the pessimism which would deny to the study of the psyche all possibility of being developed along the lines of genuinely scientific laws." Among the laws of mental sequence are some that have come down the ages, while many more are of recent origin. Due recognition is paid to the generous service rendered in every age by the classic law of association. Professor Spearman's scheme of mental laws is most imposing. In the first place we find the "Three Laws of Neogenesis" governing the quality of cognition. With characteristic modesty, he seeks to minimize the importance of this noteworthy contribution: "the real essence of the theory does not consist in discovering any brand new processes of knowing. The new aim has been, rather, to reduce all possible insightful processes to the operation of a small but complete set of them, which may be regarded as fundamental laws." There are, in addition, two general laws, "whose scientific status is more a promise than an accomplishment," and which govern orectic quality—laws of impulse and of will. The laws having sway over the quantity, both of cognition and orexis, are five in number: Output, Control, Retentivity, Fatigue, and Basal Conditions.

The study of Individual Differences is presented in detail in Part E—"What Goes With What" (six chapters). Interest in those qualities whereby men differ one from another is found in the psychology of every age. Embarrassed, however, by the vagaries of the faculty doctrine, this interest never developed scientific precision. It is only in most recent times that the subject has taken on a scientific character by reason of the extensive application of the method of correlation coefficients. And here we come upon the most fascinating chapter in *Psychology Down the Ages*—the determination of certain mental unities called "factors," derived by a statistical technique which will always be associated with the name and genius of Professor Spearman. This technique of "factors," first applied with success in the field of cognition, has more recently passed over into that of orexis. "The outstanding discovery recorded has been that, as the former sphere is dominated by the factor G, so is the latter one by H". With these two values known about an individual, a wonderfully long way has been travelled toward appraising his whole worth."

For philosophers this work has a distinct appeal. Here is a veritable storehouse of information on topics rich in philosophic implication. Moreover, the form and manner of treatment afford an object lesson in applied philosophy. Professor Spearman not only holds the view, but gives evidence thereof, that the mission of psychology cannot be carried on without close attachment to the categories of speculative thought, and that to eschew all metaphysical principles is to invite disaster. Professor Spearman has no uncertainty as to the course psychology should follow. *Psychology Down the Ages* indicates that it must follow the inexorable movement of history, i.e. it must stay wedded to common sense. Thus, as with all knowledge, psychology proceeds with great precision by definition and division.

F. DIEHL.

The Problem of Art. By CANON PETER GREEN. (London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1937. Pp. xvi + 218. Price 6s.)

If I had been ordained I should take this book as my text for a sermon on what a professional man can do with his leisure; for Canon Green, in spite

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of the multifarious and exhausting occupations of a pastor, has found time to add to his many writings on conduct and religion a theory of art whose qualities of clarity and freshness will recommend it to the plain man as well as to the scholar. Yet, had he enjoyed the free time of a research student, perhaps he would have read certain books that might have made him pause before committing himself to some of his views. I am thinking, of course, of the classics on art and the arts. There is, above all, the second part of Dessoir's *Asthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*; there is Schmarow on painting, sculpture, and relief; there are G. L. Raymond's five volumes on the fine and applied arts; there is William Archer's *Play-Making*, on the art of drama; Herbert Read's *Industrial Art*, on the minor arts, etc.

Several of his major definitions look dangerously vulnerable. Aesthetics, according to the author, is "the philosophy of art," and its objects are to find an answer to the question, "what is art?" and to study the relations between art and other human activities. But, we may legitimately ask, what about other features of aesthetic experience such as the reaction of the spectator to works of art, the creative process that brings them into being, and the enjoyment of the scenery and seasons of nature? If these facts are just as relevant to aesthetics as a material work of art, his definition of the subject is too narrow and should be expanded to cover nature and the subjective side of aesthetic experience as well as art. Though he is apparently unacquainted with their writings, Canon Green has fallen into the same error as many of the "Kunstwissenschaft" school in Germany, which has endeavoured to adapt Hegel's view of aesthetics as a theory of art to the requirements of modern thought. He rightly argues that the philosophy of art cannot be confused with the philosophy of beauty, because art includes many objects and happenings that are pathetic, tragic, comic, or even ugly, without being in the least degree beautiful. But he goes on to define beauty as "the quality in a thing which arouses in us aesthetic emotion." This contradicts the earlier and correct view that all art is by no means beautiful, and challenges the beauty of a sunset or a carnation because nature, according to the writer, cannot produce aesthetic emotion. These difficulties would have been avoided if the beautiful had been recognized as a special brand of aesthetic experience, like the comic, the tragic, or the sublime, that cuts across art and nature without monopolizing either.

Most valuable and suggestive by far is the definition of art as "a conscious and purposeful human action directed to an end, that end being the expression of emotion for the sake of emotion." The result was obtained, he claims, by piecing together stray bits from Croce, Veron, and Tolstoy. The valuable elements of this definition are the stress on purposeful expression of emotion and on the transmission or communication of this emotion to an audience. Its weakness is that it rates form as at most a sort of minor concomitant of a work of art; whereas in fact no artist, however powerful his emotions, can dispense with a rigorous form, though sometimes—in the design of a carpet or an embroidery—he may jettison emotion for the sake of it.

With one small point I will conclude my review of this interesting little book. I hope the admirable criticism of Croce on page 44 will enjoy a *succès de scandale* in academic circles; the author should be read if only because he has seen through the meaningless rigmarole of the Neapolitan quack.

LISTOWEL.

NEW BOOKS

Indian and Western Philosophy: A Study in Contrasts. By BETTY HEIMANN, Ph.D. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 156. Price 5s.)

Here are in eight chapters the printed product of a course of Forlong Fund lectures, given as a special course at the School of Oriental Studies, London, in 1936. Distributed under the usual philosophical heads, they conclude with a discussion on a convergence between Western and Eastern thought, which to the author is apparent, but apparent only. Her conclusion is, that "the divergent lines of East and West belong to wholly different planes, so that even if they sometimes appear to converge, still they will never meet."

Dr. Heimann's thought is brilliant and suggestive always. I might comment on what that thought has now given us, that once we take up the study of unlikeness, in bases or in evolution, we must, in order to be truthful, be much more discursive than it is possible to be in such brief sketches as these. Many are the points considered; many more will be those left aside. For instance, no inclusive lecture on Ethics (No. 4) can fitly omit notice of the mighty word "conscience," as worded in the East. More especially when ethics is here viewed, as viewed it must be, as the outcome of Immanence—of God (or as the Western gospels say "the kingdom of God") within you, as your very Self-in-the-More. We say, in this matter of unlikeness, a shepherd sees every sheep as different where we see all as looking alike. Yet, were we to discuss sheep-philosophy with him, we should be sure to hear much about the nature and the ways of "sheep," wherein is likeness rather than the reverse. Let us hope that the author will now consider, not the reverse but the likeness. We speak, we write philosophically to elicit what is true in man as we find him. And to do that we must not consider him merely as he is, for that is only what he seems to be. He is ever seeking a More, however wrongly he may now and then conceive his "More," and is thereby becoming More. And in him so seeking we may find a bond of likeness both in East and West, which is much more worth while discussing than the accidents of his many less basic or contingent unlikenesses.

India has been even more obviously a seeker from of old than we, and I cannot accept the author's dictum that "India has remained unchanged and uniform throughout all historic times," the belief in karma, rebirth, and liberation being cited as instances. We can trace the emergence of liberation from Vedas to an abstraction in Mid-Upanishads; we can note the up-coming of a theory of karma in those that are earliest; we can mark the quickening, the new sense of a near reality given to other lives than this span of one earth-life in the first Buddhists' expansion of the meaning of life as a dynamic becoming figured as wayfaring. Dr. Heimann has done justice to this ever-moving evolution in India's "Werden" in *maya* and other concepts. I appreciate her courageous attempt to present compressed an immense subject suggestively; I shall appreciate even more an attempt to vindicate a true human fellowship in man's fundamental quest in search of a More on his way to a Most.

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

De Veritate. By EDWARD LORD HERBERT OF CHERBURY. Translated with an Introduction by MEYRICK H. CARRÉ. (Bristol: J. W. Arrowsmith, Ltd., for the University of Bristol. 1937. Pp. 334. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

A translation of this famous treatise made from the last edition published in the author's lifetime was a piece of work well worth undertaking. Edward

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Lord Herbert of Cherbury is a sufficiently important figure in the history of English thought to deserve that Englishmen interested in philosophy should study him at first hand and not remember him only as the object of certain criticisms in the first book of Locke's *Essay*, and as the alleged father of "deism." For he was in fact a serious thinker, who was in his own time respectfully read by Descartes and saluted by Gassendi as the countryman of Bacon to whom that great man had handed on the torch of philosophy; while if by "deism" he meant (as is often the case) the doctrine of a Creator with whom his creatures can hold no personal communion, and who, having made a world, left it to run by itself, no doctrine could be less like Herbert's. To such a first-hand study a good English version, especially if accompanied by notes indicating the sources of quotations and explaining allusions, would be of great assistance; for neither the original Latin nor the contemporary French translation which Descartes found less difficult is easy reading. Mr. Carré has not, indeed, added notes of this kind; but he has prefixed an introduction which is interesting and informative (though one cannot read without surprise the remark that in the *earlier* period of the sixteenth century a certain spirit had prevailed in English theology "under the influence of such men as Colet, Tyndale, and Hooker"—who died, under fifty years of age, in the *last* year of the century in question!). The translation itself is, however, unfortunately less useful than it would have been had the translator not been too often, in passages where his help would have been most welcome, content to supply a rendering which neither makes sense in English nor accurately represents the Latin. It would have been far better on such occasions had he frankly indicated an often very excusable failure on his own part to grasp his author's meaning. Two or three instances of this fault in judgment may be given in justification of what has been said; the references given will be first to the pages of the 1645 edition, then to those of Mr. Carré's translation. *Animam nostram*, writes Herbert (pp. 71, 151), *non solum ad imaginem Divinam conditam et ejus quidem Ectypum fuisse, sed partem etiam aliquam sapientiae Divinae universalis in Notitiis Communibus impertitam fuisse, existimamus*. "I conceive," Mr. Carré translates, "that our mind is not only created in the image of God or in the copy of that image, but it has, in the Common Notions, some share in the Divine Universal Providence." Fidelity to the text should have forbidden here "or" for *et* (though if, as is possible, "in the copy" is a misprint for "is the copy," this would no doubt be immaterial) and "Providence" for *sapientiae*; and it will be obvious to a careful reader that this indifference to accuracy in detail has resulted in two real, if only slight, misrepresentations of Herbert's meaning. More serious is the rendering (pp. 186, 267) of *cum difformitas realis nostra ex parte clavi fossit, habemus etiam unde cruciemur in aeternum, cum sine resipiscencia vera iisdem semper haeserimus vestigiis* as "But there are also possibilities of endless torture, since real disharmony can arise from our side, and we should always follow the same path were it not for true penitence." Herbert's point here is that, whenever we continue in the same sinful course of conduct without true repentance, a real lack of conformity to the divine First Cause (in whose image we are created) may arise, which may result for us in the suffering of eternal torment. The passage is perfectly intelligible in its context, but what the translator offers as its rendering, if it makes any sense at all, suggests the direct opposite of what the author intends. Again (pp. 192, 273), Herbert, speaking of time and motion, observes that time cannot be explained by motion, because neither *eternity* at one extreme, nor *the instant* at the other (both of which, in his view, fall under the head of time) can be thus explained. *Licet interea tempus et motus inter se conformari possint, omnisso per se distinguuntur*;

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quod ex eo patet, quod non solum instans sed ipsam (we should, I take it, read *ipsa*) *etiam aeternitas illa quam nullus mortalium Primo Enti non tribuit, ex motu describi nequeat; uti enim non perlingit aeternitatem Motus, ita quidem in illo praeterit Instans.* Here Mr. Carré has actually reversed Herbert's statement. "Though time and movement," he says, "can be compared they are quite distinct. This is clear from the fact that not only an instant but eternity, which no one denies of the First Being, can be explained by movement. No movement is prolonged into eternity, and an instant is swallowed up in movement." One might have conjectured that "can" is here merely a misprint for "cannot," but if we read "cannot," the sentence becomes awkward to the point of unintelligibility. Had the translator understood his author he could easily have written "neither an instant nor eternity . . . can be explained by movement."

Once more. On pp. 224, 305, we read: "If we abandon these principles . . . and if we give way to wicked blasphemies, terrible crimes, and finally to impenitence, to which we are sacramentally bound." If any reader, unable to attach any meaning to the last clause, refers to the Latin, he will find the following: *Hisce interea si exciderimus . . . et blasphemiiis impiis, sceleribus horrendis, et denique impenitentia nosmetipsos sacramento quo tenemur, exolverimus.* That is: "If we have abandoned these principles . . . and, by wicked blasphemies, horrible crimes, and in the end by impenitence for these sins have released ourselves from (i.e. have behaved as though we were released from) the oath of allegiance (i.e. to our Creator whereby (as His creatures) we are bound" (the words in brackets I have added to elucidate the meaning, but without them the version I have given does, I venture to think, make sense).

These examples will make it abundantly clear that Mr. Carré's translation is not always to be trusted. In the present case—where the object of the translator is presumably rather to assist the student of a work whose historical interest is greater than its intrinsic importance, whether philosophical or literary, than to make a classic "speak English"—it would probably have been better, as a rule, to err in the direction of over-literality than of over-freedom; but such renderings as "romances" for *historiae admirandae* (pp. 96, 176), "detection of truth" for *veritatum notitia et delectus* (pp. 12, 88) certainly fail, in different ways, to reproduce with precision the sense of the original, without in any way improving the readableness of the translation.

The treatise *De Veritate* itself is a work on which its author set great store. Its publication, decided upon by Herbert after consultation with Grotius and Tillenius, and in obedience to a sign from heaven, was in his view a momentous, even a revolutionary event in the history of philosophy. The greater part of it is occupied by what we should now call an epistemological discussion, designed to establish the necessity to all knowledge of *Notitiae Communes*, present in the mind prior to individual experience; a discussion which, as Mr. Carré points out, anticipates the Common Sense doctrine of Reid, and which entitles Herbert (who was Hobbes's senior by five years) to be regarded as the first of that long succession, extending from him, through the Cambridge Platonists, to the idealists of the second half of the nineteenth century, of English critics of the empiricism which, although generally regarded abroad as characteristic of our national way of thinking, in fact constitutes only one side of our contribution to philosophical speculation. This portion of Herbert's book culminates in the sections devoted to the exposition of a new list of categories (called *Zetetica*) for which extravagant claims are made by its inventor as being wholly original, but which, according to Mr. Carré, is "taken over with little modification from the tables of Lullus

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and Ramus," and certainly resembles these too nearly to deserve to be so regarded.

The chapters on the Common Notions concerned with Religion and Revelation, which follow and intervene between those relating to the *Zetetica* and three concluding sections, dealing respectively with Probability, Possibility, and Falsity, have attracted more attention than any other part of the treatise; and Mr. Carré is right in regarding Herbert's theology as having a claim to be considered epoch-making which cannot be conceded to his theory of knowledge. That theology is, as has been already observed, very far from what is generally understood by "deism." It is a positive doctrine of divine revelation, which is still well worthy of sympathetic study, even by those to whom a knowledge of the religious development of humanity in the past is available far more extensive than anyone possessed when Herbert wrote. Herbert was, indeed, himself a pioneer—as the writer of his book *De Religione Gentilium*—in the comparative study of religions which has, since his day, so remarkably affected the outlook of those who are interested in the philosophy of religion.

If Mr. Carré would devote himself to utilizing the fruits of the study which he has already bestowed on Herbert's chief work in the preparation of an edition of it, constructed with a more concentrated endeavour to wrestle with the difficulties of the author's exposition than is evident in the translation now before us, and enriched by a thorough investigation of its historical background and antecedents, he would be conferring on his fellow-scholars a very real and considerable benefit.

CLEMENT C. J. WEBB.

Art and Truth. By J. W. R. PURSER. (Glasgow: Jackson, Son & Co. 1937. Pp. vii + 239. Price 7s. 6d.)

In the space appropriate to a reviewer it is hard for him to give due weight to the merits, however considerable, of a work whose general method and assumptions he condemns. He is bound to be dogmatic, which may be one of the faults he is finding.

Mr. Purser himself seems to distinguish two methods, a "philosophical" (or Socratic) in which we discover, and test, by instances, say, of beauty or morality, the universal principle exemplified in them, and another which he calls "logical." In the first of these, if I understand the distinction, he is eminently successful. On the relation of art to scientific, historical, moral, and philosophical truth, on the importance of subject, and similar topics, perhaps no better guide could be offered to the unphilosophical art critic who wants to co-ordinate and understand his intuitive judgments. And it is a good guide, not only because the conclusions are usually acceptable even when they are original, but because opposite views are sympathetically stated and given their full weight. But the "logical" element in the book must be to such an uncritical reader extremely misleading, and to one of philosophical training appalling in its dogmatism and looseness of language.

It seemed a good idea, in such a book, to escape all questions of interpretation by avoiding any names of philosophers until the last chapter. But the price paid is hieratic assurance. "*Modern aesthetics*" do not explain . . . the difference between 'expressing' one's feelings and uttering them" is hardly fair to Croce. "That we can ever know anything about . . . things as they exist in themselves has long ago been exploded in *philosophy*" is hardly fair

¹ My italics throughout.

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to any philosophers except Hume (once casually mentioned), not even to Kant and Hegel, the only two mentioned with approval, or to the author himself. The queerness of this last quotation is partly explained when we discover that by "things as they exist in themselves" is meant not, as usual, things as they really are but things not related to other things. The general argument seems to be that relations are created (not apprehended) by thinking and that since nothing but the whole can be unrelated, all things must be created by thinking. To "*bring a thing into relation with another*" is "to identify the two to a certain extent." So the law of contradiction is self-contradictory, and only the whole or unrelated is real, and that is thinking, about which, then, we should apparently know nothing. Yet apparently we do know that it creates or has created "things," with which it then stands in relations. In Mr. Purser's words, "Stars and stones . . . in their existence have to be continually maintained by thought (the universal thought), and thought does itself an injustice by descending to this office, for in fact their existence is a false kind of existence." Here arises a serious ambiguity in the use of the phrase "the mind," which sometimes means the minds of men (e.g. "they appear to *the mind* to be so") and sometimes something else (e.g. "an objectivity independent of individual minds is the fundamental characteristic which *the mind* gives to material things").

It is a confusing characteristic of such philosophical style that common words are used with an uncommon meaning but still also in their ordinary sense. This occurs with the word "form" which is sometimes opposed as "symbol" to "content" or meaning, sometimes as whole or unity to elements or parts; with the word "universal" sometimes opposed to individual, sometimes identified with it, sometimes identified with wholeness, sometimes opposed to physical; with the word "morality" sometimes meaning right conduct, sometimes good conduct, and sometimes conduct. Perhaps the fairest way of exemplifying the criticism I am making would be the selection of some usages of the word "truth," which seems sometimes to mean what the word generally does mean, but at others reality, knowledge (i.e. certainty), goodness, wholeness, infinity, universality, individuality. From such a selection readers must judge whether they can understand and accept these usages:—

Philosophical truth consists not in the agreement of our thought with reality but in the agreement of reality with our thought or *ideals*. It is reality which is true. *The mind* is the one truth (pp. 19–20).

Beauty is philosophically true, so far as in it brute fact has taken upon itself the *values* of mind (p. 23).

Imagination is a species of knowing (p. 40).

The calmness, serenity, permanence, and profundity of truth (p. 75).

Everything that exists aims at being the one absolute fact, it is nearer to the truth in proportion to its success. If truth was a fact among other facts, those other facts would give the lie to it by existing outside it (p. 107).

Art is truer than morality because it does not distinguish the subject from the object (pp. 118, 123), and truer than science because it does not distinguish appearance from reality, but accepts nature at its face value (p. 122).

Intemperance and cowardice are moral falsehoods (p. 100).

Truth is a whole and *an* all, not the sum of existent things (*half-falsehoods* exist) but in the sense that there is no truth outside it. What is outside truth is nothing (pp. 184–5).

To know nature in its truth we must preserve only the best side of things (p. 192).

The world of sense is both the adequate embodiment of truth, and yet, considered in itself without reference to *the* truth, an utter falsehood (p. 194).

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Sensuous appearance is a falsehood, but science *makes it into a truth* by opposing *its* laws to it as a *superior truth*.

Truth as it existed before created things assumed their present shape, and as it exists now in all created things, cannot contain sensation in it as an actuality or even as a mental vision, but only as a thought (p. 214).

The existence of partial categories as fact will be an existence of falsehood. They have no real right to exist as facts (p. 228).

The truth of falsehood is simply universal being (p. 229).

With such a view or views of truth, the "truth of art" will naturally be protean. "It is *obvious* that beauty exists *only in the mind*," it does not "exist as a fact when *nobody* is looking at it," yet it is "independent of *individual minds*"; and art may be "beautiful, though we personally do not find it so, because the *artist's* mind has objectified itself" in it.

Those who regard such language at all as I do may wonder how it can be related to the sensible and acute discriminations which I mentioned earlier. I have wondered myself why the aesthetics of such schools of idealism (Hegel himself, Croce for instance, and Bosanquet) are so much more fruitful, or, to speak rudely, so much less patently inept than their ethics. May the answer be that the "mind-dependency" or subjectivity which idealism attributes to all things, and which seems so obviously inapplicable to obligation, is in fact the nature of beauty?

E. F. CARRITT.

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Review "Order and Life," Vol. XIII. No. 49.
January, 1938.

ERRATA.

- Page 93, para. 2, l. 6, for 'organisation' read 'organism.'
- Page 94, para. 2, l. 8, for 'effect' read 'effects.'
- Page 95, para. 2, l. 11, for 'way on' read 'wagon.'
- Page 96, para. 2, l. 10, for 'amounted' read 'amounts.'
- Page 97, para. 2, ll. 1, 2, after 'interest' insert 'of the' and delete these words in l. 2.
- Page 98, l. 1, delete 'to speak of.'

CORRESPONDENCE

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

DEAR SIR,

I have occupied so much space of your magazine recently that I wish to make my reply to Mr. Mossner's criticism of my article on Hume's *Dialogues* as brief as possible.

Terms like "ingenious," "unfortunate," "widely accepted" are in my opinion merely blunders in elementary logic. "Making the wicked pious" is, I think, something which Mr. Mossner does with considerable effect himself in his *Bishop Butler and the Age of Reason*. Questions about originality are no doubt a matter of opinion and interpretation. I pass over his own identification of Butler and Cleanthes with the remark that it makes Hume's request for help "to bolster up" the argument of Cleanthes somewhat strange and not exactly complimentary to Butler. The reference to a letter from Hume to Henry Home containing an admission to being an infidel is, so far as I can learn, erroneous and should be to a letter to Oswald of Dunnikier (No. 58 in Greig); the comment I make on the passage is that in view of Hume's experience on several occasions prior to this of being called deist, atheist, sceptic, the phrase "from the character of an infidel" does not necessarily imply an admission of being an infidel; and in a later letter to Blair (No. 188 in Greig) he objects to being called an infidel. Mr. Mossner's assertion that scepticism *did seize* Hume is, so far as I can make out, once more an interpretation of Hume's remarks and not *prima facie* original evidence.

The main objection raised by Mr. Mossner turns on the supposedly *unhistorical basis* of my argument. I refuse to allow the historical basis to be limited according to Mr. Mossner's requirements—to the Anglican Church or, as he seems to do, to what he calls the representative, sometimes most distinguished, Anglican theologians. Such limitations raise questions which I am not prepared to discuss here. I emphasize as an essential element of the historical basis the outcome of the controversy in the eighteenth century to which writers called Deists, concerned also with Natural Religion, contributed. As Mr. Mossner has dealt with this issue in his *Bishop Butler and the Age of Reason* which I have read with pleasure and profit, may I use it and give some quotations to illustrate his view of the historical situation? In doing so I am following a method adopted also by Mr. Mossner in dealing with my argument.

(a) Speaking of Pope (p. 72) he says "*The Universal Prayer* . . . is not distinctly a Christian prayer. It is rather a prayer of Natural Religion." Thus Mr. Mossner admits a distinction not merely between Christianity and Deism but between Christianity and Natural Religion. (b) He refers to "the rising heresy of Unitarianism and rationalism in general" (p. 62). The statement that rationalism is heretical is Mr. Mossner's. Deism which was rationalistic and was concerned with Natural Religion was recognized to be unorthodox and caused alarm at Oxford and in orthodox circles (p. 70). "Infallible reason proved in the event a Nessus shirt poisoning the theology that wore it" (p. 125). Rationalism is here admitted to have been dangerous to theology. (c) "So in repudiating the certainty guaranteed by an infallible and universal reason, the apologist arrived jointly at philosophical scepticism and theological faith" (p. 126). Philosophical scepticism therefore did not necessarily lead to the discarding of faith; and Mr. Mossner admits that there were persons who held this position. He quotes Law to the effect that "the infidelity which is now openly declared for pretends to support itself upon the sufficiency, excellency and absolute perfection of reason or Natural Religion" (p. 120). That Law is not representative of the Anglican Church is irrelevant to my argument. (d) "Orthodoxy, now driven to its last defences, clung desperately to probability and the external evidences" (p. 145). On the other hand, the apologists were driving the Deists into

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open scepticism and in doing so "were doing the inevitable" (p. 151). "The fall of reason meant the fall of Natural Religion and this was true for both parties" (p. 151). "The court of reason was no longer held sovereign; its cases were remanded to the realm of faith or to the realm of fact" (p. 152). "Not that the apologists forfeited all claim to a Natural Religion, but in the course of time they discreetly and quietly let the subject sink into abeyance" (p. 151).

Thus rationalism in religion ended in a somewhat strange result, and according to Mr. Mossner the idea of a Natural Religion was gradually dropped. Why, I should like to ask him, was it dropped if my contention, objected to by him, is wrong? Also, does he maintain that the discarding of Natural Religion meant the rejection of religion? And does he contend that the basis of such religion had to be found wholly anew on the failure of rationalism and was not already existent while rationalism was being tried out? Had all this result come about by the middle of the century when Deism, according to Mr. Mossner, had run its course? If so, Hume's *Dialogues*, published in 1779, in no way contributed to this result. The conclusion I emphasize is that his cavil at my historical basis has no justification in view of his own evidence, and that reference to it tells neither against my interpretation nor for his own. I add that he does not seem to have studied my argument very closely, for the historical basis is not the foundation of my argument; the statement he quotes is not even a loose brick in the building, but at the worst only a bit of loose plaster sticking to the structure.

Yours sincerely,

B. M. LAING.

SHEFFIELD,

March 10, 1938.

(This correspondence is now closed.—ED.)

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

SIR,

Professor Muirhead's article, "Where is Philosophy Going?" in the October issue of *Philosophy*, needs reiterating. This season those of us who attended the Institute Lectures at University Hall and University College have had a good dose of analytical philosophy, and I for one (a very common reader of philosophy, to use Professor Stebbing's phrase) have found it very unsatisfying.

If indeed philosophy is just an intellectual pastime on a level with chess or some parlour game with no relevance to the understanding and living of life, I am persuaded that the interest in it of the majority of common readers will evaporate. "Distress of mind is the great awakener of mind," writes Professor Macneile Dixon in his delightful Gifford Lectures, "The Human Situation." How true that is. It is intensified men and women who have endured some pain or grief or who have seen anew, freshly and imaginatively, the enigma of existence, who seek for a philosophy of life. And it is just here that the analysts wound by suggesting that such incentives to philosophy are both misleading and shameful.

There is in some men's minds an obstinate conviction that the business of philosophy is to make, not only science, but life intelligible. If philosophy holds off from this effort and spends itself in small analysis issuing in scepticism, men like myself will cease to look to it for help and guidance and try to live our lives without it. Those of us who have been knocked about by life find such philosophy both irrelevant and trivial.

Yours faithfully,

P. D. ELLIS.

35 SPITAL SQUARE,
LONDON, E.1.

February 1938.

THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

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INSTITUTE NOTES

DURING the past term Mr. I. Gallie, M.A. (of Wadham College, Oxford), has delivered an interesting course of lectures on "The Nature of Mental Process."

The Addresses at the Evening Meetings have been as follows: "The Rational and Empirical Elements in Physics," by Professor Herbert Dingle; "Philosophy and the Common Reader," by Professor L. S. Stebbing; "The Philosophy of Mysticism," by the Very Rev. W. R. Inge, K.C.V.O., F.B.A.

WRIGHT MEMORIAL LECTURE.

The Wright Memorial Lecture will be delivered by Dr. W. G. S. Adams, Warden of All Souls College, Oxford, on Tuesday, June 28th, at 5.45 p.m., at University College, Gower Street, London, W.C.1. The title of the lecture is "The Philosophical Study of Politics."

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FORM OF BEQUEST

I bequeath to THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY the sum of free of duty, to be applied to the purposes of that Institute, and I declare that the receipt of the Honorary Secretary or other proper officer for the time being of that Institute, shall be sufficient discharge for the same.

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THE JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

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THE CONCEPTS OF POLITICS

J. D. MABBOTT, M.A., B.LITT.

A RECENT letter to the Press counselled caution on the return of the German colonies on the grounds that Germany was a notoriously ungrateful nation. A few years after we presented Heligoland to her, the Kruger telegram showed her ready to encourage our enemies. Why should we now make her further gifts which would merely render more effective similar treachery? Clearly behaviour like this by an individual would warrant such an attitude. If I give a man a present on Monday and on Tuesday he stabs me in the back, I shall look with suspicion on his suggestion that I should make him further gifts next week. Yet the easy use of the word "Germany" here conceals a host of problems. Was the government which negotiated the return of Heligoland responsible for the Kruger telegram, or did the Kaiser send it on his own initiative? Was the German people "behind" the government or the Kaiser when the telegram was sent? Does the present government of Germany necessarily resemble the pre-war government? Is the German people to be held responsible for what its present government does? Only if all these questions are answered in one way is the prediction plausible or the condemnation justified. The moral is that until statements about "Germany" are rewritten so as to become statements about the German Government or the German people, accusations of ingratitude and bad faith have no intelligible or verifiable meaning. This in turn should make us wonder whether "Germany" is the name of an entity which has characteristics of its own at all. Another letter to the Press some time ago began: "General diabetic opinion demands . . ." Is "General diabetic opinion" the name of a moral agent who, like General Franco, can make demands,

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be angry when they are thwarted, and grateful when they are granted? Clearly not. Yet if there is no reality in these corporate units, how are we to explain loyalty and the sentiment of national honour?

It is clear that some analysis of our social terms is necessary before we can be sure we are not being misled by false analogies. This analysis is the special contribution philosophy can make to the study of politics. It is for historians to determine the year in which Heligoland was ceded and the circumstances in which the Kruger telegram was dispatched. But when the facts are established alternative methods of stating them are possible and the philosopher can consider these methods, elicit their implications, and thus indirectly shed light on the justice of moral approval or condemnation which the facts evoke.

There is, of course, one system of politics which takes literally the unity and personality of the corporate body. Hegelian principle and totalitarian practice are unequivocal here. The State, its will, and its good, are paramount over the individual, his will, and his good. The individual is the abstraction, the unreality. He is but an instrument or an organ of the purposes of the State. Other groups, such as Churches, Universities, and Trade Unions, are also subservient parts of the national whole. I do not intend to attack this theory directly. Instead I wish to criticize some of its critics in order that the terms we use may be more clearly understood. The terms I wish particularly to examine are "Society" and "common good."

It is said by some of those who attack Hegel and his followers that he is right in requiring that all moral effort and all organized corporations should serve "the common good," but that his view of the common good is too narrow when he limits this service to service of the state; or, again, that the mistake was to attribute to the state characteristics which really belong to "Society." It is Society which demands our devotion. Church and University are not parts (still less servants) of the state, but they are parts of Society, and their function is her service. What is this entity, "Society," whose good we should all promote and whose instruments are those associations which the totalitarian state wrongly tries to control? I find three main answers to this question. None of them is clearly expressed or continuously maintained by its upholders, for complete clarity and consistency would, I think, dispose of "Society" in these senses altogether.

The first line of attack on Hegel is laid open when it is observed that I have duties towards members of another state. I should pay my German bookseller; I should tell the truth to a Frenchman whom I meet in Austria. If these duties are to be connected with a "common good" or these men are to be thought of as sharing with me a social

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life, then "Society," that unit of which we are all three members, must be wider than the nation. It must include all those men with whom I am actually related. Theories of this type differ in their answer to the question whether the relationship need be conscious or not. Maciver, whose views we shall consider further below, tends to imply that they are conscious, when he speaks of "all *willed* relationships."¹ Graham Wallas includes unconscious relationships. He would include as members of the "Great Society" those whose actions affect me economically—men, for instance, whose wage-rate alters my baker's bill, even though I have never heard of them.² There are, however, men with whom I am in no actual relationship and yet towards whom I may have duties—men yet unborn, for instance—and to include all those to whom under any possible circumstances I might have a duty we cannot stop short of the whole human race. All men, then, would together constitute that "Great Society" to which I really owe allegiance and whose good I ought to promote. This on the whole is the view of T. H. Green, which we shall also consider later in more detail. But all human beings do not together constitute a society. Their similarity does not in any literal sense unite them. If similarity could do so, then all red-haired men would be a society and all rheumatics another. This leads to the third solution. The whole of humanity is not a society, but it ought to be. Then when I pay my German or enlighten my Frenchman I treat them as members of that ideal society which would be realized if all men served one common good and were determined in their actions by these principles of truth and fair-dealing. This, I think, is the view of Mr. Joseph.³ Green also approximates to it occasionally, though he thinks the ideal is already partially achieved.⁴ In order to bring out the difficulties in all these answers I shall consider in detail the accounts of "Society" given by Maciver, Cole, and Green.

Maciver begins his book, *Community*, with an attack on the inaccuracy of our sociological terminology. He proposes to distinguish three terms—society, community, and association—and to attach to each a special and accurate meaning. "Society I intend to use in a universal or generic sense to include every *willed* relationship of man to man; community, state, and association as special kinds or aspects of social fact."⁵ This ought to mean that "society" is a general term, the name given to any group of men who stand in a *willed* relationship to each other, and that communities, states and associations are all societies of different kinds, so that there will be as many societies in the world as there are communities *plus*

¹ *Community*, p. 22.

² *The Great Society*, ch. i.

³ *Some Problems in Ethics*, ch. ix, especially pp. 118, 119.

⁴ *Prolegomena to Ethics*, §§ 259, 280. ⁵ *Community*, p. 22.

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states *plus* associations. In the same way "colour" is a generic term whose species are red, blue, etc., or "automobile" with its species private car, lorry, omnibus, etc. But Maciver's further use of the term "Society" issues partly in an awkward extension of the meaning, and, more seriously, in a logical confusion. For as his definition shows, he must regard me and my German bookseller as constituting one society, and me and my Frenchman another. This, however, is so obviously a misuse of language as to confuse rather than to clarify social theory. What is more fatal is that Maciver often writes and sometimes thinks as if "Society" were a *singular* and not a *general* term, as if there were only one entity whose name was "Society," but many states, associations, etc. There are traces of this confusion even in his definition, quoted above, where he says that society "includes" associations or that they are "aspects" of it. Colour does not include blue nor is blue an aspect of colour. Maciver is here slipping over from the relation between genus and species which is harmless to that between whole and part which is fatal. The confusion is, in fact, a very plausible and subtle instance of the Fallacy of Composition. The danger is clearest in such phrases as "Society is nothing more than individuals associated and organized,"¹ or "Certain religious doctrines undermine the security of society,"² or "the interests of the individual are the interests of society."³ It is an excellent danger signal of this fallacy when society is spelled with a capital letter. "To be the servant of Society" looks quite right, while "a club and a church are both Societies" is clearly wrong.⁴ I have already insisted that there is no such entity as "Society" and, therefore, the singular term is illegitimate.

Maciver would defend the use of "society" as a general term on the ground that two of its species, communities and associations, are very different from each other and yet have enough in common to justify the general term "society" for any instance of either kind. To anticipate my conclusions, I do not consider a community to be any more a genuine unit than is "Society" itself. I find only one so-called species, the association, and I therefore have no need at all for "Society" even in its harmless generic sense. All societies are associations and "association" is a much safer name for them. If I am right, our practice of describing the doctor, the teacher, or the priest as "servants of Society," or "servants of the community," is one we can continue to follow only at our own peril—the peril of being led to imagine that "Society" and "the Community" are names of real entities as "doctor," "teacher," and "priest" are. These

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 69.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 40.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 90.

⁴ Cf. Cole, *An Introduction to Social Theory*, ch. ii, where "Society" is spelled throughout with a capital and "community" with a small letter. Yet Cole intends both to be general terms, with many instances in each case.

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public benefactors serve *men* and men only; and for the most part they serve them *as individuals*, and not as the members of any social unit whatever. When there is a social unit, it is an association, a school, church or university.

According to Maciver, the essential difference between a community and an association is that an association is organized and a community is not. A community is defined as "an *area* of common life, village, or town, or district, or country, or even wider area."¹ The common life "must have some characteristics of its own such that the frontiers of the area have some meaning."² (It is to be observed how even with "community" Maciver tends to beg his own questions.) "The common life" is regarded as a single subject which "has characteristics." Whereas what is meant is clearly that inhabitants of the area must have common characteristics so as to be distinguished from inhabitants of neighbouring areas. "The common life" does not speak a language, marry monogamously, inherit property in the male line, etc., and there are even traces of the still worse tendency to speak of "community," as of "Society," as if it were a singular term. "The state is an association within community,"³ or "community is 'the world the spirit has made for itself'"⁴ illustrate the confusion and the title of the book itself lends colour to it. It would be less misleading if the title were "The Community" or "Communities." A book on roses would not be called "Rose."⁵

Taking "community" as a general term, then, let us consider what Maciver says a community is. In the first place the insistence on "area" and "frontier" seems a mistake. Would Maciver deny that the Jews form a community? And his own instance immediately following his definition is equally unfortunate. The English residents in a foreign capital are a community, but he surely need not mean that 'they must live in an "English quarter."' This, however, raises the crucial problem, If "community" is not the name of a geographical area, what is the unit and what confers on it its unity? Similarity is not enough, otherwise all red-haired men would be a community and all rheumatics another. It is, of course, true that when we say "There is an English community in Florence" we mean more than "A number of Englishmen are domiciled in Florence." They must be aware of each other's existence and take some pleasure in each other's company because of their common nationality. (Even these minimal conditions do not seem to be fulfilled in another of Maciver's examples. He says that Western Europe is a community,⁶

¹ *Community*, p. 22.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 39.

³ There are obviously equally difficult and interesting theological problems about the meanings of "The Church."

⁴ *Loc. cit.*

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 37.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 38.

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but here the "common life" is obviously no more than mere similarity.)

To say that wherever certain phenomena occur we must postulate a special type of unit, we must find statements about the unit which are not immediately and obviously analysable into statements about the members. Maciver recognizes this and gives a list of epithets which belong to "communities," namely, "nomadic, barbarous, civilized, populous, warlike, or again caste-ridden, feudalized, industrialized."¹ We must recall, however, that the essential difference between a community and an association is that the latter is organized, the former not. But then "feudalized" and "caste-ridden" which describes organization must be characters of associations, not of communities. All the others, with one significant exception, are epithets which directly describe the inhabitants, and for their use no special social unit is necessary. The exception is "populous" and it proves the rule. It is true that an inhabitant could not be populous by himself, while he may be barbaric or nomadic. But if "populous" means numerous, then red-haired men would be a more populous community than rheumatic men; if it means having a high proportion of inhabitants to the area, then England north of a line from Trent to Severn could surely be more populous than England south of that line without either being constituted a community thereby. When we talk of the Jewish community (or the English community in Florence) we are merely attempting to say briefly that Jews resemble each other, find pleasure in each other's company, and tend to assist each other because of their similarity (or that the Englishmen in Florence have these characteristics). But these phenomena may result from any similarity. Tailors (and diabetics) are similar to each other in many ways and men naturally take an interest in and get on easily with those with whom they have much in common. But if we are to say that wherever such a group of facts is found we have a social unit of a special type, we shall be multiplying entities without necessity and finding ourselves compelled to include the diabetic community and the tailoring fraternity among them.

In his *Introduction to Social Theory* Mr. Cole devotes two chapters to an analysis of terms. He agrees with Maciver in his use of community, but he says that "every community may be regarded as giving rise to an organized *Society*."² A Society is "the complex of organized associations and institutions within the community."³ It is surely clear that the justification of treating "a Society" so defined as a unit is entirely dependent on the interpretation of the word "complex." Let us allow for the moment that England is

¹ *Op. cit.* (Third Edition), Appendix A, p. 422.

² P. 25.

³ P. 29.

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"a community." Then the Miners' Federation, monogamy, the M.C.C., hire-purchase and the Poultry Fanciers' Association are items in "the complex of associations and institutions" which is to be found in England. But in what sense do they together constitute a single unit? If Cole had said "aggregate" instead of "complex" the fallacy would be avoided, but the term "Society" would be abolished. It is also to be observed with what dangerous ease he passes from the view that a Society is made up of organized units to the suggestion that it is itself an organized unit. "Society is a complex of organized associations,"¹ then gives place to "Society is the sum total of organized social structure,"² and that seems in turn to justify "A *community* gives rise to an organized *Society*."³ No doubt the state is itself "organized," but Cole would be the first to deny that the state includes churches, universities, etc.⁴, and there is no other organized unit which does include them. I would therefore maintain that there is no defence in Cole for the use of this term "Society" as one of the types of unit with which sociology has to deal. I find neither in him nor in Maciver any necessity for the term at all. All its uses in all philosophers and political theorists seem to me dangerously misleading. I think the adjective "social" is harmless as describing relationships of all sorts between man and man. But its derivative "society" should be banished in the interests of clear thinking. Friendship and indebtedness are social relationships, but neither do friends nor do debtor and creditor compose societies.

Cole, as I said above, accepts Maciver's use of community. But he is more sensible than Maciver of the considerations I urged which would require the rejection of community as a social unit also. He sees that if we look at a community objectively—from the outside, as it were—it is hard to believe it is a unit at all. All we can discover is a number of men similar in customs and traditions, and able and ready to help one another because they are of a common race or talk the same language or worship the same idols. But Cole's remedy is not to give up "community" as a social unit, but to say it is a "subjective social unit." It is "a group felt by its members to be a real and operative unity."⁵ "The reality of it *consists in* the consciousness of it among its members."⁶ Now this is a very interesting additional point. It is not enough that Englishmen should be conscious that other Englishmen speak the same language, believe in monogamous marriage, dislike state-interference, etc. They must also believe in England—believe that there is a unity, believe that it is operative—and then, since in the end sociology is dealing with psychological facts, the belief will create the fact (as Tinker Bell is

¹ P. 29.

² P. 30.

³ P. 25.

⁴ See his article "Loyalties" (*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1925–26).

⁵ P. 28.

⁶ P. 26. My italics.

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kept alive in *Peter Pan* by the beliefs of the children in the audience). Now any full answer to this would lead us very deep into the metaphysics of thought and its object. The most I can do is to indicate by a parallel the error I think Cole is defending, and to show how the facts he could cite in its support may be otherwise explained. The error, then, of a sociologist who imports a "subjective social unit" seems to me like the error a theologian would make if he included the Devil as a theological reality with the proviso that he was a "subjective theological reality." Individual persons have believed in a Devil, yet the theologian may maintain that their evidence was poetry misinterpreted as history and that the belief itself involves great difficulties. Therefore the Devil is no reality at all. So I agree that individual persons have believed that their own races or "communities" were realities, but I think I can show the logical and psychological errors in which this belief originated and also the further errors to which it in turn would give rise. (Some of these will be mentioned below.) If men "feel their community as a real and operative unity," they are just wrong as an animistic savage is just wrong. Whenever they think it acts or suffers, the act or suffering is really that of individuals; whatever they believe about it is either a false belief about it or a disguised true belief about individuals. No doubt their belief that their race is a unit will make their actions different from what they would be without the belief, and it is just this difference which tempts the observer to believe that they constitute a unit of a new kind. But believers in a Devil or in a Banshee will also behave differently from non-believers, and yet their beliefs may be false.

I maintain then that neither in Maciver nor in Cole can we find any justification for the treatment of "society" or of "communities" as units. There is one type of social unit only, and that is the organized association. "Association" will then serve as our generic term with church, state, university, club, etc., as its species. It is clear that "society" would be the more natural name, but "association" avoids its misleading implications. For our temptations to say "We are all members of Society," or "we have duties to Society," or "We uphold the security of Society," would be removed if we substituted in these sentences the word "association" for the word "society." The accusation levelled against Hegel that he attributed to the State characteristics which really belong to Society must now be more accurately rewritten. He attributed to man's relation to the State certain rights and duties which hold between men as men and have no basis in any association, and also that the State was the only or at least the highest association, and he attributed to it both a supremacy over other associations and also the maintenance of institutions which they can more effectively maintain.

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These conclusions are confirmed by an examination of the work of T. H. Green. He shows continually the struggles of a liberal individualist trying to avoid the conclusions of Hegel. He attempts to avert Hegelianism while preserving its central principle, by conceiving of a loyalty which is wider than the political loyalty because it is owed to a society larger than the State. He regards moral progress as "the extension of the range of persons for whom the common good is conceived as common."¹ The Athenian did not recognize the rights of the foreigner, the Roman did not allow rights to the slave. Only with Christianity was the widening process complete. "The idea has been formed of the possible inclusion of all men in a society of equals and much has been done towards its realization."² Yet Green can speak in the same paragraph of "a duty of man to man as such and not merely as the member of a community." Here again is our confusion. If there are duties of man to man, the wider society, whether as an ideal or a reality, is unnecessary.³ We may even find in Green the reasons why we may be tempted to speak of these social duties as if they were dependent on our recognition of our membership of some great society. "The language in which we most naturally express our conception of the duty of all men to all men indicates the school—that of tribal or civil or family obligation—in which we have been trained to the conception. We convey it in the concrete by speaking of a human family, of a fraternity of all men, of the common fatherhood of God, or we suppose a universal Christian citizenship, as wide as the Humanity for which Christ died, and in thought we transfer to this under certain analogical adaptations, those claims of one citizen upon another which have actually been enforced in societies united under a single sovereignty."⁴ Now when we consider the changes by which the conception of city loyalty gave way to that of national loyalty in Greece, or those which accompanied the recognition of the rights of slaves, we find they were changes in the actual social units, the associations. The Greek cities lost their autonomy; slaves became citizens. The state actually enlarged its membership in both cases. If we now ask what is the ideal which Christianity requires as the associative expression of its recognition of the duties of all men to all men, we find once more that Green will not follow the logic of his own thought to its proper conclusion. For that movement should lead to the notion of a world state actually enforcing those wider

¹ *Prolegomena to Ethics*, § 206.

² *Ibid.*, § 280.

³ H. D. Lewis, in *Mind*, N.S. vol. xlv, pp. 440 ff., exposes the same confusions in the assertion "rights are derived from society." I am in complete agreement with his argument, and his treatment of "rights" is, I think, parallel to my treatment above of duties, which was written before I saw his articles.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, § 206.

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duties by its single sovereignty, a state in which all men would be citizens and all nations should have lost their sovereignty as the slave-owner and the city state lost theirs.¹ What Green actually says, however, is this: "For those citizens of Christendom on whom the idea of Christendom has taken hold such a society does actually exist. For them—according to their conscientious conviction, if not according to their practice—mankind is a society of which the members owe reciprocal services to each other, simply as man to man. And the ideal of this social unity has been so far realized that the modern state, unlike the ancient, secures equality before the law to all persons living within the territory over which its jurisdiction extends and in theory at least treats aliens as no less possessed of rights."² We see here that Green envisages an alternative system and one in which a world state is not needed in order to express in actual institutions the duties of man to man. It would suffice if each state upheld within its own frontiers the rights and duties of men as men. This, however, is oddly described as "including all men in a society." It would be theoretically possible, for instance, for two states each to uphold these rights and duties and for the citizens of one to have no dealings with those of the other nor even to know of their existence. In what sense could both be said to belong to one society or to serve one "common good"?

Once again, then, I conclude that the use of "society" as the name of all mankind is unnecessary and misleading, and I return to my previous conclusion that the only type of social unit which need be recognized is the organized association. All statements about other aggregates of men—the lynching mob, the Jewish people, the Eskimo community, the human race, the tailoring fraternity—are reducible without remainder to statements about individual human beings. It might be supposed that there would follow from this the corollary that "common good" has also a double usage. It would be used illegitimately of all these fallacious units—community, society, crowd, etc.—for in those cases "common good" would reduce without remainder to the particular goods of individual people. But one would expect it to be used legitimately of the organized association, since we admit that the association is a genuine social unit. If this were so the good of humanity or the good of the Jewish race would be reducible simply to the good of individual men or individual Jews, but the good of the State, the Church, or the University would be genuine single goods not so reducible. I shall therefore go on to consider the senses in which "common good" is used.

(i) When we say that a "common good" has been achieved by

¹ Similarly, does a belief in the ideal of the unity of the Christian Church require unity of organization or not?

² *Prolegomena to Ethics*, § 280.

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a number of persons, we may mean merely that each has achieved for himself a good similar to that achieved, also for himself, by each of the others. Here the use of "common" or "general" is similar to that in phrases like "a general distrust" or "the common cold." If twelve men working independently acquire each some knowledge or a disease or anything else, their achievement does not turn them into a community or a society, nor is their good one good unless we are to say that two similar pillar-boxes are one pillar-box. This usage then is completely misleading, and if taken literally wholly indefensible.

(ii) We may, however, speak of a man as promoting the common good when he recognizes something as good and confers it on others, for instance when a doctor cures his patients. Here again, however, there is no community nor society, nor is there one good. The good—relief from pain—is enjoyed by individuals and produced by an individual for individuals. This usage also, though much more frequent and apparently more defensible, is equally dangerous and misleading.

(iii) In certain cases men achieve their own private ends, as in (i), and also assist other individuals to achieve theirs, as in (ii), by means of an organization which is genuinely one, and genuinely common to them all in a sense which the good it achieves is not. When you employ the same secretary as I do the secretary is not multiplied thereby, but when you catch my cold the result is two colds instead of one. So the health of a city may be achieved partly by each citizen consulting his own doctor, partly by the efforts of the Medical Officer of Health. The result is as many instances of health as there are citizens, but the means—in part at least—are communal and the same for all citizens. When an organization is used the good achieved is usually both extended and limited. It is extended to all members of the organization, but it is also limited to them. If a rich man is impressed by the suffering of certain children from lack of air and sunlight he may present a park to the town. The good he will do is then no longer limited to the particular children whom he first saw but extends to all children in the town. It will also be achieved not only so long as he keeps in mind their welfare, but will continue while he sleeps and after he has forgotten. Yet it may also be limited, for he may see suffering children in the next town and have no longer any funds for their relief. Now the phrase "common good" is still literally inapplicable. The good is a number of healthy children. But there is at last some justification for the belief that it does apply. For the children benefit *as members* of a single unit (the town) and, though the goods themselves are still private and many, the machinery (the park) is single and common. Each child has his own health, but each has not his own park nor

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his own piece of park. Here, then, there are genuinely common factors and they make a difference to the incidence of the private goods.

(iv) In this last case the common machinery was an alternative method of achieving a private good which might have been achieved by private machinery. The rich man might have brought successive parties of children to his own park. In some cases, however, the machinery must be common if the ends are to be achieved at all. The ends secured by traffic control, credit regulation, or civil law are of this type. They cannot be achieved by private enterprise without organization. Yet even here "common good" is a misnomer. While what is common is essential to what is good, the machinery or organization (which is common) is not good and the safety and confidence (which are good) are not common.

(v) In all the previous cases the good achieved was the good of individual persons and the fact that one individual possessed the good made it intrinsically no more likely that any other individual would. In certain cases, however—for instance, those of infectious disease—the achievement of the good by one individual requires that it should be achieved for others. The good which sanitation achieves must be enjoyed by all the inhabitants of an area if it is to be securely possessed by anyone. Clearly "common good" has more justification in these cases. Some hint of the same meaning lurks in the words "common knowledge," which would normally suggest not only that several people each know the same fact but that communication and not private enterprise led most of them to that knowledge. Yet here again the knowledge or the health is still essentially each man's own health or knowledge. My escape from diphtheria is *my* good, even if in order to achieve it I have to see that others are free from diphtheria also.

(vi) So far there has been no real justification for the association of "common" with "good." The good has been in every case private, and all that was common was machinery or organization used as a means to these ends. Nor has there been any suggestion of a special claim of these individuals as members of the same association as myself. But there remain two usages of "common good" which are more plausible still. The first case is that of loyalty. It seems indubitable that when men co-operate with others to achieve ends through an association, each member of the association faces more interest in the good of his associates than he would in the case of mere fellow-men. A typical if trivial instance may be found in a tennis club. If I wish to play tennis I may play on a private or a municipal court. In these cases I shall feel no special interest in others who use the court nor any duties towards them except negative duties of non-interference. If, however, I join a club to achieve the

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same end, I may well find that the club seems to me more than a mere piece of machinery to enable me to play tennis. I find members taking a positive interest in each other, encouraging the weaker players, supporting the club team and being pleased when it wins. My present problem is to decide whether these indubitable psychological phenomena have any moral significance, whether I ever have a moral duty to promote the good of another person because he is a member of the same association as myself, a duty which I should have in a lesser degree, or not at all, to anyone who was not a member. Should "charity begin at home"?

I find it difficult to give a definite answer to this question. Argument seems inapposite and experience equivocal. If I attempt to observe my own decisions I find instances in which the claims of members of my own associations give rise to indubitable duties and others in which their claims have no weight or even a negative weight disturbing the true balance of obligations. If a member of my own college asks me for advice or information, I feel an obligation which would be weaker if he belonged to another college and non-existent if he were a "man in the street." If a fellow of my college is working on a subject in theology or literature and consults me on a philosophical point, I feel I owe him a degree of help which I should not owe to a Cambridge critic or an American theologian. Yet if I am asked to vote for a member of my own college in an academic or political election, I feel a moral obligation to discount such claims. Baffled by such contradictions, I may follow the Aristotelian precept and consult those of my friends for whose judgment I have most respect. I then find that men equally scrupulous and fair-minded give contradictory decisions. Some would try to convince me that fellow-members have an even stronger claim on me than I myself feel, overriding, for instance, my scruples about the case of voting. Others say that charity may begin at home only when it is able thus to be most effective, but that any other recognition of fellow-members is immoral. In the face of these difficulties I incline to believe that membership does give others a special claim on me, and I therefore have to discover some special feature about those cases in which the claim must be neglected. I think in most (if not in all) of these special cases there is a peculiar paramount duty of impartiality (like the duty of a judge *not* to be influenced by the fact that the prisoner is a fellow-Freemason). But I admit that I do not feel that the question whether corporate loyalty is a moral virtue has ever been adequately discussed, and it is obvious that this is a problem of the first importance at a time when conflicting loyalties create the most perplexing problems and when to some men loyalty seems the highest virtue and to others a mere savage superstition.

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In our analysis of "the common good," then, I think this is a new case not covered in the previous five senses. Yet even if it is admitted the good is still not itself common or corporate. It is the good of individuals which I promote, though now of these particular individuals in virtue of their membership. The difference here from the previous cases is that the existence of the association and my membership of it are the grounds which make the good of these individuals a claim on me.

(vii) The other category in which "common good" seems more defensible than elsewhere is one in which the good itself at last ceases to be private in its nature and is intrinsically social. There are cases in which the social relationships between individuals are not means or machinery for the production of private goods but are themselves the goods at which we aim. If five men co-operate to help a sixth, he will probably be helped more efficiently, but besides this private advantage to him there comes into being the state of willing co-operation which is intrinsically good. Friendship, mutual trust and confidence, mutual sympathy and understanding, these are not merely institutions useful to the individual in helping him to attain his private ends; they are ends in themselves. It is some recognition of this intrinsic value which is often lacking in attacks on the family, whether modern or Platonic. If you treat the family as an institution instrumental to the production of a good stock (as did Plato) or to the nurture and education of the children (as do some moderns), then you may be tempted to find in sterilization and selective eugenics or in a crèche and kindergarten system some better machinery to serve your ends. But unless you could replace in your new system the close-knit sympathy and understanding of which at its best the family is capable, you will lose something of intrinsic worth. Similarly a school or college is not merely a piece of machinery to enable A, B, and C to teach and X, Y, and Z to learn, but also a device for getting men from A to Z to learn together and live together; and the living together cannot be taught by governesses or correspondence courses, though grammar and geography can. It is a truth even if only half the truth that "education is socialization."

Here we seem to find the strongest case for a "common good." Yet even here we must insert our safeguards. There need in these cases be no society, community, or associations. Wherever A and B trust each other, C and D show mutual sympathy, E and F co-operate, there these goods are realized. So "common good" (if it means good of a community) and "social good" (if it means good of a society) are still phrases with no legitimate application. It may well be that an association, by providing a permanent organized basis for them, may heighten and diversify these good human

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relationships which we have just examined, yet even then the association is still only a means to the production of the good, though the good itself has what may fairly be called a "social" character.

My conclusion, then, is that "common good" is always and everywhere a misleading phrase suggesting a unity which is not only non-existent in fact but impossible in principle.

I shall conclude this paper with some illustrations of the dangers which may flow from the misconceptions, examined above, of "society" and the "common good." First we may consider the consequences of transferring either to "society" or to particular associations the characteristics Hegel attributed to the state. One of the most indefensible tendencies of totalitarianism is often thought to be its hostility to freedom in religion, in learning, and in art. But if there were a working World State or League of Nations, its control of religion or learning would be equally unjustified. To move in the opposite direction and confer autonomy on the particular associations would not remove injustice. Everyone knows the danger of trade union tyranny or organized professional tyranny over freedom of religious, political, or intellectual development. No doubt the Miners' Federation and the British Medical Association are useful organizations, but to follow the "Political Pluralists" and to confer on them those characters which Hegel gave the state would perpetuate and would not avoid his most dangerous errors.

It might be supposed from the critical tone of the whole preceding argument, that I am returning to the barren individualism of Mill and Spenser and rejecting the discoveries of social psychology concerning group and crowd mentality. But I should not deny that men behave differently in different social groupings and I might even admit that individual psychology is a will o' the wisp—that no one can tell how a man would behave apart from all social relationships. I admit the discoveries and the phenomena. All I question is their interpretation. It is men and not committees who behave. Crowd mentality is not the mentality of crowds but the mentality of men in crowds,¹ as regimental pride is the pride of men in regiments. I can still maintain that social life is natural and political organization desirable. I should also agree that organized associations have characteristics which their individual members have not. They have their own special modes of organization. They have also the character of legal personality. Their ownership of property, their powers of contract, their liability to suit, all these cannot be resolved into characteristics of their members. Yet the vital human qualities—will, desire, and moral responsibility—do not belong to them. Nor in any proper sense have they an interest or a good of their own.

¹ Cf. S. B. Ward in *Mind*, N.S. vol. xxxiii, on "The Crowd and the Herd."

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The practical corollaries of these views may be seen if we ask some simple questions. Is it possible for a country to be happy or healthy while all her citizens are diseased or sad? No, for happiness and health can belong only to individual men. Is it possible for a country to have large possessions while all her citizens are poverty-stricken? Yes, for ownership is a legal characteristic which a country may well possess. Could such a country be called prosperous or flourishing? Only ambiguously. Her budget may be balanced, her national debt small, her trade balance favourable, her note issue covered by gold, and her assets large, while every one of her citizens may be driven, perhaps by the confiscation or taxation needed to achieve this national position, to the edge of starvation. Yet economic prosperity is not the only kind of prosperity and, measured in any other terms, "a prosperous country with unprosperous citizens" is a self-contradiction. Is there no danger that men will not see the contradiction because they have been persuaded to endow their country with full personality and to accept sacrifices, which can only add to her wealth and her honour at the cost of damaging the lives of all her inhabitants, as if they were like sacrifices made for a brother or a friend? In the same way a savage may believe that trees and mountains are really persons and the belief may influence his conduct in ways disastrous to all concerned. He may refuse to cross a mountain when his child's life depends on it, or to cut down a tree which will fall on his home to-morrow, so that the spirits should not be offended. So, too, a demand for colonies or a claim to retain them may be made a matter of national prestige or national disgrace, and in the attempt to placate those restless and insatiate spirits, national honour and national pride, children's lives may be destroyed and homes broken up.

Some illustrations of the confusion to which we are all liable may be taken from the correspondence to which I referred at the beginning of this paper. In quoting these I hope it will be clear from the whole of the foregoing argument that I am interested neither to endorse nor to counter the purely historical facts implied in these opinions, but only to see how far they must be restated to be made intelligible and whether in this restatement the original force survives. One writer says that Germany feels the loss of the colonies as an insult because they were taken away from her on the ground that she does not know how to govern natives justly. Another writer repeats the insult and justifies it by evidence. Let us consider, without prejudice, whether the evidence is relevant or the grievance legitimate. The evidence is that a certain African tribe was decimated by the local German governor. The evidence, if true, supports the intended conclusion on the following conditions: (a) *either* that the Governor was acting under orders from the German Government *or* that his action was characteristic of all German colonial administra-

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tion. (b) That there is reason to suppose that the present German Government (or the Governors they would appoint) would be more likely than not to act in this way. Is the grievance legitimate? Why should Germans feel that condemnation of their pre-war colonial administration is an insult to them? Russians do not resent attacks on the penal system of pre-war Russia. The grievance is legitimate only if the colonies are now refused on the same grounds. Another writer in the same controversy dismisses the whole "incompetence" argument as specious. Germany really lost her colonies because she began a war of aggression, lost it, and had to be punished. It is not clear from the letter whether the writer regarded punishment as deterrent or retributive. Let us suppose that he thought it was deterrent. Under what conditions would his argument be valid? (a) That the German Government did begin the war in 1914; (b) that it was a war of German aggression. It is clear that these conditions are implied. But punishment, whether deterrent or retributive, must fall on the guilty party and so two further conditions are required: (c) that those who now suffer from the loss of the colonies were responsible for the war in 1914; (d) that other governments will be dissuaded from wars of aggression by the possibility that their successors or the descendants of their subjects will suffer. It seems to me just as clear that the writer was wholly innocent of any misgivings under these last two heads. I do not believe that the notion of punishment can be applied to nations at all. "Sanctions" may stop injustice at the time it is occurring and moral censure may follow on governmental bad faith or brutality, but the necessity for continued responsibility in punishment would make it inapplicable in any ordinary case. Here at least then someone has been misled by personifying a nation.

We are, in fact, in the international field living through an epidemic of "primitive animism." And as animism can be repelled in the end only by the union of a more spiritual religion and morality with a more developed chemistry and biology, so "national animism" still awaits the aid of a change of heart among the worshippers of these false gods assisted by a clearer science of association. We must, however, beware the opposite error. The enemies of primitive animism reacted into an almost equally crude atomistic materialism, treating trees and men as mere aggregates of inanimate particles. So in our hatred of a deified nation we may tend to react into primitive individualism, dissolving away national unity altogether and treating every association as a mere collection of individual men. The organism in biology is a unit; it is neither a cell nor a mere aggregate of cells, neither an atom nor a mere aggregate of atoms. So for sociology the sound view would be that an association has its own characteristic type of unity and is neither a person nor an aggregate of persons.

RESPONSIBILITY, FREEDOM AND DETERMINISM

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THERE may in general be said to be two ways in which progress may be made in the understanding and towards the solution of a problem. The one is that of the continual development of it in the form originally given to it, by confirming this and rejecting that point in the light of fresh evidence, by clarification of concepts, and by detecting and resolving ambiguities and inconsistencies. Here it is assumed that the standpoint from which the problem has been approached is relevant and adequate. The other is entered upon when an "impasse" has been reached which can only be avoided by the realization that the original question was asked in a way which was either partially or wholly false or misleading. This is the more radical way of partial or total reformulation of the problem to be solved.

In these few pages I want first to dwell on the traditional form which the twofold problem of Freedom and Determinism appears on the whole to have retained and on the difficulties to which it seems bound to lead; and then to submit a reconsideration, which has not, I think, been sufficiently emphasized, of the nature and scope of the problem at issue.

I wish, however, at the outset to make it clear that the central notion in which I am here interested is that of responsibility and that I shall examine those of freedom and determinism and their interrelation only in so far as the former is understood to secure and the latter to destroy responsibility. It will be well, therefore, to begin by saying something on the meaning of the two terms "freedom" and "determinism" which are themselves by no means free from ambiguity.

I

(a) I shall begin with "freedom," assuming for the moment that we know in general what we mean by "determinism." Broadly speaking "freedom" (or its equivalent "liberty") may be said to have been understood by ethical thinkers in three different senses. These three different meanings may be called respectively "capri-

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cious freedom," "neutral freedom," and "rational freedom";¹ or perhaps "freedom *from*," "freedom *to*," and "freedom *in*." Our first task is to discuss how far each of these meanings adequately represents that which we understand by freedom when we oppose it to a determining necessity which destroys it.

The first meaning need not detain us long. "Capricious freedom" is simply that "freedom" which a person is said to possess in virtue of which all his actions are sheerly undetermined. It is the "freedom" of chance. The use of inverted commas here is justified, for from the point of view of whether we have here a freedom in respect of which we can choose and are responsible, it may be said to be equivalent to no freedom at all or to strict necessity. Both in the case of strict necessity and in that of "capricious freedom" the self is determined in the sense that its "actions" (if indeed it has any meaning to speak here of "actions" at all) are not within its control. The only difference between the two cases is that in the former the self is determined by laws that are, or, it is believed, can be known, whereas in the latter it is determined by forces which are not, and, it is presumed in the very word "chance," cannot be. Indeed, strict necessity has even been felt to be less incompatible with the notion of responsibility than is that of capricious freedom. Hume in fact, who seems to have understood "liberty" only in this capricious sense, argues for the necessary determination of the will to safeguard morality. "Liberty," he says, "by removing necessity removes all causes, and is the very same thing as chance."² But in fact "whatever capricious or irregular actions we may perform, as the desire of showing our liberty is the sole motive of our actions, we can never free ourselves from the bonds of necessity."³ Accordingly "I . . . dare venture to affirm that the doctrine of necessity, according to my explication if it, is not only innocent, but even advantageous to religion and morality."⁴ Capricious freedom may be described as "freedom *from*"; but whether by that is understood a freedom from this or that particular determining cause, or from all determining causes whatever, it is not a freedom in respect of which we could be said to be capable of choosing. Bradley says of it that "you are free, because there is no reason which will account for your particular acts, because no one in the world, not even yourself, can possibly say what you will, or will not, do next." You are "accountable," in short, because you are a wholly "unaccountable" creature.⁵ This "freedom" has neither content nor "direction." It

¹ This convenient terminology is borrowed from an acute article by H. Sidgwick on *Freedom in Kant* (*Mind*, 1888, vol. xiii, No. 51, partially reprinted as Appendix to *Methods of Ethics*, 6th Ed.).

² *Treatise*, Bk. II, pt. 3, sect. 1, *ad fin.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, sect. 2.

⁵ *Ethical Studies*, p. 11.

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is clearly not what we mean when we are discussing whether or not freedom is real. Thus when Kant in one place says that "independence on the determining causes of the sensible world . . . is freedom,"¹ i.e. identifies freedom with "independence on" or "freedom from," he speaks inexactly and states less than his own view. This is, of course, and we shall refer to it later, that "although freedom is not a property of the will depending on physical laws, yet it is not for that reason lawless."²

I pass to the second and third of the above meanings of freedom, those of "neutral freedom" and "rational freedom." First "neutral freedom." We described this otherwise as freedom *to* do or act. It is neutral in the sense that it is a freedom to express oneself equally in either of two alternative and contrary "directions," e.g. to do either a right or a wrong action, to tell either a truth or a falsehood. The essence of freedom so understood is precisely the capacity, in Aristotelian phraseology, to render actual through choice either of two contrary potentialities.³ "Rational freedom," on the other hand, may be described as freedom *in*, i.e. in bringing about a result of some particular kind. It is the freedom involved in Kant's notion of autonomy. We are said to manifest it whenever and only when we act rationally and more in proportion as we do so. This, however, involves holding that whenever we fail to act rationally, as for instance when we deliberately do a wrong action or tell a falsehood, we are not acting freely. To this point we shall return later.

I wish now to consider which of these two remaining senses of the term "freedom" most accurately represents that freedom which is the condition of responsibility and with which we are here concerned. When we reflect on them we must, I think, admit that each of them contains a truth which is of great importance in Ethics. On the one hand, when we say of an action which we have done that we were "free" to do it or that we did it freely, or again, that we *chose* to do it, we do certainly mean that we were free to do it only because we were also free not to do it, or to do something else; and again, that we chose to do it only in the sense that we chose it in preference to and as against one or more other possible actions, any one of which we could equally well have chosen. In other words, to be free means to have a "field" *within which* to be free, and to choose means to have alternatives within that field *between which* we choose. On the other hand, it is also true that when we consider a certain action and ask whether it is a free action or ourselves free in doing it, many

¹ *Metaphysic of Morals*, sect. iii (Abbott's translation, p. 87).

² *Ibid.* (Abbott, p. 78).

³ See *Metaphysics* Θ, 2 and 5. Together with *Eth. Nic.* iii, 1-5, these two chapters are very important for an adequate estimation of Aristotle's account of freedom of will.

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people will feel it necessary to consider not merely whether we could do or have done any other action, but also what type of action it is that we have done; a mean or immoral action, for instance, will seem to many not to be so "free" as a generous or a noble one nor the agent as free in doing it. This feeling is reflected in ordinary speech in such commonplace expressions as "being the slave of" one's passions or "giving way" to jealousy, and the like. What, however, is not so clear here is whether it is really upon the question of freedom that the important element of truth undoubtedly contained by the second of these two views has the direct bearing that it is asserted to have. Clearly, the "freedom" which we are said to exhibit when we act rationally (or rightly) cannot be the "freedom" which we are said to exhibit in deciding, as we undoubtedly sometimes do, to act irrationally (or wrongly). Either there are two radically different types of freedom, or it is misleading or false to describe one or other of these characteristics as "freedom."

Let us examine this notion of "rational freedom" a little more closely. According to it, whenever we act rationally we are free and more in proportion as we do so. Or, to put it another way, we are free when our will is determined by our reason. This view appears in Kant in such a phrase as that "a free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the same."¹ But we must notice that it is not enough merely to say that rational freedom means that we are free when we act rationally; for it means more than that. It means that we are free *only* when we act rationally. It is this word "only" that deserves attention. For in restricting, as it does, to the one side, it seems to destroy what is the very nerve of freedom. To say that we are free *only* in doing actions of some one type is to say that we are in fact not free but fettered, at any rate in the sense of being free to choose and responsible for our choice. No doubt it will be objected that in the Kantian notion of autonomy this "restriction" to the one (i.e. the rational) side is imposed by the will itself and does not therefore destroy the will's freedom. In willing the rational or universal, it will be said, the will itself restricts its own sphere of activity; and such a self-imposed restriction, so far from being the negation of freedom, is on the contrary the very essence of freedom and the symbol of a free will. To this point we shall return later. Here we may answer that, while it is true that a rational action, as proceeding from a motive representing our "higher" self, may plausibly be termed a "better" or a "higher" or a "morally more valuable" action, there seems no reason why it should necessarily be a "freer" action than one resulting from a lower motive. To assert that it leads, as we pointed out above, to the view that we are only responsible for our rational (i.e. right) actions.

¹ *Met. of Morals*, sect. iii (Abbott, p. 79).

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The point I wish to emphasize here is this. We may if we like term this character of rationality "freedom." But if the notion of freedom is to stand, as it surely must, in any intelligible relation to those of choice and responsibility, then it is a mistake to think that "freedom" can ever mean anything but "freedom *to*." We must be held responsible, if at all, equally for rational and for irrational, for wrong as for right, actions; and this we can only be if we are equally free *to* do either. Again, we may say, if we like, that the person who consistently wills or chooses rational actions is more "free" than the person who consistently wills or chooses irrational or wrong actions and his actions more "free" than those of the other. But we must bear in mind, if we do so, that we are here introducing a second and totally different conception of freedom which is not that freedom required if we are to be held responsible for any and all of our actions.¹

I conclude, then, that of these three meanings of the term "freedom," that which accurately represents what we mean when we connect the term with the notions of choice and responsibility is that of "neutral freedom." If choice is not real, then responsibility cannot be real; and without the freedom *to* choose between this or that, choice cannot be real. We may thus define this freedom as "the power of choice between two (or more) possible courses."

(b) In the above discussion of freedom we assumed that we knew what we meant by determinism, and understood it to mean a theory in general which denies our power of choice and so our accountability for what comes to be through us. We must now be rather more precise. The term may be and has been understood in at least two main senses. It may mean what we may call "natural" determinism, that is to say, the view that the will is determined "externally" by "natural" forces, whether conceived as physical or as psychological, over which it has no control. This is perhaps the meaning normally assigned to the term when it is contrasted with freedom; but it is not the only possible meaning. The will may also be conceived as determined "internally" by laws of its own. We may distinguish the two cases in another way and say that in both the will is conceived as "determined" but that, whereas in the former case it only "is determined," in the latter it also "determines itself" and only "is determined" because it does so. Now the principles in terms of which the will can determine itself

¹ It may be noted, as Sidgwick points out in the article above mentioned, that it is the collision between these two conceptions of freedom, those of "neutral" and of "rational" freedom, which presents perhaps the greatest difficulty in Kant's doctrine of freedom. He is interested in establishing the reality of both conceptions, but his general principles will not, it seems, admit of it.

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could only be rational principles; so that it will not be inappropriate if we call this internal determination "rational" determination and contrast it with the "external" or "natural" determination.

In our discussion on freedom the point about which we wished to become clear was the sense in which the term is to be understood if it is to be connected with responsibility. So here the important question will be the relation between determinism and responsibility, and whether either of the above meanings of the term determinism is more or less compatible or incompatible than the other with the notions of choice and responsibility.

Let us first consider "natural" determinism. Here what we call our "actions" are occurrences which we are instrumental in producing in the sense that we are impelled by this or that sensation or desire conceived as an externally stimulated force which is said to determine the will. Indeed the question seems here to be not so much whether the will is determined as whether there is such a thing as will. Clearly, if "I" am thus regarded as passive in respect of these occurrences, which I fondly call my "actions," brought about through me, then "I" cannot be said to will or choose them. A "passive" will is something very like a contradiction in terms; yet on this view, if there is such a thing as a will, it could at the most be the passive spectator of a series of *faits accomplis*. Such a determinism must annihilate choice and so responsibility as finally and completely as could be desired.

But it is not clear that "rational" determinism is any less incompatible with choice of and responsibility for all our "actions." We have already anticipated this point in examining the notion of "rational freedom." Rational freedom is the freedom said to be exhibited in acting rationally and only in so doing; and the conclusion was suggested that this type of freedom cannot be that required if responsibility is to be real, since it restricts our choice to actions of one kind. The difficulty is not removed by the reply that this restriction itself results from the self-imposition of a law and that it is in this self-imposition that the essence of freedom lies. For no amount of this rational freedom said to be exhibited by the will in imposing a law on itself will account for that exhibited in choosing to disregard the law. The question relevant here is: is there in fact any distinction in this connection between "rational freedom" and "rational determinism"? The freedom of rationality is the freedom of obeying, or in obeying, a (moral) law imposed by the will upon itself. But now the imposition of a law or principle is nothing but a determination, and if the law or principle is imposed by the will on itself, then this is self-determination. I can see no difference in principle between rational freedom and rational self-determination; and Kant himself says that "a free will and a will

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subject to moral laws are one and the same."¹ But if we were right in holding that rational freedom is incompatible with responsibility and if further, rational self-determination is synonymous with it, then we must say that what we have called "rational determinism" does not admit of responsibility for all our actions, including our wrong actions.

I wish here not to be misunderstood. I am not putting forward the view that self-determination *as such* is incompatible with responsibility. In fact, in order to escape from "natural" determination, responsibility requires that self-determination in some sense should be real. Nor again do I wish to dispute the view that an action resulting from a rational motive is a morally more valuable action than one resulting from an irrational motive. What I am contending is: (1) that the freedom necessarily presupposed by responsibility is not necessarily connected with rationality, and (2) that I can no more be responsible for all my actions if I am capable of determining myself and my conduct in one way only than I am if I am free only in doing one type of action.

I conclude, then, that natural determinism and rational determinism are alike incompatible with that "freedom *to*" necessitated by responsibility, at first sight for different reasons, but ultimately for the same reason. The apparent difference arises from the fact that, whereas natural determinism removes all possibilities, rational determinism restricts to one. But ultimately, whether you say to a person "you are not free to do either X or Y," or whether you say to him "you are only free when you do X," you are in fact saying the same thing, namely, that in the sense of being free to choose a course for which he can then be held responsible, he is not free at all.

II

We can now pass to our proper subject of discussion. The central issue is, of course, between those who defend the reality of responsibility and of the freedom presupposed by it and those who hold a view which, whether they admit it or not, excludes the reality of either.

The first point perhaps to be noticed here is that the defenders of the reality of freedom have been in the great majority of cases ethical or religious thinkers and that the arguments which have been brought in its defence have been almost invariably based upon ethical considerations. Mr. Carritt, for instance, writes that "freedom of choice seems demanded by morality and only by morality."² Freedom, it has been held, must be a reality because

¹ *Met. of Morals*, sect. iii (Abbott, p. 79).

² *Theory of Morals*, p. xii.

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otherwise we cannot be held responsible for our conduct, and all moral terms and distinctions, such as those between good and bad, praise and blame, lose their meaning. The saint is then a born saint, and the gangster a born gangster, and to praise one and condemn the other is as meaningless as it would be to praise a rainbow and condemn an earthquake. But in fact we do use these terms, we do approve and condemn and people are educated and punished; and this cannot surely be completely without meaning. Again, if moral distinctions are meaningless, a theology founded upon them or in any way presupposing their validity also becomes meaningless. Further, all such notions as sin and unworthiness, confession, contrition, and conversion, and justification in the sight of God become equally meaningless; for in the sight of God none will then be good or bad, but all will be equal. And this again, it has been widely felt, would be intolerable.

Against the two assertions here implied: (1) that if freedom is an illusion, then moral distinctions are illusory and moral judgments invalid, and (2) that we do in fact make such judgments and employ such distinctions, the determinist would of course have nothing to say. He would readily, or could be made to, assent to both. But he would then go on to insist that moral distinctions and judgments, in so far as they mean to imply that things and persons could have been other than they are, *are* illusory. He would no doubt be inconsistent if he admitted the reality of moral distinctions while denying that of freedom of choice; but there is no inconsistency in rejecting both. This seems to be the position taken up by the two great modern exponents of determinism, Hobbes and Spinoza. The latter, for instance, holds that "men are deceived because they think themselves free, and the sole reason for their thinking so is that they are conscious of their own actions and ignorant of the causes by which those actions are determined. Their idea of liberty, therefore, is this—that they know no cause for their own actions; for as to saying that their actions depend upon their will, these are words to which no idea is attached."¹ Consistently with this view he insists further that terms such as good and bad, praise and blame must, if they are to represent anything in the nature of reality, be divorced from the "moral" meanings which have become attached to them and which are simply the outcome of false and unreal standards of comparison set up by us in our partial and blurred condition of knowledge.² Against such a position it is useless to object that the denial of freedom renders moral distinctions unmeaning.

This, I wish to suggest, is the "impasse" out of which there is no way so long as the problem at issue is treated exclusively as an ethical

¹ *Ethic*, Part II, prop. xxxv, Schol.

² See especially *Ethic*, Part I, Appendix; and Part IV, Preface.

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problem and defended by arguments drawn exclusively from the field of ethics. For the determinist can always reject the presuppositions upon which these are based. I do not deny that it would be in the field of ethics that a determinist account, if tenable, would score its most obvious successes. But I do deny that, if determinism is to be shown to be untenable, such an approach to it is adequate. The problem must be formulated in another way so as to admit of an attack from a different quarter from which escape is not so easy.

Let us now turn for a moment to the philosophy of Kant. In Kant's system and fundamental to it is the distinction between what he calls "theoretical reason" and "practical reason." The former is the source of the principles of knowledge, of what is or may be; the latter is the source of the principles of conduct, of what ought to be, whether it actually is the case anywhere or not. This distinction in itself has relevance here. For, as we have pointed out, the arguments adduced in defence of freedom are for the most part based upon "practical" considerations, while the determinist relies upon a purely "theoretical" and speculative view of the nature of the universe as a whole which he then applies to discredit a certain alleged phenomenon within it; and no doubt such an attempted application of purely theoretical principles to a practical issue would be sufficient to condemn in Kant's eyes any determinist theory as violating one of the central teachings of the Critical philosophy. But there is a further point of greater importance and stricter relevance here. Kant did not merely speak of a "theoretical" and a "practical" reason separate as well as distinct from each other and, as it were, side by side. He also taught that "practical" reason has a "primacy" over the "theoretical."¹ And it is upon this doctrine and its implications that I wish to dwell. For it leads to the thought, which it is the main purpose of this essay to emphasize: that it is a mistake to regard the "practical" as co-extensive with the "ethical," as has all too often been done, and that the "practical" sphere contains in reality far more than what are commonly called "actions."

It seems in fact that the problem of freedom must be approached at a deeper level and on a wider basis than is generally done. For clearly the activity of the will and of choice does not first arise in connection with what the ordinary man would describe as "actions." It is exceedingly difficult to know what constitutes such an "action"; that is to say, in one respect it is not perhaps difficult, for it is not hard to grasp, though it may not be easy to define, what it is that distinguishes an "action" from an "event." But it is extraordinarily difficult to be sure at what point the activity of the self, or if we like, of the will, passes over from being not yet "action" (as commonly

¹ See *Critique of Practical Reason*, Dialectic, chap. ii, sect. iii: "Of the Primacy of Pure Practical Reason in its union with the Speculative Reason."

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understood) into being such "action." It is in fact so difficult that we may say that it is impossible; and we may even go further and assert that, so long as we are concerned with the "activity" of the will at all, it is a meaningless undertaking. For the will is precisely that in us in respect of which we are "active," and to be active means presumably to act, and to act is nothing if not to do "actions." What however is commonly understood by an "action" is the taking of such steps by the self as will bring about a change, great or small, in that total set of circumstances which we call the not-self or the "external world." But these external visible and tangible results are themselves willed only derivatively. They are the external, material results of a decision to produce them, and it is this that is directly willed. My concrete stealing of a watch out of someone else's pocket, i.e. the actual material transferring of the watch to my own pocket, may be considered as an action or set of actions of mine, and as such willed by me. But it can only be so considered, and it occurred concretely at all only as a result of a decision of mine to steal it. It is of course true that I may will to steal a watch and yet in the end be physically unable to do so, or be forcibly prevented from doing so; and thus a decision may fail to be followed by what the ordinary man would call an "action." But it is no less true and a great deal more important that I cannot actually steal the watch without having first having willed to do so. In other words, there may be an "act of will" with no resulting "action"; but there can never be an "action" without an antecedent "act of will."

The point that emerges here is, I think, clear. When Kant says that "practical reason" has a primacy over "theoretical reason," he is not uttering some obscure and mystical riddle. He means that, so far from the "theoretical" and the "practical" being distinct and separate, theoretical activity itself, *quā* "activity," involves, as all genuine "activity" must do, a "practical" or active element. Indeed, it is little short of a tautology to say that theoretical activity involves activity. But that in us in respect of which we can be called active is nothing if not the will, and this activity of the will is nothing if not its freedom. Hence it is a great misrepresentation to speak as if the questions of the freedom of the will and of choice arose first in connection with what are commonly called "actions." They do not. They arise in connection with volitional activity as such, and this, as has been pointed out above, expresses itself in decisions and judgments before it issues in "actions." No decision or judgment can be made *in vacuo* and about nothing determinate. When we decide or judge, we accept one course of action or one proposition in favour of and as against another.

Let us now turn to consider the special bearing of this upon the case of the determinist. It is surely plain. The determinist holds a

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certain theory, speculative in nature, and based on certain metaphysical or scientific convictions about the nature of the world as a whole. Such a theory, just like every theory, consists of and can be expressed in a set of propositions or judgments. A theory, however, is not something which attaches itself accidentally to the holder of it. It is something in favour of which the holder of it, by maintaining it, actively pronounces as against other possible theories, on the ground that it approximates more nearly than they do to the truth about the world. To hold a theory is to decide in favour of its truth, to claim truth for it. And we are accountable no less for that theory for the truth of which we have decided than we are for that action for which we claim rightness.

It is not open to the determinist to reply here, as he was no doubt entitled to do in the case of the supporting arguments drawn from ethics, that his rejection of moral distinctions discredits this responsibility too. For it is not merely moral distinctions and moral responsibility that are at stake here. What the determinist has here to deny is responsibility *in general* and as such, which will include that incurred by him in his maintaining the determinist theory. And this denial will involve the further one, that it is possible to distinguish between what is true and what is false; for it is only because of a conviction that a certain theory is true that one decides in favour of it. The determinist is in fact here confronted with a dilemma. Either he does accept the responsibility for his theory, or he does not. If he does accept it, then his acceptance invalidates his theory. If on the other hand he does not accept it, then he is not entitled to prefer and put forward his own theory as claiming truth any more than any other, and should strictly keep silence. For then all theories, his own no less or more than any other, are mere mechanical processions of mental events, and as such all no doubt equally actual, but also all equally valuable and valueless.

This seems to be the point that should be stressed. If the determinist insists that arguments based upon moral responsibility and upon moral distinctions are all equally invalid for the purpose of establishing the reality of freedom, we may disagree with him, but we cannot accuse him of inconsistency. If however he goes further and asserts that responsibility in the wider sense of accountability for any decision made is an illusion, he becomes involved in contradiction. He fails to see that the problem of freedom does not possess an exclusive relevance for ethics. As arising first with the activity involved in all decision and judgment, it is an inevitable presupposition of theoretical activity also.

We here reach a point whose further development and discussion would take us too far into the realm of metaphysics and away from

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our present subject.¹ It remains now briefly to recapitulate the main points which I have been trying to emphasize and which, it seems to me, should be taken into consideration if we wish to avoid an undue and misleading narrowness in approaching this whole problem.

(1) The freedom which I have been discussing is the freedom which is the condition of choice and the presupposition of responsibility; and the only meaning which I can attribute to the term so understood is that of "freedom *to*." By determinism I understand any theory which, whether by the suppression of all possibilities or (as in the case of the "freedom" of rational determinism) by the suppression of all but one, renders this freedom impossible.

(2) It has too often been attempted to defend the reality of such freedom by arguments drawn exclusively from ethical considerations. Such attempts are bound to fail because determinism can, quite consistently, reject the assumptions upon which these arguments are based.

(3) The reality of this freedom and of responsibility must rather be defended against determinism by showing (*a*) that otherwise the determinist will have to maintain that responsibility as such is not real, and (*b*) that in maintaining the view that it is not real he refutes that view.

There are one or two final remarks which I may add. It is perhaps possible to anticipate at any rate some of the objections which may be raised against the position here outlined. It will be said (1) that though I may perhaps have made it clear that "freedom *in*" is not sufficient to secure responsibility, yet I have not established the reality of that "freedom *to*," which I evidently desire to do; (2) that in dissociating freedom from rationality I have in fact destroyed the possibility of self-determination altogether. I should like to add a few words by way of reply to these points. (1) To this I would say that it has not here been my purpose to develop a detailed and exhaustive argument in defence of the general thesis that "freedom" can strictly never mean anything but "freedom *to*." I have only been concerned to show (*a*) that it is "freedom *to*" which is essential to responsibility, and (*b*) to suggest what is to my mind a more adequate defence than that usually put forward of its reality as against determinism. (2) I have never denied, but rather admitted, that self-determination must in some sense be real if "natural determination" is to be avoided. Nor have I denied that the determining principles which produce right or good actions are, even must be, rational principles. What I have denied is that, if we are to be held responsible for our wrong as well as for our right actions, the freedom necessarily presupposed by such responsibility can be identified with or set in any necessary connection with rationality.

¹ See H. Rickert: *System der Philosophie*, Part I, chap. v, sect. 6.

WILL AND ACTION IN ETHICS (I)¹

PROFESSOR J. L. STOCKS

I

ETHICS or Moral Philosophy investigates the application of the terms good and bad. We constantly use these predicates, and Ethics is an inquiry into our use of them. But this pair of terms is used over a very wide field and no one inquiry could cover it all. A ship or a tea or a house may be called good; and the investigation of such judgments would require a knowledge of ships, teas, or houses. Moral philosophy does not pretend to cover the whole field or to investigate every use of the terms: it is concerned only with the moral use, or more explicitly with the use of the terms in reference to human conduct. And even this limitation may not be sufficient. Anything sought or desired by man may be said to be thought good in the moment in which it is sought or desired: we talk sometimes of a good stroke of business: we also speak of good actions, good characters, good men. All these three uses have reference to human conduct; but it may be doubted whether the meaning of good is not different in each use. But there is no doubt that the last is the use with which moral philosophy is chiefly concerned and from which the inquiry must start.

There are two obvious questions which may be asked concerning any predicates, and therefore concerning the predicates good and bad:

(1) What do the terms themselves mean?

(2) To what subjects are they properly applied? i.e. what is the proper subject of the predicate in question?

The first of these questions would naturally be interpreted as a request for a definition. But it is an obvious fact that not all terms are capable of definition. There must be a stopping place somewhere to the process of explaining one term by another. We must be brought in the end to simple unanalysable notions in regard to which the method of definition breaks down. Now philosophy is concerned with these ultimate notions, and therefore definition is of little use to it. We should not be surprised to find that "good," like "being," "beauty," or "truth," is a simple indefinable notion, not

¹ This essay, begun by the late Professor Stocks some time before his sudden death, was never finished. The fragment was apparently the beginning of a book on ethics.

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capable of derivation from any more comprehensive notion. It is often questioned whether the method of definition has any great value in other spheres, but in philosophy certainly it has very little. A definition of good (in any sense) is therefore not our aim.

But there are ways of deepening and "precising" our understanding of a term even though it is incapable of definition. We have, of course, to assume that the term is in use and is understood already. But on that assumption it is still possible and may be profitable to ask the second question mentioned above—what is its proper application? This question is not meant to imply that the customary application is wrong—or it would seem to contradict the above assumption. It is in fact necessary to assume that in the main it is right. If the upshot of the philosophical inquiry were to be expressed in such statements as: "This which you call good is bad," "That which you call bad is good," philosophy would simply be giving a rival answer to a question asked and answered well or ill in ordinary life in the course of ordinary practical reflection. But though practical men are by fits and starts philosophers in some degree, philosophy would have no claim to a special place in the world of mind unless it had a question of its own to which it desired an answer. In the sphere of ethics I say that the philosophical question is the one formulated above in the words: "What is the proper subject of the predicates good and bad?"

To ask such a question is necessarily to embark on a *criticism* though not (except incidentally and by accident) upon a *correction* of current applications of the terms. The terms of course are used erroneously. The same thing is called by one man good and by another bad, and each man thinks himself right and the other wrong: they do not think that both may be right. Hence there is actual error in regard to these terms. But even if all uses of the terms were correct and there were no such errors, the philosophic criticism of the terms would still be useful and available. It would take the common attributions as data from which to start, and would sift and test them in the sense that it would attempt to understand them better. It could not find terms simpler than good and bad for the predicates; but it could attempt to discover the general and essential nature of the subjects to which the predicates were applied. Every such attribution is particular (that action was a good one) or at most general (stealing is bad): it might seek for a universal and in finding it would arrive at a clear discrimination of the essential and the accidental in the things called good and bad. It is clear that the more adequate and consistent the customary attributions are the more chance is there that the philosophic question will find an answer, while on the other hand if the ordinary uses are utterly haphazard and confused, the search for an answer to the philosophic

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question is a search for a will-o'-the-wisp. In this sense moral philosophy presupposes the substantial rightness of the customary uses of the terms good and bad. But however right ordinary speech is, the philosophic question must humanly remain a separate question which requires a separate answer. Human intelligence does not find universals without taking the trouble to look for them, and it is only so far as the ordinary man, not conscious of being a philosopher, seeks and formulates some kind of universal by the way that he is a philosopher.

The discrimination of the essential and accidental and the effort to find a universal is usually regarded as a work of abstraction. Taken literally that implies that the universal is a part of the particular, a part common to all the particulars which fall under the one universal, and the universal can therefore be formed by removing in thought the other parts of the particular wholes. This gives a simple recipe for finding the universal. Take a number of particulars which are suspected to belong together: analyse their constituents and discover which are constant and which vary from particular to particular: the sum of those which are constant will be the universal, i.e. the universal is the h.c.f. of the particulars. This is highly misleading. Any part of a particular is particular and not universal. The universal is not in that sense in the particulars at all. If the question is asked whether the universal is inside or outside the particulars it is safer to answer outside than inside. For by particular is meant not the thing, but the thing as grasped by perceptual thought, and perceptual thought does not grasp the universal. This shows that it is wrong to think of a universal as a common element in all the many particulars. No part of a particular is universal: the universal is therefore not a part of the particular.

Yet the universal is to be found by abstraction and philosophy is generally described as abstract thought. It is abstract from the point of view of common sense and ordinary experience in which we are all at home: the epithet is earned by the fact that the effort of the philosopher is to remove himself from that point of view and in that experience his results have no currency. "Abstract" is a negative description of philosophy, implying that much is left behind when thought passes to what is not perceived or experienced. The word contains a suggestion of depreciation: the abstract is thin, cold unreal: what is, is concrete. But the philosopher is sure that his is the real world, and sometimes stigmatizes the world of perception as abstract and comparatively unreal. Which then is the real or concrete goodness—the goodness you experience in a friend or the universal which philosophy reveals? The question need not be answered. It is enough to see that philosophy in seeking the universal is seeking something which perception does not find and the per-

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ceived does not contain, and that nevertheless it finds its data in the world of perception and is somehow relevant to it.

Philosophy, then, seeks a better understanding of the terms good and bad, not by attempting to define those terms, but by seeking for the universal nature of that of which they are properly predicated. If its procedure is abstract, that word must be taken as only a provisional description, not as committing us to any view of the relative adequacy and inadequacy of philosophy and common sense or of the relative reality and unreality of their objects.

II

What is the proper subject of the predicate good? One and one only said the Stoics, and Kant following them—viz. the good will. The human will, when good, is not the best of many good things: it is the only good thing. The will is good or bad: all other things, without exception, fail to exhibit this distinction—are *ἀδιάφορα* ("indifferent").

"Good," says Zeno,¹ "are wisdom, temperance, justice, courage, and everything which is or partakes of virtue. Bad are un-wisdom, profligacy, injustice, cowardice, and everything which is or partakes of vice. Indifferent are life and death, repute and disrepute, pain and pleasure, riches and poverty, sickness and health, and the like."

That is, in the sense in which virtue is good and vice bad nothing else is either good or bad. Virtue must be considered an attribute of will, and all Greek philosophers regard wisdom (some with qualifications, some without) as an attribute of will and hence deserving the name virtue. The Greeks not having in their vocabulary a word precisely corresponding to our "will," use as a rule the notion of action instead. Zeno's doctrine confines the application of good and bad to action.

The opening paragraph of Kant's *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals* puts the matter rather differently. He makes distinctions which the Stoics did not make, but on the main point his view is the Stoic view:

"Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification except a good will."

He goes on to mention certain things which are called and are in a sense good, but are not good in this unqualified sense.

(1) "Talents of the mind" such as intelligence, wit, judgment

¹ Cf. Ritter and Preller, *Historia Philosophiae Graecae*, 516.

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(cf. "wisdom," above). "These gifts of nature," he says, "may also become extremely bad and mischievous if the will which is to make use of them, and which therefore constitutes what is called character, is not good."

(2) "Gifts of fortune" such as power, riches, honour, health, happiness. It is the same with these. They "inspire pride and often presumption if there is not a good will to correct the influence of these upon the mind, and with this also to rectify the whole principle of acting and adapt it to its end."

The goodness of which these two classes of things used by the will are capable is utility or usefulness, and in certain cases, when misused, they become useless or mischievous. What is unconditionally good cannot become bad.

"Thus," he says, "a good will appears to constitute the indispensable condition even of being worthy of happiness."

He goes on to a third class of conditional goods:

(3) Qualities serviceable to the good will itself, facilitating its action, yet having no intrinsic unconditional value. They are said *always to presuppose a good will*. The instances given are moderation in the affections and passions, self-control, and calm deliberation. These, he says, "are not only good in many respects, but even seem to constitute part of the intrinsic worth of the person." They are not, however, unconditionally good, "though they have been so unconditionally praised by the ancients. For without the principles of a good will, they may become extremely bad; and the coolness of a villain not only makes him far more dangerous, but also directly makes him more abominable in our eyes than he would have been without it."

This third class of conditional goods raises problems which we shall have to deal with later. Kant's words about "the ancients" show that he intends here to criticize the Greek identification of the moral good with virtue. A *prima facie* contradiction may be noticed in his statement. If these qualities always presuppose a good will, how can they be compatible with a bad will? If they really constitute even in part the intrinsic worth of the person, how can their presence in the bad man make him worse? We may also observe that Kant identifies will with character, and that virtue is commonly regarded as pertaining to character. It is difficult to think of character or action except as marked by whatever of temperance, moderation, calm judgment, and self-control a man may possess. It therefore seems paradoxical to say that will is good or bad unconditionally, while these qualities are not. To these problems we must return:

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they are only mentioned here to show the divergence of the two views, which are nevertheless at bottom one and the same.

Essentially the two views are the same, since both assert that the moral good differs not in degree but in kind from other so-called goods. These other things have no right to the name good at all, says the Stoic. Kant says they may have it if some condition or qualification is attached to the term good. That condition is the presence in the man who has or uses them of a good will. Both views deny that the moral good is the best of good things: each says instead that it is the only good. Both views find this good in good conduct, but while one describes the source or principle of such conduct as virtue the other finds it in will.

A thing which is conditionally good fails to be good whenever the condition in question is not satisfied. The same thing therefore may be at one time and under one set of circumstances good and at another time and in other circumstances bad, if the good and bad are conditional. (So Kant argues from the fact that certain good things are also bad that they are only conditionally good.) The unconditional good, on the other hand, is always good. It may be unprofitable to itself or to others, but it is always good. Now there are some philosophies which make moral good, goodness of character or conduct, a conditional good. Good character or conduct, for example, may be said to be that character or conduct which profits its owner or which brings him happiness—or which profits the community and brings it happiness. The conduct is valuable for a result which it brings. It is hard to show that good conduct always is profitable (in either sense) or that profitable conduct is always good—i.e. the current applications of good and bad to conduct do not lend themselves easily to this interpretation. And such a theory really deprives the moral good of all meaning. Good is said to mean useful, and the word useful refers us to that by which the thing is used and the purpose for which it is used. But a man cannot be said to use his will; for to use is to will. Therefore the good will cannot be useful to the agent. Anyhow the notion of profit or utility drives us away from conduct to something else for which conduct is profitable, and we should have to study that and determine its nature before we could discover what conduct is good and what bad.

Plato makes a triple classification of goods: (1) Things good in themselves, (2) things good for their results, (3) things good for both reasons; and hopes to show that "virtue" or "justice" falls in the third class. But when men try to prove that goodness has good results, they usually beg the question. They show not that the conduct which we recognize as good is always good in its results, but that being good it is by that alone proved useful (example, etc.). But the utility of goodness is one thing and goodness of utility

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another. Conduct is, in fact, neither good because it is useful nor useful because it is good. Goodness is one thing and utility another, and we must be content to have the two ideas separate. It is best to content yourself with the class of things good in themselves, and avoid special pleading to show that honesty is the best policy.

Anyhow, the view which we have adopted from Kant and the Stoics is the diametrical opposite of any view which attempts to derive goodness from utility. The will is good and it alone is good: it is good in itself, as a picture is beautiful in itself, and not because it lends itself to any purpose or end of its own or any other being's creation. We have now to consider what the good will is and what are the conditions of its realization.

III

In order to understand more clearly the meaning of the assertion that the will alone is good, let us consider some common applications of the word good. A *man* is good, a *character* is good, an *action* is good. But since a man's goodness and goodness of character is shown in action, let us take the last assertion for our starting-point. The assertion that an action is good depends upon a conjectural account of the psychology of the agent, i.e. as we usually say, of the motive of the act, and is reducible to the assertion that the will embodied in the act is good. One man saves another from death by drowning or by other men's violence. Such an act would be presumably called good. But if it were discovered in some way that the man saved was the debtor of his saviour, and that the saviour's only motive was the wish to recover a debt which he could not recover in the event of death, the epithet good would be withdrawn. If again it were discovered that the man saved was the enemy of his saviour and that the saviour had worse things than death in store for him, perhaps the epithet bad would be substituted for that of good. This shows that if action is taken to stand only for the more external side of the transaction—for what is roughly within the reach of observation—actions are neither good nor bad. In the sense in which it is the subject of these predicates action is an activity of the spirit. What is called the motive of the action is either an intrinsic part of the action in this sense or the action itself. It cannot be separated from it. Common language calls actions good and also says that the goodness of an action depends upon its motive: from these two statements we can only conclude that the motive is an element in action, when action is made the subject of moral approbation and disapprobation.

When we talk of the results of an action, on the other hand, we use (or may use) action in a far more external way. For the most

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part it is true that the results are the same whatever the spirit in which, or the motive with which, the act is done. When the bullet is once shot, the results are beyond the agent's control. The act is done, its results may be startling and unexpected: anyhow, the agent's intention in shooting will not affect them for good or evil. In this double use of the word action we have the seed of an ambiguity which has given birth to some fallacious arguments. The word must be used cautiously, always remembering that action sometimes includes and sometimes excludes motive: it includes motive when it is the subject of moral predicates and excludes it when considered in the light of its consequences and results.

The contention of those who say that the will and it alone is good and bad is that what is really meant when an action is called good is that an agent's will expressed in action is seen to be good. We have seen that the term "action" is not unambiguous, and that its precise relation to "motive" is obscure. What precisely motive is and how it can be discovered we shall have to discuss later: but if we put will instead of action, we shall get rid of all ambiguity for the moment. What, then, is will? All action is an expression of will, and all will expresses itself in action. The will is the man *qua* active or agent. To act or do is to make some alteration in an existing situation. In order to know what the agent's will was, what you have to know is (1) the situation before action, (2) the situation after action, (3) what the situation before action appeared to him to be. Given complete information on these three points (which is difficult if not impossible to get), you have complete data upon which to judge the moral value of the action, you know what the agent's will was.

It may be objected to the above statement that there is will not expressed in deed and that there is will faultily expressed in deed. Beside the agent's knowledge of existing fact and the actual changes effected by his agency, there is, the critic would say, his will—a third thing, not to be inferred from the other two. It may be that it is the will, conjecturally estimated, which is judged good and bad: but we cannot discover what that will was from what was effected or what was known by the agent, either or both together. A man may have the best will in the world to help and yet find no occasion for helping, and no opportunity for expressing that will in any way whatever. Or instead of helping he may, in the very attempt to help, hinder. So that the will may be either totally unexpressed in deed or totally misrepresented by the deed.

If this criticism were sound, we might ask how will is ever known at all, how we are ever able to pass a moral judgment at all. On any theory, however, it is pretty certain that we are very seldom justified fully by the evidence in our moral praise and blame. And the critic

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would reply that in the whole and in the long run the will generally fulfils itself in deed—so that if we wait a little, withholding judgment, we shall discover the truth. That reply gives little handle to criticism.

The true answer to the criticism is one which we can all verify in our own experience—viz. that no man knows what his own will is except from his own acts, and that in inferring his neighbour's will from his neighbour's acts he is doing precisely what he does in his own case. A man may have a conviction, which seems like certainty, that in a given situation he will act in a certain way and every "intention" of so acting, yet when the time comes he may act in precisely the opposite way. The will is not, as we sometimes fancy, made up in advance: it is up to date and no more, and re-adapts itself to each fresh element in the situation as it appears. It is only so far as the situation is (or is thought to be) made up beforehand that the will can be made up beforehand, and the act, as it were, done in advance. The difficulty in inferring another man's will from the effects he is seen to produce is not due to the obscurity of his will—for one's own will is equally obscure and unpredictable—but rather to the difficulty of discovering precisely what he knew.

By a true instinct the criminal lawyers have evolved a principle that the only thing which excuses a man from the penalty of the law is ignorance of the circumstances—one circumstance only excepted—viz. the terms of the law itself. (The exception is necessary because the act is made punishable at law because it is thought bad; it is not bad because it is punishable at law. We are, of course, only dealing with punishable acts which are also morally condemned.) Thus, if the plea of good intentions is to hold good in the criminal courts, it must be reduced to the form of a plea of ignorance of some relevant circumstance or circumstances. Now I believe it to be a fact that "good intentions," when it would be upheld as a valid excuse by a moral judge, can always be reduced to ignorance of this kind. A wife poisons her sick husband. How does she prove her good intentions? By proving that for some reason she was ignorant of the character of the drug she gave, so that she could reasonably expect to assist the cure by the action which, in fact, hastened death. If it could be proved against her that she was blinded by no such ignorance, her plea of good intentions automatically collapses. Thus if we hear of a will not fulfilled in deed or falsified in the deed and wish for more precise information, we should expect to get it in the form of an account of some ignorance or of judgment relevant to the matter in question.

But, you may say, there is another possibility, lack of opportunity. This is not a real possibility unless the will can be made up beforehand. The only real opportunity is in present circumstances, and

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such opportunities the will takes according to its lights from moment to moment throughout life. A plan devised beforehand and not relevant to opportunity in this sense is a mere day-dream and has no part in will at all. I may wish to be a member of Parliament, but that wish is only part of my will so far as it is already influencing my action, and it can influence my action only when it is in my power to take steps which will bring the achievement of my ambition—in some degree, however small—nearer. We do not will what is impossible, and lack of opportunity means in the end impossibility. The unrealized will is a day-dream of disappointment—a theory of what we should have willed if circumstances had been different. Such dreams are more and less solid: such theories contain more and less of truth: anyway, there is no way of testing them. They are mere theory, and hardly more likely to be well-founded when they concern oneself than when they concern somebody else.

The objection, then, may be ruled out. The will never expressed in deed is a dream, and the will faultily expressed is a fact misstated. The will always expresses itself, but sometimes through ignorance it alters events in a fashion which it regrets. As we are always insufficiently informed as to the circumstances in which we act—every action being therefore to some extent a leap in the dark—there is plenty of room for excuse and much need of charity of judgment here. "They know not what they do." It is the only excuse for failure, and it is the best rebuke to the pride of success.

IV

It is implied in what has been said that the will cannot be put into words. When it has come into existence (i.e. *after* action) it can be described, like any other individual thing, but like other individuals never completely or exhaustively. Before it exists, too, it can be predicted but only with the insecurity that clings to all predictions even when the prophet is he who knows the possibilities most fully, viz. the agent himself. It is important to remember that an assertion about a man's will is very often a prediction, i.e. a guess: a statement of what he will or would do under certain conditions. When will is used in the present with reference to future contingencies (e.g. will to help) or with reference to a man's state just before action, we are apt to think of the will as a simple proposition or proposal adopted by him: but in so thinking we delude ourselves. What happens is that a man, continually exercising his senses and his intelligence upon his surroundings, reacts continually to the information which senses and intelligence provide, and his reaction is that positive interference with circumstances which we call action. The simplest actions are called by psychologists reactions

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or reflexes—e.g. the shutting of the eye when some visible object, say a fly, moves straight upon it—but they are actions, only actions of a simple and inferior type. They are in principle the same as actions of the most developed strategy. They may be called simple and inferior because the element in experience to which they respond is simple and inferior in importance. The power of the developed will is largely that of withholding response to the superficial features of a revealed situation and responding instead to its deeper and more permanent features. The soldier withholds response to the whistle of a bullet by the simple and obvious device of running away, and builds himself bullet-proof fortifications. So as we gain experience of life we learn to disregard little annoyances and disappointments, and to deal instead with the more permanent current of events.

Will, then, is a response to an apprehended situation. We respond inevitably to the whole of what we apprehend. If we have little intelligence and rely chiefly on our senses, like children, what we apprehend is varied, rapidly changing, somewhat fragmentary: the natural consequence is that the actions of children are vivid, changeable, and disjointed. As the intelligence becomes more and more competent to see through the kaleidoscope of sense to the relatively slow-moving strata of experience, action naturally and inevitably becomes more sedate, more precise, methodical and consecutive. It is not unnatural that men who believe that behind the puzzling variety of sense experience is an eternal unchanging reality have been tempted to believe that if men's minds could only reach to that and concentrate their thoughts upon it, their wills, without losing touch with the actual or relevance to its demands, might acquire a like constancy and immutability—so that their action, while preserving like the world an appearance of change and variety, might express a will which was always the same. Such a knowledge would be like the sight of the Pole-star which, being alone unmoved relatively to the earth, is a safe guide to the way over the earth. Without either adopting or criticizing such a theory, we may take it as an expression of the inevitable and easily verified relation of thought in all its varieties to action. The function of sense and thought is not (primarily, at any rate) to forecast the unknown future or resuscitate the dead past, it is to give us information as to the actual present situation in which we find ourselves, and upon that information we act. The philosophers who believe, like Plato, in the knowledge of the eternal as the only safe guide in life do not promise us that we shall be able to deduce from such a knowledge by any intellectual process a sovereign plan for unravelling all practical difficulties or that we shall be able in virtue of that knowledge to predict the future. The world, they say, is eternal; we shall know the world; and to that knowledge our action will be inevitably

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responsive. Our will also will be in a sense not temporal but eternal, by the same law which governs the simplest sense-reflexes of a child or an animal.

Will, then, is a reaction to a situation as apprehended, and consequently power to apprehend what is, is of the greatest moment to it. In such a reaction let us consider what place should be allotted to the notion of motive, a notion on which our moral judgments are often said to turn. Motives may be said in general to be named after a result which an action is intended to produce. ("Intended" is perhaps obscure since intention has not yet been discussed.) The reference to a result is sometimes direct, as when we say "his motive was the desire to help a friend," sometimes indirect, as when we talk of motives of economy, avarice, etc. In these last two cases the sparing and hoarding of money are easily specified as the "ends" or results-to-be-produced in question. Sometimes, e.g. when we speak of motives of affection or resentment, the reference is as much backward into the past as forward into the future. Generally any desire, affection, emotion, or propensity may be alleged as motive; and it is fairly obvious that the desire or emotion specified is intended to account for and corresponds to the direction or tendency of the action, i.e. of the intended interference with circumstances. Sometimes quite nakedly as in the first case ("desire to help") the attribution of a motive consists simply in alleging in the agent a more or less constant tendency to move in the general direction instanced in the act. But in the end this is always the meaning of motives. They are something in the man rather more permanent than the individual will and on the other hand rather less permanent than the individual character which finds expression at a particular moment in a particular action.

Now if will is a man's power to react to circumstances by altering them and motive is a disposition to alter them in a certain direction, motive is will and will is motive. The only difficulty in such an identification is that the will has hitherto been considered as an individual manifestation in a single act while the motive appears to be something more general—so we might regard the will as the motive individualized in the particular situation and the motive as the will generalized into a constant tendency. But consider the facts rather more closely. What do we mean by the "direction" of an action? All actions are necessarily selective: one thing only can be done at a time: always certain elements in the complex whole which we call the situation are altered in preference to others equally alterable. Such dispositions or desires as have been mentioned would betray themselves in this business of *selection*. In virtue of avarice, e.g. a man would be ready to alter any circumstance which obstructed access to money and reluctant to alter any circumstance

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which served as a protection to his hoarded wealth. Similarly in virtue of cowardice a man would be reluctant to alter any fact which safeguarded his person and ready to alter any that endangered it. But antecedent to selection is the observation which discovers what the situation is, and in regard to *observation* also the dispositions and desires would play their part. An avaricious man would perceive quickly any factor advantageous or disadvantageous to his special interest of hoarding and a coward would notice immediately the factors which made for and against safety. In the same way a selfish man shows his selfishness not merely in not acting so as to help others, but also constantly in not observing the effects which his action has upon the interests of his associates: he tends to ignore that element in the situation altogether and to see only what directly concerns himself.

Now the field of will is necessarily limited by the field of observation. Much of what is observed is in a greater or less degree irrelevant to the response in action; but it is quite certain that will or action cannot be a response (even if it is accidentally relevant) to what is not observed. (Accidental relevance is what we call a fluke.) The relation of observation to will is complicated by the fact above noticed that will (in the form of desire) to some extent determines our selective observation: but, confining ourselves for the moment to the single act, we may say that the limits of observation determine the limits within which will operates. A statesmanlike view of things is a necessary precondition of statesmanlike action, and narrow or one-sided observation creates a like character in a man's conduct.

It follows from all this that when we attribute a motive to action we implicitly assert an unverifiable hypothesis that a certain factor in the situation was especially prominent in the eye of the agent taking stock of his position before action, and that, of the multitude of consequences that any alteration has, one set of consequences was specially in his mind. The hypothesis is clearly unverifiable because we cannot get inside his mind and see what he saw, and even if we saw what he saw we should still have doubts because of the multitude of irrelevant detail which must cloud even the narrowest and most specialized observation. If a man acts so as at the same time to benefit both himself and a friend, who shall say that the one or the other consequence preponderated? There is no reason why he should know himself; but, of course, he may know since the one profit or the other may have been entirely unforeseen or even the opposite of what he expected. The important thing is that the attribution of motive seems to involve, at least in the instances given, the theory of a one-sidedness in the judgment of the agent and consequently in his action; and, since such a limitation seems to be a defect in practical wisdom, it looks as if the good will would


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be altogether free from motive in this sense—good action would be unmotivated action.

In short, motive is a desire which limits observation and through observation limits action. But such limitation cannot be a good thing. Therefore the good will must be free from such desires. This argument is probably sound in the main, but it will perhaps need some qualification before it can be finally accepted. (But there may be good or useful prejudices as well as bad, and to be without prejudices (in this sense) means that you are overwhelmed by the press of detail. Selection, however risky, is a practical necessity.)¹

¹ This sentence appears as a pencilled parenthesis at the bottom of the manuscript page.

(To be continued)



THE ALLEGED FASCISM OF PLATO

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I

IN Germany the claim is sometimes made that National Socialism incorporates the best of Plato's political theory. In this country, too, Bertrand Russell and Mr. R. H. Crossman have emphasized, but with a different intention, the fascist elements in Plato's thought. It has to be admitted that whereas it would be merely laughable to claim that Jesus or Kant were exponents of the fascist philosophy, there is no such glaring incongruity with regard to Plato. It may be of some interest, therefore, to examine anew the alleged likeness between the basic principles of fascism and the thought of Plato. No one would deny a strong likeness between some details of Plato's teaching and some details of fascism. The question is whether these likenesses are mainly accidental, or are due to some deep-seated similarity of outlook. In order to make this comparison, a fairly full account of fascist philosophy is needed. For since the word "fascism" is now highly charged with emotion, it tends to be used as an epithet of praise or disfavour rather than as a precise designation. Because not all fascist systems are in complete agreement, my account of fascism will be composite.

Perhaps the most fundamental characteristic of fascism is its "revolt against reason." Fascists themselves, in so far as they are aware of their intellectual position, would admit their opposition to "rationalism." This is a point of view which it is important to understand. The eighteenth century saw the spread of a movement of thought which is known as "the Enlightenment." According to the thinkers of this movement, there were certain ends which it was rational for men to pursue, and which men would pursue if they were not distracted by prejudice or blinded by ignorance. These ends were basically only one end, variously designated happiness or pleasure. It was held to be the business of the political theorist to show how happiness could be best achieved. Various well-established institutions were condemned because they failed to contribute to the general happiness. The fact that an institution had long existed was no argument in its favour. An hereditary aristocracy, for example, was condemned on the ground that the general happiness was best promoted by putting government in the hands of those best fitted to govern, and of those who would be forced to govern

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as the citizens wished. Impelled by patriotic and religious "enthusiasms," it was said, people tend to act against their best interests. If only they will free themselves from outworn traditions and misleading superstitions, they will be able to apply an unprejudiced intellect to the solution of their political problems. With the removal of prejudice men will come to agree on what is best in political action. For there is a best, which intelligent and fair-minded men will agree on. The appeal to prejudice breeds conflict, the appeal to reason leads to profitable agreement. Looking back over the history of the Western world, the philosophers of the Enlightenment claimed to see a gradual reduction of superstition and a weakening of prejudice; the power of kings, priests, and nobles was diminishing, while that of enlightened philosophers was increasing. In history could be descried a progress which, with the advance of science and spread of education, would be accelerated. Oppression, war, ignorance, and even poverty would be increasingly eliminated. History had an intelligible plan.

Beliefs of this kind have had an enormous influence upon our present civilization. Fascism completely repudiates them. Happiness is regarded as an unworthy end; utilitarianism, according to Signor Mussolini, is a *low* moral creed. Calculating attempts to increase happiness or reduce pain are undignified. Humanitarians are materialists who think that the dignity of man is enhanced by his release from effort and pain. The social worker, and even the physician, often presuppose this false morality according to which personal satisfaction is the highest good. This moral protest is supported by an appeal to biology. An increase of comfort will deteriorate the human race. Spengler says:

Nineteenth-century medicine, a true product of Rationalism, is . . . a phenomenon of age. It prolongs each life whether this is desirable or not. It prolongs even death. It replaces the number of children by the number of greybeards. It promotes the world outlook of *panem et circenses* by estimating the value of life by the number of its days, not by their usefulness. It prevents the natural process of selection and thereby accentuates the decay of the race.—*The Hour of Decision*, p. 223.

The philosophers of the Enlightenment had supposed that men really agreed upon their valuations; what looked like radically opposed systems of values were the results of hampering traditions; if only men would free themselves from them they would acknowledge the same ends. This is denied by the fascist. Separate groups develop different cultures and moralities. There is no means of deciding between them by argument. The best culture or civilization is that which survives. Hence the only way to prove that your way of life is better than that of another people is to impose it upon

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them. Furthermore, what is generally taken to be argument on moral questions is not argument at all. When a man claims to prove by argument that a certain way of life is the best, he is really only inventing excuses for his own conduct; his code of morality is not a result of argument but of circumstance. People invent reasons for supporting codes which they would have supported even if they had no reasons at all. Hence there is no difference between prejudices and so-called "enlightened" beliefs. Reason is just another prejudice.

Again, the fascist holds that there is no plan in history; or if there is a plan there is no progress. History is just a struggle of groups, individuals, cultures, and civilizations. Those that survive are the best, but we can only see which is best by seeing which survives. Hence there is no progress, for progress implies an objective standard in accordance with which individuals or groups are judged and to which they approximate more and more. History is a battlefield where disparate groups and civilizations grow and decline, conquer or meet disaster. Chance plays a great part in the issue. In the course of history man has not changed. He is no more free now than he was five thousand years ago. He is no less superstitious, religious, or prejudiced. Most men have always preferred the safety of obedience to the responsibilities of freedom. The modern man calls his god "Progress." Where his forefather spoke about devils the modern man speaks about germs.

So much for the general world-outlook of fascism. We now turn to its political teaching. Here, of course, nationalism is the most important ingredient. Because there are no objective rational ends upon which all unprejudiced men would agree, it follows, the fascist insinuates, that there is nothing left for the individual but to promote the values and power of his own group. This contention gains force because, for a variety of reasons, it has happened that in the twentieth century there has been a great deal of controversy in the sphere of morals. Within a single national community different groups have adopted and advocated very different moral valuations. People have differed very widely as to the morality of war. Moral problems associated with property have elicited opposing answers. There has been much disagreement and change in sexual morality. Democratic States purposely allow these controversies, believing that tolerance and experiment are better than persecution and rigidity. But a great many individuals are puzzled and alarmed by this uncertainty. They like to know exactly where they stand. The experimenters and reformers force them to reflect on matters which they would prefer not to think about. Why must we begin to alter ways which we have become accustomed to? The fascists take advantage of this uncertainty and resentment. They demand that

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controversy on fundamental moral questions shall cease. Dissident minorities shall be coerced and a single code shall apply to the whole nation. People will once again know exactly where they stand. All moral problems will be solved by a single simple formula: "Private and group interests are to be subordinated to the good of the Nation." A scrutiny of moral precepts in the light of any other principle than this becomes treason. Hence in Italy the priesthood is given great power in education. In Germany projects for humanizing the penal code are discontinued. In both countries attempts are made to reinstate the old sexual morality by making women as dependent upon men as can be. These tendencies meet with the approval of all those who are materially and spiritually injured by moral change. Men are no longer men, but Germans, Italians, and "Britons" (not Englishmen, Welshmen, or Scotsmen).

Now the most spectacular way of promoting the "good" of a nation is to increase its power *vis-à-vis* the power of other nations. Hence the eyes of the population are concentrated upon the doings of the nation in the international arena. The principle is actually enunciated that home politics are subordinate to foreign politics, that a diplomatic or military victory is more important than an increase in social welfare. Spengler says :

Internal politics exist only to secure the strength and unity of external politics, and when they pursue different aims of their own, decay sets in and the State gets "out of form."—*The Hour of Decision*, p. 35.

A single rigid morality is established internally in order that a united nation shall be able to increase its power. Intolerance at home is combined with belligerency abroad.

Another important characteristic of political fascism is "the leadership principle." There can be no reconciliation between fascism and democracy. The following are the main complaints made by fascists against democracy: (i) Democratic government must be weak government. For decisions in democracies are generally the result of compromise. Furthermore, owing to the party conflict the work of one government can always be undone by the government which succeeds it. (ii) The growth of parties splits the community. The tendency is for individuals to put party before the community as a whole. (iii) Democratic government enables responsibility to be avoided. Governments refrain from carrying out unpopular but necessary measures. Rather than do so, they resign and thus attempt to throw the unpopularity upon the next government. (iv) Democrats are "soft." They generally fear to make use of that force without which all government is impossible. Hence democratic governments can easily be swept away by those who can and will use force. As a result

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of these criticisms fascists propose to abolish parties (except their own), to eliminate their political opponents, and to submit themselves to the leadership of a single man who is ready to take the responsibility of governing. A single leader appeals to the masses more than a committee does. It is easier to be loyal to an individual than to a set of principles. A leader cannot resign when things go wrong and throw the task of improvement upon other people. When people say "The correct policy is what the leader says is the correct policy," they will act together with the minimum of friction.

Hence we have two fundamental propositions in fascism. First the nationalist proposition: "Whatever is for the good of the nation is right." Then the leadership proposition: "Whatever the Leader says is good for the nation is good for the nation." The Leader's opinion is, therefore, the criterion of right and wrong.

There are two important corollaries of these general principles. Fascists tend to lay great stress upon myths. They say that large bodies of men can only act together with enthusiasm when they believe the same stories. These stories may or may not be true. The important fact is that they are believed in, not that they are true. In order that a nation may be highly organized the masses must be taught the same myths. Herr Hitler was deeply impressed by the Allied war-time propaganda. He thought that the Allied success in the Great War was largely due to their widespread belief that they were fighting for justice and democracy (*Mein Kampf*, vol. i, ch. 6). The Central Powers never evolved such an attractive myth; the Allied propaganda was so skilful that it even affected the Germans to some extent. Since the war the National Socialists have invented some extremely popular and effective myths in order to heighten the national self-respect. These, and the corresponding myths of Italian fascism, need not be recapitulated here. Signor Mussolini acknowledges the influence of Sorel in showing him the importance of political mythology.

The second corollary concerns the nature of the fascist moral code. The fascists repudiate a utilitarian moral code. *A fortiori* they repudiate a moral code of love and forbearance, such as that sketched out in the Sermon on the Mount. Such codes, they say, are unbiological. Furthermore, they are incompatible with nationalism. In their place fascism substitutes a code of *honour*. In this code the highest place is given to what might be called the military virtues. A high value is set upon bravery, endurance, loyalty, unquestioning obedience to superiors, quickness to resent an insult. Pity for the weak is, as Nietzsche had argued, opposed to the lessons of biology, for action prompted by pity tends to preserve and perpetuate the weak. If the strong rejoice in their strength they will by exterminating the weak improve the race. It is also held that a large part of the

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morality of neighbour-love is merely hypocritical. This aspect of the fascist teaching is too well known to need quotations.

II

Now it is immediately apparent that the irrationalism and the relativism which are fundamental to the fascist outlook are wholly lacking from Plato's thought. According to him the Good is discoverable by the intelligence, and is hence the same for all rational beings. There can be little doubt, I think, that if he had been presented with the conception of separate cultures possessing diverse sets of valuations between which no rational preference was possible, Plato would have repudiated it. That he would have done so is clear from his attitude towards those Sophists who adopted a somewhat similar position. So far as I understand him he believed in fixed, intelligible values which are, in the long run, aspects of one. The Good is revealed to intelligence. Hence, although not all men are intelligent enough to apprehend it, different groups and societies will have the same good. There will be an objective standard in terms of which societies may be compared. It is important to notice that such a view, like that advanced by the philosophers of the Enlightenment, is opposed to the extremest forms of nationalism. For when it is held that the good is open to intelligent inquiry and that the standards of a restricted group are not the only standards available for its members, the individual is no longer faced with the choice between immorality and isolation on the one hand and selfless absorption in the national ethos on the other. But this is the choice into which the fascist leaders endeavour to thrust the individual to-day. Faced with this choice he will generally elect for conformity and nationalism. Only those are proof against this dilemma who possess a morality which is universal in its claims.

Another instance of Plato's fundamental aversion from modes of thought associated with fascism may be seen in his attitude towards war. As is well known, Signor Mussolini has several times publicly extolled the grandeur of war; Spengler, in a passage which I have quoted, says that external policy is more important than internal policy; to General Ludendorff is due the aphorism that policy exists for the sake of war, not war for the sake of policy. Now this very problem was discussed by Plato in the first book of the *Laws*. In that book the constitutions of Crete and Sparta are criticized because they were manifestly designed with efficiency in war as the supreme end. The following passage shows the conclusion which Plato reached:

But the best is neither war nor faction—they are things we should pray to be spared from—but peace and mutual good will. And thus a victory of a

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city over itself turns out, it would seem, to be not so much a good as a necessary evil. It is as though one fancied that a diseased body which has been subjected to medical purgation were at its best in that condition, and ignored a body which has never stood in need of such treatment. So, if a man takes a similar view of the happiness of the city, or indeed of the individual man—I mean, if external wars are the first and only object of his regard—he will never be a true statesman, nor will any man be a finished legislator, unless he legislates for war as a means to peace rather than for peace as a means to war.—*Laws*, bk. i, 628. A. E. Taylor's translation.

It is clear, of course, from this passage, and others in the *Republic*, that Plato was far from being a pacifist. This, considering the conditions of his era, is not to be wondered at. Furthermore, *reasoned* pacifism, as it exists to-day, is born of the terrible fragility of our highly specialized society, and the alarming efficiency of modern weapons. *Religious* pacifism depends upon a scale of values which has only become accepted at all as a result of the spread of the Gospels. The values to which the religious pacifists appeal are repudiated by fascists, Christians, communists and average men. It is, therefore, no sign of fascism in Plato that he, too, did not acknowledge them. Passages can be quoted, it is true, in which he asserts that the Greeks were innately superior to barbarians and not bound to observe civilized rules of war with them. But we are hardly justified in regarding such passages as examples of racialism or nationalism. They are not the conscious expressions of a *Weltanschauung*. They are just prejudices, like his prejudice against manual workers.

It is worth digressing at this point to call attention to the significance of this difference. There has always been class and group prejudice. What, then, is the difference between fascist nationalism and sheer national prejudice? The sociologist Karl Mannheim has shown how such a question has to be answered. An unchallenged prejudice is very seldom uttered. Conservatives are traditionally called "the stupid party," because they are not responsible for as many books as the other parties are. But the reason why they do not write and argue is not that they are stupid, but that they are satisfied. If they felt threatened they would defend themselves, intellectually and physically. Similarly, I think, the fact that fascist nationalism now attempts to construct a philosophy is a sure sign of the criticism and dislike which nationalism has aroused. Those who, for some reason or other, wish for the perpetuation of nationalism, have felt it necessary to defend themselves.

We have seen that there is lacking in Plato the fundamental irrationalism of the fascists. But in his attitude towards government and democracy he has much in common with them. Plato held that in any well-ordered State an hierarchical organization was inevitable. He held that the average man is not fit for political responsibility and cannot be educated for it. He held that government should be

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carried out by specially trained experts who would consult, not the people's wishes, but the people's good. He held that the activities of business men should be subject to State control. Exaggerated humanitarianism, he thought, would lead to the perpetuation of unhealthy stocks. Democracy he believed to be a form of government which was bound to give place to tyranny. Tyranny itself he criticized as an inefficient and wicked form of authoritarian government. But he did not disapprove of authoritarian government itself. He was prepared to welcome a rigid censorship of art and morals. He advocated the teaching of social and political myths which the rulers themselves did not believe in. He believed in the need for a State religion with the punishment of heretics. In the *Laws* he went so far as to suggest the establishment of a body like the Inquisition for the punishment and eradication of heresy (bk. x, 908-909).

There is no need for me to give a detailed account of Plato's views on government. But for the purposes of this paper it is important to say something about his description of democracy in the *Republic*. For this description is of great sociological importance. The following passage repays careful examination:

"Then, first and foremost, they are free, the city is crammed with liberty and freedom of speech, and there is permission to do there whatever anyone desires?"

"So they say," he said.

"Then clearly where the permissive principle rules, each man will arrange his own life to suit himself?"

"Clearly."

"Then this constitution, I fancy, will be distinguished by the wonderful variety of men in it?"

"Surely."

"It will turn out to be the fairest of constitutions," I said. "Like a garment of many colours of every shade and variety, this constitution will be variegated with every character, and be most fair to look upon; and possibly, just as children and women admire many coloured things, so many people will judge this city to be fairest of all."—*Rep.* VIII, 557. A. D. Lindsay's translation.

The democratic man, Plato goes on, argues that the only way to cope with a desire is to satisfy it; hence all desires, he says, "are alike and deserving of equal honour." We might say that the democratic man recognizes a democracy of desires; every desire is to count for one. He endeavours to embrace within his one life as many kinds of experiences as he can.

It was Plato's opinion that this sort of democracy contained within itself the seeds of tyranny. There is insufficient provision for electing efficient men to offices of importance. Hence the technique of governing deteriorates. Professional politicians arise who get popular support by promising to plunder the rich; the larger proportion of

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the plunder, however, they appropriate to themselves as their due rake-off. The laws themselves are not strictly executed and so fall into disrepute. There is a tendency to be lenient to criminals. The tyrant arises as a popular leader who organizes a bodyguard to protect himself against lawless opponents. With the help of the bodyguard he seizes supreme power. To begin with, he adopts popular, radical measures. In order to remain in power, however, he has to make himself indispensable. Hence he engages in wars. War serves also to keep his opponents from conspiring against him, because they have to work so hard to finance the war that they have no time for political agitation. But differences inevitably arise among his own supporters. In order to maintain his supremacy the tyrant has to suppress the ablest and bravest among them. The word which Plato uses for this process is "purge." Thus the tyrant comes to be surrounded by worthless creatures and is compelled to govern by sheer force which is only available to him for as long as he can pay for it.

There are a number of points of considerable interest in this analysis. In the first place, Plato emphasizes the variety of characters which arise in a democracy. This is a tendency which democrats have welcomed. John Stuart Mill, for instance, not only argued in favour of liberty of opinion, but he also urged the necessity of "experiments of living." It cannot be denied that "experiments of living" may have great social value. Moral codes which succeed fairly well in one set of circumstances may be totally unable to cope with changed conditions. If, however, the modes of social life are so stereotyped that no one dare live his life to a new pattern, the society may not be adaptable enough to survive in the changed conditions. Again, some would argue that spontaneous conduct is intrinsically superior to regulated or traditional conduct. But however important these considerations may be, it must also be remembered that there are limits to the tolerance which any society can permit. These limits are set by the social disturbances which the tolerance evokes. Societies exist because people have to live together and like to live in certain fixed ways. People want to live their own lives, it is true; but most of them can only think of living lives like their fellows. And they also want security. When tolerance threatens to interfere with security democracies are faced with great danger. Tolerance is valuable in so far as it preserves peace and mitigates institutional rigidity. But tolerance may, in some situations, actually promote disorder and endanger institutions. Democracies have often failed to recognize this.

Plato, it will be remembered, says that the democrat admits a democracy of desires. Satisfaction is to be sought, irrespective of what is to be satisfied. It is true that in democratic societies there is a

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tendency to regard extremely divergent moral codes with tolerance. Historically this is a legacy of the Enlightenment. The early defenders of tolerance argued that society gained more than it lost by allowing people to worship how they pleased. This is still the case in our society. In the Western world, at any rate, people's religious beliefs do not affect their conduct very much, and so governments can afford to neglect them. But people's moral and political beliefs have a greater influence upon their conduct. Hence the tolerance which is practicable with regard to religion may not be practicable with regard to morals and politics. Religious tolerance is closely correlated with lack of religious belief. Similarly a complete moral tolerance is incompatible with the adoption of a moral attitude. An era of moral tolerance, therefore, is likely to be an era when a moral code is undergoing, or is about to undergo, great changes. Such an era cannot be permanent. Those who live in it have the task of establishing a generally acceptable and efficacious morality.

Fascists, I have said, tend to deny the view that history shows a single plan emerging in the general improvement of mankind. Plato's suggestion, towards the end of the *Republic*, is that even if a well-ordered community is established, it will tend to deteriorate.

... but since decay is the lot of everything that has come into being, even this constitution will not abide for ever, but will be dissolved.—VIII, 546.

And he goes on to describe the likely course of degradation from kingship to tyranny. Among the Greeks there was, of course, nothing like the modern belief in Progress. That the historical process was cyclical was held by Heracleitus, and later, with much subtle illustrative detail, by Polybius. This theory of an historical cycle was taken over by modern critics of democracy. It is well known that Nietzsche, from whom Spengler borrowed much of his philosophy, believed in an "eternal recurrence;" the events that are happening now have happened before an infinite number of times, and will happen again an infinite number of times. Spengler has argued that although every civilization is separate from every other, they all run through the same inevitable stages of birth, rise and decline. Pareto held that there must be a continual oscillation between conservative and radical groups. It is interesting to inquire why fascists should now find such speculations so attractive. There is no space to enter thoroughly into this inquiry, but there is one obvious point which ought to be emphasized. The denial of progress and the substitution of the theory of recurrence acts as a discouragement to reformers and utopians. They must put before themselves a picture of the society which they are endeavouring to realize, and they are heartened in their efforts if they think that these efforts are being made in the line of a prevailing tendency. If they come to think,

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however, that there is no such prevailing tendency, and that men never achieve anything permanently, but always slip back into their original barbarism, then they are likely to conclude that the effort of reform is not worth the making. The humanitarian is generally tender-minded. He will be paralysed into inaction by the vision of historical recurrence.

LAWS AND THEORIES

NORMAN CAMPBELL, Sc.D., F.INST.P.

Is there any important distinction between a law and a theory? Some usages suggest that there is. Thus, everyone speaks of Boyle's Law (not theory) and of the dynamical theory (not law or laws) of gases. But the most summary inquiry will show that the distinction is not maintained consistently by individual authors, still less as between different authors; the terms "Newtonian law" and "theory of gravitation" seem to be used indifferently to denote the same proposition(s).

The practising physicist would certainly admit a distinction. Roughly, he would say, laws result directly from experiment; theories are tested by means of laws, but they contain an element, in virtue of which they explain laws, that is not so directly associated with experiment. The distinction is of great practical importance, because physicists are rapidly segregating into two classes; one establishes laws in the laboratory, the other explains or predicts them in the study. But the line of division is not easily drawn. Why bother about it? When the distinction is important, it is obvious; when it is not obvious, it cannot be important.

Philosophers, who consider the wider implications of science, are usually much less definite. Most of them seem to ignore the distinction; and those who clearly admit it (possibly not under the same nomenclature) differ curiously about its nature. Some (e.g. Mill) regard theories as hypotheses, doubtful propositions which may in time require the dignity of established laws; others (e.g. Eddington) regard theories as embodying the full refined scientific truth, and laws as secondary means leading to that truth. Surely this uncertainty is discreditable. If all scientific truth is of one kind, why does the distinction made by the practising scientist persist and increase? If it is not all of one kind, then a discussion of the meaning and validity of science must start with the making of a distinction between the two kinds.

I have long believed that the making of this distinction is much more than a preliminary to a philosophy of science, and that when it is made some of the major problems of that study are already solved. That opinion is expounded in my *Physics: The Elements* (1920). It has received very little attention; the reason may be that it has been considered and found wanting; but it may also be that, owing to the great length of that book, it has never been considered at all. The

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developments of science since it was written, and the discussions to which they have given rise, appear to make it more necessary than ever to analyse science so as to make the distinction clear. The purpose of this paper is to give the briefest possible outline of the analysis previously offered.

Science is based on facts. Statements of fact are offers to demonstrate an experiment. Thus it is a fact that a particular numeral indicated by the pointer on a scale of a particular voltmeter connected across a particular resistor is associated with a particular numeral similarly indicated on a particular ammeter in series with that resistor. A statement of that fact is, in effect, a challenge to anyone, who cares to come and see the experiment carried out, to show by his actions (not only by his words) that his experience is *not* the same as mine. Science is possible because such challenges can be made and cannot be successfully resisted; there are certain experiences in which men (and animals) cannot really differ, however much they try. Such experiences are the raw material of science.

A law is a collection of an indefinite number of statements of fact, all of which are in some sense equivalent. Thus Ohm's Law is a collection of all the statements of fact equivalent to the foregoing. In all the equivalent statements some numeral indicates the potential difference across a resistor and some other numeral associated with it indicates the current through the resistor. The statements are equivalent because they are two other series of experiments, described by statements of fact, one of which establishes the "existence" of currents, the other the "existence" of potential differences. In the first series it will be shown (e.g.) that a certain magnetic field, a certain rate of heating of a resistor, and a certain rate of deposition of silver on an electrolytic cathode are all associated; in the second it will be shown (e.g.) that a certain rate of heating is associated with a certain force between parallel plates. It is these other experiments, not equivalent to the experiment from which we started, which give meaning to the terms that are employed in "generalizing" statements of fact so that they become laws.

Further—and this is most important—the equivalence is the main reason why I am prepared to make the original statement of fact. If I doubted that the ammeter "really" indicated currents and the voltmeter voltages—if in common parlance I doubted that they were in proper working order—I should be far less willing to make my challenge to demonstrate to the world to-morrow what I have observed to-day.

This very brief analysis of a single example suggests that experimental science proceeds in this manner. Elements of experience, related by a relation A_1 , are found to form a "routine" or demonstrable experiment, κ_1 . Other elements, related by A_2 , form another

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routine x_2 . An element of x_1 , forming a "mark" of it, is found (possibly in a single experiment) to be related by a relation B to an element of x_2 , also forming a mark of it. It is concluded that these elements form a new routine y of higher order; moreover this routine is expressed by a law and not by a mere statement of fact; it is much more important. So also routines z , of yet higher order, are established by finding marks of y_1 and y_2 in a suitable relation C.

If the relations A, B, C, . . . form an identifiable class or classes, and if general criteria can be given to determine if any given element of a routine is a sufficient mark of it, then the process of finding laws (which is usually called Induction) can be reduced to rules. The principle underlying the rules will be that, if the elements a_1 , b_1 , being respectively marks of different routines x_1 , x_2 , are ever found to stand in one of these relations, then they will always stand in that relation. The relations will be "invariable relations." This principle will be similar to that of "causality," as expounded by Mill. But it will differ in two important respects. First, the invariable relation will not necessarily, as Mill maintained, contain a temporal element; second the field of the invariable relations will not be, as Mill apparently thought, any experiences whatever, but only those terms that are marks of routines.

In order to establish the principle of Induction, it is necessary to show that the invariable relations do indeed form an identifiable class or classes; for this purpose a close analysis of the relations asserted by admitted laws is required. I do not pretend that the task has been completed satisfactorily; the relations characteristic of science have not been studied as thoroughly as they deserve. But it seems to me that the analysis has proceeded far enough to make the view suggested highly plausible, and to make it permissible to assert that laws are simply assertions of invariable relations (but not necessarily causal relations) between marks of routines.

But an objection has to be considered. If the laws that science is discovering to-day have, as their terms, marks of routines already established, then there must come a stage, as we trace back the history of science, at which no routines were available to provide the terms of laws. An endless regression of routines is impossible; how did science ever start?

The answer is that the discovery of new laws is accompanied by the refinement of old routines. At any stage of a science there is a limited group of alleged routines. When two marks, one of each of two of these routines, are found to stand in an "invariable relation," it is usually found that the relation is indeed invariable, and that the marks so associated do indeed form a new routine. But sometimes the relation is found not to be invariable; the experiment cannot be repeated. The procedure then is not to reject the relation as not

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invariable, but to modify the alleged routine, usually by dividing it into several routines differing in only a few elements. It has always been found possible by this method to restore the invariability of the relations. A typical example of this process occurred when the discovery of "heavy hydrogen" required the division into (at least) two routines of the single alleged routine called simply "hydrogen."

This process of refining routines at once makes induction possible—by preserving the invariability of "invariable relations"—and makes its results inevitably uncertain. There is no routine (and therefore no law) so certainly established that its revision is impossible; on the other hand, no observations can destroy our belief in the "uniformity of nature," that is to say, the existence of invariable relations. Nothing in science will be certainly true until science is complete—that is to say, never; but nothing can ever prove it untrue. That is the formal paradox of induction. The utility of induction depends on the fortunate fact that the revision of routines that is necessary to preserve the invariability of relations is usually of small practical importance.

Theories explain laws. Explanation is not peculiar to science; it plays a part in activities as diverse as metaphysics and criminal jurisprudence. It consists in showing that what is to be explained is, in some sense, a consequence of some intrinsically plausible hypothesis. If what is to be explained is more certain than the hypothesis, the process of explanation establishes the truth of the hypothesis; but if the hypothesis is the more certain, it may establish the truth of what is to be explained.

In a purely intellectual study, "consequence of" must mean "logical deduction from" and can apply only to formal propositions. If then laws are to be explained, they must be formal propositions concerning terms definable independently of the proposition they assert. The laws asserted in our treatises are certainly not of this character; if an attempt is made to state them in a form appropriate to deductive logic, they will be found to reduce (at the best) to existence theorems from which nothing can be deduced. This feature is probably unavoidable; for, even if the uncertainty in routines arising from the possibility of their refinement is ignored, they contain an element that cannot, in the last resort, be stated; it must be demonstrated. To convey what we really mean we must take our interlocutor into the laboratory, point to apparatus, and say that we mean *that*.

However, there is one part of certain laws that is expressible in formal propositions. A numerical law, such as Ohm's Law, that in certain circumstances a current is proportional to a potential difference, gives rise to a statement expressed in terms of the highly

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developed symbolism of mathematics, and deducible by established mathematical reasoning from other propositions so expressed. Here then is something that can be explained without ambiguity. Numerical laws are characteristic of physics rather than of other sciences; that is why physics is much more theoretical than other sciences, and why those who are interested in theories all have tended to identify physics with the whole of science.

Since theories are thus intimately associated with numerical laws, it is clearly important to understand how these laws arise from the process of induction sketched above. We must have a "theory of measurement" (something quite different from what the mathematicians mean by that phrase) if we are to understand the structure of physics. Brevity forbids any attempt to expound the matter here, even in outline; but two remarks must be made.

The mathematical relation, generally denoted by $=$, does not express the whole of a numerical law; there is always a physical relation which is usually not expressed at all. Thus Ohm's Law is written $E = RI$; it is not usually stated that E , R , I must all be characteristic of the same resistor in the same state. It is not stated, partly because every practising physicist knows that it is implied (but that is not an adequate reason for its omission in elementary text-books), partly because (as has been said) it is impossible to state completely. But this part of the law is not less essential than the mathematical part. The fashionable habit of talking about "pointer readings" ignores the whole art of experimental physics and the immensely elaborate equipment with which it is now conducted.¹

The other remark concerns "experimental error." The question is how this form of uncertainty is related to the form inherent in all induction and arising from the imperfect definition of routines. I hold that there is no connection, except in the entirely exceptional case of "statistical laws." Experimental error arises from the fact that the characteristic observable relation that gives rise to numerical laws is sometimes transitive (like the mathematical relation $=$), but not always. It does not arise at all in laws that are not numerical. The doctrine that experimental error can be reduced, or the certainty of induction increased, by the mere multiplication of observations is an error having no foundation in the actual practice of physics, and arising solely from a confusion between two distinct sources of uncertainty.

A theory then consists primarily of a set of mathematical pro-

¹ The inventor of "pointer readings" thought it worth while, during the Great War, to transport elaborate astronomical equipment to a remote oceanic island. If all he wanted was pointer readings, he need never have left home.

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positions (hypotheses) from which the mathematical part of laws can be deduced. The hypothesis has to be intrinsically acceptable. In classical theories it was acceptable because it was the same as, or very like, the mathematical part of laws relating to systems other than those whose behaviour the theory is to explain; the theories were "mechanical." Modern theories are mathematical; their hypotheses are acceptable because they have the form to which some interesting or familiar branch of mathematical analysis is applicable.

But a theory cannot consist of a hypothesis alone ; for, if it did, it could not explain the physical part of laws and would have no relation to experiment. The relation to experiment is established by a "dictionary," which (like everything that concerns experiment) is never stated formally. It consists of entries relating to measurable magnitudes certain combinations of the variables characteristic of the hypothesis. Thus the Kinetic Theory of gases relates the quantity mv^2 (m = mass, v = velocity of a molecule) to the temperature of the gas; quantum mechanics relates the quantity $\psi\psi^*$ (ψ = wave function, ψ^* its conjugate) to the probability of something happening. In classical theories the dictionary entries usually are suggested immediately by the analogy on which the theory is based. In modern theories they are not so obvious; much of the technical discussion of relativity and wave-mechanics concerns the appropriateness of proposed entries.

A precise account of the relation thus established by the dictionary would require a discussion of the nature of measurement, and therefore must again be omitted. But one very important feature can be noted. The dictionary never relates each variable of the hypothesis singly to a measurable magnitude; thus, in our examples, neither v nor ψ is related singly; only combinations in which they are involved are related. It follows that a theory always contains some purely "hypothetical" ideas which have no meaning in terms of experiment, unless the whole theory is accepted.

This feature of theories enables them to be distinguished from laws even when the distinction is most liable to be obscured. Consider, for example, Maxwell's equations. These may appear at first to be a mere co-ordinated generalization of the laws of Ampère, Coulomb, Faraday, Ohm, etc. And so they are, if they are used to calculate (e.g.) the period of oscillation of the combination of a large condenser with a large inductor. For all the magnitudes involved (in particular the magnetic flux density B) are measurable; any step in the calculation can be checked by experiments that show that the laws involved are true in this special instance. But if the equations are used to calculate (e.g.) the reflectance of a dielectric for light, B cannot be measured; the laws cannot be checked; the result of the calculation means something in terms of experiment, only because

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there is a dictionary entry which relates B^2 to the intensity of the light polarized in a certain plane.

If this analysis is correct, it is clear that scientific propositions are of two perfectly distinct kinds and that any discussion of the implications of science that ignores the distinction must be of little value. But is it correct? To answer that question we must have a standard of correctness; here a difficulty is encountered that affects all attempts to expound a "logic of science," but has seldom been discussed openly.

Is the object to arrange in an order, conforming to the rules of formal logic, the propositions asserted in standard treatises? If so, the object is unattainable. The conventional terminology is so confused that, if we attempt to analyse what scientists say, our only conclusion must be that it is nonsense.

Is the object to disentangle from these imperfect propositions what physicists really mean by them? Again the task is impossible. There is an irrational element in science which is not expressible by any kind of logic, and yet confers on physics its meaning for physicists. They do not use words or symbols as instruments of thought in the characteristic part of their thinking; they use them merely to record what they have thought or to convey it to others with the same instincts. All "logics" assume that valid thought consists in the right handling of words or symbols; if there is any valid thought peculiar to science, that assumption is simply untrue.

Is the object to lay down a set of rules, imposed by some authority external to science, to which scientific thought must conform if it is to be true and disclose anything about the nature of reality? That view is obviously held by many philosophers, but no scientist can accept it; for him truth and reality mean that which is disclosed by scientific thought. A logic of this kind would be a logic of science only if science means something that no scientist believes.

A better view, I suggest, is that the purpose of any "logic of science" is to separate the rational element from the irrational, the part that is common to all kinds of organized thought from the part characteristic of science. A logic is the better, the more perfectly it effects this separation without omission and without distortion.

The analysis I have proposed does effect a separation. There are two irrational elements. One lies in the discovery of laws; the "fortunate fact" that gives science its practical value would not be a fact if scientists had not an instinctive and uncommunicable sense of what routines are likely to stand the test of further investigation and are thus worthy of provisional acceptance. The other lies in the formulation of theories; unless physicists' sense of what is "intrinsically acceptable" were confirmed by the prediction of true laws, there would be no theoretical physics.

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But candour compels the admission that the separation is not entirely complete, and that there are connections between laws and theories that have not been mentioned. Thus theories often provide a great part of the evidence for laws; "empirical laws" having no theoretical foundations are suspect. Again novelty is an essential part of explanation; theories may lose their character by mere familiarity and become no more than compendiums of the laws they originally explained. The equations of Newtonian Dynamics have long been in this position; it has become more evident since the theory of which they were once the hypothesis has been abandoned.

However, the more serious question is: Who is to judge that there has been no omission or distortion? Of course the consensus of physicists ought to be the deciding factor, but most physicists cannot be induced to take any interest in the matter. They have a horror of logic, and resent any attempt to show that their thought contains any logical element at all. In these circumstances every proposed "logic of science" is apt to be simply an attempt to answer the particular questions that interest its author.

It may be well therefore to indicate what questions my analysis will answer. Its great merit to my mind is that it renders intelligible the changes that physics has undergone during the last twenty years and, in particular, the apparent paradox that, during a period when (as we are constantly assured) the deepest foundations of the science have been destroyed, its pragmatic truth—its power of influencing the life of mankind—has been greater than ever before. To resolve that paradox we must distinguish between laws, on which alone the practical value of a science depends, and theories which, except in so far as they lead to the discovery of laws, have no practical value whatever.

Moreover, the analysis was originally based almost wholly on classical physics; it was complete while relativity had not gone beyond the "special" theory or quantum mechanics beyond Planckian oscillators. The development of these great theories, and the modifications of accepted routines that are at once its cause and its result, have followed precisely the lines that the analysis indicated as possible. The work of Minkowski and of Bohr, which rendered possible the transition from mechanical to mathematical theories, might have been conducted with the object of illustrating its principles. I cannot therefore help feeling that it may be of service to those numerous persons who, looking at science from the outside, appear to have found its recent history bewildering.

THE RELATIONS OF PHILOSOPHY

(Continuation of Article "An Approach to Philosophy," Vol. X, No. 37.)

PROFESSOR JARED S. MOORE

PHILOSOPHY, like some people, has many relations; and, as in the case of people with large family connections, it is possible to learn a good deal more about the nature of philosophy if we consider its relations with other members of the family to which it belongs. In this family are included, along with philosophy itself, two extremely important human interests, science and religion, all of which have a common concern in the fundamental problems of human experience, and attempt in various ways to satisfy man's need of adjusting himself to the universe which lies about him. Of these three related interests, Religion may be thought of as one of the parents of Philosophy, and the various Sciences as its children. As to the other parent, I suspect that its name is Art, and that all of these have Experience as their common progenitor. Eliminating metaphor, it is certainly true that experience is the instigator of all human activities, that religion and art are direct expressions or consequents of experience, and that philosophy and science are ways of elaborating and further developing experience and its consequents.

In the following sections of this paper, it shall be our endeavour to consider in turn the relations between philosophy and the sciences, philosophy and religion, and philosophy and the fine arts. Such a consideration involves in each case three questions: (1) What have these two types of interest in common? (2) How do they differ? and (3) How does each act upon the other?

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Philosophy and science are *alike* in their "impartial love of truth."¹ in their common *desire to know* for the sake of knowing. As has already been intimated, they are both ways of reflecting upon our experience for the purpose of gaining a better understanding thereof; attempts to understand life, as distinguished from merely enjoying or living it; theories about life, not ways of living.

In the early days of man's reflection upon his experience, these now distinct interests were indistinguishable: primitive science is also primitive philosophy, and the earlier chapters in books on the

¹ Brightman, *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 10.

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history of science and of philosophy are likely to cover much the same topics. But as time goes on we find some striking *differences* arising between them, which may now be considered under four successive heads: differences (1) as to scope, (2) as to their respective attitudes toward the universe, (3) as to their respective attitudes toward what is known as "the problem of reality," and (4) as to method.

(1) The simplest and most obvious distinction is that of *scope*, or inclusiveness of subject-matter. Every science is interested in some special portion of the universe, or some special aspect of experience: philosophy is interested in the universe as a whole, and in particular facts only in the light of the whole, or for the light which they may throw upon the nature of the whole. Thus we speak properly not so much of "science" as of "the sciences"; but we speak of "philosophy" in the singular number, and the special philosophical interests we call "branches of philosophy" or "philosophical disciplines." For example: among the sciences we have one, astronomy, interested in the various large bodies which make up the physical universe, and another, geology, which devotes itself to a more thorough study of that one cosmic body on which man happens to live; one science, botany, which studies plants, and another, zoology, which takes animals rather than plants for its subjects of investigation; one science, physics, to consider one set of material phenomena, and another, chemistry, to investigate another set of these phenomena; one science, physiology, to study the bodily aspect of human nature, and another, psychology, to study its mental aspect. As contrasted with these special fields, the philosopher, as Francis Bacon said of himself, "takes all knowledge for his province," and is, in the words of Plato, a "spectator of all time and of all existence."

When we consider this vast field which philosophy claims for its own—"the breadth of its scope," as we put it in our earlier article—we are not surprised that there should be such wide diversities of opinion among philosophers, even wider diversities than there are among scientists. In a small field of investigation one may hope to learn a great deal, but for a philosopher to pretend to any considerable knowledge of such a vast field as "reality in general" would be absurd. A difference of *intention*, then, arises: the scientist seeks for an intimate and detailed knowledge of his own selected field of experience: the philosopher seeks for a glimpse, and cannot expect ever to attain more than a glimpse, of the entire universe—a "synoptic view," as it is now often called, of the whole, ignoring the details.

(2) Another way in which philosophy and the sciences differ is in

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the *attitudes* they respectively take toward the universe which they both study, or the interest each has in that universe. On this point, science is interested in *facts* for their own sake, and in their causes: philosophy is interested in the *significance* of those facts for man—in ends, purposes, and values—rather than facts as such. In other words, science takes a detached, impersonal interest in things; whereas philosophy takes an intimate, personal interest in them. So, when the distinction is made, as it used to be made perhaps more commonly than it is now, between two great groups of studies in the educational curriculum—the sciences and the “humanities”—philosophy is always found, along with history, literature, and the arts, among the humanities.

In consequence of this diversity of interests, we find science and philosophy tending to view the world in very different ways. This difference is perhaps not so important as the others, and has not always obtained; but as science and philosophy have developed in the course of their history, the tendency in this direction is quite marked. The distinction may best be put in terms of the diverse *ideals* toward which science and philosophy respectively aim: the ideal of science is what is called a causal or *mechanistic* ideal, whereas the ideal of philosophy is a purposive or *teleological* one. By this is meant that the scientist thinks of the universe as like a vast machine in which everything that occurs has its definite causes and results, and seeks to discover in each case what these causes and effects are; whereas the philosopher inquires rather about the *purposes* of things—seeks to discover whether the world and the things and events in it have a purpose, and if so what that purpose is. For example, science has shown that everything evolves, and in a general kind of way *how* things evolve: the philosopher wants to know *why* things evolve in just the way they do, and what the goal of that evolution may be.

(3) A third distinction between philosophy and the sciences has to do with their respective attitudes toward what philosophers call “*the Problem of Reality*.” This is a distinctively philosophical problem—perhaps *the* central philosophical problem—in which scientists as such have no interest. Science, as it is often said, is interested solely in “*phenomena*”—i.e. things as they appear: philosophy is interested in *reality*—i.e. things as they really are. It is extremely important that we make this distinction especially clear, if we are to avoid serious misunderstanding; and first let us explain what is meant by a “phenomenon,” for this is one of the most important of philosophical as well as scientific terms.

Literally a phenomenon is an appearance (from the Greek φαίνω, I show, shine, or appear). As the term is used technically in English, it stands for anything that appears to the human mind—whether to

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the senses (material or physical phenomena), or to introspection (mental or psychical phenomena). Even those imperceptible particles of matter which physics infers from what it perceives—electrons, neutrons, etc.—are in this sense phenomena, since they appear to the human reason if not to the senses, as underlying that which does appear to the senses. In popular usage the word is often restricted to what is unusual or exceptional in nature: the ordinary person would not hesitate to call a total eclipse of the sun or a five-legged calf a phenomenon, but would never think of applying the term to the daily shining of the sun in the heavens or to a calf with the normal number of legs; and yet these latter are just as much “phenomena” as the former. The phenomena of nature, then, are just the facts of nature; and for all ordinary purposes “phenomenon” and “fact,” “object,” or “thing” may be regarded as virtually synonymous terms, though a philosopher interested in words might not be willing to take them as absolutely identical in meaning.

Now when we say that science is interested in phenomena or appearances and philosophy in reality, let us not make the mistake of supposing that the scientist would for a moment admit that his phenomena are *unreal*, or that they are *merely* appearances: the point is simply that the scientist as such is *not interested* in the question of the nature of reality, but merely in things as they present themselves to his investigating consciousness. But that is the very thing in which the philosopher—and the scientist too *when he philosophizes* (as scientists nowadays frequently do)—*is* interested. In fact, as we said above, the “problem of reality” is in many ways the central philosophical problem—the problem, namely, of whether or not phenomena “really are” what they appear to be, the problem of what is the true relation between appearance and reality. Science, on the contrary, is not interested in this question one way or the other. And it is because of this special interest that we praised philosophy in our previous article for the “depth of its foundations.”

(4) Finally, one of the most characteristic distinctions between philosophy and science as we find them to-day is the distinction of *method*. Every science bases its conclusions on careful observation, under experimental conditions when possible, and arrives at them by generalizing from the facts thus observed according to the method of reasoning known as “induction”: the philosopher attempts, on the basis of the results obtained by all the sciences, and also from such other sources as religious and aesthetic experiences, to attain through reasoning a “synoptic view” of reality in its wholeness. The subject of philosophical method is so important that it deserves separate consideration at some other time, but in the present context this must suffice.

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The various distinctions above drawn may become clearer if we illustrate them as they apply to the problems of *psychology*. When we hear this word to-day we naturally think of a science concerned with a specific group of phenomena, but this was not always the case. By derivation, psychology is the study of the soul, and yet rarely indeed in any present-day psychological treatise will one find any mention of the soul whatever. In other words, originally psychology was a branch of philosophy concerned with the question of the nature, origin, and destiny of the soul; whereas now, at least as ordinarily understood, it is a distinct science concerned with the phenomena of mental life or of human behaviour. And yet as a matter of fact both sets of problems are of as vital importance to-day as they ever were, and the term "psychology" has a philosophical as well as a scientific significance. As *science*, then, and in the usual meaning of the term, psychology is concerned, let us say, with the phenomena of mental life, *how* the mind *works*, what the "laws" of human behaviour are; whereas *philosophical* psychology is concerned with the question as to *what* the mind *is*, the nature of the self or of personality, the relation between the mind and the body, and the relation between the mind of man and the universe beyond him.

Having considered the resemblances and differences between philosophy and the sciences, we come now to the subject of their *interdependence*. How does each act upon the other? What does each contribute to the work of the other? For the relation is a mutual one, and may be taken up from each side successively.

First, then, what do the sciences contribute to philosophy? Well, if science is concerned with facts, and philosophy with their interpretation, the answer is fairly simple: science contributes the facts which philosophy endeavours to interpret, the materials with which philosophy works. In this, philosophy is entirely dependent on the sciences. In former times philosophers were sadly inclined to forget this, and to formulate out of their own *a priori* thinking—i.e. thinking independently of observational knowledge—what they called "philosophies of nature" which quite ignored any obligation of being, as we would now say, scientific. The two great German philosophers of a century ago, Schelling and Hegel, were notorious offenders in this matter. The natural consequence of this was to arouse considerable antagonism to philosophy on the part of scientists—an antagonism which unfortunately persists even to the present day in some quarters, though happily this becomes less and less as time goes on. Really there is no excuse for such antagonism to-day, since all philosophers of any importance now fully recognize their dependence on science, and many scientists are themselves much interested in the philosophical significance of their own work: in fact, any scientist

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who is contemptuous or apprehensive of philosophy to-day is simply a century behind the times on this matter; however up to date or ahead of it he may be in his own field!

But there is another side to this relationship, the contribution of philosophy to the sciences, which cannot be stated quite so simply. As we saw in our previous article, philosophy is not so much (as is science) a "body of conclusions" based on observations as a "spirit or method of approaching experience";¹ and it is much easier to define a body than it is a spirit. And yet, though every scientist works in a limited field on a limited "body" of facts, it is perfectly possible for him to carry on his investigations in a broad philosophical "spirit," keeping ever in mind the great truth of the unity of all knowledge, the interrelation of all the various specific fields. Perhaps we may say, then, on this side of our general question, that philosophy contributes breadth and depth to science. And yet there is much more to be said about this.

As these two intellectual interests have developed, philosophy has come to appropriate to itself three specific functions in relation to science. These functions are: (1) to unify the results of the various sciences into a single comprehensive system; (2) to investigate the methods common to all the sciences; and (3) to analyse critically the fundamental concepts and assumptions of the sciences. Let us elaborate these points. (1) If each science covers but a limited field of knowledge, and yet if all knowledge is interrelated, there must be some discipline whose duty it shall be to coordinate and so far as possible unify these various fields; and that function most naturally falls within the purview of philosophy. (2) Every science has its own distinctive methods of working its own particular field, and yet there is a general "scientific method" or way of working which is common to all the sciences, and it becomes natural for philosophy to take upon itself the study of these common methods: this particular philosophical interest is often called "methodology," and is usually regarded as a branch of logic. (3) Every science makes use of certain concepts peculiar to itself (e.g. the concept of igneous rocks in geology, or of memory in psychology), and it is the function and duty of each science to formulate and develop its own distinctive concepts; and yet there are also a number of more general concepts which are common to all or to large groups of sciences—such concepts, for example, as cause, natural law, matter, life, mind, etc.—and which it is one of the functions of philosophy to analyse and define. In connection with this last service also there are certain assumptions that the scientist makes in the use of these concepts, and these the philosopher must examine to the end of justifying (or the reverse) and clarifying them—such as the assumption that every event has a cause, that life is found only in connection with some material organism, etc. Professor

¹ The quotations are from Brightman's *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 7.

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C. D. Broad has proposed to give the special name of "Critical Philosophy" to this part of the philosopher's programme.¹

The three functions just described constitute together what is now most commonly designated the "Philosophy of Science." Some scholars—positivists, as they are called—would restrict philosophy entirely to these, and compel it to give up the attempt to do anything more than unify the results, study the common methods, and analyse the common concepts, of the various sciences. But this is entirely too limited a view of the place of philosophy in the world, since over and above these purely scientific interests and problems there are many *ultra-scientific* interests and problems which carry us far beyond even the vast field of all the sciences taken together, and these the true philosopher cannot ignore. These include problems about the "meanings, purposes, and values" of the facts and truths which science has discovered for us, the nature and implications of religious experience, and the nature and implications of aesthetic experience—i.e. the experience of the artist and the art- and nature-lover. Philosophy in its wholeness, then, attempts to correlate not merely the various fields of scientific experience, but *all* types of experience, into a single world-view: in other words, in Broad's terminology, philosophy has a "speculative" as well as a "critical" function (*loc. cit.*).

Before leaving the subject of philosophy and the sciences, there is a closely related topic to which we must give our attention. This is the question as to the distinction between philosophical and scientific knowledge on the one hand, and the knowledge of the ordinary person—the "plain man," or "man in the street," as philosophers like to call him—on the other; or between philosophy, science, and "common sense," as it is often now called.

The simplest account of this distinction is that presented by Herbert Spencer, the noted philosopher of evolution, in his work entitled *First Principles of a New System of Philosophy* (first edition, 1862). As Spencer therein regards these three types of knowledge, they differ from one another solely in the *degree* to which they respectively unify our understanding of the world; common sense, he says, or, as he calls it, "knowledge of the lowest kind is *un-unified* knowledge; Science is *partially-unified* knowledge; Philosophy is *completely-unified* knowledge" (*op. cit.*, § 37). From what has just been said on these matters it can be readily seen that here Spencer is adopting the positivistic position that philosophy is simply the system of all the sciences, and this position has already been rejected. But more important is it for us to note that in this analysis Spencer ignores any possibility of the second distinction between philosophy

¹ See his article in *Contemporary British Philosophy*, First Series (The Macmillan Company, 1924).

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and the sciences which we drew above—viz. the distinction in their respective attitudes toward the world: for Spencer, there is no such distinction in attitude, but the difference between common sense, science, and philosophy is merely one of degree.

The late George Stuart Fullerton, of Columbia University, in the second chapter of his valuable *Introduction to Philosophy*, has put us in his debt by calling attention to this question of attitudes. As he sees the matter, science differs from "common thought" only in degree—its greater degree of accuracy, thoroughness, and systematization; but philosophy, or "reflective thought," as he calls it, presents an entirely different *kind* of view of the world, or takes an entirely different attitude toward it. According to his account, when we study science we do not in any sense leave behind us the world of ordinary experience, but merely examine that world more carefully and more thoroughly; but as soon as we begin to philosophize we find ourselves in quite another atmosphere, and "the real world in which we all rejoice" seems "to dissolve and disappear" (*op. cit.*, page 30).

Here we have two quite different reports as to the distinction between common sense, science, and philosophy: for Spencer they differ merely in degree; for Fullerton, common sense and science differ only in degree, but philosophy differs from both the others in point of view. Which of these is right? Or is the true theory different from either of these? Which is really nearer to common sense in its attitude toward the world, science or philosophy? That there is a large degree of truth in both the Spencerian and the Fullertonian accounts is, I think, unquestionable, and yet perhaps neither quite touches on the heart of the matter. Certainly the world of ordinary experience is a world of values and purposes as is the world of philosophy, not merely a world of facts and causes as is the world of science. Both philosophy and common sense take the world in its concrete wholeness, whereas science abstracts and mechanizes. It would seem, then, that we should on the whole regard the attitude of the philosopher as the same as that of the plain man, as contrasted with the more abstract and artificial attitude of the scientist. That is to say, paraphrasing William James,¹ philosophy is merely a more persistent attempt to understand the world of common sense.

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION.²

The relation of philosophy to religion can be best made clear if we

¹ *Psychology, Briefer Course*, p. 461.

² By religion, as the term is here used, is to be understood that human activity in which man feels himself to be in personal contact with a personal Deity. This is not intended as a comprehensive definition applicable to anything that anyone might call religion, but a statement of how the term as used in this article is to be understood.

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inquire first as to the ways in which religion is allied to philosophy and distinguished from science, and then as to how religion differs from both philosophy and science.

On the first point, I think that if we rehearse the various contrasts already drawn between philosophy and the sciences we shall find religion on the side of philosophy—that is to say, that *religion is like philosophy and unlike science in all the ways in which philosophy and the sciences were distinguished above*. In other words, taking into the account the position of common sense, the attitude of religion, like that of philosophy and unlike that of science, is the attitude of common sense. We shall now proceed to draw our comparisons, though in doing so we shall not follow quite the same order of points as we did in our previous section.

Religion, we find, is (1) interested in the *significance* and *value* of things for man, rather than in facts for their own sake; and (2) views the world, not as a system of causally related phenomena, but as an instrument of a *divine purpose*. That is to say, religion, like philosophy, takes the *teleological* rather than the mechanistic attitude toward the world. If these two points had always been taken into consideration, many famous "conflicts between religion and science" might have been avoided. Let us recall the two great scientific conceptions which brought about the most important of these so-called conflicts—the Copernican theory propounded in the sixteenth century, and the Darwinian theory propounded in the nineteenth.

Copernicus showed that the earth on which we live, instead of being the centre of the universe, with the sun and planets revolving about it (the Ptolemaic view), is really itself but one of the planets revolving about the sun as *their* centre. Which of these two views of the relation between the earth and the sun is correct is a question of *fact*, a question of *science*; and quite regardless of the still newer view of Professor Einstein and the relativists on this matter, the scientific truth undoubtedly lies on the side of Copernicus. But what has all this to do with religion? What possible difference can it make to man in his spiritual relations with God whether the sun revolves around the earth or the earth revolves around the sun? The question really has no "significance and value for man," and so, properly understood, is not a religious question at all. If the Church in the sixteenth century had realized this, much trouble and disaster could have been avoided.

Similarly as to the Darwinian theory of the origin of man. What difference can it make to religion whether God created man directly, or brought the human species into existence through descent from other animal species? The doctrine of evolution is an attempt to explain *how* man came into existence, the natural *causes* which brought him about: it is, therefore, a purely *scientific* theory, and has

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no significance one way or the other for religion. True, the religious view of the world implies that man owes his origin to God, that God is "Creator" of the universe and all things therein; but its *primary* implication is that God brought man into the world for a *purpose*, and *how* this result was accomplished makes no difference whatever to religion.

Continuing with our comparison, two other points remain to be considered. Religion, like philosophy but unlike science, is interested (3) in *reality as a whole*, rather than in any particular portion of it; and is interested (4) in *reality as distinguished from phenomena*. As illustrative of the former point it may be noted that religion has often actually been *defined* as the attitude which a man takes toward the universe as a whole, and God as the "Universal Being"; and the common designation of God as the "Supreme Being" corroborates the truth that for religion He is the ultimate reality of the universe, and in no sense a "phenomenon."

The above comparisons, therefore, seem to indicate the alignment of religion with philosophy rather than with science. But there are other ways in which religion is as sharply distinguished from philosophy as it is from science; and we pass now to a consideration of these.

Religion is unlike both philosophy and science (1) in that it is a *way of living*, whereas philosophy and science are *theories* about life. In other words, the aim of philosophy and science is knowledge: the aim of religion is personal fellowship with God and the inspiration of daily life. Philosophy and science take a purely intellectual interest in the world: religion takes an emotional and practical interest in it. Philosophy and science appeal to the intellect alone—the "head," as we sometimes say: religion appeals primarily to the "heart" and the will. In all these points (or, rather, ways of elucidating the one point), the close relation which subsists between religion and *morality* is evident—religion as concerned with man's vital relations with God, and morality with right living in purely human affairs. In its essential nature, then, religion is not to be thought of as belonging in the same class with philosophy at all, any more than with science; but rather with morality and ordinary living. As brought out in our earlier article, it is a way of living rather than a way of understanding life.

But in drawing this contrast it is to be noted that we have not anywhere denied that religion *does* have an interest in knowledge. Philosophy and science, we said, "take a *purely* intellectual interest in the world," appeal to the intellect *alone*"; whereas religion "appeals *primarily*," not solely, to "the heart and the will." Properly speaking, religion is something that appeals to *all* sides of human

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nature, takes man in his concrete wholeness; though its *emphasis* is on the emotional and practical sides of that nature, whereas philosophy and science are *purely* intellectual pursuits. All worthwhile religion must be *based* on knowledge, if it is not to degenerate into mere sentimentalism—a morbid and unintelligent gush of emotion. Recognition of the importance of such an intellectual basis for religion has led to the production of various systems of *theology*, which attempt to formulate and organize the concepts and propositions which underlie the practice of religion. Theology, then, belongs with science and philosophy among the intellectual disciplines which engage the interest of men: it is an essential basis for any worthwhile religion, but must never be identified or confused with religion.

As to the *function of knowledge*, then, there is a second way in which religion differs from both philosophy and the sciences: (2) religion is life, and knowledge is merely *instrumental* to it; whereas for philosophy and science, knowledge is an *end in itself*. Furthermore, there is a difference as to the *method* by which knowledge is attained in the two fields: (3) philosophical and scientific knowledge is of the type known as *discursive*—i.e. the result of reflection, reasoned out, argued about; whereas religious knowledge is *intuitive*—i.e. direct, immediate, the result of experience aided by faith. In this latter point again religion is seen to be allied to ordinary life; for in both the spiritual and the material fields we live by experience and not by reasoning, however different the experience may be in the two cases. But science and philosophy are “rational inquiries” into the implications of those experiences.

Finally, (4) religion is a concern of *individuals*—man and God, and the relation between them: philosophy and science are concerned with *universals*—concepts, classes of things, “laws.” In making this distinction, however, we must take care not to make the mistake of thinking of religion as concerned with individuals in their isolation—God and my own soul only; but rather as concerned with *all* men, with individuals as *social*, not as solitary, beings. For just as without an intelligent background religion becomes one-sidedly sentimental, so without a consideration for others it becomes purely selfish.

We are now ready to consider the *interdependence* of philosophy and religion. As in the case of philosophy and science, each contributes to the other.

Religion, like science, contributes data for philosophy to work upon. As we saw above, though philosophy is greatly dependent upon science for its materials, it is not limited in this dependence upon science alone, but must take into consideration other types of experience besides that upon which science itself is based. The data

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of religion, then, are as important as those of science, as materials for a complete philosophy.

Conversely, philosophy contributes strength and depth to the beliefs of religion—strengthens them by giving them a firmer intellectual foundation and so saving religion from sentimentalism. It must be acknowledged, of course, that often the effect of the study of philosophy is to weaken rather than to strengthen one's religious beliefs; but this, I am convinced, is because one has not gone deeply enough in his study of the implications of experience. Francis Bacon the philosopher and Alexander Pope the poet agree in their advice on this matter. "It is true," says Bacon, "that a little philosophy inclineth man's mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth man's mind about to religion." And to this the poet adds, in a familiar couplet:

A little learning is a dangerous thing;
Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring.

A brief study of philosophical problems cannot, it is true, carry us very far or very deep; but we can at least be warned against jumping to conclusions!

PHILOSOPHY AND THE FINE ARTS

Under the expression "fine arts" are to be understood such human productions as poems, musical compositions, pictures, statues, buildings, etc.—works which are intended to be beautiful, or enjoyable merely in the contemplation of them, quite apart from any usefulness they may have as instruments of some end beyond themselves. A building, for example, may be useful as a residence or as a house of worship, or a vase as something to hold flowers in; and yet it may give one pleasure just to look at such an object without making any use of it whatever. And as for pictures, statues, poems, and pieces of music, they may be utterly useless, and yet tremendously enjoyable to look at or listen to.

It is a curious fact that though practically all writers on the general problems of philosophy discuss at length the relations between philosophy and the sciences, and though most of these give considerable attention also to the relations between philosophy and religion, the parallel question regarding philosophy and the fine arts is apt to be entirely neglected, and the only art which seems ever even to be mentioned in this connection is poetry. Now we can easily understand why poetry should be favoured above the other arts in this matter, and shall later give special consideration to this relationship; but the broader question is quite as important as any which we have yet discussed.

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At the outset let it be agreed that many works of art seem to have no philosophical significance whatever, and so do not bear upon our problem. Many paintings, for example, are mere patterns in line and colour, many poems or pieces of music merely rhythmic sequences of tones or articulate sounds. But notwithstanding this, there is a vast field of art which does have philosophical significance (such as, for example, the types of poetry known as "reflective" and "didactic" poetry), and if we examine these works I think we shall find that, like religion, they manifest the *same point of view as technical philosophy* as distinguished from that of science—i.e. interest in *meanings, purposes, and values*; in the *synoptic* view of things; and in *reality* as distinguished from mere appearances. Much fine art *is*, as we have just acknowledged, a matter of "surface appearance," as it is sometimes called—sensuous patterns, reflections of light, etc.; but the more profound forms go far beneath this surface into the inner meanings of things. And even when a given work is concerned entirely with surface appearances, its *beauty*, even if merely sensuous beauty, is not merely a *fact* about a picture or a poem—as is, for example, the fact that the picture is painted in oils, or that the poem is composed in iambic hexameters—but a *value* which the work has for an appreciative observer or reader.

It is this relationship that Aristotle had in mind when he said, "poetry is more philosophical than history." In this saying, "poetry" is used as representative of all that we have called the fine arts, and "history" is synonymous with all the merely descriptive sciences; and the proposition asserts (among other things which do not now concern us), as we have done, that of these three interests, art is nearer to philosophy than is science.

As in our earlier section we instituted a comparison between the ordinary person, the scientist, and the philosopher in the matter of knowledge; so now let us similarly illustrate the respective attitudes of these three types of individuals toward nature, making use of two familiar poems for this purpose.

The plain man is well represented by *Peter Bell*, of whom Wordsworth tells us

A primrose by a river's brim
A yellow primrose was to him,
And it was nothing more.

He had always called that yellow thing that grew by the side of the river a primrose. His father had always called it that before he was born, and *his* father before him, so why make a fuss about it!

The botanist tells us a good deal more about it. In the first place, he does not call it simply a yellow primrose, but gives it a far more

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impressive name—*Primula vulgaris*, of the family *Primulaceae*. It has spoon-shaped, deeply veined leaves, he tells us, and bears its blossoms on single-flowered scapes. Its corolla is salver-shaped, divided into five lobes, with five stamens included. He groups it among the gamopetalous angiospermae, and traces its origin for us to more primitive forms. And when he is through, we sigh, thank him graciously, and say, not unlike Peter Bell, "well, what of it after all!"

Then comes the philosopher, with his synoptic viewpoint, and exclaims with Tennyson,

Flower in the crannied wall,
I pluck you out of the crannies,
I hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
Little flower—but if I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all in all,
I should know what God and man is.

And even though it is true that many philosophers would repudiate any literal acceptance of the ideas expressed in this poem, the lines nevertheless represent a philosophical, as distinguished from an ordinary or a scientific attitude toward nature. The philosopher does not simply accept the flower without asking questions, nor does he merely try to tell us all the facts that he can discover about it, but he asks about its *meaning* and its place in the universe. And, be it noted, it is the ordinary and the philosophical points of view that most naturally find expression in poetry—the botanist would find the language of the artist quite inappropriate for expressing what he has to say.

Now let us see *how philosophy and fine art differ*. Most essentially they differ (1) as to the *Ideal* at which each aims, the supreme value by which each is estimated. For philosophy (as also for science and for religion) this ideal is *Truth*, which by nature expresses itself in propositions: for fine art the ideal is *Beauty*, whose nature it is to express itself in material forms—words, tones, colours, masses, etc. There are a number of profound concepts of the human mind which are of interest alike to the philosopher and the artist—Life, Death, Love, Nature, God. These are distinctly philosophical ideas, and yet the mere naming of them will recall to the thoughtful reader at once any number of instances of works of art which have taken one or more of these ideas as their subject. We may mention, for example, Hamlet's famous soliloquy on life and death; or the representations of the conflict between love and death in the painting by G. F. Watts denominated *Love and Death*, and in the music of Wagner's great lyric drama, *Tristan und Isolde*, especially the closing passage.

And yet see how differently philosopher and artist *treat* these great

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themes. In each case the philosopher is interested *solely* in the ideas themselves, the artist is interested *also* in their material expression. Both are interested in the ideas; but whereas this is the philosopher's *sole* concern, it is *also* a concern of the artist to express these ideas in outwardly pleasing forms. In Watts's picture, for example, the conflict between love and death is symbolized by two figures—one tall and fully draped, its features hidden, representing Death, forcing his way through a door; and the other, Love, represented by a naked youth facing the observer, and trying vainly with outstretched arm to prevent his opponent from accomplishing his purpose. All this is done "beautifully," as we say, through intrinsically pleasing lines, colours, and representations of natural objects; and the artist is at least as interested in these outward forms as he is in the ideas symbolized thereby.

A philosophical theory, therefore, is a system of abstract ideas (concepts or "universals") *only*: though the philosopher must needs use outward forms (words) to record and communicate these ideas, these words are not parts of the theory, but expressions of it merely. A work of art, on the other hand, is a system of ideas expressed in concrete material form: the ideas may be abstract universals (love, death, etc.), but they are symbolized by means of concrete individuals (as the two figures in Watts's picture); and these outward forms are actually elements in the work of art itself.

A second distinction between philosophy and fine art parallels the third one drawn above between philosophy and religion, viz.: (2) philosophy, like science, is *reflective*—a matter of reasoning and argument; fine art, like religion (and common sense), is *intuitive*—a matter of imagination ("insight," "vision") rather than reasoning, an expression of feeling rather than of intellectual argument. In the words of Browning's *Abt Vogler*,

The rest may reason and welcome: 'tis we musicians know.

Philosophers may argue and confute one another, scientists may analyse and classify; but through it all the artist, the poet, the musician, like the mystic and the man of faith, remains serene and confident—he sees for himself, he *knows*!

At the beginning of this section it was pointed out that of the various fine arts, *poetry* is the one most closely allied to philosophy. The reason for this is clear enough—that both philosophy and poetry make use of *words* as their media of expression. Many great men of past and present combine the two interests of philosopher and poet—notably Lucretius the ancient Roman, Dante the medieval Italian, and Goethe the modern German—called by George Santayana, himself a poet as well as a philosopher, the "Three Philosophical

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Poets," and discussed by him in a book by that title. Of more recent poets of the English tongue we recall especially, perhaps, such ones as Robert Browning and Ralph Waldo Emerson. All of these, with the possible exception of Lucretius,¹ we think of as primarily poets, but poets of a distinctly philosophical type of mind.

Then there are those others whom we think of as philosophers first of all, but philosophers of a lyrical type, noted as much for their literary style as for their philosophical ideas: most honoured for his supremacy in this combination of excellences is Plato, whose dialogues are literary as well as philosophical masterpieces; and among contemporary writers, Mr. Santayana, already cited for his book on the three poet-philosophers, should certainly be included in the same category. In contrast to such philosophers as Plato and Santayana one thinks of their equally great respective contemporaries, Aristotle² and Whitehead,³ as pre-eminent in the field of thought, but hardly so in the field of letters. Similar contrasts might be drawn between such alluring writers as Descartes and Berkeley on the one hand, and the more formal Spinoza and Kant on the other; or, among the great German followers of Kant, the literary Schopenhauer and the profound but far from charming Hegel. It is true that none of the philosophers named in the present paragraph couched their ideas in the language of verse; but prose literature at its best is also a fine art, and thinkers who are able to present their thoughts in attractive prose deserve, along with their poetical brethren, to be called artists.

Taking poetry, then, as the fine art nearest allied to philosophy, what are the outstanding *differences* between these? These differences will, of course, be merely applications of the differences already noted between philosophy and the fine arts in general to the specific conditions of the distinctive medium of poetry—i.e. differences in the use of words. (1) To the poet, words are essential elements of his art, ends in themselves as well as means of conveying ideas; whereas to the philosopher they are means only—necessary for recording and communicating his ideas, but of no interest in themselves. As a natural consequence of this distinction there follows another: (2) the

¹ It is hard to say whether we should call Lucretius a "philosophical poet" or a "poet philosopher." The present writer would rather prefer to say the latter—that, apart from some of the earliest philosophers, who also wrote metrically, Lucretius is the one example in history of a philosopher of the first rank who presented his ideas in masterly verse.

² At least this is true of the main body of the works of Aristotle which have survived. We are told, however, that he did write other works of real literary quality.

³ I do not, of course, mean for a moment to deny that Professor Whitehead's writings often do possess real literary charm, when their author is not taking his duties as a philosopher too seriously.

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philosophical poet endeavours to express his ideas in as beautiful forms (words and sequences of words) as possible, when necessary sacrificing accuracy and systematic presentation to style and emotional expression; whereas the technical philosopher makes truth his chief concern, even at the expense of style and emotional appeal. Because of this contrast in aim and emphasis, verse, with its extensive use of concrete imagery, is the preferred medium of the former type of writer; whereas the language of the technical philosopher tends to be decidedly "prosaic" (not to say, "prosy") and abstract.

On the matter of the *interdependence* of philosophy and fine art nothing novel appears to be said, since the situation here is precisely analogous to that between philosophy and religion. Aesthetic experience—the experience of the artist, the art lover, and the lover of nature—like religious experience, contributes data for the philosopher to develop; and, conversely, as we have seen all along, philosophy contributes profound ideas to the artist, and without philosophy art might easily fall into triviality. But on the whole it must be confessed that this interrelation is not so important as in the cases of science and of religion.

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN GERMANY

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

It is not the purpose of a Survey to give a detailed analysis of certain books like a single review, but rather to draw the attention of the reader to works of some importance and use to him, and to indicate, if possible, some general trends of thought of to-day. Whereas our last survey was devoted to Philosophy of History, we take under review to-day some books on the Philosophy of Nature, that is philosophy of physics, chemistry, and biology, and we finish with some historical books on the subject.

In doing so, we notice first of all a quite different situation. While Philosophy of History, still in its Pre-Copernican stage, tries to establish a real basis and to find fundamental notions of history, the philosophy of physics is faced with different problems. Here, on the contrary, the traditional concepts, derived from a former stage of physics and established in the classical system of modern physics and in the corresponding philosophical systems from Descartes to Kant and their followers, are no longer valid. The internal transformation of physics is so far-reaching that philosophers are at a loss to know either what to make of it or how to keep their old standpoint and concepts, accommodating them to the new situation in physics, or finally how to change their own point of view.

There is no better introduction into the present situation of physics than A. Einstein's and L. Infeld's new book,¹ which gives a thrilling account of the dramatic development of modern physics from Galileo up to the present. It is philosophically important because it concentrates on the chief internal philosophical impulses and intuitions at work in modern physics. It starts with Galileo and with the development and well-known breakdown of Mechanism (cp. *Our New Pathways in Philosophy*, Leipzig, 1929, pp. 124 ff.). In Einstein's view the new and revolutionary idea replacing the old substance-idea is the conception of the *field*. Faraday, Maxwell, and Hertz laid the foundation of a new programme of field-physics which, however, has been only partly realized owing to the impossibility of excluding the concept of matter. Out of this field-physics the problem of the theory of *relativity* arose. It is a well-known fact that in this theory a second set of absolute entities, those of absolute time and space, have been replaced by new concepts. But the interesting point is that the general theory of relativity in putting the problem of the formulation of laws which are invariant regarding all possible co-ordinate-systems, is much closer to the classical theory than seemed to be the case at the time of its first appearance. In fact the development of physics is seen here not as the destruction of one theory by another, but rather as a wider generalization embracing the earlier form. Nature is here still the unity of invariant laws which, though changing their form in different systems of co-ordinates, are nevertheless identical. Thus the concept of substance persists in the notion of absolute law. But this unity of nature and this concept of law is just what is questioned in the much more revolutionary

¹ *Physik als Abenteuer der Erkenntnis*, A. W. Sijthoff, Leiden, 1938.

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quantum mechanics. The origin of two kinds of interpretations (the wave and the corpuscular interpretation), the impossibility of describing atomic individual events as objective happenings in space-time and the introduction of statistical laws are very well described. The book is very useful to the philosopher because it gives him first-hand knowledge of the essential points in modern physics, and because it enables him to see the important role of basic ideas in the building up of physical theories which are described here as free creations of the human mind.

Perhaps one could wish to hear more about the problems arising from quantum mechanics. Nevertheless, a *new stage of disharmony* is revealed full of difficult and fruitful problems which may be easily misinterpreted. It is astonishing that the physicists do not say a single word about the problem which puzzles the philosophers most, the problem of causality and quantum mechanics.

For this reason the book of E. Cassirer, *Determinism and Indeterminism in modern physics*,¹ is rather helpful. Just as he tried to show in his earlier books on *Substance and Function* and *Einstein's Theory of Relativity* that Post-Kantian physics are not incompatible with a Neo-Kantian interpretation, so he tries here to execute the corresponding task with quantum mechanics. The material of the different chapters (The Principle of Causality in Classical Physics, Causality and Probability, Causality and Quantum Mechanics . . .) is, as in all of the author's books, abundant, including critical reviews of the most important papers on the subject. Cassirer's solution is as follows. It is impossible to reconcile Kant's treatment of the law of causality as a principle of the pure understanding, or as a constitutive principle of our knowledge of nature with the conclusions of quantum mechanics. Consequently he regards this law as merely regulative, or as a "postulate of empirical thought" belonging to the sphere of "modality." As a law, no more concerning events or things but our knowledge of them, it only means that the process of transforming observed data into exact quantitative statements, and these into functional equations, and their final unification into one system of physical knowledge, is possible. The special principle of causality of quantum mechanics may be taken in Heisenberg's formulation which says that, if at any time certain physical quantities are measured as exactly as possible, then at each other time quantities exist which may be exactly measured, i.e. for which the result of measurement may be predicted in a precise manner.

It is interesting to compare C.'s results with Grete Hermann's:² *Concerning the basis of physical propositions in classical and modern theories*. Her view is that here, as in the theory of relativity, the old concepts are not displaced, but only their unequivocal (eindeutige) application suspended, necessitating the abandonment of an unequivocal interpretation of nature. Worth comparing are, further, the *Proceedings of the second international congress for the unity of sciences* (Copenhagen, 1936), which was wholly devoted to the principle of causality. Here Niels Bohr develops his theory that the ideal of causality ought to be replaced by the point of view of complementarity (Komplementarität). Perhaps still more interesting are the attempts of Martin Strauss to formulate Bohr's distinctions in form of logical syntax. He, following Wittgenstein and Carnap, tries to interpret the causal principle as a syntactical proposition regarding the logical structure of theory, and only as an indirect statement about nature. In defining complementarity through a

¹ *Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der modernen Physik*, Wettergren u. Kerber, Göteborg, 1937.

² *Abhandlungen der Fries'schen Schule*, N.F., vol. vi, parts 3-4, Berlin, Verlag Öffentliches Leben, 1937.

³ *Erkenntnis*, vol. vi, parts 5-6, Meiner, Leipzig, 1937.

formula of J. v. Neumann's quantum mechanical transformation theory, he arrives at a new kind of scientific determinism. He states that the inapplicability of the classical form of causality has nothing to do with indeterminism in the usual sense of the word, but is a consequence of the complementarity. Thus in a remarkable manner these interpretations, like those of Planck, Einstein, and Louis de Broglie (*Travaux du IX^e Congr. Int. d. Philos.*, Paris, 1937), come to the same negative conclusion that there is no indeterminism in physics. But the causal problem itself remains unsolved and complicated. It demands probably more than a mere formal transformation of the principle of causality, namely, a change of our epistemological attitude towards nature, and probably a change of logic also. The principle of causality, even if merely regulative, cannot be a modal principle (because the problems of possibility, reality, and necessity are specific and not to be identified with the problem of reason). On the other hand, it loses its specific meaning if identified with the tendency towards a systematic unity of our knowledge. Real problems are not solved if they are replaced by others (thus Mach did not give a solution by replacing *causality* by *function*). The problem of causality cannot be solved if not taken as part of the wider problem of "reason" (Grund), and without distinguishing different meanings of reason. The confusion of the problem regarding quantum mechanics seems to arise from the fact that two different meanings of reason, *ratio essendi* and *ratio cognoscendi* are not distinguished. That we are not able to follow the fate of a single atom or determine at the same time its space-time and velocity only means that we arrive at the limit of the method of *ratio cognoscendi*, and that if we try to describe this sphere in terms of the concepts of macro-physics we are mistaken. But it does not mean that there is no *ratio essendi* of any kind. The philosophically most important consequences of this theory are the demands for a transformation of our concept of the law of nature and of logic. I may perhaps draw the attention of the reader to a paper of Gonseth on the law of nature and to another one of Zygmunt Zawirski, who tries to apply in an interesting manner Lukaszewicz's logic of more than two values (*mehrwertige Logik*) to the problem concerned (both in *Erkenntnis*, vol. vi).

Alwin Mittasch's book on *Catalysis and Determinism*¹ leads into a different, but still cognate, field, namely, into the philosophy of chemistry. Causality figures again as the central problem. His general thesis is that causality as a form of synthetic order of our impressions after the principle of cause and effect assumes different forms corresponding to various levels of being. M. distinguishes a material causality of preservation (E.K.), an impulse causality (Anstoss-Kausalität; A.K., a causality initiating certain evolutions), the physiological—biological stimulus—causality (R.K.), the totality-causality likewise biological (G.K.), the psycho-physical and psychical causality (S.K.), all of which are embraced in a universal causality with plan and aim (N.K.). His special thesis is that chemical catalysis is a special kind of impulse-causality. This general scheme, I admit, is very rough, but nevertheless not without interest. His chief idea that we must formulate the principle of causality in a different manner according to different objects is not new, it is the central idea of Schopenhauer's important essay *On the fourfold root of the principle of sufficient reason*. It is moreover the basis of Aristotle's distinction of the different meanings of *aitia*. New only is its application to the present stage of science. But it is not worth while to explain his distinctions because they are not exact enough.

The most interesting part is that on catalysis, because Mittasch is an authority on this subject, and has published several books and papers on

¹ *Katalyse und Determinismus*, Springer, Berlin, 1938.

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catalysis in chemistry and biology. It is astonishing that the phenomenon itself is ambiguous. We often hear, say: Do not interpret, describe, and explain. Dilthey even believed the methods of natural science to be description and explanation, that of history interpretation. Now Berzelius sees the chief characteristic of a catalyser in its causing chemical processes which would not occur without it, others see it in its exercising an accelerating influence. M. introduces a new point of view defining catalysers as determining direction and velocity of chemical reactions (he means by direction the choice of a specific reaction).

This definition or this interpretation of the phenomenon induces M. to introduce a new kind of *catalytic causality*. I discuss only this point, which is of some philosophical importance, recommending the pages on the different kinds of catalysis, and on the special form of its reaction to the especially interested reader. M. believes chemical causality to be a typical preservation-causality finding its complement in the catalytic impulse-causality. Now, I am afraid, I must disappoint the author. For he does not see that every kind of so-called "forces" in influencing any system determines its direction and velocity, or better, acceleration. It is highly superfluous to introduce any "directing forces" (*vis directivae*) into the explanation of nature because every one of the so-called forces is in itself directional. Thus magnetic, gravitational, electric "forces," etc., always determine direction. (This is, by the way, one of the strongest arguments against the introduction of teleological causes into the interpretation of inorganic or organic nature.) Granted that M.'s description and definition be right (a description which we, being no specialists in this subject, are unable to judge), it would be quite as sensible to introduce a causality of magnetism, gravitation, electricity, etc. But that would be senseless. *Scientiae non sunt augmentandae praeter necessitatem*.

If thus the general thesis of the book lacks precision and the special thesis is mistaken, the book nevertheless, through the analysis of catalysis, has value as one of the rare papers on the philosophy of chemistry written by authorities on chemistry.

Going on we note that the present situation of *Philosophy of Organic Nature* falls somewhere between philosophy of physics and philosophy of history. On the one hand, older theories and concepts have to be overcome as in physics, and on the other hand new concepts must be introduced as in history. Kurt Goldstein's book *The Structure of the Organism*¹ is important because the author develops the first *biological Gestalt-theory* without identifying himself with the psychological Gestalt-theory with which, however, he is closely connected.

The author is a neurologist, formerly Professor at Frankfurt and Berlin, now in New York, and has had great experience of brain lesions. His theory of the organism is unique in being mainly based on these experiences. This is its strength as well as its weakness. It would be fair to characterize this biology as totalitarian (*Ganzheitsbiologie*), and there is more than a mere external relation between the totalitarian tendencies in biology and in politics. His chief idea (corresponding in a certain respect to the tendencies of Holism and Organicism in this country) is that every reaction of the organism is a reaction of the *whole* body, and not only of a part of it. Therefore he opposes absolutely any attempt to build up the organism out of single reflexes or out of any parts.

This reacting organism follows a biological law which is a formal principle of reaction: it is only because every change caused through the stimuli of the outer world is in "adequate" time reduced to an "adequate" mean level

¹ *Der Aufbau des Organismus*, Nijhoff, Haag, 1934.

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that it preserves its formal chief character, its relative constancy which is a guarantee for its existence as well as for its recognizability (p. 349). This law (in which "adequate" means as much as "natural to this specific organism") implies more than it seems to imply at first sight, namely, (1) the principle of least action which I believe is of great importance in organic nature (meaning in this case that every change is readjusted in the simplest economical manner), (2) the law of compensation (that every disturbance of organic balance is followed by a return to it), (3) the idea that the constancy of an organism is based on an equilibrium natural to this specific being, and on a natural tendency towards it (cp. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Nervenheilkunde*, Leipzig, 1929, vol. 109, pp. 1 ff.).

Thus this theory is a kind of *reactive* theory of life. It does not start from the organism as acting, but as reacting body. It believes that to the basic law corresponds a basic biological process and a basic biological function the same throughout the whole nervous system and probably the whole organism. Consequently its chief distinctions are an organism reacting in the right manner (reacting adequately), or in a wrong manner (catastrophically), or generally "to be in order" and "to be in disorder." The development of the organism may therefore be described as passing from order to order, or from catastrophe to catastrophe (I wonder what a violet may think about this description of its life). If we restrict the author's descriptions to the human organism we find interesting remarks about the change of the function of the organism through lesion. Illness arises if an organism is changed in such a way that it reacts catastrophically in its normal surroundings. This book deserves the attention of all interested in the Philosophy of the Organism, because, written by a biologist of high philosophical culture, it contains much first-hand observation and formulation of biological facts, and, e.g., a new theory of the nervous system, and because it sees biological and psychological phenomena in their interconnection (an attitude as necessary as rare among biologists). It is even interesting in its errors (e.g. in the thesis that being is always positive, that nature does not know negative elements; I leave it to the reader to explain why a statement of this kind is meaningless). But it gives only one side of the picture; the reactive conception of life must be completed by an active one. And notwithstanding the protest of the author, analysis and synthesis are always connected, and the transition from the whole to the parts is only the one side which again must be completed through the transition from the parts to the whole. After all, every great progress in natural science has been linked up with the discovery of basic elements. Whether this basic element of biology has already been found in the author's arch-enemy, the reflex, the future will decide. The Gestalt-school is right in denying the organism to be a mere aggregate of parts, but it may be an integration. Probably biological integration and differentiation will be found one day to be as intimately connected as they are in mathematics.

It may be relevant to add some remarks on books related to the history of the subject. Worth mentioning is the *Bibliographia Kepleriana*,¹ because it is a comprehensive bibliography of Kepler, and because to every really penetrating historical study a good bibliography is the first presupposition. The drawback of this book is that it is more and less than a real bibliography. It is more in so far as it adds explanatory remarks about the content of the books and their relation to Kepler's life. These remarks are surely useful to many readers, but are of course restricted in length, and cannot contain a thorough analysis. It gives more by adding facsimiles of the titles of the first editions; they are very nice to look at, useful perhaps to librarians, but not

¹ Verlag, C. H. Beck, München, 1936.

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necessary. Finally, the libraries are added which possess these editions, but the list is incomplete, omitting, among others, the English libraries. The Bodleian, e.g., possesses the pamphlet No. 36 on the four Satellites of Jupiter, together with the dissertation "De Nuncio Sidereo," and with the wonderful motto of Alcinoüs: He has to be free in his mind who wishes to philosophize. Consequently all the conclusions drawn on p. 60 from the non-existence of this edition are without foundation. The work is less than a bibliography by giving nearly always the generally very long titles in abridged form, and thus omitting sometimes very interesting details, and chiefly by omitting the Manuscript-remains which here (like in many other cases) are indispensable. It is now one of the jokes of history that the bulk of Kepler's MSS.-remains was bought on the advice of L. Euler by the Empress Catherine of Russia, and is in the library of the observatory of Pulkowo. Whereas the last monumental edition of E. Ch. Frisch brought much new material from these sources, the unpublished material of this new bibliography is very scarce, consisting of a catalogue in Kepler's own hand (1622), which, however, is incomplete. The value of the new edition of Kepler's works, of which already one volume has been published, about which we are unable to judge because we have not seen it, depends entirely on the question whether these MSS. are at the disposal of the editors or not. If not, I am afraid, this new edition cannot be a definitive one, and may be an improvement upon the last great edition, and upon the new material published in the meantime, only in minor points. Here, as in every kind of scientific work, the principle must be: all or nothing.

Of minor importance is a small book of Anneliese Maier about *Mechanism in the Seventeenth Century*,¹ trying to show how complicated and how strongly its development was influenced by speculation. She treats of Gassendi, Galileo, Digby, Hobbes, Descartes, Malebranche, Huyghens, Newton, Leibniz, Boyle, and Locke. If this paper leads back to an interpretation which is definitely ruled out by the development of physics, R. Höningwald's more important study of the *Thinkers of the Italian Renaissance*² goes back to a still earlier stage of modern Philosophy of Nature, although it takes it merely as part of the universal philosophy of the Renaissance. This he believes concentrates on three central ideas: method, historical source, and personality. The concentration on problems is an advantage for the analysis of the problems, but a disadvantage for the understanding of persons. To label, e.g., Leonardo as Platonist does not, I am afraid, do justice to his originality (cp. our *Leonardo's theory of the visible world*, *Revue philosophique*, 1936).

We conclude with a short remark on Heinrich Scholz, *History of Logic*.³ The importance of Scholz is that he maintains the tradition of symbolic logic in Germany. He publishes in the above-named Proceedings of the Fries School an interesting article on *Bolzano's Theory of Science*. Not only this article, but Bolzano himself deserves the study of all serious students of logic. The short history of logic is valuable because, from the point of view of symbolic logic, it throws new light on the historical development of logic, and contains some interesting historical remarks and bibliographical notes. On the whole, the reader would wish to see more facts and fewer judgments; even the symbolic logic is here defended rather than expounded.

Thus the whole field of Philosophy of Nature (including physics, chemistry, biology) and its relations to epistemology and logic is full of problems which cannot be without influence on the further development of philosophy. If anyone should ask us to characterize the present relation of philosophy to

¹ *Die Mechanisierung des Weltbilds im 17. Jahrhundert*, Meiner, Leipzig, 1938.

² *Denker der italienischen Renaissance*, Haus zum Falken, Basel, 1938.

³ *Geschichte der Logik*, Junker und Duennhaupt, Berlin.

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nature in one word, I believe it must be the same as that which characterizes physics of to-day: disharmony; whereas the corresponding relation in the cases of Galileo, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, who themselves were in one person philosophers and scientists, was harmony. To them nature as well as science of nature was *one*; the law of continuity established in Leibniz's system the harmony of the universe. No gulf existed between the human understanding and nature. That now all this is changed is by no means chance. For philosophy is an expression of man, and the relation of philosophy to nature is based on the relation of man to nature. Yet in the development of modern thought man lost first God, then Man, and finally Nature. Proceeding from discovery to discovery, he is left with nothing but a system of highly developed empty symbols which, he is now told, do not reveal to him anything about nature, but only about his knowledge, or even his mere language about nature.

Therefore to-day's philosophy of nature expresses either the loss of nature and its unity, or the desire to regain it; and the trend of thought, not openly confessed but secretly felt, is: *à la recherche de la nature perdue*.

F. H. HEINEMANN.

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Critical Realism: Studies in the Philosophy of Mind and Nature. By G. DAWES HICKS. (London: Macmillan & Co. 1938. Pp. xxiv + 346. Price 15s. net.)

When a Briton or an American speaks nowadays of philosophical "realism" he refers principally and usually to the philosophies that Moore's *Refutation of Idealism* and the *New Realism* of the American sextet did so much to stimulate if not even to inaugurate in the early years of the present century. This tendency may conceal the fact that there had been a persistent realistic trend in European philosophy in the later nineteenth century, despite the general dominance of opposing theories, and that the movement was British as well as continental. Men like Adamson and Hobhouse sponsored it; and, especially from Adamson's pen, it was "critical" in the historical as well as in the obvious sense. In other words, it was prepared to follow (although it was anxious to amend) the Kantian tradition, and was not like McTaggart (despite his Hegelianism), Moore, Russell, or Whitehead, deliberately "pre-critical" in its outlook.

In his modest introduction, Mr. Dawes Hicks claims affiliation with this movement. I would not wrong him if I called him a second Adamson, unless the statement was carelessly supposed to mean that he set to work in leading-strings. That is certainly not the case. His work is most definitely his own, and if it is "critical" both in the historical and in the obvious sense, the reason is that the author has come to adopt that attitude after prolonged and very extensive as well as very precise acquaintance with the major philosophies of many epochs and cultures. He is "critical" by conviction—a learned Kantian in no danger of becoming water-logged in the marshes of East Prussia, willing and eager to navigate his critical realism in the tricky currents of the present age. Incidentally he had anticipated the American "critical realists" in his choice of that title, and his attitude in philosophy is quite distinct from theirs.

For many years now, Mr. Dawes Hicks has developed his philosophy and epistemology in occasional papers dealing with their salient themes, and has shown the greatest care as well as an almost inexhaustible patience at each step in his task. A selection of these papers is printed here together with an introduction, and one paper hitherto unpublished. In the result we have what is very nearly a systematic treatise on epistemology, and very definitely, a unified exposition. The catena of essays (whose original dates of publication extended from 1916 to 1934) has not required much alteration and treats systematically of perception, imagination, conception, matter, force, and nature, sometimes through the criticism of others, sometimes by the most direct methods. It is to be regretted, I think, that the book does not contain an independent essay upon the nature of mind, for Mr. Dawes Hicks has written on that subject too, and it is a subject that (naturally) pervades his epistemology. His explicit treatment of this general subject, in the present volume, however, is principally to be found in the brief statements of § 7 of Essay IX (Essay IX, as a whole, hardly suffices, being a polemic against Mr. Broad's theory of a "psychic factor"). Apart from this disappointment, how-

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ever, there is little to diminish our satisfaction with the solidity and the cumulative impressiveness of these essays. Essay XI (on Meinong), it is true, stands a little apart from the rest; but it is a very valuable exposition of Meinong's epistemology. The concluding essay (XII) comparing Spinoza with Leibniz may reasonably be regarded as an epilogue concerning natural theology—an appropriate culmination for any serious philosophy.

As I have said, Mr. Dawes Hicks's methods are frequently direct although sometimes he prefers to proceed less directly through the criticism of others. I shall not here say very much about his employment of the more indirect method (e.g. his essays upon Bradley's and Eddington's account of "nature," or upon Mr. Stace's subjectivism), except to remark that few contemporary writers show an equal mastery of theories they oppose or are equally successful in achieving the reality as well as the appearance of fairness. I shall, however, attempt to make some brief observations upon Mr. Dawes Hicks's epistemology and upon some of its distinctions from other types of "realism" or of what is commonly accounted such.

As it seems to me, Mr. Dawes Hicks is so far Kantian that he believes that our acquaintance with reality must always be sensori-conceptual, and also that the principal task of epistemology is to analyse what is meant by the awareness of an "object." He is not a Kantian in so far as Kantianism lends support to the caricature that an "object" is a manufactured article composed of "given" sense-elements stuck together with transcendental glue. "Sensa" (so-called) are, for him, not *given* objects and, indeed, are not objects at all. None of them is an *etwas* to which thought may be *gerichtet*. For him they are not even entities that should be called "appearances" but the "ways in which a thing is apprehended" (p. 29).

On this cardinal point Mr. Dawes Hicks is emphatically at odds with the Cambridge realists or quasi-realists (supposing the appellation to be approximately correct). It seems clear that he may be right. It need not be supposed, e.g., that the limits of observation, in any given instance, impose an objective boundary, and when Mr. Dawes Hicks follows Ward in his general analysis of the perceptual situation and maintains that perception is best described as a process of discrimination capable of improvement (that is to say, capable of nicer discrimination) there are many who would agree with him and so would deny that each refinement in discerning implies the emergence of a new natural *etwas*, a "sensum." They would allow, in short, that some reputed "objects" are not objects; but they might want to know rather more about what an object *is*. According to Ward "the presentational continuum" formed the *totum objectivum* within which the discrimination took place. Such, as I gather, is not Mr. Dawes Hicks's view. He believes in dynamic substances, but his repeated exposition of a Wardian analysis of the process of perception (both he and Ward being neo-Kantians of a kind) does not (I think) carry him very far; and a "way" of manifestation is not very explicit. It reminds me uncomfortably of the Humian (and Cartesian) term a "manner"—not very different from a *je ne sais quoi*. I should like to see a definition of a "way."

Another respect in which Mr. Dawes Hicks differs from many contemporary "realists" or quasi-realists is his free and habitual use of the term "content" in his epistemological analysis. He believes *ex animo* in "contents" with regard to perception, imagery, and conception, and he sprinkles his pages liberally with the term. This pervasive use of the term on his part prevents one's comments upon it from being merely tussy, or from descending to paltry incidentals.

There are, it appears (p. 92) no less than three distinct sets of "contents"

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required in epistemological analysis. On the side of the object there are the "content" of the object and the "content apprehended." On the side of the subject there is the "content of the mental act." Let us call these "contents," A-contents, B-contents, and C-contents respectively.

The A-content of an object, one learns, is the sum of that object's characteristics (p. 94). Its B-content is the sum of its *apprehended* characteristics by any given mind in any given act of awareness. So far the distinction (error apart) is very clear. What is not plain is why the word "content" should be used at all. It is unnatural to say that an old curtain "contains" dinginess, let us say. But it is clear enough that unless a man's attention exhausts the "object" that confronts him, it will select from that "object." Therefore the *noticed* characteristics of the object will be less than *all* its characteristics. It is also clear, however, that B-contents, although they need not be mental things, or a sort of mental screen between minds and things, are mentally circumscribed in all cases in which they do not coincide with A-contents. Hence it is quintessential to distinguish them sharply from C-contents; and that is (if possible) the more necessary because it is usual to regard "blue" "equal" and the like (i.e. "sensations" and "universals") as *mental* contents, which is precisely what Mr. Dawes Hicks wants most strenuously to deny.

According to Mr. Dawes Hicks, C-contents are the characteristics of the act of awareness. Again I do not see why the word "content" should be used at all. It seems to me to be unnecessary and also misleading, since it is the legatee of a philosophy that Mr. Dawes Hicks believes to be void. Moreover, since self-acquaintance is a note of mental acts (according to our author) and may be more or less explicit (according to any one who admits its existence) it would seem that we ought to distinguish between *all* the characteristics of the act of awareness and those that, at any given time, are reflexively prominent. If so, we ought to have D-contents as well as C-contents. But let that pass. Epistemology must become very treacherous indeed, if it does not display a warning signal whenever C-contents are at all likely to be confused with B-contents.

Mr. Dawes Hicks, for the most part, very definitely avoids such a confusion, but I think that his readers may find the point confusing; and I know that I do. Moreover, it does not seem to me that his own doctrine is invariably free from this confusion, although I hope that this impression is due to my own obtuseness. Thus he tells us (p. 106) that when people think they can recall music in the stillness of their homes after returning from a concert, "I surmise that what they are in truth reproducing are the contents of their perceptive acts whilst in the concert hall, and the imagery that results may well cluster round some nucleus of perceived fact." Now Mr. Dawes Hicks is very emphatic in holding that the act of perceiving blue is not blue, or the act of perceiving a sound sonorous (p. 41). But the images that appear after the concert surely *resemble* the sounds heard at the concert, that is, have similar characteristics. If then the C-contents (i.e. the characteristics) of the mental acts are quite dissimilar from the B-contents at the concert, how can the illusion occur? If images "cluster round" perceived fact are not such images B-contents of the apparent situation? Are they not "ways" in which the situation is apprehended? (It is, in fact, very difficult to deny that an image is an *etwas* to which attention may be *gerichtet*.) The same difficulty, as it seems to me, clings to a part of Mr. Dawes Hicks's exposition of "Conceptual thought and real existence." He distinguishes clearly between the concept and the universal. The universal is an A-content, but he says (p. 135) "A concept is a *way* in which a universal is conceived [*italics mine*], a *mode* in which it is grasped by

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thought, or in other words a content apprehended (corresponding to the so-called 'presentation' or 'appearance' in sense-perception)." It is therefore a B-content and we are warned on the preceding page that it is not a C-content (which is "a mental state of conceiving"). Nevertheless, we are also told (p. 135) that a concept is a "product of thought." Therefore that which has C-contents can *produce* that which has B-contents. This seems to me to be very odd. For B-contents (be it remembered) are characteristics of the object, just as much as A-contents are. They are a selection from the totality of A-contents (i.e. characteristics). Since a universal, *ex hypothesi*, may be the whole A-content in the case, there need be no room for the distinction between A-contents and B-contents. In that case, therefore, the concept and the universal should coincide, and mental acts would produce A-content.

I have no space for further comments on a scale proportionate to work of this high quality. In a cursory way, however, I should like to commend the essay on "The dynamic aspect of nature" to the reader's careful attention. I have to confess that I find this essay more illuminating regarding the arguments that should be avoided in this connection (by psychologists, physicists, and philosophers) than in its positive pronouncements on what force and cohesion in nature actually are; but the negative paths are badly in need of lighting, and when they are lit the truth may be rolling about at our feet. As I have said, I should like to have seen an independent essay, or several independent essays, upon the nature of the human mind. It seems to me that the doctrine of "contents" on p. 241 might give way under pressure, and that many of Mr. Dawes Hicks's emphatic assertions about our knowledge of the characteristics of mental acts are dubiously consistent with what seems to me to be the Kantianism of his philosophy of the mind itself. But to ask for more in this way is liker sheer greed than a justifiable complaint against lenten fare at the wrong time of year.

JOHN LAIRD.

The Degrees of Knowledge. By JACQUES MARITAIN. Translated from the second revised and augmented French edition by Bernard Wall and Margot R. Adamson. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938. Pp. xviii + 475. Price \$6.00.)

An English translation of M. Maritain's chief work on Epistemology is eminently desirable, and we wish that the volume before us met the need. We are not here concerned with the masterly and subtle, perhaps over-subtle, adaptation of St. Thomas's philosophy to the vastly increased store of knowledge available to the world to-day, that forms the theme of *Les degrés de Savoir*; nor with the interest that M. Maritain's learned and exhaustive study is bound to excite in the thinking public. His work has been accessible in French for several years, and has roused deserved attention, especially by its handling of the Thomistic theory of knowledge in relation to contemporary mathematical and physical advances and by its penetrating analysis of Christian mystical experience. Our business is solely with the adequacy of this translation. M. Maritain is not an easy writer, even when we read him in the original. The difficulties arising from the nature of his subject are increased by his coinage of a peculiar terminology (e.g. *intellection ananoétique*, *dianoétique*, *perinoétique*) and by his complex and lengthy sentences. We are not complaining of M. Maritain; he is well within his rights, and he never uses hard words without giving an explanation of their meaning. But

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these idiosyncrasies of style and presentment make his book hard to translate; and a translation that heightens the difficulty of the original is of little service to the English reader. We wish we could recommend the present version, but to do so is beyond the scope of our charity. The translators have made a gallant effort to achieve what is wellnigh impossible, i.e. to follow M. Maritain's sentences literally, preserving the punctuation and structure of the original without modification. The result is that their version is artificial and obscure. What is worse is that it is by no means accurate, especially in the more difficult chapters, such as those on "Critical Realism" and "Metaphysical Knowledge." We have been at pains to compare the translation with the original. Take the following example (*E.T.* 113, *Fr.* 181-182).

"I shall therefore say, bowing down in my turn before the jargon of pedantry, that as the object is correlative to a knowing subject, to an ontological 'for itself' to which it corresponds, which by reflection on its acts of thought perceives immediately, not, as Descartes thought, its rightful essence, but the fact of its rightful existence, and which we may call the *cis-objective subject*, it is also, not correlative to, but inseparable from (because it is itself) an ontological 'for itself' which precisely takes on the name of the object in so far as it is present to thought, and which we may call the *objectivable* (!) or *transobjective subject*, not certainly inasmuch as it is hidden behind the object, but, on the contrary, in the degree to which it is itself grasped as object, and that (!!) it nevertheless constitutes an irreducible in which the possibility of new objects to be grasped remain always open (for it can give rise to an indefinite sequence of necessary and contingent truths).

Here is the original:

"Nous dirons donc, en nous prévalant à notre tour du jargon de la pédanterie, que comme l'objet est corrélatif d'un sujet connaissant, d'un 'pour soi' ontologique auquel il fait face et qui par réflexion sur ses actes de pensée perçoit immédiatement non pas sa propre essence, ainsi que le croyait Descartes, mais le fait de sa propre existence, et que nous pouvons appeler *sujet cis-objectif*, il est aussi, non pas corrélatif, mais inséparable (parce que c'est lui-même) d'un 'pour soi' ontologique qui prend précisément le nom d'un objet en tant qu'il est présenté à la pensée, et que nous pouvons appeler *sujet objectivable* ou *sujet transobjectif*, non pas certes en tant qu'il serait caché derrière l'objet, mais au contraire en tant qu'il est saisi lui-même comme l'objet, et qu'il constitue cependant un irréductible en lequel la possibilité de nouveaux objets à saisir demeure toujours ouverte (car il peut donner lieu à une suite indéfinie de vérités nécessaires ou contingentes)."

Of course, it is not all so bad as this, though we could cite many more examples from these two chapters where confusion has been worse confounded by the translators. The closing chapters on mysticism, on the other hand, are more competently rendered. But is it pardonable to perpetrate such inaccuracies as "Melissa" for "Melisse," "pseudo-Dionysius" for "pseudo-Denys," the wrong initials for Dr. Whitehead (when the original gives no initials), or such a monstrosity as "Spinozianism"? Moreover, the punctuation needs revision throughout. M. Maritain gives at least an index of proper names; the translators give none. These delinquencies and drawbacks are serious. We are almost persuaded that it would take the English or American reader less time to learn French and to read M. Maritain in the original than to grasp the more difficult (which are also the more important) parts of this version. It would also cost less to his pocket.

W. G. DE BURGH.

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The Principles of Human Knowledge. By GEORGE BERKELEY. Edited, with an Analysis and Appendix, by T. E. JESSOP, M.A., B.Litt., Professor of Philosophy in the University College of Hull. (London: A. Brown & Sons, Ltd. 1937. Pp. xix + 148. Price 2s. 6d. net.)

Professor Jessop has performed a very useful task in producing this critical edition of Berkeley's *Principles* at a price within the range of every student.

In this edition Professor Jessop has departed from the practice of all previous editors. He has printed in full the text of the first edition, and has noted the variants in the second in such a way that they may be easily and yet exhaustively studied by reading the footnotes in thick type and by observing the thick brackets, indicating omissions, in the main body of the text.

In addition, Professor Jessop has indicated the respects in which the text of the first edition departs from a manuscript in Berkeley's hand of sections 85-145 now in the British Museum. This manuscript has not before been utilized.

Some doubt may be felt as to whether Professor Jessop was well inspired to print the text of the first edition rather than the second. The second edition contains the text which Berkeley, after mature reflection, wished to go down to posterity. From the point of view also of a study of the development of his thought, it might have been clearer to have printed this text, noting the variants in the two anterior texts, namely those of the manuscript and of the first edition. The matter is not, however, of great importance. What is important is that the variants should be clearly indicated; and this has been admirably done by Professor Jessop.

The variants in the texts fall into two main categories. Into the first category fall the variants of style or form. For example, in the second edition Berkeley consistently cuts out the term "etc.," which frequently occurs in the first edition. He either deletes it altogether or replaces it by some phrase such as, "and so forth."

The second class of variant includes those of philosophic importance. An extremely interesting result of Professor Jessop's collation of the British Museum manuscript appears in section 140. This is the much-quoted section which begins (in the first edition): "In a large sense, indeed, we may be said to have an idea of spirit." In the second edition the words "or rather a notion" are added after "idea." Now Professor Jessop points out that in the manuscript the whole of section 140 is written on the facing page reserved for additions and corrections, and that the words "or rather a notion" were written in the manuscript but crossed out. This discovery supplies a further argument against the theory, never very soundly based, that Berkeley's doctrine of notions was a late development.

In the Appendix to the volume are printed two letters of 1729 and 1730 from the Rev. Samuel Johnson to Berkeley. They are interesting as containing the earliest known criticism of any length and weight of Berkeley's theory.

G. A. JOHNSTON.

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Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. New series, vol. xxxvii. Containing the Papers read before the Society during the Fifty-eighth Session, 1936-1937. (London: Harrison & Sons. 1937. Pp. 246. Price 25s.)

Knowledge and Foreknowledge. The Symposia read at the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association at the University, Bristol, July 9-11, 1937. Aristotelian Society supplementary volume xvi. (London: Harrison & Sons. 1937. Pp. 243. Price 15s.)

From a series of *Aristotelian Society Proceedings* extending over a number of years it should be possible to estimate philosophical tendencies; but the contents of a single volume must be determined by so many accidents—whom could the Secretary find who had not read a paper recently, who was willing to read one this year, and so forth—that a review can hardly be more than a roughly classified catalogue.

Professor Alexander's presidential address ("Form and Subject-Matter in Art") was postponed to the middle of the 1936-37 session, his place at the opening meeting being taken by Professor de Burgh ("The Idea of a Religious Philosophy"). But both these distinguished authors are confessedly only repeating, with some additions, what they have said at much greater length elsewhere, so it is no disparagement of either of them to say that the paper of the year is Mr. John Wisdom's "Philosophical Perplexity." The importance of this is that it represents the first appearance in print of the developed philosophy of Wittgenstein. It is true that Mr. Wisdom cautions his readers "against supposing it a closer imitation of Wittgenstein than it is"—certainly at best it is only Wittgenstein at second-hand; but the fact remains that, until Wittgenstein publishes something himself, this is as near as anyone can get who is not of the inner circle of disciples, or in personal contact with them, or able to beg, borrow, or steal a copy of one of the "coloured books" which are circulating in manuscript. The paper cannot be summarized—it must be read. It may be added that it is very amusing.

After this perhaps the most significant contribution is Professor Levy's "Causality and Determinism"—not, however, for its own sake (for Professor Levy, too, has expressed himself at greater length elsewhere), but as representing one more stage in the gradual acceptance of Dialectical Materialism in academic philosophical circles. (Tendencies outside philosophical lecture-rooms already suggest that this may well become the fashionable philosophy of the nineteen-forties, as Logical Positivism has been that of the nineteen-thirties.) Here the doctrine is applied specifically to physical science. Covering much the same ground, but from the standpoint of the "pure" scientific worker, Dr. Jeffreys ("Scientific Method, Causality and Reality") argues that "scientific progress does not depend on exactness"; a hypothesis is established when, applying the theory of probability, "we get a better fit than we should expect if the observations were distributed at random." To the casual reader both these papers may well prove barely intelligible, for Dr. Jeffreys takes for granted an acquaintance with technical terms of mathematics (particularly the term "parameter"), while Professor Levy uses important terms (such as "quality" and "dialectical change") in senses quite unfamiliar to the non-Marxian philosopher, with no, or very inadequate, explanation.

Papers by Mr. Mace ("Physicalism"), Mr. Ayer ("Verification and Experience"), and Mr. I. Gallie ("Mental Facts") may perhaps be treated as thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, though the Physicalism which Mr. Ayer attacks is a much more full-blooded affair than that which Mr. Mace defends, and Mr. Gallie only concludes very half-heartedly that the case *against* a modified Physicalism (or as he prefers to call it "neutralism") is *not proven*.

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There are no less than four ethical papers, if we include Professor Jessop's "Evaluation, Causality, and Freedom," which, though it deals with knowledge rather than action, treats knowledge ethically, as involving "evaluation"; (the conclusion drawn is that knowledge cannot be regarded merely as a special case of causation). Of these the most ambitious is Professor Campbell's "Prolegomena to a Theory of the Moral Criterion," designed to show that the moral worth of conduct cannot be judged by its approximation to any concrete standard, but "solely on the basis of the internal determination involved," which ends in a discussion of the nature of responsibility. This last question is then taken up and discussed by Mr. A. K. Stout ("Free Will and Responsibility"), but without coming to any very surprising or unorthodox conclusions. Mr. Whiteley ("Goodness of Motives") defends against objections the common-sense view that motives (and not only actions) may be intrinsically (and not only instrumentally) good or bad.

Political philosophy is represented only by Professor Langley's "Freedom and Modern Political Conceptions," in which the scales are held so evenly between the Corporate States, Communism, and Liberal Democracy as to leave the unfortunate impression at the end that nothing decisive has been said.

The 1937 Joint Session at Bristol produced three symposia and two addresses. For his presidential address Professor Field chose a refreshingly new subject—"The Teaching of Philosophy." It is a pity, however, that this could not be a symposium. The question of the function of a Philosophy Department is one that must interest all teachers of philosophy, especially in the modern universities, and, instructive though Professor Field's views are, it would have been even more instructive to see how far others of equal experience agreed or disagreed with him.

The first symposium is concerned with "Induction and Hypothesis." Miss MacDonald, who opens it, takes the question to be whether induction requires justification, i.e. whether, having made a prediction in accordance with our best inductive methods, we can still ask whether (and if so how) we *know* that it will come true. Her answer seems to be that the question is absurd and due to linguistic confusion; the word "know" has several different uses in English, but, when we say that we "know" that something will happen, we just *mean* that it is the conclusion yielded by our inductive methods. Both the other contributions are parallel replies to Miss MacDonald; but Mr. Ryle devotes most of his space to an interesting distinction of three senses of "probability" (which he calls "plausibility," "numerical odds," and "inductive reliability") and discussion of the relations between them. Mr. Berlin, in a very long paper, concludes that we can describe kinds of universe in which induction would be possible and impossible, but cannot by rational means decide of which kind this actual universe is.

Both the other symposia are disappointing. The question set for the second was "Is there an absolute good?", but none of the three symposiasts seems to have been quite certain what this meant. Professor de Burgh holds that there is an absolute good, namely God, but that this can be known only by religious faith, but assumes that the question for discussion is whether the existence of such a good can be proved by philosophical (i.e. metaphysical or ethical) arguments. Professor Laird thinks that there is an intelligible and legitimate sense in which any *intrinsic* good could be called an "absolute" good, defining an intrinsic good as "one which is good in itself irrespective of the rest of the universe," and takes the question to be whether there is only *one* such good. Finally, Professor Campbell takes an absolute good to be *one* which "comprises all value within itself," and then divides moralists into Objectivists and

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Subjectivists, for the first of whom the question takes the form, "Can we conceive a state of affairs in which all intrinsic goods co-exist, each in its utmost degree of perfection?" and for the second the form, "Is there any conceivable state of affairs which would yield a complete and lasting satisfaction of the human self?" But all three, however they understand the question, answer it in the negative.

For the third symposium the question set was, "Does philosophy analyse common sense?" But Mr. Duncan-Jones, who opens it, deals in fact with the quite different question, "What is it that the kind of philosophy which professes to analyse common sense actually does?" He leaves the impression of an honest but puzzled mind, raising many questions, but not finding them so easy to answer to his own satisfaction. Mr. Ayer, who is the only other symposiast, confines himself for the most part to one of Mr. Duncan-Jones's questions—whether the analysis of a common-sense proposition can be described as explaining what everybody means by it—or, as he himself otherwise puts it, the question how analytical philosophy can be distinguished from lexicography. The answer he suggests is that the difference is in the purpose and effect, rather than in the nature, of the activity; analytical philosophy is explanation of the proper use of words, but only of such as may encourage us to draw false inferences, ask spurious questions, or make nonsensical assumptions.

At the final sitting Professor Broad gave an address on "The Philosophical Implications of Foreknowledge." This, too, is very disappointing. Its purpose is to show that the occurrence of supernormal precognition involves no logical or metaphysical impossibility, so that the question whether it occurs or not is a purely empirical one. But few who find this difficult will feel that their difficulties have even been seriously met, far less resolved. Perhaps the most interesting thing about it is that the conclusion of Professor Broad's own well-known discussion (in *Scientific Thought*) of the reality of the future is now given up, though without any indication what fault the author now finds in the argument.

A. M. MACIVER.

A Philosophy for a Modern Man. By PROF. H. LEVY. (London: V. Gollancz, Ltd. 1938. Pp. 287. Price 7s. 6d.)

Professor Levy's book is composed not of philosophy in any strict sense of the word, but of a curious amalgam of economics, politics, history, mathematics, physics, sociology, and metaphysics, the whole being precipitated round a core of solid Marxist dogma, which forms at once the basis and the background of Professor Levy's thought. The book is written in an arid and abstract style, as arid and abstract as that of Marx himself—the following is a fair sample: "The succession of class societies that has culminated in the present capitalist phase must first be regarded as a group, a very large scale statistical historical isolate, each atomic element of which was itself a phase of the whole succession. The development within the whole group has been of a straight-line statistical nature, successive phases replacing the previous, but still manifesting in each an internal class structure"—and Professor Levy continuously makes use of expressions such as "social dynamics," whose meaning is taken for granted, but never explained.

Philosophy, as Professor Levy understands it, has a practical aim. It should, he holds, "illuminate the practice of ordinary life." Should the question of a philosophy's truth be raised, then its claim to be true must "stand

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or fall by its active meaning for man." But it is not enough that a philosophy should be true; it is not even enough that it should illuminate man's practice, it must also improve his world. For—and here we come to the distinctive claim which Professor Levy makes for philosophy—a philosophy, "if it is to be a real living guide to man, must illumine the part he has to play in re-shaping the world so that his ideals may be finally achieved."

This brings me to that insistence upon the complementary character of theory and practice, which forms one of the distinctive features of Professor Levy's (and Marx's) philosophy. "All philosophy," he writes, "must simultaneously be an avenue to understanding and a spur to action, not an escape into inactive contemplation." Thinking, he agrees with the pragmatists, should be tested in action, and is shown to be true by the results of action. Now an action is a part of the process of nature. Hence in "following a mental process" we are engaged in an activity that "gears in it all points with the material happenings in nature." Material and mental changes are, in other words, "complementary forms of activity intimately bound together by a qualitative relation."

Professor Levy's view apparently is that both mind and matter are aspects of some underlying substance which possesses both physical and mental qualities. But since there was a time when this planet was presumably mindless, the material is, he holds, more substantial and more enduring than the mental. This being so, it is extremely important that we should know what Professor Levy takes matter to be. His answer to the question, "What is matter?" is, apparently, the same as the answer which Dr. Johnson gave in reply to Bishop Berkeley: "The word matter is used," he says, "for what we take up as pieces and objects everywhere." In other words, it is what we can see, touch, and handle.

But if you are going to make matter both the basis and the essential nature of what you take to be real, it is surely necessary to go in a little more detail into the vexed questions touching its nature. Matter, says the modern physicist, is a series of events, but the view that there is a continuing solid core running through the events obtains no countenance from modern physics. Matter, say the philosophers, is something which we experience and cannot, therefore, be conceived apart from experience. Professor Levy is impatient with the philosophers, but it is a little surprising to find that he dismisses as unimportant the analysis of the physicists.

These, however, are not really the questions which interest Professor Levy. His real concern is to apply his physical and metaphysical theories to the nature and development of societies. His account follows strictly Marxist lines. The social and cultural forms of a society are, he holds, the product of its technical development, but there is a time-lag before the social and cultural order adjusts itself to prior changes in technique. During this time-lag the inventions in technique by the application of which human life could be transformed out of all recognition are not permitted to be used for human betterment. The conclusion is that the social and cultural order which holds up the technical development, by means of which human life might be ameliorated, must be swept aside. Ages such as our own, in which an effete social order is palpably withstanding the pressure of economic and technological changes towards new social and political forms, are eras of frustration and disappointment. The failure to harness the forces of production to the well-being of the people becomes more and more pronounced, and the pressure of the revolutionary forces which this failure generates grows ever more insistent. We have two alternatives: one is to seek to arrest the progress of society to new social and political forms, freezing it, as it were, on the brink

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of change. The other is to go forward to the next stage in social and political development, even if this means, as inevitably it does, a violent break with the existing order. The next stage, which is the stage of a classless society, will *necessarily*—here Professor Levy's determinism finds expression—supercede the present one. Hence all that human beings can do is to accelerate this inevitable change, and to make it less catastrophic than it might otherwise be, by consciously envisaging its inevitability and deliberately preparing for what they realize to be inevitable. "A historic analysis shows that we *will* do so and so. We might as well do it deliberately and with enlightenment." Hence the final object of philosophy, as Professor Levy conceives it, becomes that of "guiding ourselves and others towards this classless society."

This is no place for a criticism of the underlying Marxist philosophy which Professor Levy is, in various ways, seeking to apply. Two points may, however, be noticed. First, Professor Levy's training as a mathematical physicist has made him a determinist. As a consequence, he holds that the progress of society, and in particular its development in the direction of a classless order, is *determined* to take place. The laws in accordance with which it will take place are presumably what he means by "social dynamics." Whether a theory of history of this kind is possible or not, is open to question; what appears to be reasonably certain is that Marxism is not itself such a theory. Marxism entirely failed, for example, to predict the appearance of Fascism. Nor does Professor Levy advance any cogent arguments for thinking that the development of a classless society will *necessarily* be the next phase in human history. It might quite easily be a reversion to barbarism as a result of the revolutionary break with the existing order of society which Professor Levy regards as inevitable.

In the second place, Professor Levy makes much of the exclusion of teleological conceptions from his philosophy; the notion of purpose is to him anathema. Nevertheless, as the quotation given earlier in the review shows, he does on occasion lapse into the old-fashioned language which makes use of such words as "ideals." Philosophy in fact must help to re-shape the world so that man's "ideals may finally be achieved." It is pertinent to ask, "Whose ideals?" No doubt Professor Levy means that the ideals which are to be realized are his own; but suppose that they are the Archbishop of Canterbury's or Hitler's. No doubt Professor Levy would argue that the movement of history is inevitably determined to proceed in the direction of the realization of *his* ideals and not those of persons with whom he disagrees; but I cannot see that he offers any reasons for this view which, in the absence of them, must remain an expression of faith.

C. E. M. JOAD.

The Moral Basis of Politics. By NAOMI MITCHISON. (London: Constable. 1938. Pp. xxi + 376. Price 8s. 6d.)

In the novels both of Aldous Huxley and of Naomi Mitchison there has been an expression of a growing interest in government and politics, and it is a symptom of the intellectual unrest of the present time that both should have felt the need to express directly their political ideals. Any reader who found Huxley's *Ends and Means* a stimulating approach to the moral and political implications of modern social life will certainly appreciate Mrs. Mitchison's book. It is a brave and honest and often moving attempt to

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reveal the moral issues behind political systems and the conflicts they produce.

She begins with an account of the end at which we should aim. This consists in right relationships between people. (She admits, however, that "being ourselves" must be part of the good, and also that right relationships can hold only between good people, whose goodness must therefore be of some other type. Towards the end she allows further that there are some wicked and many "nasty" people who presumably cannot be encouraged to "be themselves." It is interesting here to see how her ideal of right relationships seems at first sight to be at the opposite pole from Huxley's ideal of "detachment," and yet how the working out of both ideals brings their practical expressions nearer to each other.) So we come to the need for change and to the resistance to change not merely in capitalism and in conservatism but in the ordinary man who has little imagination, no clear ideals, and something to lose. It is at this point that her two most interesting chapters come in: those on Violence and on Dilemmas. The only alternative to violence as a method of change is conversion or catharsis, and this catharsis or new vision is not merely an initial requirement, but a continuing necessity especially for leaders if they are to avoid the corruptions of power. Its methods of attainment are various; meditation, tragedy, contact with the people you represent, all these can recreate the vision which is needed to keep alive the spirit of fellowship. The chapter on Dilemmas shows how conflicts of loyalty arise and how they are sometimes intelligible as conflicts between long-range and short-range policies. This solution is applied in particular to the present dilemma in which the "left wing" finds itself between the long-range absolute pacifism of Lansbury and the short-range policy of "fighting the dictators." All through Part I the argument is alive and alight with admirable and infectious individuality.

Part II applies to political practice, the conclusions of Part I. It is also stimulating though much more negative and cautious. After an initial chapter shrewdly analysing the various motives for political action and the dangers they involve, Mrs. Mitchison concludes with the methods and difficulties of political reform directed to the achievement of her ends. Here she admits that one principal handicap is our almost complete ignorance of the actual wants of the people, a problem in which she hopes mass observation will help us.

Criticism of the argument in a review would be unprofitable for it would have to fasten almost entirely on her main premisses, and these she is not concerned to defend or to analyse. They include her account of the good (some doubts on which have been suggested above), her stress on economic class distinctions and on political remedies, with the socialism which is the consequence of this stress, her distrust of non-social values, and consequently of religions. But those who accept these fundamentals (and they are admittedly the audience for whom she is writing) will find her book attractive and enlivening, and even those who do not will find in her chapters on motives for political action and political inertia and on Pacifism and Dilemmas much of interest. Her book is difficult to classify, but in its humanity, its refreshing directness, its use of personal experience and its clear impress of the author's personality it recalls Graham Wallas's *Human Nature in Politics*. In particular it should form an excellent basis for a series of discussions by any group of people who are studying present-day politics with a view to understanding the general principles at issue.

J. D. MABBOTT.

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Beyond Humanism: Essays in the New Philosophy of Nature. By CHARLES HARTSHORNE. (Chicago and New York: Willett, Clark & Co. 1937. Pp. xiv + 324. Price \$2.50.)

"Pragmatism," said Chesterton a generation ago, "is a matter of human needs; and one of the first of human needs is to be something more than a pragmatist." Similarly, begins Professor Hartshorne, "if the man of to-day leaves humanism, it should be to go beyond and forward." For at its best, he maintains, humanism simply expresses "an interest in man" which may degenerate into "a monomania, excluding interest in everything else"; or, still more severely, "the specific disease of humanism is the megalomania, the wishing to be God." In its stead he advocates an explicit Theism, but of a wholly new type based on a "New Philosophy of Nature," excluding all supernaturalism, and incorporating current quantum physics with a fresh metaphysics and theology derived from Peirce and Whitehead, James, Bergson, and Tennant; even Spinoza, in short, "to-day would be a Whiteheadian."

His ambitious and attractive programme is pursued competently and temperately, although his treatment rapidly becomes definitely technical and, to my mind, somewhat obscure. I found the style rather heavy and involved and (probably arising from this) the sequence of ideas not too easy to follow, so that while the wide diversity of subject-matter is undeniably impressive, it seems to me to exhibit some dissipation of interest rather than firm integration and lucidity. The most serious defect, however, appears to my mind to be the inherent incoherence of the author's cardinal principles.

Only theistic philosophy, he contends, can ever be "clear and consistent," although modern science and logic necessitate our rejection of earlier theologies. His own system is "theistic naturalism, or naturalistic theism," implying not merely any intimate interrelation between God and nature, but rather their absolute coincidence; and since this principle is fundamental, while I should take it to vitiate Dr. Hartshorne's final standpoint, I will state it unambiguously in his own terms. The keynote is Spinoza's *deus sive natura*: "God is simply nature," while nature, conversely, has a quality that "may be divine" and in virtue of which it is far more than our environment or any "mere collection of natural entities." Nature, then, is "a superhuman but man-including organic whole . . . an individual, living and psychic . . . a kind of God . . . the universe is divine, the supremely integrated conscious organism." Equally unmistakable is the resultant panpsychism: the theism is "panpsychic," exactly as pantheism is theistic and objective. As with most other forms of panpsychism, however, this commits us to what I should regard as an indefensible subjectivism, since "all sensations are located in the nervous system . . . feelings are the stuff of existence . . . electrons must feel" and remember, just as the "world-whole" possesses feeling—a viewpoint which is, incidentally, Bradleyan rather than, as the writer asserts, genuinely Hegelian.

In all this, obviously, the fundamental feature is the identity, or coincidence, between God and nature: to repeat, "God is nature"—the two "coincide." "The whole of nature, as really an organized whole, is God . . . God is really the Life of Nature." This conclusion, on the other hand, is substantially modified in so far as God is "the mind of nature . . . which is his body"; God is "the mind of the world-body . . . a supreme mind in a supreme organism . . . the cosmic mind"; and in this connection Professor Hartshorne appeals to our actual experience of body-mind relationship. But this, I believe, immediately invalidates the identity between nature and God, since it is plainly

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impossible that God should *be* nature, and at the same moment "the mind of nature"; the first principle implies identity, the second distinction, though not of course separation. For we must note that Professor Hartshorne does not hold that God is the mind (or life) of nature within some yet more inclusive whole that incorporates both as, for instance, an Absolute of some sort might do. On the contrary, for him "God is nature"; so that to add that nature is God's body is just like saying that a man's body is the man himself, and, simultaneously, that the man is the mind of his own body. This is perfectly illogical, and it introduces a fatal inconsistency into the very centre of "panpsychic" or "natural" theism. If, on the other hand, we regard man as a whole which comprehends body and mind both together, this is simply the familiar theistic analogy to God and nature which the author categorically rejects.

But this illogicality is further intensified by the essentially personal attributes of God—will as "the only final integration . . . a purposive rational mind," and love: "God loves all men . . . the world-embracing love of God," while "a unified person is a synthesis of knowledge and love." Now not only is it characteristic of man's personality, but it also becomes increasingly characteristic as personality transcends its human phases, that it distinguishes itself, though once again without severing itself, from all else with which it is concerned. Every artist, for example, is inseparable from his art; but to say that he *is* his art is quite meaningless, and all the more so the finer the artist. Similarly, if God is genuinely personal, as Dr. Hartshorne contends throughout, then it is absolutely impossible for him to *be* nature, no matter in what sense we interpret "nature." In short, divine personality, and divine identity (or even coincidence) with nature, are logically self-contradictory categories, so that the author's attempt to combine them vitiates his theism. He intends, however, to publish a sequel, *The Vision of God*, so that it is only fair to await his fuller discussion of these difficulties.

In other respects the writer is a strenuous advocate of "the eternal existence of finite minds of some kind . . . a complete memory of all past events," and of indeterminism, for which he advances several weighty, though never, I think, conclusive arguments. It is surely too extreme to say that recent research "has been overwhelmingly unfavorable to faith in absolute law," and that "order cannot be absolute but must be limited by and blended with disorder." For to take "disorder" literally is to render even divine knowledge and will nugatory; certainly the universe may be "wilder than our dreams," but it cannot be ultimately disorderly in anything but some metaphorical sense; otherwise, the farther science advances the nearer it approaches a complete collapse which would ruin vast ranges of philosophy itself.

Towards contemporary humanists Dr. Hartshorne is severely critical. There has been a "decline in Russell's intellectuality," and he "has not kept up with the march of ideas," while "Santayana's materialism is essentially parasitic." But it may be left to these equally vigorous controversialists, as well as to Moore, Dewey, and Freud, to defend themselves against the author's strictures.

J. E. TURNER.

The Idealism of Giovanni Gentile. By Roger W. Holmes. (New York and London: The Macmillan Company. 1937. Pp. xvi + 264. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

The author of this book has set himself to explain what is essential in the "actual idealism" of Gentile, taking the *Sistema di Logica* as his text-book, and to compare it critically with other modern philosophies. In spite of his

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attempts to read his own views out of Hegel, Gentile is much nearer to Fichte, not only in doctrine, but also in temper and purpose, and has concerned himself with fundamental epistemological issues which the metaphysically minded Hegel slurred over. Mr. Holmes sees this, and makes it the beginning of a general account of Gentile's standpoint and achievement, leading up to a fairly detailed summary of the contents of the *Sistema di Logica*. Such a summary was much to be desired, because the work in question is not available in English, and yet is the most complete and authoritative exposition of Gentile's main contentions: his radical condemnation of all previous systems of metaphysics on the ground that they made knowledge impossible; his "peremptory and definitive" critique of scepticism, which extracts from solipsistic premises what he claims as a logic and metaphysic possessing *a priori* certitude; his "logic of the abstract," with its revision and reevaluation of traditional formal logic; his "logic of the concrete," which substitutes for the Hegelian dialectic one which is Fichtean in spirit, and sums it up in the formulae "Ego = Ego" and "Ego = Non-Ego." Mr. Holmes goes on to compare Gentile's philosophy with various forms of realism and with positivism, presenting it as a unique instance of a middle way between these extremes, and showing that the difference between Gentile and the realist or positivist is ultimately a difference between the questions they ask: they disagree about the very nature and function of philosophy. His own decision is in favour of actual idealism, as being the most humanistic philosophy, though he finds many flaws in Gentile's statement of the doctrine, and suggests improvements.

There has long been room for a book which should interpret Gentile to the English-speaking world. The present work has made a beginning of the task, but is far from having completed it. It points the way, though not clearly, to an informed judgment upon Gentile. The Italian philosopher has asked the old epistemological question, how we can be justified in holding our ultimate principles. He has shown suggestively how the mind, by its own free act, thinks, and finds in thought itself its guiding principles, and how all thought is a moral act. This is an account of the terms on which we acquire and accept our known world; and these are also the terms on which alone any metaphysic may legitimately be held. But Gentile also holds that, in thinking, thought creates its object, and gives to itself and its world alike their reality, the only reality which is conceivable. Thus his account of the genesis of knowledge becomes an account of the genesis of reality, his epistemology becomes not the basis for a metaphysic, but itself a metaphysic. Mr. Holmes thinks this transition is justified. The final judgment upon Gentile will turn largely upon whether it is so.

The book contains Americanisms, and is disfigured by some jargon. On page 164, lines 9-11, a plural subject is given a singular verb. On page 180, line 17, "categorical" should be "categorial." On page 34 occurs a statement which implies that Philo of Alexandria was a Christian.

At the end of the book is a detailed bibliography of Gentile's writings.

H. A. HODGES.

The Christian Understanding of Man. By various authors. Edited by Dr. J. H. OLDHAM. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1938. Pp. xii + 268. Price 8s. 6d. net.)

For the Conference, held in Oxford last July, on the Subject of *Church, Community and State*, elaborate preparation was made by the co-operation

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of scholars in many lands. Only one of the projected volumes of essays, that on *The Church and Its Functions in Society*, was ready for the Conference. The Report of the Conference under the title *The Churches Survey Their Task* was published in October 1937. The remaining six books are appearing tardily, and this volume is the first of them. It falls into two parts. The first deals with some current conceptions and the second with the distinctively Christian. The first essay on *The Scientific Account of Man*, by Prof. T. E. Jessop, can be warmly praised for its lucidity of style and balance of judgment. Its purpose is to show that when science (physical and biological) confines itself to its own province, and theology minds its own business, there need be no conflict between the account science gives of man and the estimate the Christian religion offers. Very valuable is the description of the limitations and the resources of science, and the consequent distinction as regards authority between science as such and philosophies which sometimes claim to speak in its name. The second essay by Dr. R. L. Calhoun on *The Dilemma of Humanitarian Modernism* is good, but not quite so good as the first. The third, on *The Marxist Anthropology and the Christian Conception of Man*, by N. Alexeiev, is of high merit; it is adequate in knowledge and competent in judgment; it seeks to bring out clearly the points of contact between Communism and Christianity in its view of man, as well as the contrasts. It seeks to do justice to Communism, and the Christian conception is not that of rigid orthodoxy of the Russian type, but one that Christian theologians generally could endorse.

In the second part the fourth essay, by Emil Brunner, is much less narrowly dogmatic than I should have expected. He does not quarrel with science or philosophy; he accepts the modern scholarly view of the Holy Scriptures; and if he still inclines to use the old theological terms, he seeks to meet the thinking of to-day. He does not assert the total loss of the divine image in the Fall, but only its perversion, demanding its restoration by grace. The fifth essay by Austin Farrer is a capable discussion, inclining sometimes to be over-subtle of the whole subject, showing the contrast between English and Continental thinking, when compared with Brunner's. Dr. W. M. Horton's contribution (the sixth essay) is American in its alertness and up-to-date-ness. He deals mainly with the breakdown of standards in the thought and life of to-day. The last essay, by Pastor Pierre Maury, appears almost as an anticlimax, the *reductio ad absurdum* of Neo-Calvinism. The Christian anthropology has no contact or concern with general anthropologies. All it has to do is to assert the Biblical doctrine of man, son, and grace. This is not the place to show that; what is here presented ignores the greater part of the teaching of the Scriptures, uses the Scriptures dogmatically and not historically, and lacks the graciousness an exponent of divine grace should display. A genuinely evangelical theology need not be as exclusive or intolerant. The absence of an index is a serious defect, and will lessen the usefulness of the volume.

A. E. GARVIE.

The Kingdom of God and History. By various authors. Edited by Dr. J. H. OLDHAM. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1938. Pp. xii + 216. Price 7s. 6d. net.)

This is the second volume of essays, prepared in connection with the 1937 Oxford Conference on *Church, Community and State*. The Table of Contents gives only the names of the writers; and each seems to be supposed to deal

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with the whole subject. The first four essays seem to me, however, to present a special aspect, which might have been indicated in a separate title. The quite sketchy essay of Dr. H. G. Wood serves as an introduction, indicating the connections of the different aspects presented. The second essay shows all the fine qualities of Dr. C. H. Dodel as scholar and writer. He presents the contrast between Hellenic and Hebraic thought, the dualism of the eternal and the temporal, depriving history of significance, of the Hellenic view, and the presence and activity of the eternal in the temporal, inverting history with value, of the Hebraic view. He then outlines the conception of the Kingdom of God in the Old and the New Testaments. His dominant idea may be found in these sentences: "The Kingdom of God is not something yet to come. It came with Jesus Christ, and in its coming was perceived to be eternal in its quality. That eternal quality is manifested in turn by the continuous life of the Church, centred in the Sacrament in which the crisis of the death and resurrection of Christ is perpetually made present" (p. 35).

The first part of the third essay, by Dr. Edwyn Bevan, discusses a theological problem. If the sovereignty of God involves a close correspondence of natural event and human action, then there is this dilemma: if the natural order is rigidly fixed, human choice must be predetermined, or, if human choice is free, God's action in the natural order must be variable. In the second part Dr. Bevan describes the Christian conception of the Kingdom of God. He does not identify it with any stage in human progress on earth, any millennial earthly kingdom, but with "the heavenly hope which is essential to Christianity" (p. 69). Dr. E. W. Lyman contrasts the Christian conception of the Kingdom of God with "the evolutionary optimistic view of history" whether it be naturalistic or idealistic; and concludes that either is "left in a dilemma between a relativism which will justify each of our conflicting historical forces equally well, and a relapse from optimism to complete pessimism" (p. 87). He holds that "the Kingdom of God, in the Christian view of history, is a transcendent-immanent conception and stands for a transcendent immanent goal" (p. 93). It is God's rule *in* and yet *above* "everything that can be expressed in history." Its consummation lies beyond history, and yet it is present in "prophetic historic action on the part of both the individual Christian and the Christian Church" (p. 102).

The fifth essay, by Dr. Paul Tillich, runs to forty pages, and the sixth, by Dr. H. D. Wendland, to fifty. Both are marked by German thoroughness; but their standpoints are different. The first is on exile from Germany, and professes himself a "religious Socialist," the second still holding his chair in Germany, expresses his criticism of "the secular forms of Messianism" (p. 168). with great reserve. Both invoke what has now become an obsession in Continental thinking, the "demonic" element in history as contrasted with the "divine"; Wendland speaks of a Kingdom of Satan (p. 159). I myself do not believe that the introduction of this conception makes history any more intelligible. It would demand more space than I can claim to discuss these elaborate essays in any detail. Tillich rejects the interpretation of history in the *dialectical theology* and in the *nationalistic* (p. 130). He finds the "demonic" element in history in "the autonomy of the capitalistic economic system" (p. 132) in nationalism, which "must be described as neo-paganism even when it assumes no explicit religious form" (p. 134), and "dictatorial forms of government, in which the 'demonic' force of an unrestricted exercise of power drives men into presumptions towards God and the destruction of the human values which belong to the Kingdom of God" (p. 135). To these disruptive forces it is the task of the Christian Church "to represent the unity of the Kingdom of God" (p. 139).

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According to Wendland the Kingdom is past, present, future, and is the Kingdom of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. History is *sacred* in so far as God's grace and salvation are present in it; *secular*, where men follow their own ways; and *church*, in so far as in the Church there is worldliness as well as grace and salvation. On page 154 it seems to me there is probably a mistranslation: "sacred history is present and active in, with, and *behind* secular history." I conjecture that instead of *behind* should stand *under*, in correspondence with the sacramental formula of Christ's corporeal presence. These aspects are worked out in a series of propositions. While there is a present judgment of God in history, this foreshadows the Last Judgment, which will mark the end of history. At page 189 Wendland, with great reserve, seems to offer a justification for the "German Christian" attitude in politics, although he recognizes the danger of the secularization of politics. The last essay, by Mr. Christopher Dawson, opposes the Christian to "the other countless traditions that make up human history" (p. 204); criticizes the Protestant issues of the tradition in Socinianism and Millennialism [*sic*], affirms the opposition of Catholicism to Liberalism, and exalts the Catholic tradition. His conclusion may be quoted. "In comparison with the optimism of Liberalism the Christian view of life and the Christian interpretation of history are profoundly tragic. The true progress of history is a mystery which is fulfilled in failure and suffering and which will only be revealed at the end of time. The victory that overcomes the world is not success but faith, and it is only the eye of faith that understands the true value of history" (p. 216). This essay is an anti-climax, not as regards its literary merits, but as regards its pessimism in regard to human history in contrast to the more or less tempered optimism of preceding essays. The use of the book is made much more difficult than need be by the absence from the top of the right-hand page of any distinctive heading. If the contents offered no such heading, the name of the author might at least have been given. Although it is difficult in this volume, because of its variety, to see the wood for the trees, yet one conclusion seems to be justified; the emphasis is on the *rule*, and not the *realm* of God; the Kingdom is God's sovereignty of grace, consummated in the eternal life, not the temporal, and not a social ideal to be realized in time on earth.

A. E. GARVIE.

Christian Faith and the Common Life. By various authors. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1938. Pp. xii + 196. Price 7s. 6d. net.)

The contents of the third volume in the series, following up the Oxford Conference, do not generally correspond with the expectations which the title might raise. They do not deal with the actual conditions of the common life, and the application of the Christian faith to them. Some of the essays have the advantage of a distinctive title, but others have not, although the contents might suggest one. The table of contents gives only the names of the contributors. In the *Introduction* Nils Ehrenström sketches the situation of Christian morals in the world to-day, and indicates differences and agreements among the contributors. Dr. Martin Dibelius offers a valuable survey of *The Message of the New Testament and the Orders of Human Society*, emphasizing the universality of sin, and the necessity of grace. The contribution of Archbishop Temple has no distinctive title; but it has a distinct purpose. While insisting that the Christian must apply Christian standards in all spheres of the common life, he also contends for "the widest possible survey"

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of the effects of action, and justifies compromise as the only practicable best. The next essay, also without any distinctive title, by Dr. Niebuhr, appears to me in many ways the most valuable treatment of the subject. He shows how the fact of sin affects the application of the law of love in the solution of the problem of the common life. He is not sparing of his criticism of churches and theologians, and combines German systematic thinking with American practicability. Wemer Wiesner illustrates the theological reaction on the Continent to a biblical dogmatism; he distrusts human reason, rejects even the conception of orders, such as family, nation, as rooted in God's creative purpose, which Emil Brunner accepts as a basis for Christian ethics, and limits God's indications of His will to the Christian revelation and to individual instruments. He is specially antagonistic to the recognition of "the law of nature," as expounded in Roman Catholic ethics. His title is "The Law of Nature and Social Institutions." This world is "chaotic and tragic," and God's purpose in it is mysterious. The essay by Dr. H. H. Farmer on *The Revelation of Christ and the Christian Vocation* sketches the Christian viewpoint, aspects of the common life which confirm it, problems and difficulties which arise from it, and then concentrates on the problem thus presented to the Christian. He advocates a reliance on intuition rather than reflexion as a moral guide, but recognizes that there are safeguards necessary to avoid arbitrariness. He applies his analysis, the moderation of which must be recognized, to the question of war, and asserts pacifism as the Christian solution of the problem. In qualification of his pacifism let me offer only two considerations: (1) in a defensive war, surely the action of the aggressor has for the time suspended the "personal" relations, which carry the full moral obligations; (2) God's action in history is retributive, where this redemptive purpose is resisted; and such retribution may be necessary to the ultimate fulfilment of the redemptive purpose. Seeing that in a later volume of the series international relations are discussed, it seems to me this contention for pacifism is irrelevant to the special purpose of this volume. The last essay, by Professor J. C. Bennett, offers a clear and useful analysis of the *Causes of Social Evil*, objective and subjective, and offers a necessary protest against the indiscriminate denunciation of sin as the sole source of all such evils and especially against the frequent invocation of "the demonic." Rightly he says of this myth: "it is rapidly becoming a new catch-call which throws very little light on any social fact" (p. 175). This is the criticism of the whole volume which I feel compelled to offer. The discussion generally is too abstract; and it leaves the impression that there is so little agreement among Christian thinkers that no unambiguous marching-orders can be expected from the churches for any advance of the hosts of the Lord against the enemies of His kingdom. Nevertheless, there is so much learning and ability in the volume, as to demand and justify careful study.

A. E. GARVIE.

Church and Community. By various authors. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1938. Pp. xii + 259. Price 8s. 6d.)

This volume is the fifth in the series, dealing with the Church, Community, and State, although it is the last to appear. Most of the chapters have their own distinctive titles, but these are not given in the table of contents. Dr. K. S. Latourette leads off with an *Historical Survey and Interpretation* in a series of propositions: (1) "Every community has tended to have its own religion"

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(p. 3). (2) "Until about a century and a half ago, Christianity, where it was the predominant religion, was accepted as a community affair" (p. 5). (3) "Acceptance of Christianity by the community did not preclude a certain amount of unbelief" (p. 7). (4) Where this acceptance has taken place, "a tension has existed between the Christian conscience and the standards of the community" (p. 8). (5) "In Western Europe the Protestant Reformation did not diminish the intimacy of this relation between Church and community" (p. 9). (6) Since the latter part of the eighteenth century there has been "a divorce between Church and community" and the rise of sects (p. 11). (7) "As Christianity has either voluntarily abdicated or been rejected, the religious vacuum thus created has not remained unfilled" (p. 16). This disappointing record, however, ends in a warning: "He would be a rash prophet, however, who would forecast in this the collapse of the Church or the passing of its faith" (p. 17). Thus is the present situation set before us: I believe accurately, comprehensively, and succinctly.

Dr. Ernest Barker gives an acute analysis of the conception of community to show how varied are its factors, none of which by itself—common blood, soil, law, and government—is sufficient, unless it involves "a conscious and purposive sharing in a general way of life" (p. 31). Similarly, he analyses the conception of Church. "A Christian Church," he says, "is *sui generis* in its custody of the Word of God and in the duty of mission—universal mission—incumbent upon it under the Word" (p. 42). It rests its authority on divine revelation. In a historical summary he shows the gradual detachment of the Church from the community State. In the world to serve it must not be of the world in its standards, for it has a mission to the world, "its custody of the Word and the motion of the Spirit" (p. 60).

Dr. Marc Boegner deals with the *Church and the Nation* in relation to France from the standpoint of a Protestant. One sentence will suffice: "The Church is, and also ought to be, the only place where the citizens of a nation are reminded not only that the nation is not an end in itself, not only that the nation ought to be in community with other nations, for the sake of the common good of humanity, but still more and above all, that the ultimate end assigned by God to it is, beyond all national distinctions, the kingdom where God shall be all in all" (p. 81). The contribution under the same title of Dr. Hans Lilje is of unusual interest. The standpoint is German, but not that of the "totalitarian state." Indeed, with due reserve the author detaches himself from it. Recognizing blood and soil as the natural bases of nationality, he deprecates the notion of racial purity and lays the chief emphasis on history (p. 90). He affirms "the unity of the human race," and the inclusion of all nations "in God's plan" (p. 100). Neither the birth of a nation through the creative Will of God, nor the consciousness of its calling, can be used superficially as a means of self-glorification (p. 110). As a Lutheran he adopts the dualism of the creative and the redemptive order of God—world and Church—and deduces the principle that the standards of the Gospel cannot be directly applied to the nation. While seeking to influence the nation, the Church must maintain the independence of its Gospel (p. 113).

Dr. Manfred Björkquist expounds "the idea of a National Church in describing the Lutheran Church in Sweden, which embraces nearly the whole of the nation. He regards the close relation to the State as an advantage in affording the possibilities for reaching the whole nation and no hindrance to its necessary liberty; but admits that such a connection is not necessary. D. Stefan Zankov, a Bulgarian, and one of the most progressive of the representatives of Orthodoxy in the oecumenical movements, gives a comprehensive account of "nation and Church in the Orthodox lands of Eastern

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Europe." That relation has necessarily been affected by the subjection of most of these lands to Turkish rule, the faith of these Churches is mystical, ascetic, and eschatological; and presents a marked contrast to that of Western Protestantism. Church and nation have here been closely identified. Dr. E. E. Aubrey deals with Church and community from the American standpoint, where the State exercises no authority over the Church, and the Church has to exercise its influence in a "melting-pot" of diverse nationalities only slowly growing into community. The last essay on the same subject by Dr. H. Paul Douglass is far too long (67 pages). It would have gained in interest if the descriptive parts had been shortened and the last section on "the elements of a possible solution" had been expressed in less sociological jargon. His conclusion is that the entanglement of the Church by "sociological necessity" makes its position in the community equivocal; and nevertheless, it can hope for "victory based, as it believes, on the congruity of the Christian religious objectives and insights with the objective faith of the universe and the corresponding basic needs and undying aspirations of man" (p. 259). On the whole the volume is one of the best in the series, and deserves study as contributing to the discussion of a vital issue of to-day.

A. E. GARVIE.

Church, Community and State in Relation to Education. By various authors. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1938. Pp. xii + 234. Price 7s. 6d. net.)

This volume is divided into two parts. I, The Crisis in Education, and II, The Crisis in Christian Education. The first essay, by Professor F. Clarke, with admirable lucidity states what the crisis is. In contrast to the totalitarian view, he argues that education must aim at a disciplined personal liberty under the authority which religion alone can give. Professor W. Zenkovsky gives after a discussion of the totalitarian idea and totalitarian tendencies and *Étatism*, or the glorification of the state, and the Crisis of Secularism and other relevant matters, a most valuable survey of educational theory and method and its victory in Soviet Russia, of the conception of community (or *volk*) and culture in Germany, and of Education and State in Italy. He concludes that by awakening the Christian consciousness alone shall we "illumine the gift of freedom—through its development and not through its limitation" (p. 62). Dr. P. Monroe contributes a disappointingly complacent account of the "relationship of community, state, government, church, and school in the United States," which contains much interesting information, but offers little illumination on the problem. Mr. C. R. Morris deals with *the State and Voluntary Effort*. His argument may be given in one sentence: "The best thing our educational system can do to defend democracy is to turn out men and women who really enjoy and care for that vigorous individual life and work which would not be allowed to them under a totalitarian system. And this is what at present our democratic schools and universities are largely failing to do" (p. 105). A common ideal animates the three constructive contributions.

The second part deals with the Crisis in Christian Education. Mr. J. W. D. Smith seeks to show the difficulty of a Christian education in a community which is not Christian, and argues that it can only be met as the Church itself gains a clearer insight into the intellectual and spiritual issues involved. Dr. Kohnstamm pleads for an educational evangelism of which Christ will

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be centre, and deals with the defects of traditional education, such as intellectualism, under-estimation of activity, false emphasis in distance from common life of the objects of faith, appeal to fear, neglect of the special needs of girls. He offers practical counsels on the Church's task. "X," who appears to be German, describes the present crisis of civilization and the educational problems arising from it; cause and effect of the universal cultural and educational crisis; the attempt to find a political solution giving rise to the problem of freedom; and in this setting indicates the Church's task. Dr. Oldham, who has arranged and edits the whole series of books, offers some concluding reflexions. In his judgment the crisis is a challenge to the Church, to vision and endeavour.

A. E. GARVIE.

The Universal Church and the World of Nations. By various authors. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1938. Pp. xii + 315. Price 8s. 6d. net.)

This is the last of the series of volumes following up the Oxford Conference. The chapters bear distinctive titles, and the volume as a whole shows more orderly planning than do some of the others. The Marquis of Lothian leads off with the *Demonic Influence of National Sovereignty*. He here expresses an idea, which seems almost an obsession: there can be no peace till national sovereignty is subordinated to a commonwealth of mankind; all other considerations are unduly minimized. I am sorry he has accepted that controversial slogan "demonic," as it seems to me to add nothing to our understanding of events. Sir Alfred Zimmern, who writes on the *Ethical Presuppositions of a World Order*, asks with reference to this idea "whether it is not a little unhelpful, and more than a little old-fashioned to fix on 'sovereignty' as the root-cause of the troubled condition of inter-state relations" (p. 52 note). He gives an acute analysis of four assumptions: "(1) There is a world order now in existence. (2) There is a world society now in existence, but it has not yet been reduced to order. (3) There is no world society in existence, and in the nature of things there never can be one. (4) There is no world order, and, humanly speaking, there never can be one" (p. 27). In his discussion of these lines of thought, he associates them "respectively with Cobden, Woodrow Wilson, Bergson, and St. Augustine" (p. 28). He is critical of them all. He states the problem as follows: "Granted the limitations of human nature, are there any issues on which it is reasonable to expect that *man's* social conscience can be relied upon to act as a permanent force in world affairs?" (p. 46). He concludes that these limitations "compel us, for the time being, at any rate, to abandon the hope of establishing anything approaching a universal system of world-order" (p. 50). He admits that there are relations among some nations so close that war is "unthinkable," and if such relations "covered the whole world, the problem of world-order, in its strictly political sense and within the limits of human weakness, would be solved" (p. 54).

The third essay, by Dr. O. H. von der Gablentz, treating the economic aspects, is too technical to be discussed here. The distinguished Swiss international jurist, Dr. Max Huber, deals with the *Christian Understanding of Law*. He approaches "the problem of the international, supranational, and universal 'as' an essential part of the greater problem: History and the Kingdom of God" (p. 101). "Law," he says, "is the sum-total of the rules which, by their claim to validity, order the external relations of human beings among themselves" (p. 102). It is generally only national in its scope. "Only

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where the beginnings of a common ethic or of a large and permanent community of interest are present, can the international legal order go beyond the practice of concluding treaties" (p. 104). Only the Christian Church has created such "a possible basis for an international and supranational law." Such law has importance only in the measure in which "a right balance in the static and dynamic elements in the relation of nations is attained" (p. 118). From this standpoint *power, force, and war* are discussed. Regarding the argument against war from the enormity of the evil it inflicts, he says: "From the specifically Christian standpoint there is no room for the quantitative element in judgment of evil" (p. 121). As regards "the conscientious objector," while advocating all practicable tolerance, he states that "the claim of the citizen to be able to demand as a right that the State should renounce its claim upon him by taking his subjective decision into consideration, makes, in principle, the whole authority of the State an open question" (p. 124). He notes as one of "the elements of the present international law" which is a serious hindrance "the exaggeration of the idea of sovereignty" (p. 127). An ethic which would afford a basis for international law "must give a central place to the idea of justice" (p. 139); and the actuality of the relations of nations falls far short of this ideal. The obligation to create a just order remains, even if the prospect is not hopeful.

Mr. John Foster Dulles finds, as the title of his contribution, "the problem of peace in a dynamic world" suggests the source of war in the barriers which national boundaries impose on expansive human energy, and the solution in a removal or lessening of these barriers. Rev. V. A. Demant traces the roots of war in human nature in the frustration of desires, and emphasizes the need of redemption. The Rev. Wilhelm Menn offers a thorough discussion on *the Church of Christ and the International Order*. In contrast to the nations, "the Churches have a common ground which can make their meetings profitable, in spite of all political, national, and racial differences, one indeed which brings them from the outset into a positive relationship" (p. 206). Their *oecumenicity* should afford a basis for their *internationalism*; but, while it is necessary that the Church in each nation should become one with it, that God's redemptive purpose may be fulfilled, there is the danger of its becoming so nationalized that the One Holy Catholic Church becomes "a purely eschatological entity," and even "its missionary task is called in question" (p. 216). While preserving its internationalism, it cannot associate itself with any such, resting only on utilitarianism or materialism, and must even be cautious in its relations to idealistic humanism; but must maintain its own destructive witness to the Gospel. Its task is to give to its universal principles "a new interpretation and a new application in every particular instance and in every new historical situation" (p. 231). As a German the author on good grounds does not share "that naïve belief in a League of Nations," and offers some justified criticism of the League of Nations. He closes with the aspiration for the unity of the Church.

Dr. Otto Piper, dealing with *War and Christian Peacemaking*, accepts the Lutheran dualism between this fallen world, hostile to God, and the redeemed Church, and virtually limits its peacemaking to the discharge of its own distinctive task. The Rev. Canon Raven sets out with "sweet reasonableness" the case for *pacifism on the religious basis*. Much as I sympathize with his attitude, I cannot accept his argument as convincing, even from our common Christian standpoint. The volume as a whole leaves a depressing impression as showing how intractable the present situation is, and how slow must be the processes of the education of mankind to eschew war and ensue peace.

A. E. GARVIE.

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Business Ethics—Studies in Fair Competition. By FRANK CHAPMAN SHARP and PHILIP G. FOX. (New York and London: D. Appleton-Century Co. 1937. Pp. xi + 316. Price 8s. 6d. \$2.25.)

This joint work of a professor of philosophy and a professor of business administration is full of meat. It is systematic, has humour, shows common-sense, and exhibits a special knowledge of the important problems of modern business.

The authors realize first of all that their title requires an apologia. It might strike some as a contradiction in terms. But, they contend (p. 3), "so far are business men from being without moral standards that the majority of them, like the majority of other people, have three. There is first the standard which John Smith applies to his treatment of other people—his competitors, his customers, his employers, and those from whom he purchases his supplies. There is, second, the standard which he expects them to apply to him. Finally there is the standard which he applies to other people's treatment of each other." These standards are applicable between buyer and seller, and between competing buyers or competing sellers. They deal mainly with questions of price. Thus the main topics discussed are fair price, including (Chapter XVI) that of property in ideas; fair treatment of competitors; and fair service of seller to buyer, including the questions of (Chapter III) intentional misrepresentation, (Chapter IV) "innocent" lies, (Chapter V) "let the buyer beware," and (Chapter VII) the limits of persuasion. The final chapters discuss the facts and possibilities of "moral progress in the business world"; they contain interesting pages (pp. 243-4) on the sense of craftsmanship as an Ally of Morality and (pp. 262-6) business men's luncheon clubs, such as Rotary.

As an economist the reviewer would like to testify to the timeliness of this work. He is particularly grateful for the chapter (X) on Corporate Management. The corporation, or, to translate into English, the joint stock company, has become by far the most important economic institution of our time. Yet apart from its legal façade, little is known publicly of its actual functioning and control. The examples the authors give of the practices of chairmen, presidents, and directors of oil and other corporations, not only exhibit the prevailing graft, which we are accustomed to hear about, but show up also the prevailing confusion of thought about the rights and duties of officers and shareholders. On more than one occasion in the recent United States Senate investigations of corporate activities we are told (p. 134) that "officials who had enjoyed the rights of dictatorship over a corporation for long periods of time without owning more than a very small fraction of the stock were compelled by the driving attorneys to admit that they had never before appreciated the fact that 'they didn't actually own the damn company.'"

Relations within the Corporation abound in difficult points of ethics. May a director, for instance, who is also an investor, buy or sell shares in his company according to his inside knowledge? If the information is disastrous he will want to sell. The only way such an official can (p. 136) "dispose of his stock with advantage to himself is to find someone else who will agree to become a stockholder. This means, in effect, that he must find someone who does not yet know of the disastrous information. The officer thereupon invites this person into the Corporation to assume his losses." All that is needed to make a perfect picture, conclude the authors, is for the directors "to write the victim a letter of welcome into the fold, together with pious expressions describing the zeal with which the management will care for the interests of the newcomer."

Modern economic institutions also discussed are Direct Selling, and the

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Expert. "Many wholesalers have complained that it is unfair for the manufacturer to sell directly to the retailer and for the retailer to buy directly from the factory. They regard themselves as the victims not merely of an injury but also of a wrong." The authors discuss this by-passing of the familiar trinity of traders—producer, wholesaler, and retailer—under the heading (p. 152) "Is there a Sacred Way from Manufacturer to Consumer?" The ethics of the expert is discussed in a whole chapter (VI) called *Knowing One's Business*. The view advanced is that more trades should be protected from the charlatan and ignoramus as the State to-day, by registration and examination, protects the medical profession. Important also in the eyes of any economist is a salutary reflection on the ethics of the present unequal distribution of wealth. The authors rightly point (p. 192) to the large rôle played by chance and the cumulative effect of any initial chance success.

The book ends with a summary chapter giving some of the principal mistakes made in passing moral judgments. Mistakes include looking to actual results rather than to intentions, not taking into account the interests of *all* the parties affected, not considering circumstances, and being biased by private likes and dislikes for the persons concerned. But the great value of this book lies in its wealth of instances, often drawn from well-documented legal cases, fully disclosing names and circumstances. It is a pioneer book, as its dustcover quite truthfully remarks, and should lead to a new, up-to-date teaching of ethical problems in terms readily comprehended and accepted by an industrial community.

P. SARGANT FLORENCE.

A History of Cynicism, from Diogenes to the Sixth Century A.D. By D. R. DUDLEY, Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge. (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd. 1937. Pp. xii + 224. Price 12s. 6d.)

A history of Cynicism must have a double purpose, and may be judged in two ways. (1) Whatever its plan may be in detail, it has to portray the individual Cynics and their eccentricities. There is much legitimate entertainment to be had in this way, and Mr. Dudley, who is an excellent *raconteur*, has made the most of it. His idiomatic translations from the ancient sources are a pleasant feature of the book, and he leaves with the reader a vivid picture of life in the ancient world. On a more intellectual plane, but connected with this anecdotal purpose, there is the business of examining sources; much serious and well-judged research, which should come under this category, is included in Mr. Dudley's book.

(2) Philosophically speaking, the main interest of a history of Cynicism lies in its answer to three main questions: First, with whom did the movement begin? Secondly, what were the Cynic doctrines, if any? Thirdly, was there real continuity in the movement? (If a negative answer is given to the last two questions, I suppose that, in the narrower sense of philosophy, Cynicism has no philosophical interest.) The last point is an interesting one to consider. A long period, from Diogenes to the sixth century A.D., is covered by Mr. Dudley's book, and there are times in which we have to acknowledge a slump in Cynicism, if not its total extinction, especially between 200 B.C. and the first century of the Empire. Since the Cynics had no organized school, the thread of their continuity was bound to be slender; and it was a continuity in external things, the wallet and rough cloak, rather than in any ideas of which these were symbolic.

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Clear answers are given here at least to the first and third questions. Mr. Dudley dismisses Antisthenes from the leading part, and installs Diogenes in his place, on very reasonable grounds. "The traditional view has been established by two interested parties—Alexandrian writers of *Successions of Philosophers* and the Stoics. The former wished to trace all philosophical genealogies back to Socrates wherever possible; the latter, desirous of showing themselves as the true heirs of Socrates, made great play with the connection of their founder Zeno with the Cynic Crates, and turned Diogenes into a Stoic saint." On the question of continuity, Mr. Dudley takes the view that the eclipse of Cynicism during the second and first centuries B.C. was not total. In Greece, it continued to lead a spasmodic and subterranean existence; in Rome, although the references by Latin writers do not all prove personal acquaintance with it, it does seem to have gained a footing in the time of Cicero. Mr. Dudley gives two main reasons for its decline in this period—firstly, that the varieties of "originality" were limited, and even Cynicism, by being familiar, became respectable; secondly, that it was alien to the Roman temper. And he accounts in this way for its revival in the first century A.D.—"luxury was more rampant than ever, and philosophy, even Stoicism, had compromised with it." I will only say, in criticism of this section, that the account of Thræsea and his adherents seems to me scarcely relevant; it is a pity to fuse Cynicism with Stoicism. But the very fact that this can happen brings us back to the second main question, What were the doctrines of Cynicism? This is not very clearly discussed in the book; I think Mr. Dudley generally takes it for granted that Cynicism was essentially personal and external, and he says that it "had no definite theoretical background," but it would have been useful to hear further argument on this point. The book at least leaves me with the impression that Cynicism is never more than Stoicism plus bad manners; and perhaps the best answer to give to this question is simply, "none."

D. J. ALLAN.

The Traditional Formal Logic. By W. A. SINCLAIR. (London: Methuen & Co. 1937. Pp. xi + 131. Price 4s. 6d.)

Mr. Sinclair has done a real service to all whose business includes the teaching of Formal Logic, by producing a book which confines itself to what may be called the practical side of that study, viz. the rules for the manipulation of statements and arguments. The ordinary text-book requires the student to dig out the practical rules from the discussion of theories on which they are supposed to depend, and when discussion has once got under way it seems almost impossible for an author to steer clear of matters which have nothing to do with Formal Logic. Mr. Sinclair has seen that Formal Logic requires very little theory and no discussion. Such theory as is necessary, e.g. the class doctrine of the proposition, he states briefly and clearly: the question whether it be true is irrelevant to the task of putting statements into logical form or arguments into syllogisms, and it is to enable the student to perform such manipulations that the book has been written.

The details of the book need not be dealt with here. Some teachers will regret that Mr. Sinclair has given such a meagre amount of immediate inference, and many will regret the omission of the old exercises on the rules of the syllogism—determining mood and figure from given data, etc.—but Mr. Sinclair is keenly alive to the danger of making Formal Logic too intricate and passing beyond the minimum likely to be expected of pass students or to be useful as an introduction to more advanced logic.

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The aim of the book is to make it possible and even easy for the student to get up Formal Logic for himself without instruction, and the aim seems to have been achieved. Teachers who adopt the book should find that the time saved on helping students to use a text-book will be far more profitably spent on philosophical problems. Some knowledge of Formal Logic is necessary to every student of philosophy, and Mr. Sinclair is to be complimented on his success in minimizing the effort necessary to acquire that knowledge.

GEORGE BROWN.

Intuition. By K. W. WILD. (Cambridge, at the University Press. 1938. Pp. 240. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

This is a most likeable, lively and (if I may say so) a most intelligent book. Intuition is the name for so many different processes in so many philosophies that its frail thread of unity—not much more than the contrast between “within it and within,” on the one hand, and “about it and about” on the other hand—is liable to snap under the kindest pressure; and Miss Wild for the most part is “sceptical but impressed,” as she says on one occasion. She has, however, a lively and catholic curiosity, a flair for penetrating analysis, and an effectively debonair way of writing. She has chosen a theme that suited her talent.

The first hundred pages or so seem to me to be rather less successful than their successors. She begins with Bergson, and produces what seems to me to be rather a congested account of a congested doctrine. In contrast her careful analysis of a great but slenderly evidenced question—the precise meaning of Spinoza’s third grade of knowledge—reaches a high standard. An account of Croce follows, then an account of Jung (with excursus comparing him with Lévy Bruhl, Whitehead, and Wordsworth) then an account of Whitehead *solus*. This time-jumping and provocative method has the advantage of illuminating several of the different facets of a diversified and divisive subject, but it puts something of a strain upon the reader, especially since all the exhibits have been broken off from their historical antecedents. (When Miss Wild speaks of intuition as a “new name” in Spinoza’s philosophy one is frankly puzzled. Was Spinoza not a commentator on Descartes? And if there had been no critical and post-critical philosophy, would Croce have dreamed of evolving his doctrine of intuition?)

The next and central part of the book is divided according to subject-matter. Intuition in religion, in morals, in aesthetics, is successively discussed, and is followed by chapters on genius, teleology, and axiology. In the chapter on genius the expository conjunction of Rousseau, Goethe, Henry Ford, and King David, Goliath’s conqueror, is effective as well as bold, and Miss Wild has touched nothing that she does not understand much better than most.

In a short concluding discussion of about twenty pages, Miss Wild proceeds to compare definitions. She is convinced that there is something to clarify, despite the fact that, “the word intuition has been used by serious and thoughtful writers in so many different senses that it has no clear meaning outside its immediate context, and often not in it.” The notes of immediacy, inexplicability, and reliability seems to pertain to all serious accounts of “intuition,” and it is nearly always held to be conformable to the spiritual rather than to the material. On the whole the idea that “intuition” is a *prius* in all knowing of whatsoever special kind seems to be less expugnable, to this author’s mind, than any other; and I think we hear rather less in these definitory statements about the emotional penumbra of much “intuition”

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than in the body of the discussion. In general Miss Wild is convinced that "a careless dismissal of what is intensely felt and persistently defended is not philosophic."

Miss Wild has had the courage to end her book with the brief paragraph "And so on," and that is not the only respect in which her short concluding chapter is more than usually courageous. She thinks she can "safely" draw fifteen positive conclusions, "which we may expect every one to accept," that she has disproved four propositions (a modest number) can show that four are improbable, but that fourteen remain possible. It does not seem to me that she has been as careful about accuracy of expression in this chapter as in the others, although the need for accuracy in it is obviously very great. In particular I do not think that II (4) on p. 229 is precise or even intelligible as it stands. But I hope I am wrong.

JOHN LAIRD.

Liberality and Civilization. By GILBERT MURRAY, D.C.L., LL.D., Litt.D. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1938. Pp. 94. Price 2s. 6d. net.)

Here are two lectures recently given at the invitation of the Hibbert Trustees in the Universities of Bristol, Glasgow, and Birmingham, by an author of world-wide fame. The loss of liberalty he holds (whatever one's politics) is the legacy of the insecurity of the Peace. Unless men can devise liberal things, there is ruin before us, and there is still time for the revival of liberalty, since it has not faded altogether into the Limbo of forgotten and fantastic things. The state of Europe is the poignant, pitiful theme of this tract for the times. "Nations can destroy one another if they will; they can save one another if they will. But no nation can destroy the others and save itself." Liberalty and humanity go together and require a comity of nations. Liberalty can still cast out fear, although we are so close to the abyss, and the author attempts throughout to give practical suggestions for the succour of a tortured world. His hope is still in the League of Nations, as is natural in one who has given such distinguished services to that body, and he does not believe that dictators can be liberal; but he is not more tendencious than his liberal spirit compels him to be.

JOHN LAIRD.

Punishment. By HANS VON HENTIG. (London: William Hodge & Co., Ltd., 1937. Pp. 239. Price 1.5s. 6d. net.)

This book by Dr. Hans von Hentig, who was formerly Professor of Penal Law and Criminology at the University of Bonn, is the translation into English of a German original from which the numerous footnotes, we are told, have been omitted. The book suffers from the circumstance that it is a translation, and it is manifest throughout that it is a translation of a German original. The effect is to give one a sense of effort in the reading, and though the style does here and there give promise of improvement, the effort has to be maintained to the end. Apart from this criticism which one has to make of the translation, the work displays all the characteristics that one associates with German scientific writing. There is a wide, almost an infinite, range of learning which gives to the chapters on "The Evolution of Punishment" a very considerable interest. In these chapters illustrations are drawn from ancient and modern history and from Christian and Jewish and Aryan and non-Aryan sources.

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There is a useful chapter on "The Theories and the Purpose of Punishment." The dominant purpose that commends itself to the author is that of the use of punishment as a means of social selection, to which the old arrangement of purposes, reformative, deterrent, and preventive are to be subordinated. There is, however, a danger in allowing the criminologist a free hand in these matters. It is that the point of view of the criminologist as such is apt to be too narrow and needs to be corrected by a superior point of view, be it ethical or even political. Moreover, one feels that certain modes of punishment that may commend themselves to the criminologist for one reason may come to be used by the political power for another, and quite different, purpose, as in fact would seem to have happened with the introduction of sterilization into German law. It is perhaps in the irony of things that Dr. von Hentig should have advocated this new mode of punishment as long as twenty-one years ago.

The book shows throughout a certain scientific temper, and the author manifestly has all the material at his disposal. One feels, however, that his general philosophy is unacceptable. Thus, he attaches a great deal too little importance to intellect (p. 83) and is apt to deny the freedom of the will (p. 148). On these things the whole tradition of European law and punishment have been founded. With their denial other things of necessity must disappear: as, for instance, the idea of justice for which Dr. von Hentig appears to have very little concern in this book on punishment. Altogether, as a piece of writing directed to English conditions, one feels that the latest work by Mr. Leo Page on *Crime and the Community* is not only more readable but also of greater value.

RICHARD O'SULLIVAN.

Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Volume XIII. Philosophy of Education. (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America. 1938. Pp. 232.)

Amongst the papers and addresses on education in this volume is a forceful plea by Dr. N. Murray Butler, who is speaking as a guest of the Association, for the intervention of philosophy in the realm of education; and there are several papers devoted to the part Scholastic philosophy may hope to play in making a theory of education for America. These papers contain much healthy self-criticism (as in the statement on p. 62 that "a Scottish child of eleven is at the developmental level of an American child of thirteen"), but at times they become somewhat naïve or overburdened with citations. However, since Aquinas left no explicit philosophy of education among his writings, it is reasonable that his modern followers should draw out the implications of what he did say on the human character and intellect.

Of more interest is the report of a joint-session with the American Philosophical Association in December 1937. Here Dr. Louis Mercier of Harvard defends Scholastic philosophy as a "dualistic humanism" against monistic criticism from Professor Blanshard of Swarthmore College. Perhaps Dr. Mercier neglects the importance of the idea of *analogia entis* in his exposition, and thus lays himself open to the charge that the Thomist account of the relation between temporal and eternal "runs off into mystery at crucial points."

The second discussion (pp. 147-170), between Dr. Sheldon of Yale and Fr. G. B. Phelan of Toronto, is concerned with the nature of the union of mind and body. Dr. Sheldon is for one-way action, of mind on body; while Fr. Phelan exposes the Scholastic conception of mind as a spiritual substance

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and at the same time principle of unity to the growing and sentient body. It is valuable to see the points of contact and disagreement between Scholasticism and more recent philosophies here brought into general view, for much can thus be achieved to break the barriers set around Scholastic philosophy by its difficulties of language and environment.

J. H. CREHAN.

"Piers Plowman" and Contemporary Religious Thought. By GRETA HORT, M.A., Ph.D. (London: S.P.C.K.; New York: Macmillan Co. 1938. Pp. 170. Price 8s. 6d. net.)

The interest of this able and well-written book is not mainly literary, nor solely religious, as philosophy and theology were in close alliance. After an appreciative description of the poem, and a balanced estimate of Langland's knowledge of theology based on an examination of his Latin quotations, two chapters are devoted to the description of Man; then follow chapters on Predestination, the Atonement, and the Sacrament of Penance. In the Conclusion the author expresses her opinion that "Piers Plowman helped to prepare the way for the English Reformation, the characteristic of which is its catholicity," that it "is a theological poem, and that the key to it is the problem of the *salus animarum* as that presented itself to our fourteenth-century forefathers" (p. 159). If philosophy is as complete an interpretation of the world and life as the mind of man can compass, this problem may fall within its province. For readers of exclusively technical interest in philosophy, Chapters III and IV may advance a claim, for the author here deals competently with contemporary thought in the sphere now assigned to psychology. To enter into any details would demand more space than the book can claim, although it deserves this brief mention and commendation.

A. E. GARVIE.

Immortality: A Critique of the Process of Nature and the World of Man's Ideas. By COUNT HERMANN KEYSERLING. (London: Oxford University Press. Humphrey Milford. 1938. Pp. xvi + 232. Price 10s. 6d.)

This is a translation by Jane Marshall of a book published in Germany about thirty years since. It has been through three editions, and the author admits that it represents a stage of the problem he has now passed. But he considers it is a stage that others, seeking to approach the same problem, must also pass. Hence he allows it to be translated, and refers to other work, not accessible to the reviewer, as indicating his present position. This naturally makes reviewing not an easy task. Nor is it easy to put briefly the main thesis of the book. It may be stated, however, as follows. The individual is the fleeting shadow Hume declared him to be. But actually he is the ever changing manifestation of a supra-personal entelechy or energy, which is the expression of life as a whole. Only from that standpoint is the individual explicable or significant. Now this, of course, is really the biological aspect of the individual. He is the expression of the germ plasm. As such he is as immortal as life is. But in a world ultimately doomed to extinction, according to the second law of thermodynamics, this does not seem much ground for immortality. Consciousness is a very secondary product in the author's scheme of things. It is life, life as it is in cabbages and kings, of which he continually speaks. As

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in the Buddhist conception, the individual dies every moment. There does not, therefore, seem anything very distinctive in this, and the book is the more tantalizing because of its rhetorical style, which does not suit its philosophical purpose. Yet it is worth reading despite its repetitions and obscurities. It is indefinite, and yet has signs of real insight. If the author would re-write this youthful manifesto in the light of his maturer thought, it might well be an outstanding book. As it is, it leaves the reader with a sense of dissatisfaction, for which, of course, he will blame the author, with an uneasy sense that perhaps he too is to blame for not being sufficiently able to think himself into the author's standpoint.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

Books received also:—

- J. HJORT. *The Human Value of Biology*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1938. Pp. xii + 241. 2 dollars 50; 10s. 6d.
- T. G. MASARYK. *The Ideals of Humanity* (Tr. by W. P. Warren); and *How to Work* (Tr. by M. J. Kohn-Holoecek, translation revised by H. E. Kennedy). London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1938. Pp. 191. 6s.
- C. G. JUNG. *Psychology and Religion*. New Haven: Yale University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1938. Pp. 131. 9s.
- S. BUCHANAN. *The Doctrine of Signatures: A Defence of Theory in Medicine*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. 1938. Pp. xiv + 205. 7s. 6d.
- S. A. COOK. *The "Truth" of the Bible*. London: S.P.C.K.; New York: Macmillan & Co. 1938. Pp. xix + 346. 9s.
- A. C. MUKERJI. *The Nature of Self*. Allahabad: The Indian Press, Ltd. 1938. Pp. xii + 359. Rs. 5.
- G. O'CONNELL. *Naturalism in American Education* (Preface by L. J. A. MERCIER). New York: Benziger Bros. 1938. Pp. xxvi + 285. 2 dollars 75.
- W. F. OBERING. *The Philosophy of Law of James Wilson, Associate Justice of the United Supreme Court, 1789-1798*. (Vol. 1 of Philosophical Studies of the American Catholic Philosophical Assn.) Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America. 1938. Pp. 276.
- T. G. MASARYK. *Modern Man and Religion* (Preface by V. K. ŠKRACH. Tr. by A. BIBZA and V. BENES. Tr. revised by H. E. KENNEDY). London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1938. Pp. 328. 7s. 6d.
- J. E. SHAW. *The Lady "Philosophy" in the "Convivio"*. Cambridge, Mass.: The Dante Society; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1938. Pp. 29. 3s. 6d.
- S. CHASE. *The Tyranny of Words*. London: Methuen & Co. 1938. Pp. xii + 275. 10s. 6d.
- G. N. M. TYRRELL. *Science and Psychological Phenomena*. London: Methuen & Co. 1938. Pp. xv + 279. 12s. 6d.
- W. H. WATSON. *On Understanding Physics*. Cambridge at the University Press. 1938. Pp. xii + 146. 7s. 6d.
- P. ROMANELLI. *Gentile: The Philosophy of Giovanni Gentile: An Inquiry into Gentile's Conception of Experience*. (Ed. by the Casa Italiana of Columbia University). New York: S. F. Vanni Inc. 1938. Pp. xi + 191.
- J. CURNOS. *Hear, O Israel*. London: Methuen & Co. 1938. Pp. xvii + 163. 5s.
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CORRESPONDENCE

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

SIR,

I should take this opportunity to thank Professor F. Otto Schrader for the appreciative and encouraging review which he has written on my book, *Thought and Reality*, and which has been published in the January issue of this journal. He has been quite fair to me in it, and it is after some hesitation that I have decided to send this short note. There are a few points in the review, which, if taken as he tried to present them, will lead to some misunderstanding of Sankara's philosophy. There are, again, a few points of criticism levelled against Sankara, which, I feel, can be met reasonably from the side of logic.

Professor Schrader objects to regarding the Absolute as conscious, and says, with Duessen, that this is due to Sankara's anthropomorphism. On the other hand, he has no objection to treating it as supra-conscious. But the supra-conscious cannot be the same as the unconscious or infra-conscious; it must be more than our consciousness. The consciousness we have at this empirical level is not perfect; that is, for it there always remains some impenetrable core in the object. But in the Absolute this defect is removed. It is fully mediated immediacy or self-consciousness, in which the screen between the subject and the object drops. Of course, it is not consciousness in the ordinary sense, viz., consciousness of an object that is alien to consciousness. It still is consciousness for which the object itself is consciousness: it is our ordinary consciousness made perfect. It is for this reason that Sankara regards the consciousness of the self, not as its property, but as the same as the self. For the same reason many of the Western idealists too have called the Absolute by the name of Self-consciousness.

Our thought cannot form an epistemological ideal beyond such a Self. It is the most perfect type of existence that we can think of, and which we regard as the truth of our finite existence. That is why whenever we have direct experience of it we are said to reach the deepest depths of our being. We cannot think of deeper depths than that. Buddhism may postulate eight supramundane worlds. But the number of such worlds can never be definitely proved, and the question belongs to mythology, not to logic and metaphysics. The Absolute is postulated as that which transcends all thought, and so all relations. If from any world it is possible to think of a higher, then that world is still within reach of thought and has relations to the higher and the lower. So naturally that cannot be the Absolute. The Absolute is not what is merely supra-mundane, but what is beyond thought. The world of the angels is supra-mundane, but it is not the Absolute. Nor is it logical to postulate something beyond the infinite. Mythology may do so, but it is not metaphysics. Buddha was silent when the question was put to him about the Self or the Absolute; but the reasons for his silence were best known to him only. It would be dogmatic to interpret his silence as denial. But Sankara asserts the truth of the Absolute, because unreality, according to him, is unthinkable without thinking of reality as its basis. The Absolute is real as the basis of the world, which is relatively unreal.

The suggestion is made that *māyā* may be understood from the side of the Greek conception of the world as Being and Non-Being. But there is a subtle and profound difference between the two conceptions. *Māyā*, according to Sankara, is neither Being nor Non-Being, and is not a unity of the two. This point I have explained in my book, and need not repeat what I have said already. Or rather, we should say that Being and Non-Being are understood by Sankara differently from the Greeks. Non-Being is the admittedly unreal, which is never experienced as real. It is not what turns unity into plurality, or Being into Becoming; and it is not the same as absence or difference. It does not enter at all into the constitution of *māyā*. *Māyā* is an entity which is experienced as real; it is positive. Yet it is not Being or Existence, for the Absolute only is such. The Absolute also is positive, yet it is also

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Being or Existence. It is for the reason that *māyā* cannot be treated as either existence or non-existence that it is said to be inexplicable. The Absolute also may be said to be inexplicable, but in a different sense, viz., that of being beyond thought, not in the sense that it is neither Being nor Non-Being.

Another suggestion is made that *vivarta* may be understood as creation from nothing. This seems to be a misunderstanding. At least Sankara does not understand it in that sense. The creation is out of Brahman, not out of nothing. But this Brahman does not change or undergo modification in the process. For example, when milk turns into curd, the milk is no more; its very substance is transformed. This process is called *pariṇāma*. But when gold is made into an ornament, gold is not transformed into any other substance. Similarly Brahman is the cause of the world; but this is a peculiar cause which does not change in the process. Such a process is called *vivarta*. Sankara does not accept the principle that creation can be out of nothing. On the other hand, he does not also accept the principle that every case of causation must be a case of *pariṇāma*. *Vivarta* is a peculiar concept, and its peculiarity should be as such recognized, and should not be understood in terms of any other concept.

I should like to add that the concept of creation as *līla* or play, though it does not seem to be explicitly mentioned in the Upanishads, is yet found in the *Brahma-sūtras* (ii, 1, 33), which are an interpretation of the Upanishads. And all the commentators of the *Brahmasūtras* accept the concept of *līla* as expressing the Upanishadic view. I therefore attributed it to the Upanishads, though I could have been more definite. This and a few lapses will be corrected in a second edition when that is required; *twāṭvidyā* is not a misprint for *sthāṭāvidyā*, but for *tulāvidyā*.

I again thank Professor Schrader for introducing my book to the Western readers as important and comprehensive. And it will give me much gratification if the readers take, not merely antiquarian, but philosophical interest in it.

P. T. RAJU.

ANDHRA UNIVERSITY, WALT AIR,
May 13, 1938.

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

SIR,

When a review by one eminent philosopher of another's work is admitted to be not a review but a "grouse," and a "grouse" declared to be justified, some reply seems called for on behalf of those readers who value the work in question.

Professor A. E. Taylor's complaint (in *Philosophy*, April 1938) against Mr. Santayana's book, *The Realm of Truth*, includes two charges: first, that his "verbal graces," "picturesque metaphors," impair the effect of his work—obscure that straightforward statement of meaning he could give us if he would; secondly, that these freely indulged metaphors are actually no mere adornment but "pieces of a myth, and a myth which impresses one as false." To the second of these charges no reply need be made. That one philosopher's system should appear to another reviewing it as false, or inadequate, is a result for which we are all prepared. What surprises is that those metaphors which at one moment are characterised as parts of Santayana's essential myth, should also be spoken of as deviations from the honest effort to communicate meaning. It is just this point that I wish to contest.

It seems to me that many philosophers are rightly realizing—to-day perhaps more than ever before—that our clearest renderings of reality, whether couched in austere conceptual terms or variegated with abundant imagery, may with equal justice be described as myths—myths in the sense of partial renderings from some human, historically conditioned standpoint of what necessarily transcends human grasp. In Santayana's work, it seems to me, a reader at all in sympathy with his standpoint can feel the effort of a sincere mind to render exactly, now by logical statement, now by brilliant imagery, the outlook to which the writer's experience and powers

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constrain him; and if in some important respect such a reader differs from the author's conclusions, still the clarity of exposition, in its untechnicality and variety of literary presentation, enables one to enter imaginatively the distinctive outlook and to measure and clarify one's own thought against it.

Yours faithfully,
MAUD BODKIN.

2 NORTH GROVE,
HIGHGATE N.6.,
April 1938.

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

SIR,

May I protest against the last paragraph of the review of Canon Green's *The Problem of Art* in your April number? Your reviewer hopes that the author "will enjoy a *succès de scandale* [*sic*] . . . because he has seen through the meaningless rigmarole of the Neapolitan quack."

I have had, in my time, occasion to express disagreement not only with Croce and Canon Green but also with your reviewer. I hope nothing was lost in explicitness by trying to follow the urbane tradition of Hume and Butler, rather than the bad manners of Bradley.

The passage in Canon Green thus commended seems to me an inadequate interpretation of Croce.

Yours, etc.,
E. F. CARRITT,

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE,
OXFORD,
April 8, 1938.

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INSTITUTE NOTES

The Syllabus of Lectures and Evening Meetings for the Session 1938-39 is now in course of preparation, and will be sent to members in the early autumn.

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THE JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

VOL. XIII. No. 52.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MYSTICISM ¹

THE VERY REV. W. R. INGE, K.C.V.O., D.D., F.B.A.

WILLIAM JAMES'S famous book, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, appeared in 1902. Ever since that date studies of the psychology of mysticism have poured from the press. In our own country we may name Evelyn Underhill, Mrs. Herman, and von Hügel. In France, Bastide, Murisier, Récéjac, Boutroux, Delacroix, Janet, Poulain, Bremond, Bergson, Bréhier. In America, besides William James, Starbuck, Leuba, Coe, Hocking, Rufus Jones, P. E. More, Pratt, Royce, Bennett. These lists are far from complete. In Germany the subject seems to have aroused less interest; but Otto, not long before his death, published a book dealing with it.

The psychological approach is characteristic of our time. The strong current of anti-rationalism, subjectivism, and relativity which has swept over America and many schools of thought in Europe, has threatened to banish ontology from philosophy, and to leave it with only the theory of knowledge, psychology, and ethics, which are the three parts of Höffding's *Philosophy of Religion*. The importance attached to religious experience has led to a fresh study of the writings of the mystics, which has been supplemented, especially in the United States, by the method of the questionnaire. Medical psychology has been called in, and even the psycho-analysts have offered their contribution.

I should be the last to disparage the value of these researches, which have thrown much light on some of the dark places of the human mind. One may indeed suspect that an undue amount of

¹ Lecture delivered at the Evening Meeting of the Institute on March 21, 1938.

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attention has been given to the abnormal manifestations of a natural and healthy state of the soul. Some of the writers whose names I have mentioned would confine the word mysticism to the pathology of religion, a view which can hardly be held except by those who either give the word a meaning which it does not bear in religious philosophy, or who regard all except the most tepid religious devotion as pathological. Others are willing to treat the testimony of the mystics to their own experiences with great respect, and even to allow that their construction of reality may be as worthy of credence as that which forms the basis of naturalism. For instance, William James says, "The existence of mystical states absolutely overthrows the pretensions of non-mystical states to be the sole dictators of what we believe." Those who go as far as this have admitted that the mystical experience is one of the facts with which a comprehensive philosophy has to deal. F. H. Bradley's words are well known. "Nothing can be more real than what we experience in religion. The person who says that man in his religious consciousness is not in touch with reality does not know what he is talking about."

Nevertheless, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that psychology, while it remains within its self-imposed limits, is an abstract study, a branch of natural science. Its subject is the states of human consciousness in and for themselves. The relation of those states to objective reality falls outside the province of the psychologist. Dr. William Brown, who believes in the genuineness of the mystic sense of God, is careful to make this clear. "If I may speak no longer as a psychologist but as a man," he writes, "the experience of life confirms my belief that the possibility of some communion between that [divine] power and the individual is not an illusion."¹ Many, I suppose, would say that the question of the objectivity of the vision falls outside the scope of philosophy also, since in their opinion all truth is relative, and the quest of the absolute is vain. But those who believe this must remain for ever outside the world in which the mystic moves. For mysticism is essentially ontological; the contemplative cares nothing for states of consciousness. His business is with the ultimately real. He aspires to the vision of God, and believes that this vision is within his reach. If this quest is foredoomed to disappointment, he would be the first to agree with Murisier and Leuba that his whole life has been a delusion. That he may be deceived he knows well. All through his spiritual journey he is on his guard against "the false light"—against the snares of the Evil One, who can transform himself into an angel of light. But if there is no absolute standard whereby these fraudulent images are condemned as evil, while genuine revelations are accepted as coming from God, he is at the mercy of his own sinful and corrupt

¹ In his contribution to *Religion and Life*, p. 54.

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nature; his faith is vain, and his earnest, often agonizing prayers are futile.

It is because contemplation—I prefer on the whole to use this word, which is the word used in Catholic theology—is essentially ontological, standing or falling by the Platonic act of faith that “the completely real is completely knowable,” that there is and must be a philosophy of mysticism. That most of the mystics was not philosophers is true but irrelevant. If the pearl of great price for which they were willing to sacrifice everything is really there, the truth revealed to them is not only one of the facts of which philosophy has to take account; it is the culminating point of philosophy, the goal of knowledge, and the aim of conduct. Their method, as we shall see, involves a certain conviction about the Supreme Reality, a theory of knowledge of a quite distinctive kind, and a scheme of ascent to the goal of earthly existence, which is the vision of God. Although for many contemplatives this quest was embarked on as an act of faith, and proved empirically, it none the less rests on a definite philosophy.

The philosophy of mysticism has indeed been worked out by several thinkers of genius. Plato himself was a mystic, as we might gather from several passages in his dialogues, and most explicitly from the remarkable Seventh Epistle, of the genuineness of which almost all scholars are now convinced. The philosophy of contemplation must always be of the Platonic type. Its greatest thinker is of course Plotinus; but several Christian mystics have made valuable contributions—Augustine, for example, Eckhart, and Böhme, and even some Catholic saints who are not ranked as philosophers, like St. Bernard and St. John of the Cross. The scheme, in fact, is unusually definite and uniform in contemplatives divided by place, time, and creed.

There is, however, in my opinion, a very important difference, affecting the whole philosophy, between European and Asiatic mysticism. I use European and Asiatic as convenient terms; but there have been European thinkers who have belonged to what I have called the Asiatic type, and Indian thinkers, such as the great Sankara, the main subject of Otto's book, who, according to him, resist the world-renouncing tendency of Indian thought generally. This is the most important point that I shall have to deal with in this lecture, both on account of its decisive significance in forming an estimate of the philosophy of mysticism, and because of the strange misunderstanding which has vitiated most books about the Neoplatonists. I must return to the subject. Here I will only say that by mistranslating Plotinus's “the One” or “The First Principle” by the word God, and ignoring the whole rich world of supersensuous reality which is the spiritual home of the Platonist, they have

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accused these thinkers of deifying an empty abstraction, and hypostatizing the Infinite Not. But this misunderstanding, which is inexcusable in the case of Plotinus, seems to me, judging from very inadequate knowledge of Indian philosophy, to be really characteristic of many of the Hindu thinkers. The sensible world for them is pure illusion; it teaches us nothing; and our refuge from it is in an undifferentiated Absolute with no qualities. Thus, it seems to me, they offer us a journey through the unreal, which can be no real journey, and a rest in the eternal which is too much like the sleep of death. There is much in Eckhart which seems open to the same criticism, though he does not carry these ideas through consistently. But European mysticism generally is free from this error, and I hope to show that the mystical theory of knowledge is inconsistent with it.

Among modern writers who have made contributions to the philosophy of mysticism I may name Edward Caird, Thomas Whittaker, Royce, von Hügel, Urban, K. E. Kirk, Dom Cuthbert Butler, Radhakrishnan and other Indians, de Burgh, Urwick, Bergson, and T. H. Hughes. The French Neo-Thomists, such as Gilson and Rousselot, are often helpful.

The word mysticism is so loosely used that I must make it quite clear what I do and do not mean by it. I am willing to accept most of the following definitions. Westcott, without mentioning the word, summarizes exactly what a Platonist believes about the approaches to the vision of God. "Religion in its completeness is the harmony of philosophy, ethics, and art blended into one by a spiritual Force, by a consecration at once personal and absolute. The direction of philosophy is theoretic, and its end is the true. The direction of ethics is practical, and its end is the good. The direction of art is representative, and its end is the beautiful. Religion includes these several ends, but adds to them that in which they find their consummation, the holy." (These last words will at once suggest Otto's book, *Das Heilige*, written long after Westcott. I am not in favour of making "the holy" a fourth, beside goodness, truth, and beauty. The sense of "the numinous" may be evoked by the contemplation of any of the three absolute values. Nor am I in favour of postulating a sort of sixth sense which the mystics, it has been suggested, possess for the apprehension of divine truth. Plotinus was saner when he said that we only need a faculty "which all possess, but few use"; though we must add that all possess it in very different degrees.) Leuba says shortly that mysticism is "an intuitive certainty of contact with the supersensible world." Pfeiderer says: "Mysticism is the immediate feeling of the unity of the self with God; it is nothing, therefore, but the fundamental feeling of religion, the religious life at its very heart and centre." "It appears," says Pringle

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Pattison, "in connexion with the endeavour of the human mind to grasp the divine essence or the ultimate reality of things, and to enjoy the blessedness of actual communion with the highest. The first is the philosophic side, the second its religious side. The thought that is most intensely present with the mystic is that of a supreme, all-pervading, and indwelling Power, in whom all things are one. On the practical side, it maintains the possibility of direct intercourse with this Being of Beings. God ceases to be an object, and becomes an experience." R. L. Nettleship's words that "true mysticism is the consciousness that everything, in being what it is, is symbolic of something more" emphasizes one side of mysticism, a very important side, in my opinion. I cannot accept any definition which identifies mysticism with excited or hysterical emotionalism, with sublimated eroticism, with visions and revelations, with supernatural (dualistically opposed to natural) activities, or, on the philosophical side, with irrationalism. I suggest that a generation which treats its experience of ghosts with respect ought not to be rude about the experience of God.

I propose to divide my subject into three sections—ontological, the doctrine of ultimate reality; epistemological, the doctrine of knowledge; and ethical, the chart by which the mystic finds his way up the hill of the Lord.

The common assumption that God is so bound up with the world that it is as necessary to Him as He is to it is incompatible with mysticism. The Supreme, whether we call it God or with Plotinus the One or with Eckhart the Godhead, or with some moderns the Absolute, is transcendent. The notion that God is evolving with His universe, coming into His own, realizing Himself, or emerging, owes its popularity to "the last Western heresy," the idea that the macrocosm is moving towards "one far-off divine event." There can be no process of the Absolute, no progress, and no change. Exhortations to take time seriously may be in place when we are dealing with history; but to subordinate the Eternal to space and time is a fatal error in metaphysics.

In considering the status of Time and Change in reality, we cannot make ourselves independent of natural science. Our astronomers, when they are confronted with an impasse, may take refuge in Berkeleyan idealism; but this way of escape is illegitimate. We cannot begin with stars and atoms, treated as concrete realities, and end with mental concepts which have no necessary connexion with the phenomenal world on which all science is based. Now, however we may define progress, it is quite certain that it is a local, temporary, and sporadic phenomenon in some corners of the universe; to erect it into a cosmic law is not only fantastic but ridiculous. If anything can be pronounced absolutely certain, it is the irrevocable doom of

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all life on our planet. And if God be involved in the evolution which we rashly assume to be an endless movement in one direction, then God must die.

Writers like Edward Caird seem to regard it as self-evident that the idea of unilateral activity, transeunt causation, is untenable. We are not dealing with physical attraction and repulsion, and I can see no difficulty in it. At any rate, if we reject it, all theism goes with it. Even thinkers so favourably disposed to Christianity as Pringle Pattison never really get beyond pantheism.

It is quite possible that mystical intuition is the source of ontology. In all philosophy we come to a point where we must trust our deepest convictions, which are not arrived at by any process of reasoning, but must be accepted as fundamental facts. Such, I maintain, are the absolute values, Truth, Goodness, and Beauty; and such is the conviction that behind the multiple there must be unity, behind the changing the immutable, behind the temporal the eternal. "*Quod est non fit nec fieri potest*," says Eckhart. Bradley accepts the dialectic of mysticism when he says, "The relational form implies a substantial totality beyond relations and above them. . . . The ideas of goodness and of beauty suggest in different ways the same result. We gain from them the knowledge of a unity which transcends and yet contains every manifold appearance."

The Platonists, following an important but perhaps isolated statement of Plato himself, place the One, the Absolute, "beyond existence." This expression is not used by the Christian mystics, but the difference is really verbal. When Eckhart says, "*Deus est suum Esse*," he means that God does not *have* Being, but *is* His own Being. When he says, "*Esse est Deus*," God is predicated of Being, not Being of God. Eckhart, like Plotinus, does not use "God" of the Godhead: "God and Godhead are as far apart as heaven and earth." Of the Godhead nothing positive can be affirmed; and though Eckhart protests that his method is only "*negatio negationis*," he is certainly in danger of leaving his Supreme Principle void of contents. "Do not prate about God," he says. We must also remember, in comparing Eckhart with Plotinus, that "*esse*" in scholastic theology is convertible with "*unum*" and "*bonum*," and that Plotinus warns us of the danger of trying to get beyond the sphere of Nous, in which the relation of subject and object still exists. In the kingdom of the "One-Many," subject and object correspond perfectly, and are inseparable, but they remain subject and object. "To rise above Nous is to fall outside it." This is one of the pregnant sayings which interpreters of Plotinus almost wilfully disregard. When we read in Scotus Erigena, "*Deus per excellentiam non immerito Nihilum vocatur*," we can understand the need of this warning.

There are two paths by which the mystic rises to the contemplation

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of the Absolute, the path of dialectic and the path of experience. The God of religion is rather the revelation than the revealer. The source of revelation cannot be revealed; the ground of knowledge cannot be known. The Monad is not an atomic individual, but the unity of a group; "the One is not one of the units which make up the number two." We have to postulate an absolute Unity behind the duality of the relational form, because we must not reduce either Nous or Noëton to dependence on the other. The philosophy of mysticism is neither subjective idealism nor crude realism.

The latest writer on the philosophy of mysticism, Mr. Hughes, is wrong in saying that Plotinus exhausts the resources of language to assert the personality of the One. The One "does not think;"¹ he is essentially Will only as being his own cause. But like almost all who speculate about the Absolute or the Unknowable, Plotinus tells us rather too much about him. His successors were driven by their dialectic to postulate some still more ineffable principle beyond the One. "No monad or triad," says Dionysius, "can express the all-transcending hiddenness of the all-transcending superessentially superexisting superdeity."

In what I have called Asiatic mysticism the denial of all value to the things of sense carries with it a blurring of all distinctions. "*Omnes creaturae sunt, unum purum nihil*," says Eckhart. Thus the supra-real and the infra-real are described by the same word. The Self, which is supposed to be all-inclusive, is really an empty category. Hegelians are fond of putting in the pillory Pope's line, "As full, as perfect in a hair as heart." If God is equally present in all things, He is equally absent in all things. This kind of pantheism does not differ very much from atheism, and moral distinctions disappear like all others. Hence the antinomianism of much Indian thought. The Hindu not only eats and drinks religiously; he sins religiously. Sometimes the Asiatic mystic uses language which in spite of its superficial subtlety is really meaningless and absurd. For instance, Jelaleddin writes:

I am the mast, the rudder, the steersman and the ship;
I am the coral reef on which it founders.

This is hardly parodied by Andrew Lang's:

I am the batsman and the bat;
I am the bowler and the ball,
The umpire, the pavilion cat,
The roller, pitch, and stumps and all.

¹ This may be established without my emendation (which I consider quite certain (in 3.9.3.) *ἀλλ' οὐ νοεῖ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπέκεινα ὄντος* for *οὐ θεοῖ . . . ὄντες* which makes no sense.

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We cannot know the Infinite, for to know is to limit; but we can know the fact of the Infinite, for this is implied in the act of knowing. If the fact of limit only implies the indefinite, the act of limiting implies the infinite. When we have once committed ourselves, by an act of reasonable faith, to the belief that the fully real can be fully known, or, in another phrase of Plato's, that he who is filled with the most real is most really filled, we can hardly stop short of the last step, in which reason comes to rest where all distinctions are reconciled.

Plotinus and the Christian mystics all call the Supreme Principle the Good as well as the One. The Good in this connexion is not exactly a moral quality. The Good is the supreme object of all desire. It is the condition of knowledge, that which makes the world intelligible. It is the creator and sustainer of all things. The Good may be defined as unity as the goal of desire. This desire is said to be universal. "All things pray except the Supreme," says Proclus. The desire is not only universal but insatiable. "The soul," says Plotinus, "is always attaining and always aspiring." "Knowledge itself is desire." This is why it cannot be content even with the attainment of the *κόσμος νοητός* which is the Platonic heaven. The same craving for the infinite, for the felt presence of God Himself, is characteristic of all mysticism.

The dialectic thus leads logically to the point where it must abdicate in order to enter "naked," as they said, into the Holy of Holies. The word "irrational" is here most inappropriate. The reasoning faculty which the Greeks called *λογισμός* or *διάνοια* is the activity of the intellect only. But *νοῦς* is the whole personality unified under its own highest part. The faith which began as an experiment, and passed through illuminated understanding, ends as an experience. The intellect is in no way false to itself in recognizing its own limitations.

The path of the dialectic proceeds *pari passu* with inner experience. It might be expected on the principles of mysticism, that since the human soul is a microcosm, having affinities with every grade of reality, there should be something in the soul which, if only in a flash, can transcend even life in the spiritual world, and find in itself a confirmation of what the dialectic affirms as to the primal source of all reality. This confirmation, according to the mystics, is given now and then in the indescribable experience of trance or ecstasy. That this is a real experience cannot be doubted. It comes in a sudden flash; so Plato describes it in his Seventh Letter, and so Augustine describes it in almost the same words. While it lasts, all the faculties of the mind are suspended; the subject hardly knows whether he is in the body or out of the body. He is convinced, when the vision is over, that he has been favoured with a real communion with the

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Highest. He cannot describe it, and it never lasts long. There is a curious consensus that about half an hour is what may be expected. The contemplatives have to find room in their scheme for what they believe to be the culmination of the divine favours to them; the apparent emptiness and formlessness of the vision must be a key to its character; and so they connect it with what the dialectic of their philosophy tells them about "the One beyond existence."

It is rash for one who has never experienced anything of the kind to hazard an opinion about it. In one sense the vision of God, as we may call it, occupies a very small place in philosophic mysticism. Plotinus believed himself to have enjoyed the beatific vision four times while Porphyry was his disciple; Porphyry himself had it once; the later Neoplatonists, instead of cheapening it, came to think that it was hardly to be enjoyed in this life. In the philosophic Christian mystics, like Eckhart, it is not stressed. In the ascetic mystics of the cloister the experience seems to have been tasted more often; and instead of being the very rare reward of a long course of ardent devotion and earnest contemplation, there was a tendency to warn aspirants after saintliness that these supernatural favours are often bestowed on beginners as an encouragement, and afterwards withdrawn. Among the lesser mystics we have to allow a heavy discount for hysteria, self-deception, and even unreality. This is fully admitted. St. John of the Cross writes of a certain nun, "All this that she says: God spoke to me; I spoke to God; seems nonsense. She has only been speaking to herself." It is safer, I think, to put aside the mass of "mystical phenomena" which fill the older books, and to study the acknowledged masters of the spiritual life. For them, these experiences are allowed to be extremely rare, and to be the reward of a long and arduous discipline. By far the greater part of recorded divine favours is of interest only to the psychologist, and not always even to him.

And yet we cannot tear out these visions from our scheme. Those who record them—I am speaking only of the leaders—are absolutely sure that they were genuine; they afforded the most exquisite sense of blessedness that can be imagined; and the effects on the character were permanent. The only point that may reasonably be doubted is whether they were rightly explained as a vision of God as He is (this question was hotly debated by the scholastic theologians), or of the "One beyond existence" of the Platonists. I am myself inclined to think that although progress may be possible within the sphere of the spiritual life—the heaven which the Platonists call *ἐκεῖ*, "yonder," it is hardly conceivable that the human soul should even for a moment escape from the conditions which belong to all finite existence. There must be something of the Absolute in us, say the Platonists; otherwise we could not see the Absolute. But I think

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we should be wise to accept Plotinus's warning, quoted above, against trying to "wind ourselves too high," as Keble says.

We must be on our guard against confining contemplation and ecstasy to the religious life. There are, according to our view, three absolute values in which the nature of God is revealed to us. The earnest pursuit of any one of these may give rise to mystical phenomena. What is called nature-mysticism is an important branch of our subject. I will not quote from Wordsworth, the best-known example of this temperament. Almost equally well known is Tennyson's account of "a kind of waking trance which I have often had when I have been alone. All at once, individuality seemed to dissolve and fade away into boundless being, and this not a confused state but the clearest of the clear and the surest of the surest, utterly beyond words, where death was an almost laughable impossibility, the loss of personality seeming no extinction but the only true life." A third admirable example of nature-ecstasy may be found in *The Story of my Heart*, by Richard Jefferies.

Some philosophers have certainly tasted this kind of rapture. Bradley quietly says that "with certain persons the intellectual effort to understand the universe is a principal way of experiencing the Deity." And Einstein in an address to an American audience in 1930 says: "The religious geniuses of all times have been distinguished by this cosmic religious sense. . . . It seems to me that the most important function of art and science is to arouse and keep alive this feeling in those who are receptive."¹ Poincaré, I believe, went into ecstasy over mathematics.

From the point of view of the philosopher, the weak point in the mystical doctrine of the Absolute is the impossibility of explaining how the One can produce multiplicity out of itself. This is often regarded as fatal to the whole system. Thinkers who belong to this school are of course well aware of the difficulty. Plotinus argues that the universe would be incomplete unless every possible grade of being, from the highest to the lowest, were represented. But it is not clear how the perfect can be completed by the admixture of the imperfect. He uses metaphors—that of a full vessel overflowing, and that of light, which, as he supposes, is diffused without losing anything of its energy. At other times he says, "It had to be," which is to give up a problem which can have no solution. The difficulty is not confined to this school of thought. It is wisest to admit that we know neither how nor why there is a universe. The upward path, the return to God, may be traced, and a chart made of the journey. Heraclitus says that the road up and the road down are the same. But the road down, from the Creator to the creatures, is no business of ours, and frankly we know nothing about it.

¹ From T. H. Hughes, *The Philosophic Basis of Mysticism*, p. 186.

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Mysticism asserts that the world was created, but not in Time. It was not formed by the splitting up of the Absolute into parts, an impossible conception, nor is the time-series the course of God's life. Eckhart is determined to banish the imagery of Time and Space from his conception of the Godhead. God, he admits, "becomes and disbecomes"; but this is only an accommodation to our ways of thinking in our outward relations. But "*Now* is the minimum of Time. Small though it be, it must go; everything that Time touches must go. *Here* means place. The spot I am standing on is small, but it must go before I can see God." "There is no greater obstacle to God than Time."

Accordingly, the Christian doctrine of the creation of the world in Time is a great stumbling-block to the philosophic mystic. Some had the courage to deny it; others, like St. Thomas Aquinas, say that though all the arguments are against it, we must accept it because it is revealed truth. How such a fact could be revealed is a question which does not trouble him. Creation, but not in Time, means logical posteriority or axiological inferiority; and this is all that mystical philosophy cares to assert.

Whittaker says that if the Second Law of Thermodynamics is a cosmic law, Neoplatonism as a philosophy is disproved. This law, the principle of Carnot as the French call it, tells us that all the energy in the universe is being irrevocably dissipated into space in the form of radiation, so that the time will come when there will be no more life anywhere, and no relics of the universe except some aggregations of incombustible "ash." There are very great philosophical difficulties in this theory. It implies that the universe started "with a bang," as Eddington says, at a point of time which we could date if we knew it; it contradicts the mathematical principle that every process is theoretically reversible; and it raises the question whether there can be such a thing as empty Time, in which nothing will ever happen any more. A common-sense objection might say, "If the universe is running down like a clock, it must have been wound up like a clock. And whatever Power wound it up once may presumably wind it up again." The principle of Carnot is obviously fatal to the theory of universal or even human perfectibility, and (I should say) to such deification of history as that of Croce. I do not think Neoplatonic mysticism takes Time seriously enough to be destroyed by any theory of what happened in the past or will happen in the future. But the question is very difficult, and the astronomers who have discussed it are not, I think, very well equipped for metaphysical problems.

It is a mystical doctrine, to which Plotinus gives great importance, that all creativity is the result of contemplation. The One, by contemplating itself, produces the world of spiritual reality, the "intelligible

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world." This in turn, the world of νοῦς-νοητά, by contemplating the One, generates the world of Soul; and Soul, by contemplating the Intelligibles, generates the world of phenomena. Each product is inferior to its archetype, which it resembles as far it can. Every creator then creates, so to speak, with his back turned. This principle has a practical importance in social ethics. The motto of the mystic is, "See that thou make all things according to the pattern showed thee in the mount."

Before leaving this section of my subject, I will quote the words of J. M. Baldwin's *Thought and Things*.¹ "In the highest form of contemplation, the strands of the earlier and diverging dualisms are merged and fused. In this experience of a fusion which is not a mixture, but which issues in a meaning of its own sort and kind, an experience whose essential character is just this unity of comprehension, consciousness attains its completest, its most direct, and its final comprehension of what reality is and means." This, we may say, is the beatific vision of the philosopher, which comes to him, like most discoveries, in a flash. As Augustine says, "*Mens mea pervenit ad id quod est in ictu trepidantis aspectus.*"

If my subject were Neoplatonism as a mystical philosophy, instead of the philosophy of mysticism generally, I should take pleasure in proving how very misleading Edward Caird, followed, as he admits, by von Hügel, is in placing what religion calls salvation in the transient experience of ecstasy, instead of in the rich and bright kingdom of real existence, the intelligible world. But I have vindicated what I believe to be the truth in my book on the philosophy of Plotinus, and I have not much to add to what I said twenty years ago. The intelligible world, which I have called the spiritual world, having decided that "Spirit" is the least misleading of possible translations of νοῦς, is the heaven of the Platonist. It is the "place" or state in which individuality survives without separateness; where there are no barriers to complete knowledge of other spirits except those which come from differences of nature; where the divine Goodness, Wisdom, and Beauty are fully present and active; whose perfect fruition is not idle but creative; where, as Plotinus says, "Spirit possesses all things at all times simultaneously. It *is*; it knows no past nor future; all things in the spiritual world coexist in an eternal Now." "Eternity is God manifesting His own nature; it is Being in its calmness, its self-identity, its permanent life." "Nothing that *is* can ever perish" (οὐδὲν ἀπολείται τῶν ὄντων).

This full, rich, happy life is what "the Soul become Spirit," "the spirit in love," yearns after and attains. I insist that the greatest of the mystics makes this life in the intelligible world the centre of his system. But can we deny that many of the mystics, both in Chris-

¹ From T. H. Hughes, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

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tianity and other religions, have practically adopted another philosophy, traces of which we have already found in Eckhart, a philosophy which begins by denying all value to the world of becoming, which proceeds by peeling the onion, stripping off one after another all that gives colour, variety, interest to life in this world, and ends by grasping zero and calling it infinity?

This is an unsympathetic verdict on the negative way, which has played so important a part in the history of mysticism. It proceeds, I think, from intense concentration of the will upon the goal, which is the vision of God, undimmed by mists and veils. Each experience is rejected in turn as not good enough. "Neti, neti," "not this, not this," as the Indians have said. It is not realized, as I have said already, that a journey through the unreal is an unreal journey. It is not realized that there are degrees of truth and reality, and that we must take with us whatever on our upward journey we have gained of positive value.

My acquaintance with Indian mysticism is only slight; but it does seem to me that the intelligible world, with its rich contents, simply drops out of their scheme. And the intelligible world is not a super-numerary physical world, nor a new heaven and earth to be brought into being hereafter. It is the world which we know, seen as it really is, *sub specie aeternitatis*. πάντα ἐνταῦθα ὅσα καὶ ἐκεῖ; all that is in heaven is also on earth. This is one of the pregnant dicta of Plotinus which his commentators have entirely failed to notice.

The theory of reality as constituted by the unity in duality of thought and its object is worked out with great subtlety both by Plotinus and Proclus. It deserves, I think, more attention than either realists or idealists have given to it. But this again belongs rather to a study of Neoplatonism than of mysticism generally, and I will again refer to my book on Plotinus, where it is explained at length. But the theory of knowledge is an essential part of all mystical philosophy, and I must try to give some account of it.

The beatitude, "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God," might be called mystical theology in a nutshell. These writers are fond of saying that like can only be known by like, or in a favourite image, "We could not see the sun if there were not something unlike in our eyes." This law, which is assumed to be self-evident, underlies the whole theory and practice of mysticism. The soul is the wanderer of the metaphysical world. It has its affinities with every grade of being, from the highest to the lowest. It has, as we have seen, a mysterious faculty at the apex of its being which is capable of entering into relations with the Absolute, or, as the Christians said, into immediate relations with God. This was the foundation of the curious theory that in every human soul there is a something which can never consent to sin. This was called by

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various names, such as the soul-centre, the spark, or the odd word *synteresis*. Plotinus also had made the highest part of the soul impeccable. It was a debated point among the later members of the school whether the soul "comes down" (the spatial metaphor should not mislead us) entire, or whether part of it remains "yonder" in the spiritual world. The majority of the school differed here from Plotinus; for, as Iamblichus asks, "If the will can sin, how is the soul impeccable?" It enables Plotinus to take a charitable view of sin. "Vice," he says, "is always human, mixed with something contrary to itself."

If the soul lost contact completely with the spiritual world, it could never rise any higher. The Christian doctrine of grace does not contradict this, for grace, or the Holy Spirit, imparts itself, and becomes, we may say, part of the personality. The spark, according to the bolder mystics, was lighted directly at God's altar, and was actually a divine activity.

Spiritual progress and knowledge of reality proceed in parallel lines. We all make a world after our own likeness. Such as men themselves are, such will God appear to them to be. Thus, although mysticism is built upon a basis of rationalism, at every step we can only see what we deserve to see. The world that we know changes for us, just as a landscape changes as we climb a mountain. It seems to follow that we have no right to dispute what the mystics tell us that they have seen, unless we have been there ourselves and not seen it. When we study the record of the discipline to which the contemplatives subject themselves, we are not likely to claim that we have stood where they have been.

Psychologists, of course, have been at work upon these experiences, and have brought in their favourite idea, "the subconscious," or "subliminal self." There is a subconscious life, a storehouse of powers, instincts, intuitions, inhibitions, good and bad, which now and then come imperfectly into consciousness. But it seems to me very misleading to confound this with the inmost sanctuary of the soul in which the mystic is convinced that the Holy Spirit has His abode. There is nothing respectable about the subconscious as such. It is not as foul as Freud makes out, but it is not the seat of what is best in us.

Christian contemplatives, as early as Clement of Alexandria about A.D. 200, have divided the course into three sections, purification, enlightenment, and unitive love. Clement puts faith in the first place, faith being, to use a recent definition, that of Frederic Myers, the resolution to stand or fall by the noblest hypothesis. This reasonable venture is combined with a determined effort to cleanse the soul of all that may impede its upward progress. But it is worth while to insist that both Plotinus and some of the Christian mystics require

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the aspirant first of all to practise the "civic virtues," those which society requires of us. The discharge of this debt must precede even the cleansing, chiselling, and polishing of our own statue which Plotinus tells us that we must work at.

The second state, enlightenment, means that we have come to realize the existence of new values, to which we were at first blind. These values become facts which our philosophy must find room for. Then, as Clement says, "Knowledge, as it passes into love, unites the known with the known. He who has reached this stage may be called equal with the angels."

It is not suggested that the need of purification and enlightenment can ever be outgrown. But there is a real change in the personality. Plotinus calls it "the soul becoming νοῦς; St. Paul calls it the change from the psychic to the pneumatic man. The Christian writers, following St. Paul, prefer πνεῦμα to νοῦς; but the words are practically identical.

This raises the important question whether the philosophy of mysticism leaves room for the idea of personality in God and man. "Mysticism," says Keyserling, "always ends in an impersonal immorality." In considering this problem, we must remember that neither ancient philosophy nor Christian theology had any word for personality, nor felt the want of any word. "Hypostasis" and "*persona*" by no means corresponded in meaning, and when these words were applied to the "Persons" of the Trinity, neither of them meant anything like what we mean by personality. When modern theologians make personality the centre of their system they are at best translating Christian philosophy into an alien dialect. They are using a new category which was neither used nor missed by ancient thought. For instance, Pringle Pattison says, "Each self is a unique existence, which is perfectly impervious to other selves—impervious in a fashion of which the impenetrability of matter is a faint analogue." Scientifically, the illustration is as unfortunate as the Neoplatonic notion that light loses nothing in radiation; but how utterly contrary to traditional philosophy is this strange doctrine of impervious selves, "*solida pollentia simplicitate!*" Mysticism denies it *in toto*. Lewis Nettleship unconsciously paraphrases Plotinus when he says, "Suppose that all human beings felt habitually to each other as they now do occasionally to those they love best. So far as we can conceive of such a state, it would be one in which there would be no more individuals at all, but an universal being in and for another; where being took the form of consciousness, it would be the consciousness of another which was also oneself—a common consciousness." As Plotinus says of the life yonder, "each is all and all is each, and the glory is infinite."

The Christian mystics use extravagant language about the necessity

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of abolishing the "I " and "mine." These are barriers between the soul and reality, which must be levelled. If this looks like abolishing personality, the answer is that the abstract Ego, a figment, is quite different from the full and rich experience to which we hope to attain, a unification and concentration which is at the same time infinite expansion. The centre remains, but the circumference is boundless. "*Christus in omnibus totus*" is the Christian form of what the Neoplatonists say about the undivided *νοῦς*.

The idea of an abstract ego seems to imply three assumptions—that there is a sharp line separating subject and object; that the subject, thus sundered from the object, remains identical through time; and that this impervious entity is in some mysterious way both myself and my property. The mystics would deny all three. "It is not *my* soul," says Eckhart, "which is transformed after the likeness of God."

In Aldous Huxley's new book, *Ends and Means*, there is an interesting discussion of this subject. Fully agreeing with the words of Keyserling which I have just quoted, he says, "Those who take the trouble to train themselves in the arduous technique of mysticism always end, if they go far enough in their work of recollection and meditation, by losing their intuitions of a personal God, and having direct experience of a reality that is impersonal." He goes on to argue that the worship of a personal God is a lower kind of religion, which generally ends in attributing to the Deity very human passions, and which encourages the mawkish sentimentality and emotionality which were encouraged in the Counter-Reformation, and from which, he thinks, Catholic Christianity has never completely recovered. "It has also led to that enormous over-valuation of the individual ego, which is so characteristic of Western popular philosophy."

I think there is much truth in this. But when an educated Christian insists that God is personal, he means mainly that prayer is not a soliloquy. Meredith's saying, "He who rises from his knees a better man, his prayer has been granted," does not quite satisfy us. It is also true that only the permanent can change. Impersonal is a negative word. Plotinus insists that distinctness is real, though separateness is transcended: *δεῖ ἕκαστον ἕκαστον εἶναι*.

The true mystical doctrine is that each man's self is determined by his prevailing interests. Where our treasure is, there will our heart, our self, be also. What we love, that we are. Most of us live on the psychic, the intermediate plane; we may rise above this, or fall below it. Our personality is what we are able to realize of our opportunities, which are potentially infinite. The ego or self is not given us to start with; we do not yet know ourselves. The mystics speak of a strong attraction which the higher exerts upon the lower. We are drawn upwards by love and desire for what is above us. The

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Greeks speak quite confidently of the universal desire to *know*; it would be well if modern ethics made more of this. Platonism speaks of the attraction of the *beautiful*; this again should not have been ignored. The desire for the vision of God, the *morally* perfect Being, has been emphasized by all Christian contemplatives. But the prayer of Crashaw, "Leave nothing of myself in me," is understood by all of them. "Personality only exists because we are not pure spirits," says Lotze. It is a question of defining a word. We might say with equal truth that pure spirits alone are fully personal, and that personality in its ideal perfection exists only in God.

I pass to another problem. "Mysticism," says Nettleship, "is the belief that everything in being what it is is symbolic of something more." "Every truth," says Pennington the Quaker, "is shadow except the last. But every truth is substance in its own place, though it be but a shadow in another place. And the shadow is a true shadow, as the substance is a true substance." This has been called nature-mysticism; it is as prominent in some mystics as it is absent in others. "The invisible things of God," says St. Paul, rather unexpectedly, from what we should gather of his temperament, "are clearly seen, being understood from the things that are made." The philosophical question is whether, as Plato thought, the visible world may lead us up to the perception of the divine Forms, or whether, as some mystics have held, they are mere hindrances, "the corruptible body pressing down the soul." The truth seems to be that all life is sacramental, but in various degrees. The mystic does not need "mere forms," and often rejects cultus and ritual for this reason; but to the devout worshipper these are not mere forms.

It has been said that dogmatic theology is only the intellectual presentation of mystical symbols. I do not altogether like this; for the subject-matter of dogmatic theology is very largely the pictorial imagery which is the natural language of devotion among the "*simpliciores*." To represent eternal truth under the forms of space and time, the universal as the particular, the action of God in the world as miracle, is natural and normal in popular religion. But this movement is in the opposite direction from mysticism, which always views these pictorial presentations of divine truth with impatience, and often tries to dispense with them. The well-known couplets of Angelus Silesius have all this motive. "Were Christ born a thousand times in Bethlehem, and not in thee, thou art lost eternally." "Where the body dies," says Böhme, "there is heaven and hell. God is there, and the devil, each in his own kingdom. The soul needs only to enter by the deep door in the centre." "This pearl of eternity," says William Law, "is the temple of God within thee, where alone thou canst worship God in spirit and in truth. This adoration in spirit is that truth and reality of which outward forms are only the figure

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for a time." "Heaven is not a thing without us," says Whichcote, "nor is happiness anything distinct from a true conjunction of the mind with God." It is needless to multiply quotations; this language is common to all the mystics. The best of them insist that a symbol must have a real resemblance to the thing symbolized. Fanciful and "loose types of things through all degrees," as Wordsworth calls them, are no part of true mysticism.

Necromancy, astrology, alchemy, palmistry, and spiritualism are the reproach of mysticism, and have nothing to do with the philosophy which is our subject. It may be, as the later developments of Neoplatonism suggest, that this philosophy is inadequately protected against these perversions; but we need not stop to deal with either these or with the morbid hallucinations which fill Catholic histories of the mystics.

"It is an accursed evil to a man," Darwin once wrote, "to become so absorbed in any subject as I am in mine." That great man realized what a sacrifice he was making, and we honour him for it. The contemplatives of the cloister were even more absorbed in their inner conflicts than Darwin was in natural history, and of course they suffered for it severely, sometimes even to the peril of their reason; we ought to be able to make allowances for the effects on the mind of extreme specialization, carried on under the unnatural conditions of monasticism.

This extreme concentration has had an unfortunate effect on the ethics of mysticism. I am excused from discussing this subject both by limitations of space and by my title, which confined me to the philosophy of mysticism. I cannot therefore consider the relation of mysticism to asceticism. The Platonic mystic lives in strict training; if he does not, he is a dilettante. But he does not maltreat his body, which on the contrary he tries to keep fit. The Indian fakir, the pillar-saint, the flagellant, are an aberrant type, practically extinct in the West. We may leave them to the student of morbid psychology.

It may be said that the desire to torment the body follows logically from the dualistic philosophy which connects evil with matter. Metaphysical dualism is inconsistent with mystical philosophy, the natural tendency of which is to deny any substantiality to evil, and even to regard it as an illusion belonging to an imperfect knowledge of a half unreal stage of existence. It is no solution of the problem to say that evil is only *privatio boni*; the ethical scale of values contains minus quantities, which must somehow be acknowledged. The doctrine that "matter," which in Neoplatonism is of course immaterial, the phantasmal substratum of all that exists, is somehow responsible for evil is not very different from saying that evil has no positive being. But in practice "the flesh" was often substituted


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for "matter," and a kind of subordinate dualism, never countenanced by the leaders of the school, attached itself to the popular preaching of Platonism. This notion, which took deep root in the East, quite apart from mysticism, undoubtedly encouraged the aberrations which I have mentioned. But it is no part of our subject.

The unfortunate effect of the detachment of the cloistered mystics from ordinary life is seen in their almost callous indifference to public misfortunes and private sorrows. When Plotinus says almost contemptuously that if men object to seeing their native towns destroyed by an enemy, and their friends and relations killed or led into captivity, they ought to learn to fight better, we feel that for him the city of which the type is laid up in heaven has severed all connexion with Rome and Alexandria, the fortunes of which were beginning to arouse grave anxiety among all good citizens. Spinoza, we may remember, is equally callous about the wars which were devastating Europe in his time. When Jerome describes how the widow Paula deserted her orphan children: "On the shore the little Toxotius stretched forth his hands in entreaty, while Rufina, now grown up, besought her mother to wait till she should be married. But Paula's eyes were dry as she turned them heavenwards," we feel the disgust which that most unpleasant saint often arouses in us. The Blessed Angela of Foligno is not the only saint who congratulates herself on the deaths of husband and children, "who were a great hindrance to my life of devotion." The fact that the love of country, and family affection, may be the shortest road up the hill of the Lord was hidden from them. But once again, that is not the fault of the philosophy.

Mysticism as a philosophy will not satisfy anti-intellectualists or pragmatists or sceptics or agnostics or materialists or those who take Time so seriously as to put God inside it. It is a philosophy of absolutism, which offers an experimental proof of itself. The proof is terribly hard, because it requires the dedication of the whole life to an end which is not visible when we begin to climb. Our world must change again and again, and we with and in it. The pearl of great price is there, and within our reach; but we must give all that we have and are to win it. As the Stoic Manilius says:

Quid caelo dabimus? Quantum est, quo veneat omne?
Impendendus homo est, Deus esse ut possit in ipso.



THE ETHICAL DOCTRINE OF HOBBS

PROFESSOR A. E. TAYLOR

THE moral doctrine of Hobbes, in many ways the most interesting of our major British philosophers, is, I think, commonly seen in a false perspective which has seriously obscured its real affinities. This is, no doubt, largely due to the fact that most modern readers begin and end their study of Hobbes's ethics with the *Leviathan*, a rhetorical and, in many ways, a popular *Streitschrift* published in the very culmination of what looked at the time to be a permanent revolution, and do not pay such attention to the more calmly argued statements of the same doctrine contained in the *Elements of Law*, circulated before the outbreak of the Civil War, or the *De Cive*, produced (apart from the explanatory notes appended in the second edition of 1646) before the issue of the conflict could have been thought to be already decided by "the sword." As a corrective to misunderstandings based on exclusive attention to the *Leviathan*, I shall, in these pages, take my references to Hobbes almost entirely from the *De Cive*, and, for convenience' sake, I will use the text of the English version, *Philosophical Rudiments concerning Government and Society*, printed in 1651 and reproduced in Vol. II of Molesworth's edition of the *English Works*. (I have remarked a few errors in this volume, notably the total perversion of Hobbes's sense by the omission of a whole line of text in XVI, 16, p. 245, of Molesworth.¹ But with these few exceptions it seems to me a sufficiently faithful rendering for my purposes.)

The impression which the average reader of the *Leviathan* carries away with him might, I think, be fairly summed up thus. (I assume that the reader has really read Hobbes's text, and not merely run away with the *malicious* interpretation suggested by the singular essay prefixed to the Clarendon Press edition of it.) The answer to the question *what ought a good man to do?* is the simple one that he ought to obey the political "sovereign" without asking any

¹ In the original Latin text of the sentence Hobbes says, as we should expect him to say in the course of an attempt to prove that the supreme power, both spiritual and temporal, was possessed, in the days of the Israelite and Jewish monarchies, by the kings, that the priests could only do rightfully what God commanded them, whereas the king had rightfully all the power over every man which that man had over himself (*sacerdos id tantum iure poterat quod Deus iuberet, rex autem iure poterat quidquid poterat iure unusquisque in se*). In Molesworth's edition this is represented by the sense-destroying statement that "the priest could do rightly whatsoever every man could rightly do himself."

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questions or making any difficulties, and the reason why he ought to do this is equally simple. It can be shown, if not to demonstration, yet with overwhelming probability, that he stands personally to lose by doing anything else, and the object of every man's desire is "always some good to himself." It is my personal interest that the miseries of anarchy should be prevented; by disobeying the civil law in any particular, I am, so far, contributing to the recurrence of anarchy; *ergo*, it is always to my interest to conform to the law. And to say that this is to my interest is equivalent to saying that it is my duty; my duty, in fact, means my personal interest, calmly understood. That this should be popularly accepted as an adequate account of Hobbes's teaching about morality may be partly explained by historical causes. When Butler set himself to expose the fallacies of the "selfish" psychology of human action, he found admirable examples of them in some of Hobbes's analyses of the "passions," and he did the work of refutation so thoroughly that he has perhaps made the notion that there is nothing in Hobbes but this "selfish psychology" (a charge which he himself is careful never to make) current from his day to our own. Partly also I think Hobbes himself must be held unintentionally responsible for the result. The *Leviathan* is far the most readable and amusing of his works, and it was written in a time of revolution and unsettlement as a persuasive to cessation from fruitless civil strife. For its immediate purpose, as an exhortation to peace, it was right and proper that the author should develop the contention that peace is the real interest of his fellow-countrymen as persuasively as he could; it is not surprising, therefore, that it attains such dimensions in his book as to give the impression that it is really all, or almost all, that he has to say.

And yet it is not all, nor nearly all. There are really two distinct questions before Hobbes, the question why I *ought* to behave as a good citizen, and the question what inducement can be given me to do so if my knowledge of the obligation to do so is not in itself sufficiently effective. According to his repeated declarations, it is a certain fact of psychology that I shall violate the law and break the peace if I believe that I stand to gain by doing so¹ Hence the

¹ Thus (*De Cive*, V, 1): "It is of itself manifest that the actions of men proceed from the will, and the will from hope and fear, in so much as when they shall see a greater good or less evil likely to happen to them by the breach than observation of the laws, they will wittingly violate them." Hence Hobbes goes on to maintain that the moral guilt of offences into which subjects are led by the insufficiency of the penalties provided for them falls not in the subject but on the sovereign. "If, therefore, the legislator doth set a less penalty on a crime, than will make our fear more considerable with us than our lust, that excess of lust above the fear of punishment, whereby sin is committed, is to be attributed to the legislator, that is to say, to the supreme" (*De Cive*, XIII, 16).

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importance for him of arguing that I never really stand to gain by such conduct, since the recurrence of the state of "war of every man against every man" is a disadvantage to me which cannot be offset by any compensating advantage. But the Hobbian answer to the other question, why I ought, or am obliged, to be a good citizen is quite different; it is, quite explicitly that I have, expressly or tacitly, pledged my word to be one, and to violate my word, to refuse to "perform my covenant as made," is *iniquity*, *malum in se*.¹ Hobbes's ethical doctrine proper, disengaged from an egoistic psychology with which it has no logically necessary connection, is a very strict deontology, curiously suggestive, though with interesting differences, of some of the characteristic theses of Kant.

This comes out particularly strikingly in the passage in *De Cive* (III, 5), where Hobbes is explaining the difference between the justice of an act and the justice of a person. A just *act* is "what is done in accord with right," but a man who does acts which are in accord with right is not *eo ipso* a just *man*. "When the words are applied to persons, *to be just* signifies to be delighted in just dealing, to study how to do righteousness, or to endeavour in all things to do that which is just; and *to be unjust* is to neglect righteous dealing, or to think it is to be measured not according to my contract, but some present benefit. . . . That man is to be accounted just, who doth just things because the law commands it, unjust things only by reason of his infirmity; and he is properly said to be unjust, who doth righteousness for fear of the punishment annexed unto

¹ When he is speaking strictly, Hobbes makes a distinction between *injustice* and *iniquity*, though the distinction is not always carefully kept up (less carefully, I think, in *De Cive* than in *Leviathan*). Injustice, in the strictest sense of the word, is possible only in the "civil" state, since it is by definition disregard of the commands of the lawful sovereign. Iniquity, which can exist in "the state of nature," or in the conduct of the sovereign, who, since he is not subject to his own commands, cannot be guilty of injustice proper, is violation of the "natural law," which is also, according to Hobbes's repeated explanations, the *moral law*. But since my obligation to obey the sovereign is based on the assumption that by living under his protection I have expressly or tacitly "covenanted" with all my neighbours to accept his commands as the rule of life, and the obligation to observe a "covenant" is thus antecedent to the institution of civil society, the moral guilt of "injustice" arises from the fact that all injustice is also *iniquity*, and therefore breach of the moral law, though not all iniquity is "injustice." Even in the "state of nature" to which, according to the *Leviathan*, it is "consequent" that no act can be just or unjust, *wanton* violation of a promise could be iniquitous. (It is true that since, according to Hobbes's psychology, a man inevitably acts to secure what he believes to be his own greatest good, really *wanton* promise-breaking could never occur. The promise-breaker would always be acting from the "reasonable" motive that he hoped to secure more good by breaking his word than by keeping it.)

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the law, and unrighteousness by reason of the iniquity of his mind."¹

This is precisely Kant's distinction between action done merely in accord with law and action done from law, with the characteristic difference that Hobbes is trying to reduce the law from which the virtuous man acts to the single law that a promise once duly fulfilled must be kept, and Hobbes is laying himself open to the very same line of argument which has, fairly or unfairly, been used against Kant, that a "good will" which wills nothing but this conformity to laws because it is law, is formal and empty.

Indeed, Hobbes actually goes as far as to anticipate Kant's attempt to reduce all really wrong willing to the irrational attempt to will both sides of a contradiction at once. Thus we read (*De Cive*, III, 3, and the argument is equally used in other expositions of his theory) "There is some likeness between that which in the common course of life we call *injury*, and that which in the schools is usually called absurd. For even as he who by arguments is driven to deny the assertion which he first maintained, is said to be brought to an absurdity; in like manner, he who through weakness of mind does or omits that which before he had by contract promised not to do or omit, commits an injury, and falls into no less contradiction than he who in the schools is reduced to an absurdity. For by contracting for some future action, he wills it done; by not doing it, he wills it not done; which is to will a thing done and not done at the same time, which is a contradiction. An injury therefore is a kind of absurdity in conversation, as an absurdity is a kind of injury in disputation." "There is in every breach of covenant a contradiction properly so called; for he that covenanteth, willeth to do, or omit, in the time to come; and he that doth any action, willeth it in the present, which is part of the future time, contained in the covenant; and therefore he that violateth a covenant, willeth the doing and the not doing of the same thing, at the same time; which is a plain contradiction. And so injury is an absurdity of conversation, as absurdity is a kind of injury in disputation." The thought here is at bottom the same as Kant's, but for the differences that (1) Hobbes, for his own reasons, reduces all "injury" to the violation of an express or implied promise; (2) and he has not, like Kant, thought of the "universalizing of a maxim" as a criterion of its freedom from contradiction. But the really important point is that Hobbes agrees with Kant on the "imperative" character of the moral law, exactly as he also agrees with him in the assertion that it is the law of "right reason."

¹ Cf. *De Cive*, IV, 21. "Although a man should order all his actions so much as belongs to external obedience just as the law commands, but not for the law's sake, but by reason of some punishment annexed to it, or out of vain glory; yet he is unjust."

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Hobbes's recognition of the imperativeness of the natural, which is also the moral law, is obscured for a hasty reader by the fact that he also repeatedly describes the contents of that law as "theorems" discovered by our reason, like the theorems of mathematics, and even goes so far as to say that these theorems only become *laws* proper in civil society.

Thus (*De Cive*, III, 33) "those which we call the laws of nature (since they are nothing else but certain conclusions, understood by reason, of things to be done and omitted; but a law, to speak properly and accurately, is the speech of him who by right commands somewhat to others to be done or omitted) are, not in propriety of speech laws, as they proceed from nature. Yet, as they are delivered by God in holy Scriptures . . . they are most properly called by the name of laws"; again (*Leviathan*, XV), "these Dictates of Reason, men use to call by the name of Lawes, but improperly: for they are but Conclusions, or Theoremes concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves; whereas Law, properly, is the word of him, that by right hath command over others. But yet if we consider the same theoremes, as delivered in the word of God, that by right commandeth all things; then are they properly called Lawes." So in the *Elements of Law* (XV, 2), the "precepts of Natural Law" are said simply to be "those which declare unto us the ways of peace, where the same may be obtained, and of defence where it may not," without any reference to an imperative character, though we read later in the same work (XVIII, 1) that they are "also divine laws in respect of the author thereof, God Almighty." One might, at first, be disposed to understand these deliverances to mean that in themselves the "laws of nature" are mere propositions indicative about the means which are commonly found to be most conducive to a peaceful existence, and that their imperative character as laws, in the proper sense of the word, is entirely secondary; it only arises in a civil society when the sovereign has bestowed it upon them, and reinforced it with penal "sanctions." Thus outside a civil society with penalties for breach of contract, the "law" that "men perform their covenants" would mean merely the proposition that in the vast majority of cases, perhaps in all, a man will find that it pays him better to keep his word than it would do to break it; in civil society, so far as regards contracts of which the law takes cognizance, this statement of fact is converted into an imperative by the sovereign who imports the "thou shalt" into it by making covenant-breaking actionable in his courts. And this is, I believe, how Hobbes has commonly been understood by most of his readers.

But there are, as it seems to me, insuperable difficulties in the way of such an interpretation.

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(1) It is to be observed that from the first, and even when he is speaking of the condition of things in his imaginary "state of nature," Hobbes always describes the items of the natural law as *dictamina*, or dictates, never as *consilia*, or pieces of advice, and the very use of this language implies their imperative character. ("Dictates," as the inhabitants of many European countries are finding out to their cost to-day, are something very different from counsels or recommendations.) So, too, Hobbes regularly says of his natural law that it is a "theorem" which *forbids* certain actions, and uses imperative or quasi-imperative language in his formulation of them. Thus (*De Cive*, II, 1) the law of nature is defined as "the dictate of right reason, conversant about those things which are either to be done or omitted (*dictamen rectae rationis circa ea, quae agenda vel omittenda sunt*) for the constant preservation of life and members, as much as in us lies." "A Law of Nature (*Leviathan*, XIV) is a Precept, or generall Rule, found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved." And (*ibid.*) the "Fundamentall Law of Nature" is that "by which men are commanded to endeavour Peace." The imperative character of the law is thus inseparable from it. Even in the "state of nature" the "fundamental law" is not "men cling to life and are reluctant to leave it"; but "I *am* to do what will, so far as I can see, preserve my life, and I *am not* to do what I judge will imperil it." (Suicide would apparently be wholly excluded, even amid all the miseries of the "natural state.")

It is in strict accordance with this recognition of the imperativeness of the law that Hobbes always lays it down that *obligation* is not created by the sovereign when he issues his orders backed by threats of penalties. The moral obligation to obey the natural law is antecedent to the existence of the legislator and the civil society; even in the "state of nature" the law obliges "in foro interno," though not, as Hobbes is careful to add, *always* "in foro externo." This is not a mere idle playing with words. Hobbes could have conveyed his meaning more unambiguously perhaps, if he had laid more stress on the point that the fundamental law of nature and morals, as he conceives it, is a law of *reciprocal* obligation: what it commands is peace with him who is willing also to be at peace with me, "that peace is to be sought after, *where it may be found*," "that every man ought to endeavour Peace, *as farre as* he has hope of obtaining it." The *caveat* that the "Laws of nature oblige *in foro interno* . . . but *in foro externo*, that is, to the putting them in act, not *always*" is, after all, only meant to remind us that the obligations of these laws are reciprocal, and that where there is no common power to

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act as protector, a man has to judge for himself whether his desire for peace with me is reciprocated on my part. It has also a fuller implication, which Hobbes's unfriends have not always been fair enough to keep in mind. Whereas the civil law can only be infringed by overt acts or words, the moral law is violated by an improper thought or purpose. "Whatsoever Lawes bind *in foro interno* may be broken, not onely by a fact contrary to the Law, but also by a fact according to it, in case men think it contrary. For though the Action in this case, be according to the Law; yet his Purpose was against the Law, which where the Obligation is *in foro interno* is a breach." (*Leviathan*, XV). "The laws which oblige conscience, may be broken by an act not only contrary to them, but also agreeable with them; if so be that he who does it, be of another opinion. For though the act itself be answerable to the laws, yet his conscience is against them" (*De Cive*, III, 28, 7)."

Hobbes is thus quite consistent with himself in maintaining that the natural law—unlike the civil—is "*immutable and eternal*"; what they [the 'laws of nature'] forbid, can never be lawful, what they command can never be unlawful. For *pride, ingratitude, breach of contracts* (or *injury*), *inhumanity*, contumely will never be lawful, nor the contrary virtues to these ever unlawful, as we take them for dispositions of the mind, that is, as they are considered in the court of conscience, where only they oblige and are laws" (*De Cive*, III, 29).

(The meaning of the last clause is only that an outward act which would otherwise have been an exhibition of pride, or a breach of contract, and therefore contrary to the moral law, may acquire a different character, at a particular place and time, owing to the dispositions of the civil law. Thus to exact marks of respect which it would be pride in a private man to demand, may be a proper proceeding on the part of an ambassador or a judge who has the dignity of his sovereign and his sovereign's courts of justice to maintain, and is consistent with the most perfect personal modesty. To desist from fulfilling a contract which the law-courts have pronounced illegal and forbidden me to fulfil is not to show myself a promise-breaker and a man of bad faith, but to prove myself a good citizen; it is my duty as executor under a friend's will *not* to pay legacies which the law has declared invalid, and so on.)

To do full justice to Hobbes we have to remember that the private man in the civil state has other obligations besides that of "keeping his covenant" by obeying all the commands and prohibitions of the civil law. There is a large range of action in respect to which the "sovereign" has not laid down any specific commands, and here, Hobbes holds, I am obliged by the natural law to exhibit the "equity" which he sums up in the traditional maxim not to do to

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another what I am unwilling to have done to myself. "Justice" is not the whole of that to which a citizen is obliged only, and quite naturally, in view of the political disorders of the reign of Charles I and the Commonwealth, the practical importance of obedience to constituted authority is so great in Hobbes's eyes that it becomes his predominant theme; it is easy to forget that he equally teaches that we are under an "eternal obligation" to practise an equity which demands mercy, benevolence, gratitude, and to practise it because the law demands it.

Since all obligation, including the obligation to honour my "covenant" by strict obedience to the sovereign, is thus derived by Hobbes from a "natural law" which is the "dictate of reason," he really escapes from the charge brought against him by Cudworth of making moral distinctions the creation of "meer will." It is true that, according to him, there is one distinction which the sovereign does make by his "meer will," that between *just* and *unjust*, *unjust* meaning by definition what the civil law forbids, and *just* what it permits. But the sovereign does *not* in this fashion make the antecedent and more important distinction between *equity* and *iniquity*; his will does not create the iniquity of refusing him the obedience we have promised. And the declaration that he does create the distinction between justice and injustice is, in exposition, so whittled down that it loses a great deal of its apparent sting. Thus we learn that the sovereign does nothing to create the obligation to keep a "covenant"; all that he really does is to decree that the performance of certain "covenants" is illegal, and to prescribe the precise forms of declaration of our intentions which his courts will regard as constituting a contract. So, we are told, he does not make adultery wrong; it was wrong antecedently by the "natural law"; he merely decides "what copulations" are to be regarded as adulterous.¹ I suppose this means that in any case, independently of the authority of any civil law, we could lay it down that sexual connections which are incompatible with the existence of a civilized community are wrong and should be forbidden; but I should be taking too much upon me if I presumed on my own authority to say just what sexual unions are so incompatible; if I am a loyal citizen, I shall regard that as settled for me by the civil law. The law may, of course, make a mistake, exactly as Hobbes himself says, one monarch

¹ E.g. *De Cive*, XIV, 10. "For though the law of nature forbid theft, adultery, etc.; yet if the civil law command us to invade anything, that invasion is not theft, adultery, etc. For when the Lacedaemonians of old permitted their youths, by a certain law, to take away other men's goods, they commanded that these goods should not be accounted other men's, but their own who took them; and therefore such surreptions were no thefts. In like manner, copulations of heathen sexes, according to their laws, were lawful marriages."

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may wage an iniquitous war against another. But, as he argues with reference to that illustration, the iniquity of the war is not the guilt of the subject who is commanded to bear arms in it; his business as a good subject is simply to obey the command of his own sovereign, to whom he has "covenanted" to be loyal, and must therefore obey, if he is not to break the command of the natural law that "covenants" are to be kept. He has thus discharged his own conscience; if the command were iniquitous, the inquiry concerns only the sovereign who gave it, and he, according to Hobbes, will have to answer for it to God; if the subject had broken his "covenant" to obey his lawful sovereign on the strength of his personal belief that the command given him was iniquitous, the iniquity of the disobedience would have been with him. This is, of course, just the familiar doctrine, "Theirs not to reason why; Theirs but to do and die," a principle which perhaps few of us would care to apply as unrestrictedly as Hobbes does, but without some recognition of which all transaction of concerted human business would become impossible.¹

It must be remembered, however, that this unqualified submission to the sovereign is regarded by Hobbes not as a mere counsel of safety, but as a strict moral obligation, and that the obligation is imported into it from the "eternal" natural law that faith once given is to be kept, which is antecedent to the creation of political society. His view is not that in civilized societies the natural (or moral) law has been superseded by another, but that, in virtue of his theory of civil society as created by a "covenant" of every member with every other to recognize the sovereign's commands as the rule of life, even when I disapprove of some particular command, I am strictly bound by a "prior obligation," which I cannot violate without bad faith, to comply with it, exactly as a judge is

¹ *De Cive*, XII, 3. "Whatsoever any man doeth against his conscience, is a sin; for he who doth so, contemns the law. But we must distinguish. That is my sin indeed, which committing I do believe to be my sin; but what I believe to be another man's sin, I may sometimes do without any sin of mine. For if I be commanded to do that which is a sin in him who commands me, if I do it, and he that commands me be by right lord over me, I sin not. . . . They who observe not this distinction, will fall into a necessity of sinning, as oft as anything is commanded them which either is, or seems to be unlawful to them; for if they obey, they sin against their conscience; and if they obey not, against right. . . . For by our taking upon us to judge of *good* and *evil*, we are the occasion that as well our obedience, as our disobedience, becomes sin unto us." Clearly Hobbes would have been on the side of those who have regarded Sophocles's *Antigone* as simply criminal in her defiance of Creon. The doctrine, in its unqualified form, may have its dangers, but in the middle of the seventeenth century many "subjects" needed the warning that the commands of a lawful authority are not to be disobeyed whenever they do not approve themselves to the private judgment of a subordinate.

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bound by his office to give sentence in accord with the law, even when he personally thinks the existing law a bad one.

If we grant Hobbes's assumptions about the dependence of civil society on the "covenant," and the character of the "covenant" itself, the duty of obeying the civil law, even where I personally think it to be iniquitous, follows as part of a consistent deontology. It is not a logical necessity of the system that we should also accept his egoistic moral psychology. Even if we reject this psychology *in toto*, so long as we grant the premises that civil society rests upon a "covenant" to obey whatever shall be enacted as the "law of the land," and that breach of covenant is always a violation of duty, the conclusion he wishes to draw will follow, viz., that I am only free to be guided by my personal opinion as to what is equity when the civil law has seen fit to leave me free.

(2) The strictly deontological character of Hobbes's thought comes out equally in the doctrine, essential to his argument, that the civil sovereign himself, who obviously cannot be subject to the jurisdiction of his own courts, but has been, in Hobbian language, "authorized" in advance to command and forbid at his own discretion, is just as much under a rigid law of moral obligation as his subjects. He is obliged to equity, the strict observance of the natural (or moral) law, which means, in effect, that he is bound to command and forbid always with a view to the good of the community (and, therefore, as Hobbes is careful to explain, to the practice of just judgment, humanity, mercy, and benevolence). And Hobbes's professed doctrine is that though no human court can take cognizance of the sovereign's shortcomings in this matter, he has always to reckon with the account he will yet have to render to God, who is no acceptor of persons. A hasty reader of the *Leviathan* (though he would be a hasty one) may come away with the impression that Hobbes's sovereign has extensive rights, but nothing to speak of in the way of corresponding duties. The impression should be corrected by a perusal of *De Cive*, XIII, *Concerning the Duties of those who bear Rule*, a chapter of which I would particularly recommend the concluding sections (15-17), which deal with the way in which this duty is violated by "princes" who unduly restrain the "harmless liberty" of the subject by a multiplicity of superfluous laws, allow law to be stultified by the imposition of inadequate penalties or made odious by the infliction of unnecessary severities, or poison its administration by conniving at the corruption of judges by bribes and presents. All such misconduct on the part of "princes" is constantly described by Hobbes as *iniquity* and *sin*.

Now since Hobbes also attempts to reduce all *iniquity* in the end to breach of an express or implied contract, and since he also, as we all know, makes it so capital a point that the parties to the original con-

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tract by which civil society was created are not the "sovereign" and the "subject" (who only come into existence in virtue of the contract itself), but the individual items of a "dissolute multitude" which is not yet a society and has no legal personality, we might find a difficulty here. If the original contract, which must not be broken, imposed no conditions of any kind upon the future sovereign's arbitrary exercise of the power to command and forbid, how can he be said to be guilty of *iniquity* if he chooses to issue a host of grandmotherly commands, to enforce them savagely, or to neglect enforcing them, or if he winks at the bribery of his judges? He never covenanted with his subjects that he would not do these things; if he does them, then, he breaks no "covenant," and cannot be iniquitous, if iniquity and breach of contract are the same thing. Hence it is not unnatural that Hobbes should have been suspected of meaning no more by all his talk about the "duties" of sovereigns than that a sovereign who acts in the ways he condemns is likely to draw unpleasant consequences on himself. Yet it is, I think, impossible not to feel that Hobbes is writing in earnest all through the chapter of the *De Cive* which deals with the duties of "them who bear rule," he does mean that in observing the rules he lays down, rulers are only discharging a *debitum*, and Hobbes would have been the first to insist that a man cannot properly be said to owe a debt to himself. It must be remembered that he is always very careful to insist that in ruling with a single eye to the public good, the sovereign is doing what he is *obliged* to do by the "natural law," and that, in his terminology, there is an essential difference between following a *counsel* and obeying a *law*. "*Counsel* is a *precept*, in which the reason of my obeying it is taken from *the thing itself which is advised*; but *command* is a *precept*, in which the cause of my obedience depends on the *will* of the commander. For it is not properly said that *thus I will* and *thus I command*, except the will stand for a reason. Now when obedience is yielded to the laws, not for the thing itself, but by reason of the adviser's will, the law is not a *counsel* but a *command*, and is defined thus: *law is the command of the person, whether man or court, whose precept contains in it the reason of obedience*. . . . *Law* belongs to him who hath power over those whom he adviseth; *counsel* to them who have no power. To follow what is prescribed by *law*, is *duty*; what by *counsel* is *free-will*" (*De Cive*, XIV, 1). If Hobbes had meant, then, that the sovereign who does the various things which he condemns in a sovereign is acting in an *ill-advised* way, doing what he is likely hereafter to be sorry for, and nothing more, he ought, according to his own definitions, to have called the "precepts" of *De Cive*, XIII, simply counsels, not duties. If the ruler can be said to have duties at all, he must be himself subject to a *law* that is to the *command* of some "persons whose precept

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contains in it the reason of obedience." (Here, again, we may remark an anticipation of Kant, though with a difference. Hobbes means to say that a "counsel" is exactly what Kant calls an *analytic* imperative; it takes the form "do this, if (or since) you desire that, to which this is required as a means." But a dutiful act is one of obedience to a law for which obedience the motive is just that the law is law, is, in fact, in the Kantian not very well-chosen phrase, a *synthetic* imperative.) If Hobbes is to be regarded as consistent with himself we must explain how, on his theory, the sovereign can be guilty of breach of faith, and how this breach of faith can be the violation of a command which is the command of a *person* (in the Hobbian sense), and "contains in it the reason of obedience."

Now as to the first point, there is something to be considered on which Hobbes himself has hardly laid all the stress he should have done. The sovereign, according to him, is created by a voluntary transference to him of what, in the "state of nature," had been the personal right of each of his future subjects. What each of us transferred to the sovereign by this transaction was the right to prescribe at his discretion what we should do and omit. But the purpose of this transference was the promotion of the safety and commodious living of each of us. We did not renounce our claim to this when we renounced our claim to judge of our own discretion how it may be attained. And though the "renunciation" was made not by a contract between the sovereign "of the one part" and the "people" of the other part, but by one between each individual man and every other, in which the sovereign is a beneficiary, but not a party, Hobbes is quite clear on the point that to make the transaction complete there must be an *acceptance* of the proposed transfer of rights by the beneficiary. "In the conveyance of right, the will is requisite not only of him that conveys, but of him also that accepts it. If either be wanting, the right remains" (*De Cive*, II, 5). Hence, though Hobbes does not say much on the point, there is a bargain to which the sovereign is a party in the constitution of civil society. He is not a party to the bargain, of which Hobbes speaks in particular, between you and me to divest ourselves of most of our "natural right," he alone has divested himself of none of it. But, as the beneficiary under the bargain, to whom the "rights" you and I lay down are transferred, he *accepts* the transfer, and in accepting it must be supposed to understand and accept the provision that the powers transferred to him are to be exercised for the preservation and commodity of all of us. This does not affect the conclusion Hobbes is most anxious to establish, that you and I cannot equitably cashier the sovereign or call him to account, since we are supposed to have agreed together to authorize beforehand whatever commands the sovereign may, in his arbitrary discretion,

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think good to give. We may not rebel because *we* think that what he commands is not conducive to the ends for which the transfer of right was made, since we expressly agreed that *he* was to be the judge of what is so conducive. But it is enough to show that there really is a bargain, to which the sovereign is a party by his acceptance of the sovereignty, that the transferred rights shall be exclusively used in the ways which the sovereign honestly believes to further the end aimed at in the transference, and this is enough to explain why, even on the assumption that all "iniquity" can be reduced to breach of contract—an assumption which Hobbes can hardly be said to carry through with complete success—the sovereign can be said to be capable of "iniquity," to be bound by the natural law, and to have a variety of exacting duties. By accepting the sovereignty he has virtually contracted, not indeed to submit his commands to the judgment of any council or body of ministers, but to use them only as he, in his conscience, deems to be for the common safety and welfare. Hence iniquity on his part, too, though not an offence of which any court can take cognizance, could be brought, at a pinch, without any departure from the main lines of Hobbes's thought, under the head of breach of the great law that "men perform their covenants once made."

(3) There still remains a further point for consideration. Sovereigns, we are told, have duties; a duty means "following what is prescribed by law," and a law is "the command of the person . . . whose precept contains in it the reason of obedience."

If the fulfilling of the law of nature is a duty in the sovereign, it follows that the law of nature is a *command*, and a command the reason for obedience whereto is that it is the precept of a "person" with the *right* to command. What "person," then, is this, whose commands are binding on princes because they are *his* commands? Not the "natural person" of any man, since Hobbes denies the existence of any universal monarch of the earth; not a "court" composed of many "natural persons," since there is no such "court" with jurisdiction over the independent princes of the world. I can only make Hobbes's statements consistent with one another by supposing that he meant quite seriously what he so often says, that the "natural law" is the command of God, and to be obeyed *because* it is God's command. Its clauses are "theorems," because they are discoverable by the unaided use of clear and rational thinking. But if they are also commands, then on Hobbes's principles they are commands laid by one will upon another; no man, as Hobbes puts it, can oblige himself, because, being at once obliger and obliged, he could equally release himself at will from his obligation. "It were merely in vain for a man to be obliged to himself, because he can release himself at his own pleasure, and he that can do this

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is already actually free" (*De Cive*, VI, 14). "No man can be obliged except it be to another" (*ibid.*, XII, 4). It would seem to follow that the rules of natural "equity" cannot be commands, or laws, and therefore compliance with them a *duty*, so long as we know no more about them than that they are conclusions rightly collected by reason. To recognize them as *laws*, we must also know that they are the commands of God, and since Hobbes teaches that a law which binds *in foro interno* is not really complied with unless there was a formal intention to obey it as law, we do not really fulfil the demands of equity unless we obey the divine command as such, because it is a divine command.

On the question how we know that the "theorems" which figure in Hobbes's text *are* commands of God, the answer seems to me to vary from one exposition to another. From a passage already quoted from the *Elements of Law* it would look as though the "theorems" obtain this fuller character of being divine laws from their being laid down as commands in Scripture. If that is so, it should consistently be added that they are not laws, but remain simply true "theorems" everywhere outside the "kingdom of God by covenant," i.e. that they are only *laws* to the Jews and Christians who recognize the authority of the Scriptures to which Hobbes appeals. Yet in *De Cive*, XV, 4-5, we meet another different theory. There we are told that God has a two-fold kingdom, "*natural*, in which he reigns by the dictates of right reason; and which is universal over all who acknowledge the divine power by reason of that rational nature which is common to all," and "*prophetical*, in which he rules also by the *word of prophecy*; which is peculiar, because he hath not given positive laws to all men, but to his peculiar people and some certain men elected by him." It is then added that in the *natural* kingdom God's right to rule is founded solely on his *irresistible power*" (whereas in the *prophetical* kingdom, as is explained in detail in the sections of *De Cive* and *Leviathan* devoted to the subject of religion, God's sovereignty over the "elected" rests on a *covenant*). It seems to follow that according to this version of the doctrine, the natural law is a *law* (and not merely a collection of true theorems) for all men except atheists (when Hobbes always regards not as disobedient subjects of God, but as aliens, outside God's kingdom).¹

¹ I confess here to finding a real difficulty in understanding how Hobbes could hold that mere *irresistible power* can be the foundation of a moral obligation. In strict consistency, should he not have held that the moral obligation to obey the natural, which is also the divine, law only covers the case of Israelites in the past, and Christians in the present, who are subjects of God in virtue of a "covenant," by which they are pledged to "faith and obedience" (or, when they have erred through frailty, repentance)? As the omnipotent Lord of all things, God is only king over "infidels" in the same sense in which He is king over the beasts whose subjection to his "irresistible power" is not supposed to give rise to any obligations.

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We should, in consistency, have to suppose that the knowledge that the natural law is the command of God may be attained independently of acquaintance with the Jewish and Christian Scriptures. I do not know whether there is any way of reconciling the various passages, nor how, if the view of the *De Cive* is adopted, Hobbes supposes persons unacquainted with the Scriptures to have discovered that the natural law is a command of God. But we are, I think, bound to believe that he means what he says when he calls it such a command; in no other way can we make his explicit statements about the connection between the notions of a *duty*, a *command*, and a *law* inherent with each other. A certain kind of theism is absolutely necessary to make the theory work.

The reasons which used to be given in the nineteenth century for supposing these theistic utterances to be insincere verbiage are really not creditable to the knowledge or intelligence of the writers who used them. In substance they only amount to this, that Hobbes always insists strongly on the incomprehensibility of the divine nature, and on the impossibility of our having a "conception" of God, and that he points out in particular the danger of anthropomorphism attending the ascription of intellect and will to God. (The difficulty is that in us, according to Hobbes, will is *appetite*; the "last appetite in deliberation," and intellection has its beginnings in "sense"; but clearly we cannot ascribe appetite and "sense" to the infinite and irresistible being.) Utterances of this kind are so far from being necessarily expressions of atheism that they are the common stock-in-trade of orthodox Christian scholastics. If Hobbes said that we have no conception of God, it was the universal scholastic doctrine that the *essentia* of God cannot be known to us in this life; though we can answer the question *an sit Deus*, we have to leave the question *quid Deus sit* to be solved in a better world. Neither will nor intellect, nor anything else, according to the greatest of the scholastics, can be *univocally* predicated of God and of any creature. When Hobbes in *De Corpore* threw doubt on the value of philosophic arguments for the beginning of the universe in time, he was only repeating that had long before been more fully urged by St. Thomas. When he says—and the words have actually been used in support of the allegation of "atheism"—that we may only attribute to God two kinds of predicates, negative predicates which deny of Him anything which is a mark of limitation, and superlatives which, by their form, indicate that there is no comparison between Him and the creatures of whom the same epithets are predicated in the positive degree, he is, consciously or not, reproducing the teaching and phraseology of the *de divinis nominibus* of "Dionysius the Areopagite," a writer sympathetically expounded by St. Thomas. Clearly arguments which, if valid, would prove the

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atheism of most of the schoolmen, including the *Doctor angelicus*, prove nothing about that of Hobbes. On the other hand, he *seems* always to accept at its face value the argument that the universe (= the aggregate of bodies) must have a cause, and since, on his own definition of causation, nothing can be *causa sui*, it follows at once (1) that the "cause of the universe" is neither itself (the "aggregate of bodies") nor any part of itself, and (2) that, if as Hobbes held, nothing can be conceived but body, this cause, though certainly known by the causal argument to exist, must be incomprehensible to us. The internal consistency of this doctrine seems to me to be the best proof that it was sincerely held. (There is, perhaps, a certain inconsistency between Hobbes's definition of cause and effect, for which it should follow that a cause is always temporally prior to its effect, and the doubt expressed in the *De Corpore* about the validity of the reasons given for a beginning of the world in time.¹ But the utmost that this proves, I think, is only that Hobbes had not thought out the implications of the problem to the end. He has been laughed at for leaving the question undecided until it shall be authoritatively determined by the sovereign. But he is here again in the company of St. Thomas. Both leave the last word on the matter to the authorized interpreter of Scripture. The only

¹ The relevant facts are these:—

(1) Hobbes expressly says, here agreeing completely with St. Thomas that no good reasons can be given why the world should have had a beginning (*De Corpore*, IV, 26, 1) (I quote from the text of 1668). *Illos igitur qui mundi originem aliquam fuisse rationibus suis a rebus naturalibus demonstrasse se iactitant laudare non possum. . . . Nonne qui reternitatem mundi sic tollunt, eadem opera etiam mundi conditori aeternitatem tollunt.*

(2) According to the definitions of cause and effect given in the same work (II, 9, 3), a *causa integra* (entire cause) is the "aggregate of all the accidents both of the agents how many soever they be, and of the patient put together; which when they are all supposed to be present (omnibus suppositis) it cannot be understood but that the effect is produced *at the same instant* (quin effectus una sit productus) and if any one of them be wanting, it cannot be understood but that the effect is not produced," and we are consequently told "quo instante causa sit *integra*, eodem quoque effectum esse productum." Thus the "entire cause," including the requisite conditions "is the patient," and the effect are simultaneous. But Hobbes infers from this very proposition the "causation and the production of effects consist in a certain continual progress" (*ibid.*, II, 9, 6), and this seems to imply that the "agent," if not the "patient," also has an existence which is temporally prior to the "effect." If this principle can be extended to the causation of the universe, it would follow that the universe is *not* eternal. I suppose, however, that Hobbes, who held that philosophy is only concerned with those things of which there are "generations," could quite consistently have said that the principle, being a philosophical one, must not be applied to God, nor yet to the "world" if the world is "eternal," and that the question therefore remains open for us as philosophers, though as good subjects we must acquiesce in the sentence of the sovereign, if he thinks fit to pronounce on the matter.

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·difference between them is that St. Thomas's authorized interpreter is the ecclesiastical power, and it has already given its decision; Hobbes's is the temporal, and its decision cannot be known until the "sword" has finally settled who is to be the temporal sovereign in England.)

The "incomprehensibility" of God, so far from being inconsistent with the thesis that the natural law is a divine command, actually serves to remove a possible objection. If God were comprehensible, it is conceivable that accurate knowledge of His nature might prove that nature to be such that we cannot think of it as the source of commands which oblige mankind. But if the nature of God is an inscrutable mystery, then this very inscrutability makes it impossible to use our inability to understand *how* God commands us as any argument against the fact that He does so command us, provided that the fact appears to be sufficiently authenticated. *If* a man finds evidence for the fact either in the witness of our sense of imperative obligation itself, or in the coincidence of the "theorems" of "right reason" with the injunctions of Scripture, a Hobbit cannot retort on him by alleging, to use the unlovely diction of modern slangishness, that "ultimate reality is unethical," and therefore *cannot* be the source of moral commands and prohibitions. As we simply do not know what the "ultimate reality" is (have no "conception" of it), we are talking idly when we pretend to know that it is "non-ethical."

My own belief, for whatever it may be worth, is that Hobbes simply meant what he said about the natural law as a command of God, and that he was led to this conviction not so much by the Scriptural testimonies which he produces in such profusion, as by the unusual depth of his own sense of moral obligation. The impression repeated study of his works leaves on me is that Hobbes was a fundamentally honest man, and a man, as Professor Laird has said, with an almost overwhelming sense of duty. To such a man the thought that duty is a divine command is so natural that it is almost impossible not to form it. And I conceived that Hobbes's religion—for, in spite of De Quincey's jests, I think it clear he had one—consisted, as Kant's did, almost exclusively in the discharge of the duties of everyday morality with an accompanying sense of their transcendent obligatoriness. It is clear that he was not "religious" in any deeper sense of the word; the worship of the heart was plainly not congenial to him, and his theories, in fact, make any direct personal relation between the worshipper and his god illusory. But such as it was, his religion does impress me as a genuine thing, and it is not very different from that of many worthy persons of to-day who would be sincerely shocked if they were to be accused of "atheism." It seems to me that when we make the

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necessary allowances for ways of thinking which were current in the middle of the seventeenth century but are now obsolete, Hobbes may have been more in earnest than is usually allowed in supplementing this religion of the duty of a citizen with the one "article of faith" that Jesus is yet to reappear in Palestine and reign endlessly in temporal felicity over resuscitated believers. Such a "faith" would have no chance of being accepted as "the good Christianity" if it were to be proclaimed to-day. But I do not think it impossible that a man living in the welter of conflicting and bitterly hostile creeds of all kinds prevalent in England in the period 1640-50 may have fancied that something of this kind would emerge at last as the simple "substance of the faith."¹

My serious concern, however, is not with what may have been Hobbes's personal opinions on these things, and I only make the remarks of the last paragraph by very free protest against the too facile assumption that there is nothing in the scriptural exegesis with which *Leviathan*, in particular, abounds beyond an ingenious treating of the ecclesiastics with their own weapons. The point I am really anxious to make is that Hobbes's *ethical* theory is commonly misrepresented and unintelligently criticized for want of sufficient recognition that it is, from first to last, a doctrine of *duty*, a strict deontology. It is true that Charles II had the good taste to enjoy the philosopher's conversation, and that the Whitehall of the Restoration is an unlikely quarter in which to find a deontologist. But Hobbes, after all, was not so very often at Whitehall, and he does not belong to the age of the Restoration wits. He is the contemporary of Clarendon, Falkland, and Selden, not of Rochester, Etherege, and Villiers.

¹ I certainly do not myself think that the feats of Biblical interpretation in the *Leviathan* are, in the main, a mere game. Hobbes's exegeses, where they are opposed to those generally current in his time, are often manifestly sound, and even where, to our better informed age they are not sound, they may well have seemed so to their seventeenth-century author. It is only in a small minority of cases that he seems to me to be merely "answering a fool according to his folly." It should always be remembered that Hobbes has an admirable practical purpose in his endeavour to reduce the articles of belief "necessary to salvation" to a minimum. He wants, in an intolerant age, to put an end to persecution for speculative disagreements without challenging the generally accepted view that it is the sovereign's duty to "cause such a doctrine and worship to be taught and practised" as he believes "necessarily conducive to the *eternal* salvation" of his subjects (*De Cive*, XIII, 5). And he held, as we see from his *Behemoth*, that the ultimate cause of the great rebellion had been the zeal of Presbyterian ministers to enforce all their own personal opinions on points of speculative divinity as "necessary to salvation." Persecution, he thinks, will cease if the sovereign insists on no article as fundamental beyond the recognition of Jesus as the future Messianic king, and the subject understands that conformity to the established worship does not imply speculative agreement in opinion, except on this single point.

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N.B.—I have in the text omitted to quote what is perhaps the most important single sentence of Hobbes about *obligation*. In view of its definiteness, I give it both in the Latin and the English forms. *De Cive*, XIV, 2, *annot.*—Clarius ergo hoc dico. Pacto obligari hominem, id est propter promissionem praestare debere. Lege vero obligatum teneri, id est metu poenae quae in Lege constituitur, ad praestationem cogi. *Philosophical Rudiments concerning Government and Society*, XIV, 2.—More clearly, therefore, I say thus: that a man is obliged by his contracts, that is, that he ought to perform for his promise's sake; but that the law ties him being obliged, that is to say, it compels him to make good his promise for fear of the punishment appointed by the law.

The clear distinction thus made between the *obligation* and the subsequent *compulsion* though the "penal sanction" is (a distinction merely overlooked in Bentham's statement that "a Sanction is a source of obligatory powers or motives") explains at once how Hobbes could maintain that the "laws of nature" oblige *in foro interno* even before the creation of civil society, that in civil society they continue to oblige wherever the civil law has issued no injunctions, and that they oblige the sovereign himself, who is inamenable to the civil law. The obligatory force of the civil law itself is, in fact, derived entirely from that of the natural. If we are always to obey the civil law, even when in our private opinion it is inequitable, that is because we are already obliged, in virtue of the natural law itself, to honour our "previous engagement" to be directed by the commands of the sovereign. I am always sure that to break this engagement is inequitable, whereas my personal opinion that the act the sovereign commands me to do is inequitable is, in Hobbes's eyes, never more than a conjecture, and even if I have conjectured rightly, the answerability for the iniquity of the act so commanded lies not with me, but with the sovereign.

OUR EVIDENCE FOR THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER MINDS

PROFESSOR H. H. PRICE

1. IN ordinary life everyone assumes that he has a great deal of knowledge about other minds or persons. This assumption has naturally aroused the curiosity of philosophers; though perhaps they have not been as curious about it as they ought to have been, for they have devoted many volumes to our consciousness of the material world, but very few to our consciousness of one another. It was thought at one time that each of us derives his knowledge of other minds from the observation of other human organisms. I observe (it was said) that there are a number of bodies which resemble my own fairly closely in their shape, size, and manner of movement; I conclude by analogy that each of these bodies is animated by a mind more or less like myself. It was admitted that this argument was not demonstrative. At the best it would only provide evidence for the existence of other minds, not proof; and one's alleged knowledge of other minds would only be at the most well-grounded opinion. It was further admitted, by some philosophers, that our belief in the existence of other minds was probably not *reached* by an argument of this sort, indeed was not reached by an argument at all, but was an uncritical and unquestioning taking-for-granted, a mere piece of primitive credulity; but, it was claimed, the belief can only be justified by an argument of this sort.

This theory, which may be called the Analogical Theory, has come in for a good deal of criticism, and has now been generally abandoned. Perhaps it has sometimes been abandoned for the wrong reasons; for some of its critics (not all) seem to have overlooked the distinction between the genesis of a belief and its justification. However this may be, I shall not discuss the theory any further at present. My aim in this paper is to consider certain other theories which have been or might be suggested in its place, and to develop one of them at some length.

With the abandonment of the Analogical Theory a very different view, which I shall call the Intuitive Theory, came into favour. It was maintained that each of us has a direct and intuitive apprehension of other minds, just as he has of his own, or at least that he intuitively apprehends some other minds on some occasions, for instance in a conversation or a quarrel. It was said that there is social

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consciousness as well as self-consciousness, a direct awareness of the "thou" as well as a direct awareness of the "me." I wish to emphasize that this consciousness was held to be a form of knowing, not merely belief (however well-grounded), still less taking for granted. And I think it would have been said to be knowing by acquaintance—extrospective acquaintance as we might call it—though doubtless this acquaintance would make possible a certain amount of "knowledge about," just as when I am acquainted with a noise I may know about the noise that it is shrill or louder than some previous noise.

This view might be worked out in several different ways. Do I have extrospective acquaintance with foreign selves, or only with foreign psychical events, from which foreign selves can somehow be inferred? Or would it be said that foreign selves, and my own self too, are only logical constructions out of extrospectible or introspectible data? Again, is my extrospective acquaintance confined to human minds, or does it extend to sub-human and super-human ones, if such there be? It is certain that some who held this kind of theory thought that it did extend to super-human minds at any rate; for they thought that religious experience, or at any rate one of the types of experience covered by that label, was an extrospective acquaintance with the Divine Mind. And I suppose that some might claim an extrospective acquaintance with what we may call ex-human minds, minds which once animated human bodies, but now animate them no longer (and perhaps with ex-animal minds, if there are any?).

We should also have to ask just what the special circumstances are which make this extrospective acquaintance possible. For clearly it does not occur in all circumstances. Otherwise we shall never be deceived by waxworks; we could tell at a glance whether the man we see lying by the roadside is unconscious, or dead, or only shamming; and we should know at once whether the words we hear are uttered by a gramophone or by an animate and conscious human organism.

I do not propose to pursue these questions any further. I only mention them to suggest that the theory requires a more detailed and thorough working out than it has yet received. But perhaps it is well to add that it derives no support whatever from the phenomena of telepathy. No doubt there is strong empirical evidence for the occurrence of telepathy. But the telepathic relation appears to be causal, not cognitive; it is more like infection than like knowledge. An event E_1 in mind No. 1 causes an event E_2 in mind No. 2, without any discoverable physical intermediary. It may be that E_2 resembles E_1 fairly closely. For instance, E_1 might be the seeing of a certain scene accompanied by a feeling of horror, and E_2 might be the imaging

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of a visual image closely resembling that scene, accompanied by a similar feeling of horror. But E_2 is not a *knowing* of E_1 ; just as, when you have scarlet fever and I catch it from you, my fever is not a knowing of yours.

But some advocates of the Intuitive Theory proceeded to take a further step, which we must now consider. We were told, and still are, that the problem before us was mis-stated. We started by assuming that every man has from the first a direct introspective awareness of himself, or of mental events in himself, and the problem was to justify his beliefs concerning other selves. The Analogical Theory said that they were justified by observation of other human bodies. The Intuitive Theory said that they were justified by occasional acts of extrospective acquaintance; or rather it said that some of them are not beliefs, but intuitive knowings, and that the rest (which *are* only beliefs) are justified by the evidence which these occasional extrospective knowings provide. But, it is now suggested, the problem has been stated the wrong way round; we are being puzzled at the wrong things. The really puzzling thing, it is suggested, is *self-consciousness*, not consciousness of other people. What comes first in the historical order is consciousness of one's neighbour, extrospective consciousness. Consciousness of oneself only comes later, after considerable mental development; in some cases perhaps, say in the idiot or the very primitive savage, it never comes at all. Nor is the order merely historical. It is epistemological too. When I do come to know my own mind, I only come to know it by contrast with my neighbours' minds which I have been knowing from the first.

It may, however, be objected that this is only true of attentive and discriminating self-consciousness. Might I not have been *aware* of myself from the first, even though it required time and pain before I attended to this internal datum and discriminated it from other objects of my awareness? To meet this difficulty, the theory is sometimes stated in a still more radical way. It is suggested that the primary thing both in the historical and the epistemological order is a consciousness whose object is not "you" nor "me," but "us." This primitive *we-consciousness* can be called neither introspective nor extrospective, but is that out of which both introspection and extrospection have developed. Each man as he grows up gradually learns to distinguish between different parts of this originally given we-object, and in particular to distinguish between "me," "you," and "the rest." But this achievement, it is suggested, is not an entirely stable one. In times of great emotional stress, as in a battle or a riot, it may break down. One then slips back into the primitive and undiscriminating we-consciousness, and is aware only that "we" are doing or feeling so and so. Such occasions are very rare in the life of the civilized man. But in the very primitive savage it

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may well be the other way round. Perhaps he only manages to distinguish between "me" and "you" once or twice in a lifetime.

We have now described several different forms of the Intuitive Theory. They differ as to the relation between introspective acquaintance and extrospective acquaintance, between self-consciousness and social consciousness. But they all have one very important contention in common. They all maintain that there is such an experience as extrospective acquaintance, a direct and intuitive knowing whose object is either another mind, or at any rate an event in or state of another mind. But *does* extrospective acquaintance ever occur? Am I ever acquainted with a feeling of anger or of fear which is not my own? I am sometimes acquainted with my own thinking-processes. Am I ever *acquainted* with thinking-processes which do not occur in myself and have nothing to do with me? It seems to me perfectly clear that the answer to these questions is, No. Of course I am constantly taking for granted the existence of all sorts of foreign emotions and foreign thinking-processes. I take their existence for granted without the least hesitation or doubt. But this is a very different thing indeed from knowing them by acquaintance. If anyone professes that he does sometimes have such extrospective acquaintance with his neighbour's mental processes, I do not see how to refute him. But I can easily conceive both of a strong motive, and of a plausible but inconclusive argument, which might lead him to claim that he had such acquaintance when in fact he had not.

First, the motive. As a distinguished philosopher has said, "we don't want inferred friends." But still, though one does not want them, one may have to put up with them for lack of anything better. Secondly, the argument. It may be urged that unless there is some extrospective acquaintance, the beliefs which each one of us holds concerning other minds could not have the high degree of probability which some of them obviously do have. For where else could the evidence come from which is to give them this high degree of probability? Mere observation of other human organisms, such as the Analogical Theory appeals to, provides but weak evidence, if it provides any at all. One might try to cut the knot by offering a Behaviouristic analysis of statements about other minds, as Logical Positivism did in its wilder youth, on the ground that otherwise these statements would be unverifiable and so nonsensical. If my belief about another mind is really only a belief about the behaviour of a certain human organism, then no doubt I can find abundant evidence to justify it. But then what about statements concerning my own mind? These can be verified or refuted by introspection; so they are *not* to be analysed in a purely Behaviouristic way. But this leaves us with an intolerable asymmetry between

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statements about myself and statements about my neighbour. It seems perfectly obvious that words like "hear," "see," "fear," "think," have exactly the same meaning when I apply them to my neighbour as when I apply them to myself. If "*I* see a cat" means simply "this retina here is being stimulated by light-rays and these muscles are adjusting themselves to respond to that stimulus" (e.g. by stroking the cat, or offering it a saucer of milk), well and good; then we may analyse "Smith sees a cat" in an analogous way. Only, what is sauce for Smith must be sauce for me as well. The Behaviouristic analysis must apply to both statements alike, or else to neither. But as a matter of fact it seems to me clear that "*I* see a cat" cannot be analysed in this way. However much truth we recognize in the detailed contentions of the Behaviourists—and for my part I am prepared to recognize a great deal—I do not understand how anyone can hold a purely Behaviouristic theory about himself. Much of what we are pleased to call our thinking is doubtless nothing but talking or twitching of throat-muscles, and much of what looks like deliberate action may well be nothing but a complicated chain of conditioned reflexes. But unless I sometimes do think in the literal and non-Behaviouristic sense, how could I discover that at other times my alleged thinking is only talking? How indeed could I *discover* anything at all, or even understand the statements which Behaviourists make to me?

For these reasons it is certainly plausible to argue that unless extrospective acquaintance sometimes occurs, one's beliefs about other minds could not have the high probability which some of them obviously do here. For if extrospective acquaintance be excluded, we must fall back on ordinary perceptual observation. And then it seems we must have recourse either to the Analogical Theory or to Behaviourism, and neither gives us what we want. But I think that this argument, though plausible, is not conclusive. For Behaviourism and the Analogical Theory are perhaps not the only alternatives available. There is at least one other which deserves to be considered, and I propose to devote the rest of this paper to the consideration of it.

2. The suggestion I wish to examine is that one's evidence for the existence of other minds is derived primarily from the understanding of language. I shall use the word "language" in a wide sense, to include not only speech and writing, but also signals such as waving a red flag, and gestures such as beckoning and pointing. One might say, the suggestion is that one's evidence for the existence of other minds comes from *communication*-situations. But this would be question-begging. For communication is by definition a relation between two or more minds. Thus if I have reason to believe that a

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communication is occurring, I must already have reason to believe that a mind other than my own exists. However, it would be true, according to the theory which I am about to consider, that the study of communication is of fundamental importance. For according to it one's most important evidence for the existence of another mind is always also evidence for the occurrence of communication between that mind and oneself. Even so, the word "communication" has to be taken in a wide sense, as the word "language" has to be. Utterances which I am not intended to hear, and writings or signals which I am not intended to see, will have to be counted as communications, provided I do in fact observe and understand them. In other words, we shall have to allow that there is such a thing as involuntary communication.

Let us consider some instances. Suppose I hear a foreign body¹ utter the noises "Look! there is the bus." I understand these noises. That is to say, they have for me a *symbolic* character, and on hearing them I find myself entertaining a certain proposition, or if you like entertaining a certain thought. (It does not matter how they came to have this symbolic character for me. The point is that they do have it now, however they got it.) As yet I only *entertain* what they symbolize, with perhaps some slight inclination towards belief; for as yet I have no decisive ground for either belief or *disbelief*. However, I now proceed to look round; and sure enough there is the bus, which I had not seen before, and perhaps was not expecting yet. This simple occurrence, of hearing an utterance, understanding it and then verifying it for oneself, provides some evidence that the foreign body which uttered the noises is animated by a mind like one's own. And at the same time it provides evidence that the mind in question is or recently has been in a determinate state. Either it has been itself observing the bus, or it has been observing some other physical object or event from which the advent of the bus could be inferred.

Now suppose that I frequently have experiences of this sort in connection with this particular foreign body. Suppose I am often in its neighbourhood, and it repeatedly produces utterances which I can understand, and which I then proceed to verify for myself. And suppose that this happens in many different kinds of situation. I think that my evidence for believing that this body is animated by a mind like my own would then become very strong. It is true that it will never amount to demonstration. But in the sphere of matters of fact it is a mistake to expect demonstration. We may expect it in the spheres of Pure Mathematics and Formal Logic, but not elsewhere. So much at least we may learn from Hume. If

¹ I use a phrase "a foreign body" to mean "a body other than my own." As we shall see, it need not be a *human* body.

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I have no direct extrospective acquaintance with other minds, the most that can be demanded is adequate *evidence* for their existence. If anyone demands *proof* of it his demand is nonsensical, at least if the word "proof" is used in the strict sense which it bears in Pure Mathematics. It is not that the demand unfortunately cannot be fulfilled, owing to the limitations of human knowledge. It is that it cannot really be made at all. The words which purport to formulate it do not really formulate anything.

To return to our argument: the evidence will be strongest where the utterance I hear gives me new information; that is to say, where it symbolizes something which I do *not* already believe, but which I subsequently manage to verify for myself. For if I did already believe it at the time of hearing, I cannot exclude the possibility that it was my own believing which caused the foreign body to utter it. And this might happen even if my own believing were, as we say, "unconscious"; as when I have been believing for many hours that to-day is Saturday, though until this moment I have not thought about the matter. I know by experience that my believings can cause my own body to utter symbolic noises; and for all I can tell they may sometimes cause a foreign body to do the same. Indeed, there is some empirical evidence in favour of this suggestion. The utterances of an entranced medium at a spiritualistic séance do sometimes seem to be caused by the unspoken beliefs of the sitters. That one mind—my own—can animate two or more bodies at the same time is therefore not an absurd hypothesis, but only a queer one. It cannot be ruled out of court *a priori*, but must be refuted by specific empirical evidence.

It might, however, be suggested that we are demanding too much when we require that the foreign utterance should convey new information. Would it not be sufficient if the information, though not new, was, so to speak, *intrusive*—if it broke in upon my train of thought, and had no link, either logical or associative, with what I was thinking a moment before? Thus, suppose that while I am engaged in a mathematical calculation I suddenly hear a foreign body say "to-day is Saturday." I did in a sense believe this already. I have received no new information. Still, the utterance has no logical relevance to the propositions which were occupying my mind, and there was nothing in them to suggest it by association. Would not the hearing of this utterance provide me with evidence for the existence of another mind? I admit that it would, but I think the evidence would be weak. For I know by experience that my powers of concentration are exceedingly limited. Sentences proceeding from my own unconscious sometimes break in upon my train of thought in just this intrusive way. It is true that they usually present themselves to my mind in the form of verbal images. But

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occasionally they are actually uttered in audible whispers, and sometimes they are uttered aloud. How can I tell that these same unconscious processes in myself may not sometimes cause a foreign body to utter such intrusive noises? Their intrusive character is no bar to their unconscious origin. What we require is that they should symbolize something which I did not believe beforehand at all, even unconsciously. It is still better if they symbolize something which I *could* not have believed beforehand because I was not in a position to make the relevant perceptual observations. For instance, I hear a foreign body say "there is a black cloud on the horizon" at a time when my back is turned to the window, and then I turn round and see the cloud for myself. Or I am walking in pitch darkness in a strange house, and hear someone say "there are three steps in front of you," which I had no means of guessing beforehand; and I then verify the proposition for myself by falling down the steps.

3. It follows from what has been said that if there were a foreign body which never uttered anything but platitudes, I should be very doubtful whether it was independently animated, no matter how closely it resembled my own. In the instance given ("to-day is Saturday," when I already believe that to-day is Saturday) the platitude was a *singular* platitude, stating a particular matter of fact. But there are also *general* platitudes. Among these some are empirical, such as "there is always a sky above us," "all cats have whiskers"; while others are *a priori*, such as " $2 + 2 = 4$," or "it is either raining or not raining," and are true at all times and in all possible worlds. If there was a body which uttered only singular platitudes, I should be inclined to conclude (as we have said) that it was not independently animated; I should suspect that its noises were caused by my own believings, conscious and unconscious. If it uttered nothing but general platitudes, I might doubt whether it was animated at all. I should be inclined to think that it was a mere mechanism, a sort of talking penny-in-the-slot machine, especially if its repertoire of platitudes was limited; though it might occur to me to wonder whether any intelligent being had constructed it.

So far, then, it appears that if the noises uttered by a foreign body (or its visible gesticulations) are to provide adequately strong evidence for the existence of another mind, they must give me information. They must symbolize something which I did not know or believe beforehand, and which I then proceed to verify for myself. If these conditions are fulfilled, I have evidence of the occurrence of a foreign act of perceiving—an act of perceiving which did not form part of my own mental history. But it is not really necessary

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that the information conveyed should be a singular proposition, restricted to one single perceptible situation. It might be general, as if I hear a foreign body say "some cats have no tails," or "all gold dissolves in *aqua regia*." Neither of these is restricted to one single perceptible object or situation. Still, they are both empirical, and there is a sense in which even the second can be empirically verified, or at any rate confirmed, by suitable observations and experiments. Clearly such utterances as these do give me evidence for the existence of another mind; but not in the way that the previous utterances did, such as "there is the bus," or "there is a black cloud on the horizon now." They do not show that a specific perceptual act falling outside my own mental history is now occurring, or has just occurred. In one way they show something less—merely that some perceivings of cats or of gold have occurred at some time or other. But in another way they show something more: namely, that a foreign act of *thinking* is occurring or has recently occurred, directed upon the *universals* "cat," "tail," "gold," and "*aqua regia*." (Or if it be objected that even perceiving involves some thinking, directed upon universals in abstraction from their instances.)

But further, the information I received need not be empirical at all. Suppose I hear a foreign body utter the noises "if 345 is added to 169, the result is 514." I understand these noises, but as yet I neither accept nor reject what they say. For I have never worked out that particular sum before, or if I have, I have forgotten the result. However, I now proceed to work it out, and sure enough the result is 514. This, too, gives me evidence of the existence of another mind. But this time I get evidence simply of a foreign act of thinking, and not of any foreign perceptual act at all.

Here, however, we encounter a difficulty. It may be objected that this argument for the existence of another mind is quite different from the one used hitherto, and even inconsistent with it. In the previous cases everything turned on the difference between utterances which give me information and utterances which do not. But a mathematical statement, it is often said, tells me nothing about the world. For it is true whatever state the world may be in. And the like holds of all other *a priori* statements. (Accordingly some philosophers have said that all *a priori* statements are *tautologies*.) If so, how can a mathematical statement be called informative? But if it is not informative, then according to our previous argument the hearing and understanding of it can give us no evidence for the existence of a foreign act of thinking. Indeed, we ourselves gave the utterance " $2 + 2 = 4$ " as an instance of a platitude above.

To this I reply that there is a sense in which many mathematical and other *a priori* statements are informative. It is true that they

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do not give information about empirical matters of fact, in the way in which such statements as "it is now raining" do, or "some cats have no tails." But they do assert something. They assert certain *entailments* (or necessitations, if you will). And though any entailment, once you have seen it, may be called obvious or evident, it is not on that account necessarily a platitude. The term "platitude" is relative. That which is a platitude to you need not be a platitude to me; and that which is a platitude to me at one time of my life may have been non-platitudinous to me at another. A statement is only a platitude to me when its truth is *already* obvious to me, *before* I hear the statement. If the truth of it was not obvious beforehand, but only becomes so afterwards when I have attended to the meaning of the symbols and to their mode of combination, then it has certainly told me something new which I did not know before. At the time when I heard it, it was certainly not a platitude for me, though it will be one in future if my memory is good. Even " $2 + 2 = 4$," though it is a platitude to me now, perhaps was not always one. When I first heard it, perhaps it told me something new which I had not been able to work out for myself. As Mr. Russell says somewhere, even the Multiplication Table was probably exciting in the time of King Aahmes; for at that time it was not platitudinous to anybody.

It appears, then, that mathematical statements (and likewise other *a priori* statements) can very well be informative, in the sense that they can tell one something which one had not previously found out for oneself; though the something which they tell is an entailment, and not an empirical matter of fact. If it be said that such statements are tautologies, then we must insist that there are novel tautologies as well as stale ones; and the hearing and understanding of a novel one does give strong evidence for the existence of another mind, though the hearing of a stale one gives none or very little.

4. In the situations hitherto mentioned the noises which I hear and understand are uttered by a foreign organism which I observe. And the foreign organism is more or less similar to my own. But of course I need not actually observe it. It suffices if I hear an intelligible and informative utterance proceeding from a megaphone or a telephone, from the next room or from behind my back. It may, however, be thought that such a foreign organism must be in principle observable if I am to have evidence of the existence of another mind, and further that it must be more or less similar to my own organism. But I believe that both of these opinions are mistaken, as I shall now try to show by examples.

There is a passage in the Old Testament which reads, "Thou shalt hear a voice behind thee saying, 'This is the way, walk ye in it.'"

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Now suppose that something like this did actually occur. For instance, I am lost on a mountain-top, and I hear a voice saying that on the other side of such-and-such a rock there is a sheep-track which leads down the mountain. After the best search that I can make, I can find no organism from which the voice could have proceeded. However, I go to the rock in question, and I do find a sheep-track which leads me down safely into the valley. Is it not clear that I should then have good evidence of the existence of another kind? The fact that so far as I can discover there was no organism, human or other, from which the voice proceeded makes no difference, provided I hear the noises, understand them, and verify the information which they convey. Now suppose I go up the mountain many times, and each time I hear an intelligible set of noises, conveying information which is new to me and subsequently verified; but I never find an organism from which they could have proceeded, search as I may. I should then have reason for concluding that the place was "haunted" by an unembodied mind. Such things do not happen, no doubt. But still there is no contradiction whatever in supposing them. The point is that if they did happen they would provide perfectly good evidence for the existence of another mind. And this is sufficient to show that the presence of an observable organism is not essential; *a fortiori*, the presence of an observable organism more or less resembling my own is not essential.

Now suppose an even more extravagant case. The clouds might form themselves into Chinese ideographs before my eyes. I might be able to read Chinese, and I might find that these ideographs made up intelligible sentences, conveying new information which I could verify by subsequent observation. Or I might find that they stated a geometrical theorem which I could follow when it was put before me, but could not have discovered for myself. Here, again, I should have good ground for thinking that there was another mind communicating to me. But I could not form the remotest notion of what sort of organism it had; and so far as I could tell, it might have none at all.

In the two cases just considered no body was observed to produce the words, but at least the words themselves were perceived by hearing or sight. But even this is not essential. It might be enough if they presented themselves to me in the form of mental imagery, auditory or visual. Suppose that a sentence came into my mind in this way which conveyed information entirely new to me, information which I could not have inferred from anything I already knew or believed; suppose further that there was nothing in the preceding train of thought to suggest it by association. Then I should be inclined to think that this image-sentence was produced by some unconscious process, in myself. The sentence might be "there is

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a wrecked motor car round the next corner." Suppose that on turning the corner I did find a wrecked motor car. I should be somewhat astonished, especially if the sentence had been a long and circumstantial one (mentioning, say, the colour and make of the car, and the number of its number-plate), and was verified in all or most of its details. Still, I should stick to the hypothesis that it was produced by my own unconscious, and should attribute the verification to coincidence. But if such things happened to me several times, it would be reasonable to consider the hypothesis that there was another mind, or several, communicating to me telepathically. And if experiences of this sort went on happening, all giving me new information which was subsequently verified, the evidence might become very strong.

It appears then that I could conceivably get strong evidence of the existence of another mind even if there was no observable organism with which such a mind could be connected. This incidentally is a new and fatal argument against the old Analogical Theory which was referred to at the beginning of this paper. For that theory maintained that one's evidence of the existence of other minds could *only* come from observing foreign bodies which resemble one's own. It is also clear that even when I do observe a foreign body producing the relevant utterances, that body need not be in the least like my own. There is no logical absurdity in the hypothesis of a rational parrot or a rational caterpillar. And if there was such a creature, I could have as good evidence of its rationality as I have in the case of my human neighbours; better evidence indeed than I can have in the case of a human idiot. There is no *a priori* reason why even vegetable organisms should not give evidence of being animated by rational minds, though as it happens they never do. If the rustlings of the leaves of an oak formed intelligible words conveying new information to me, and if gorse-bushes made intelligible gestures, I should have evidence that the oak or the gorse-bush was animated by an intelligence like my own.

Here it may be well to consider the case of parrots more closely, for they appear to cause some difficulty to my thesis. Parrots do make intelligible utterances. But we do not usually think that they are animated by minds like our own; and some even hold that they are not animated at all in the sense in which human bodies are, but are simply behaving organisms which respond in a complicated way to environmental stimuli. It is true that the utterances of parrots do not usually tell us anything new. But it is quite conceivable that they might. Suppose that I do hear a parrot make an utterance which gives me new information. This certainly gives me evidence for the existence of a mind *somewhere*, an intelligent mind like my own. But I should usually assume that the mind in question does

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not animate the parrot-organism itself. Why should I assume this? In default of further evidence, it would be quite unreasonable to do so. But, as it happens, I have learned from observation of other parrots that when they make intelligible noises they are not, so to speak, the original sources of these noises, but are merely repeating the utterances which some human body has made in their neighbourhood. Thus, when I receive information from the utterances of *this* parrot, I have reason to think that the mind which is responsible for it does not animate the parrot-body itself, but does (or did) animate some human body in whose neighbourhood the parrot has lived. The case is parallel to that of an echo. An echo coming from a wall might consist of intelligible noises, and they might give me new information. But I should not conclude that the wall was animated by an intelligent mind, because I know that walls do not spontaneously produce noises of that sort, but only reproduce noises which are going on in the neighbourhood. The parrot is merely a sort of delayed echo. The like holds for gramophones and telephones, and possibly also for human sleep-walkers.

It must, however, be noticed that my reasons for thinking that these things are *not* animated by intelligent minds are all, so to speak, extraneous reasons, drawn from observations falling outside the situation itself. Suppose one did not have this extraneous information: one might, for instance, be a savage who understood English but had had no previous experience of the behaviour of these particular sorts of objects. It would then be perfectly reasonable to believe that parrots, gramophones, and telephones *are* animated by intelligent minds. For since the noises they utter are *ex hypothesi* intelligible and informative, there is evidence for the existence of an intelligent mind which produced those noises. And as one would then have no evidence for thinking that the production was indirect, it would be perfectly reasonable to conclude that the object from which the noises emanate was itself directly controlled by the mind in question. The conclusion, though reasonable, would of course be mistaken. But perhaps we ourselves are sometimes mistaken in just the same way. For all we can tell, some of the human talkers we meet with may be nothing but living gramophones controlled by minds not their own. Indeed, there is reason to think that something of this kind does happen temporarily in hypnosis.

We have seen that one's evidence of the existence of another mind comes from the receiving of *information* by means of intelligible symbols. In the cases hitherto considered the information turned out to be true, and I discovered this by testing it for myself. But it is not really necessary that it should be true, nor that I should test it. False information is just as good, so long as it *is* information. What is required is that the utterance should convey something

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which goes beyond what is already present to my mind, something which I did not consciously think of for myself, and which could not (so far as I can tell) have been presented to me by some process in my own unconscious. A piece of true information which I did not previously possess has this "going beyond" character. But a piece of outrageous fiction may also have it. Of course some fictions are as familiar to me as some truths. These stand on the same footing as platitudes, and the hearing or reading of them gives me no decisive evidence of the existence of another mind. But when I read a novel which I did not write, or hear for the first time a tall story which I did not invent, then I do have good evidence for the occurrence of mental acts not forming part of my own mental history. These foreign mental acts of which I get evidence are primarily acts of thinking. But I can infer that the mind in which they occur must also have had perceptual experiences more or less like my own at some time or other. For one can only make up a fictitious narrative by conceiving of universals, and these must have been abstracted from perceived instances. Or if it be said that there are some universals which are not abstracted from perceived instances, but are known somehow else (innately perhaps?)—viz., such formal or categorical universals as "cause" and "substance"—we may reply that no narrative could consist wholly of these. If it is to be a narrative at all, it must also contain non-categorical universals, such as "cat," "green," "to the right of"; and these at any rate must have been abstracted from perceived instances.

5. I have now tried to show by a number of examples that it is the perceiving and understanding of noises and other symbols which gives one evidence for the existence of other minds. I think it is clear that the situations I have described do provide evidence for this conclusion. But exactly *how* they do so is not yet clear. Before we discuss this question, however, there are three preliminary points to be made.

First, it is necessary to insist that there is nothing recondite about this evidence for the existence of other minds. It is not the sort of evidence which only philosophers or scientists or other experts can discover. Perhaps I have spoken as if it were suddenly presented to the notice of an intelligent and reflective adult, who has reached years of discretion without ever finding any good reasons for believing in the existence of another mind, and now finds some for the first time. But of course this is not really the position. The evidence I have spoken of is available to anyone, however youthful and inexperienced, as soon as he has learned the use of language. All that is required is that he should be able to receive information by means of words or other symbols, and that he should be able to

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distinguish between observing something and being told about it. (Perhaps he is not *self-conscious* until he is able to draw this distinction. If so, we may agree with those who say that consciousness of self and consciousness of others come into being simultaneously, though not with their further contention that consciousness of others is a form of acquaintance or intuitive knowledge.) Thus by the time that he has reached years of discretion evidence of the sort described is exceedingly familiar to him, little though he may have reflected upon it.

The second point is more serious. It may be objected that one cannot learn to understand language unless one *already* believes (or knows?) that the noises one hears are produced by a mind other than oneself. For if not, how would it ever occur to one that those queer noises which one hears are symbols at all? Must one not assume from the start that these noises are *intended* to stand for something? Then, but not otherwise, one can proceed to discover what in particular they stand for.

To this I reply, at first it does not occur to one that the noises *are* symbols. One has to discover this for oneself. And one discovers it by learning to *use* them as symbols in one's own thinking. One begins by merely noticing a correlation between a certain type of object and a certain type of noise, as one might notice a correlation between any other two types of entities which are frequently combined, say, thunder and lightning. The correlation is at first far from complete, for one sometimes observes the object without hearing the noise. But gradually one comes to imitate the noise for oneself. And thus the correlation becomes more nearly complete; if no foreign body says "cat" when I see a cat, I shall say "cat" myself. Thus a strong association is set up in my mind between that type of noise and that type of object. The next step after this is certainly a mysterious one, the more so as it is perhaps not literally a "next" step, but merely the continuation and completion of something which has been going on from the start. But the mystery has nothing to do with awareness of other people's intentions. It has to do with what used to be called the abstraction of universals from particulars. We must suppose that all conscious beings have the power of recognizing that two or more particulars are similar to each other. No consciousness devoid of this power would be of the faintest use to its possessor; so it must be assumed that the lower animals, if they are conscious at all, can recognize at least some similarities, namely, those which are important for their biological welfare. But only some conscious beings can single out within the similar particulars that common factor in respect of which they are similar, and can conceive of it in abstraction; that is, at times when they are not actually perceiving or remembering any particular of

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the sort in question. This conceiving of universals in the absence of their instances is what we commonly call thinking. And it is for this that symbols are required; conversely, noises and the like only become symbols in so far as they are used as means to such conceiving. For example, I have seen many cats, and for some time I have found that the noise "cat" occurs when I see one (whether it is uttered by a foreign body or by myself, or by both). I must now attend to the common feature of all these objects, and learn to associate the noise with that. Then, when I hear the noise in future, whether uttered by myself or not, it will bring that common feature—that universal—before my mind, even if no cat is actually being perceived by me. When this happens, and not till then, the noise "cat" has become a symbol for me. The process is very puzzling, and I do not profess to have given anything like an adequate account of it. But whatever difficulties there may be about it, it does not seem to presuppose at any stage that one has a prior knowledge of other minds, or even a prior belief in their existence.

Thirdly, a word must be said about so-called Primitive Animism. According to some Anthropologists, primitive men take for granted that all bodies whatever (or at any rate all striking and noticeable ones) are animated by minds; and if this is so, it is plausible to suppose that civilized infants do the same. In that case, have we not stated our problem the wrong way round? The problem will really be "What leads us to believe that most of the bodies in the universe are *not* animated by minds?" rather than "What leads us to believe that certain ones *are* so animated?"

This objection is difficult to discuss because the facts are in dispute. When people say that the savage or the infant is an animist, they seem to be attributing a kind of philosophical theory to him—a set of explicit and formulated beliefs about the universe. But this seems to be an over-rationalization. Beings so primitive and unreflective cannot be accused of subscribing to any kind of "-ism." It would be nearer the mark to say that the savage or the infant *acts as if* he thought that most of the bodies he meets with are animated. But I suspect that even this goes too far. All we can be reasonably sure of is that he acts as if he *did not distinguish* between the animate and the inanimate—he speaks angrily to the chair-leg against which he bumps, or tries a stone for murder¹—whereas we ourselves treat the animate in one way and the inanimate in another. If so, the question is this: what evidence has one got that this non-distinguishing treatment, which is observed in savages and infants, is unreasonable; what reason is there for thinking that a human body differs in some very important way from a rock or a tree, or even from a cow? And the evidence is the sort of evidence

¹ This is said to have happened in ancient Athens even in classical times.

already mentioned. Rocks and trees never utter noises which convey information to us, nor make informative gestures, and it is exceedingly doubtful whether cows ever do; but it is certain that human bodies do frequently utter informative noises and make informative gestures.

However, even if it is literally true that savages and infants hold explicit "animistic" beliefs, this need not worry us. It is just a curious psychological fact, if fact it be. It makes no difference to the logic of the matter. For the point is, what *reasons* has one got for believing the proposition that all bodies are animate? And the answer is that in the case of human bodies one has strong reasons, whereas in the case of other bodies one has not. One could perfectly well discover this even though one did *not* start by believing the proposition to begin with, as the "Primitive Animist" is supposed to do. The initial believing, if indeed it occurs, is not a logical pre-supposition of the discovery. The evidence for a proposition is neither strengthened nor weakened by the fact that I believed the proposition before I began my inquiry.

6. We may now return to the main argument. We have described a number of situations in which the perceiving and understanding of symbols gives one evidence of the existence of another mind. But how exactly do they provide evidence for this conclusion? Let us confine ourselves for simplicity to the cases in which the evidence comes from the hearing of sounds. Two conditions, we have seen, must be fulfilled. The first, and most important, is that they must have a symbolic character. And they must be symbolic *for me*. It is obvious that the characteristic of being symbolic is a relational character. An entity S is only a symbol in so far as it stands for some object—whatever the right analysis of "standing for" may be. It is no less obvious, though sometimes forgotten, that the relation is not a simple two-term relation. It involves at least three terms: the entity S, the object O, and in addition a mind or minds. S symbolizes O *to someone*. The relation is more like "to the right of" than it is like "larger than." A is to the right of B from somewhere, from a certain limited set of places. From other places it is not to the right of B, but to the left of it, or in front of it or behind it.

But if the hearing or seeing of S, or its presentation to me in the form of an image, is to provide me with evidence of the existence of another mind, it is not sufficient that S should symbolize some object to someone. It must symbolize some object *to me*. I myself must understand it. Otherwise all I know about it is that it is a noise or black mark having such-and-such sensible qualities. It is true that if I heard sounds uttered in the Arabic language, which I do not understand, I could reasonably conclude to the existence

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of another mind. But only by analogy. The sounds have some similarity to others which *are* symbolic to me; I therefore assume that they, too, might come to be symbolic to me if I took the trouble.

Secondly, it is essential, I think, that the sounds should symbolize to me something *true or false*. They must propound *propositions* to me. It is not, however, necessary that they should have the grammatical form of a statement. A single word may propound a proposition. Thus the word "snake" may be equivalent to "there is a snake in the immediate neighbourhood." Again, the phrase "the bus" may be equivalent to "the bus is now approaching." Must the proposition propounded be such that I can *test* it, whether in fact I do test it or not? It must certainly be such that I know what the world would be like if it were true. Otherwise I have not understood the symbols: for me they are not symbols at all. But it is not necessary that I should be able to discover by direct observation that the world is in fact like that, or is not. Otherwise I could not understand statements about the remote past, whereas actually I can understand them perfectly well.

The third condition is the one which we have already emphasized. The noises must not only be symbolic to me; they must give me information. The proposition which they propound must be new to me. That is, it must be new to me as a whole, though of course its constituents and their mode of combination must be familiar to me; otherwise I do not understand the utterance. If it is not new (i.e. new as a whole) the noises do still give evidence of the occurrence of a mental act other than the present act which understands them, and even of a mental act which is in a sense "foreign." But as we have seen, it might conceivably be an unconscious mental act of my own. And this greatly diminishes the evidential value of the utterance.

Now suppose these conditions are fulfilled. I hear noises which are symbolic to me; they propound to me something true or false; and what they propound is new to me. For instance, I hear the noises "here is a black cat" at a time when I do not myself see the cat and was not expecting it to appear. How exactly does this situation provide me with evidence of the existence of another mind? (It is well to insist once again that evidence, not proof, is all that can be demanded.)

It might be said: I have direct access to a number of cognitive acts by my own introspection. I find that these acts are usually accompanied by noises, audible or imaged. Moreover, I find by introspection that an act directed upon one sort of object, e.g. a cat, is usually accompanied by one sort of noise; and that an act directed upon another sort of object, e.g. blackness, is usually accompanied by another sort of noise. Thus there is a correspondence between

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the noises and the acts. Differences in the noises are accompanied by differences in the "direction" of the acts. When the object of the act is complex, I usually find a corresponding complexity in the noise. If n_1 usually accompanies an act directed upon O_1 and n_2 usually accompanies an act directed upon O_2 , then I find that the complex noise n_1n_2 is usually accompanied by an act directed upon the complex object O_1O_2 . And the structure of the complex noise (the way the constituent noises are arranged) varies with the structure of the object-complex upon which the accompanying act is directed. In this way, it may be said, I know from introspection that when the noise-complex "here is a black cat" occurs it is usually accompanied by a specific sort of cognitive act, namely, by the seeing and recognizing of a black cat. But this time it cannot have been a cognitive act of my own, for I was not seeing any black cat at the time when the noise-complex occurred. It must therefore have been a foreign cognitive act, an act extraneous to myself, and therefore presumably forming part of the history of some *other* mind.

However, such an account of the matter is not altogether satisfactory. The relation between the noises and the mental acts is really much more intimate than this. It is not a mere accompanying. If it were, the noises would not be functioning as *symbols*. When I am thinking I am always aware of symbols of some sort or another. But they do not just occur along with the thinking. The occurrence of them, whether in a sensible or an imaged form, is an integral part of the thinking itself. One might even define thinking as awareness by means of symbols. Perhaps, indeed, I can *perceive* without symbols. But in fact symbols usually are present to my mind in perceiving as well. And if they are present, again they do not merely accompany the perceiving. They enable me to analyse what I perceive, to recognize and classify the various factors in it, so that the perceiving turns into what philosophers call perceptual judgment, a piece of intelligent or thoughtful perceiving.

Thus the argument should be restated as follows: I know from introspection that noises of this sort frequently function as *instruments* to a certain sort of mental act (not merely accompany it). Therefore they are probably functioning as instruments to an act of that sort in the present case. But in the present case the act is not mine.

But there is still a further amendment to be made. There is a sense in which the noises *are* functioning as symbolic instruments to a mental act of my own. For after all, I do understand them. It is true that I am not seeing the black cat. But I do entertain the thought that a black cat is in the neighbourhood. And I think this *by means of* the noises that I hear. But if the noises are in any case functioning as instruments to a mental act of my own, what need

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have I to suppose that there is also some other mental act—some foreign one—to which they are instrumental?

To clear up this point, we must distinguish two different ways in which symbols can be instrumental to cognitive acts. We must distinguish *spontaneous* thinking from *imposed* thinking. In the present case, my entertaining of the thought that there is a black cat in the room is *imposed* by the noises which I hear. What causes me to use these noises as symbols is the noises themselves, or rather my hearing of them. When I hear them, they arouse certain cognitive dispositions in me (dispositions arising from my learning of English, which are there whether I like it or not); and the result is that I am forced to use them for the entertaining of a certain determinate thought, one which but for them I should not on this occasion have entertained.

But how did these noises happen to present themselves to me? I did not originate them, either consciously, or—so far as I can discover—unconsciously either. And how did they happen to be arranged in just that way? They are so arranged that they make up a whole which is for me a single complex symbol, symbolizing something true or false about the world. That is how they manage to impose an act of thought upon me, which many of the noises I hear do not, striking and complicated though they be. How did this remarkable combination of events come about? How is it that each of the noises was for me a symbol, and how is it, moreover, that they were so combined as to make a single complex symbol, symbolizing something true or false? Well, I know from my own experience how it might have happened, because I know what happens in *spontaneous* thinking. In the spontaneous acts of thinking which introspection reveals to me, noises often function as symbolic instruments. And when they do, they are not usually found in isolation. They are ordered into complexes, each of which is symbolic as a whole and signifies something true or false. It would not be correct to say that I find two acts occurring at once: on the one hand, an act of spontaneous thinking, on the other an act of spontaneously producing symbols and ordering them into a symbol-complex which is true or false as a whole. What happens is that the producing of the significant symbol-complex occurs *in the process of performing* the spontaneous act of thinking. Sometimes this spontaneous act of thinking is concerned with something which I am perceiving. It is then a so-called perceptual judgment.

Thus I can now guess how the noises which I hear have come about, and how they have come to be such and so arranged that I am made to use them as instruments for an act of imposed thinking. For I know by introspection that just such noises, and just such an arrangement of them, are often produced in the course of acts of

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spontaneous thinking. This makes it likely that here, too, they were produced in the course of an act of spontaneous thinking. But in this case no spontaneous thinking of that particular sort was occurring in myself. Therefore in this case the spontaneous act of thinking must have been a *foreign* act, occurring in some other mind. If the noises are "here is a black cat," the act was probably a perceptual judgment, occasioned by the perceiving of a black cat. But if on investigating the matter for myself I find no black cat, the evidence for a foreign act of thinking still stands. (As we pointed out earlier, false information is just as evidential as true.) Only I shall then have to conclude that this act of thinking was not a perceptual judgment after all, but a piece of fiction-making or story-telling.

In this instance the noise-complex was already familiar to me as a whole. I have often seen black cats and said to myself "here is a black cat." But this is not always so. When I hear a complex noise and find myself using it as an instrument for an act of imposed thinking, it frequently happens that the complex as a whole is one which I am not familiar with. Thus the noise-complex, "the steward of Common-Room keeps a tame mongoose," may be one which I have never myself made use of in an act of spontaneous thinking. Still, if I hear it, it will impose an act of thinking on me; not less so if I am sure that what I am being made to think of is false. And it will accordingly provide me with evidence of a foreign act of spontaneous thinking. This is because I often have used the *constituents* of the noise-complex in the course of my own spontaneous thinkings, for instance the noises "mongoose" and "steward" and "Common-Room." Moreover, although this actual combination of noises is new to me, the *manner* of combination, the structure which the noise-complex has, is perfectly familiar. I have often used it myself in the course of my spontaneous thinkings. Thus the noise-complex as a whole functions as a symbol for me, and imposes an act of thinking on me, even though I have never made use of it in any of my own spontaneous thinkings.

7. We must now raise certain general questions about this argument for the existence of other minds. Though very different in detail from the one used by the old Analogical Theory, it is clearly an argument from analogy. The form of the argument is: situations *a* and *b* resemble each other in respect of a characteristic C_1 ; situation *a* also has the characteristic C_2 ; therefore situation *b* probably has the characteristic C_2 likewise. The noises I am now aware of closely resemble certain ones which I have been aware of before (in technical phraseology, they are *tokens* of the same *type*), and the resemblance covers both their qualities and their manner of combination. Those which I was aware of before functioned as symbols in

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acts of spontaneous thinking. Therefore these present ones probably resemble them in that respect too; they too probably function as instruments to an act of spontaneous thinking, which in this case is not my own.

But the argument is not only analogical. The hypothesis which it seeks to establish may also be considered in another way. It provides a simple *explanation* of an otherwise mysterious set of occurrences. It explains the curious fact that certain noises not originated by me nevertheless have for me a symbolic character, and moreover are combined in complexes which are symbolic for me as wholes (i.e. propound propositions). Many varieties of sounds occur in the world, and of these only a relatively small proportion are symbolic for me. Those which are symbolic for me can occur in a variety of combinations, and the number of mathematically possible combinations of them is very large; of these combinations only a small proportion "make sense," that is, result in noise-complexes which are symbolic for me *as wholes*. But if there is another mind which uses the same symbols as I do and combines them according to the same principles, and if this mind has produced these noises in the course of an act of spontaneous thinking: then I can account for the occurrence of these noises, and for the fact that they are combined in one of these mathematically-improbable combinations. When I say that these facts are "explained" or "accounted for" by our hypothesis, I mean that if the hypothesis is true these facts are instances of a rule which is already known to hold good in a large number of instances. The rule is, that symbolically-functioning noises combined in symbolically-functioning combinations are produced in the course of acts of spontaneous thinking; and the instances in which it is already known to hold good have been presented to me by introspection.

It may be objected by some that the hypothesis is worthless because it is *unverifiable*. Accordingly it may be said that it has no explanatory power at all, nor can any argument (analogical or other) do anything to increase its probability. For being unverifiable, it is nonsensical; that is, the words which purport to formulate it do not really formulate anything which could conceivably be true or even false.

Now it is true that the hypothesis of the existence of other minds is "unverifiable" in a very narrow sense of that word, namely, if verifying a proposition entails observing some event or situation which makes it true. I cannot *observe* another mind or its acts—unless extrospective acquaintance is possible, which there is no reason to believe it is. But the hypothesis is a perfectly conceivable one, in the sense that I know very well what the world would have to be like if the hypothesis were true—what sorts of entities there must

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be in it, and what sort of events must occur in them. I know from introspection what acts of thinking and perceiving are, and I know what it is for such acts to be combined into the unity of a single mind (however difficult it may be to give a satisfactory philosophical *theory* of such unity). Moreover, the hypothesis *is* verifiable in what is called the "weak" sense. I know what it would be like to find evidence to support it, because I have in fact found a great deal of evidence which does support it; and this evidence can be increased without assignable limit. It seems to me to be a mistake to demand that all the different types of hypothesis should be verifiable in the same manner. What is to be demanded is, first, that the hypothesis should be conceivable (otherwise certainly it is nonsense); and secondly that it should be verifiable or refutable in its own appropriate manner, in accordance with the methods suitable to that particular sort of subject-matter.

However, it is instructive to ask what one would be left with if one refused to entertain the hypothesis of the existence of other minds on the ground of its unverifiability. It would still remain the case that one thinks by means of symbols. Further, the distinction between spontaneous and imposed thinking would still hold good. Nor could one possibly deny that in imposed thinking one acquires information which one did not possess before. It is a rock-bottom fact, and one must accept it whatever philosophy one holds, that the thinking imposed by heard or seen symbols enlarges one's consciousness of the world far beyond the narrow limits to which one's own perception and one's own spontaneous thinking would confine it.¹ An extreme empiricist must accept this fact like anyone else. But the purity of his principles prevents him from attempting any explanation of it, since they force him to conclude that the hypothesis of other minds is nonsensical. So he must just be content to accept the fact itself. Or perhaps he may say: what I *mean* by asserting that there are other minds is simply this fact, that my own consciousness of the world is constantly being enlarged by the hearing of noises and the seeing of marks which are symbolic to me, and by the consequent acts of imposed thinking which go on in me; so that "you" is just a label for certain pieces of information which I get in this fashion, and "Jones" is a label for certain other pieces of information, and so on. In that case he, too, can admit that there are other minds. Indeed, he can say it is a certainty that there are,

¹ Here we may note that even the most rigorous course of Cartesian doubt requires the use of symbols. One cannot doubt without symbols to bring before one's mind the proposition which is to be doubted. And philosophical doubt, which is concerned with complicated and highly abstract matters, is scarcely conceivable without the use of *verbal* symbols. We may conjecture that Descartes himself conducted his doubt in French, with some admixture of Latin.

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and not merely (as we have suggested) a hypothesis for which there is strong evidence. But obviously he is giving a very strange sense to the phrase "other minds," a sense utterly different from the one which he gives to the phrase "my own mind."

If I am right, there is no need to go to such lengths. One has evidence of the existence of other minds in the ordinary literal sense of the word "mind," the sense in which one applies the word to oneself. Nevertheless, the argument I have offered does have its sceptical side. Any mind whose existence is to be established by it must be subject to certain restrictive conditions, which follow from the nature of the argument itself. In the first place, it must use symbols which I can understand; and I shall only be able to do this if I am able to use them myself. It is true that I may be able to guess that certain noises or marks are symbolic even if I cannot myself understand them. But this, as we have seen, is because they have a fairly close resemblance to other noises or marks which I do understand. If I never understood *any* of the noises or marks which I hear or see, I should have no evidence for the existence of other minds. (Strictly speaking we ought to add "tactual data" as well. They, too, may be symbols for the person who feels them, as the case of Helen Keller shows.)

There is a second restriction of great importance: any mind whose existence is to be established by an argument must be aware of the same world as I am aware of. It must be such that the world which I am aware of is *public* to me and to it, *common* to both of us. This restriction really follows from the first. Unless the foreign symbols refer to objects which I too am aware of they will not be for me symbols at all. These public entities need not be sense-data. Sense-data might still be private, as many philosophers hold. It might even be, as some hold, that the sense-datum analysis of perception is mistaken from beginning to end, and that sensing is not a cognitive process at all, but is merely the being in a certain state ("seeing bluey," or the like). But still, if I am to have evidence of your existence, there must be publicity *somewhere*. Somehow or other we must both have access to one and the same world; if not by sensing, then by some other form of consciousness which sensing makes possible. Suppose this was not so. Suppose that there is another mind which is not aware of the same world which I am aware of, and suppose that it somehow produces noises which I hear or marks which I see. When it makes these noises, obviously I shall not have the faintest idea what it is talking about. How can I, since *ex hypothesi* the noises do not refer to any objects which I am aware of? But this is equivalent to saying that I have no reason whatever for thinking that it is *talking* at all. And so I shall have no reason whatever for believing that it exists, or even for suspecting

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that it does. The noises which I hear, even though in fact they state the profoundest truths, will be for me mere noises, like the sighing of the wind or the roaring of waves.

It appears, then, that any evidence which I can have of the existence of another mind must also be evidence that the other mind is aware of the same world as I am aware of myself. Philosophers have sometimes suggested that each mind perhaps lives in a private world of its own. Probably no one believes this. But some people have been worried by the suggestion. They have suspected that though incredible it could not be rationally refuted, and have had recourse to mysterious acts of faith to get them out of their difficulty. But the difficulty does not exist, for this speculation of philosophers is nothing but a baseless fancy. The theory is such that there could not conceivably be any evidence in favour of it. Any relevant evidence one can get is bound from the nature of the case to tell against it. Any evidence that I can get of your existence is bound also to be evidence that you do *not* live in a private world, but in the public world which is common to all intelligences, or at least to all those which can have any good reason to believe in one another's existence.

Another and less welcome restriction which our argument imposes concerns the minds of the lower animals. It is commonly held that the lower animals do not use symbols. Now this may be an overstatement. Possibly some of the higher vertebrates do use them on some occasions. It may be that some of their cries have a symbolic character (though they would be extremely vague and ambiguous symbols), and some of their bodily movements and postures may constitute a crude kind of gesture-language. If this is so, then our evidence for consciousness in them is the same in kind as our evidence for the consciousness of our human neighbours, though it is very much smaller in extent. But there is no reason to suppose that snails and oysters speak, even in the widest sense of the word "speak," or that anyone has ever received information from a caterpillar; not that there is any *a priori* reason why these things should not happen (cf. our remarks on parrots above), but so far as we know they do not. However, these are empirical questions of Natural History, which do not concern me. I only wish to insist that *if* the lower animals do not use symbols—symbols which we can understand and which convey information to us—then our evidence for the existence of animal minds is different in kind, and not merely in degree, from our evidence for the existence of human minds. It can only be evidence of a teleological sort, derived from observation of their bodily behaviour. Much of the behaviour of animal bodies has an apparently purposive character, and suggests that they are moved by wishes and are adapting means to preconceived ends.

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But it is not easy to say how strong this evidence is. How are we to distinguish between genuine purposiveness and mere *de facto* conduciveness to certain results, say to the survival of the animal or its species? The movements of the cat in the presence of a mouse are such as to increase the probability that the mouse will be caught. But is there more in the situation than this? Is it at all clear that the cat *wishes* to catch the mouse, and consciously controls its movements in accordance with this wish? Moreover, we find the same appearances of purposiveness in plants. We also find it in all sorts of biological phenomena which no one supposes to be under conscious control: in the anatomical structure of every type of organism, in the mutually co-ordinated growth of its parts, in the circulation of the blood, and in countless other cases. If once we start assuming that wherever there is purposiveness there is mind, we shall end with a most unpalatable and extravagant form of Vitalism; every organism, even the humblest vegetable, will have to be endowed with an intelligence—an intelligence far exceeding our own in its scientific knowledge and its inventive capacity.

I shall not pursue these questions further. Perhaps the difficulties which I have mentioned can be met. I only wished to point out that when communication by means of symbols is lacking, the existence of foreign minds cannot be established in any simple or straightforward way; or if it can, it looks as if the word "mind" would have to be used in a sense somewhat different from that which it has when applied to beings who do communicate by means of symbols. (Cf. the difficulties which arise concerning "unconscious mind" in ourselves.) Thus, when Descartes maintained that human beings are conscious but the lower animals are not, this theory was by no means a foolish one, though it may be mistaken. Certainly there was no logical inconsistency in it. Our reasons for attributing consciousness to other human beings are radically different from our reasons (such as they are) for attributing it to the lower animals. Only he seems to have drawn the line in the wrong place. The line should really be drawn between those beings who use symbols and those who do not. If any animals do use symbols, they come above it; and if any human beings do not, they fall below it, even though they happen to walk on two legs.

8. My argument for the existence of other minds is an argument from language (in a wide sense of that word). It may, however, be objected that I have considered only the *informative* function of language. But of course language is not merely informative. It also has what is called an *emotive* function. This again may be subdivided. In so far as it gives vent to the emotional or conative attitude of the speaker—gives vent to it, not describes it—language may be

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called *expressive*. In so far as it is designed to arouse the emotions of others, or to influence their actions, it may be called *evocative*. Now many would hold that in the language of everyday life (and it is this, not the language of science or philosophy, which concerns our present inquiry), the emotive function is quite as important as the informative, or, indeed, much more so. Would it not be very naïve to suppose that the main point of everyday language is to say things which are true or false? The main point of it surely is to express one's emotions and wishes, and to evoke those of others. Is it not this which makes language a *social* instrument? Or rather, since the word "instrument" suggests something which might conceivably be dispensed with and replaced by a substitute, let us say that language is the basis of society—a society is a set of minds which talk to one another. The contention then is that what makes it so is primarily its emotive function. Thus many who would agree that one's evidence for the existence of other minds comes from the perceiving and understanding of symbols would nevertheless complain that I have been approaching the problem from the wrong end. For I have been considering only the informative function of language, whereas according to them it is the emotive function which is of primary importance.

Now, of course, I agree that in any complete account of the nature and function of language great attention must be paid to the emotive side. But I am not concerned in this essay to suggest a theory of language, nor even the barest sketch of one. I am concerned simply with an *epistemological* problem: how the understanding of language gives each of us reason to believe in the existence of other minds. And for this purpose only the informative function of language is relevant. The reason for this is that one's access to another mind is not direct. One gets access to it indirectly by way of the *objects* which the other mind and oneself are aware of in common. If we like to speak of a "social relation" between one mind and another, then my contention is that this relation involves three terms, not two. It involves not merely the two minds, but also some object which they are both aware of. Or again: since I am never directly acquainted with another mind, my evidence for its existence can only be evidence for the existence of something satisfying a certain *description*; and the description must always contain a reference to some object or objects which we are aware of in common.

This primacy of the object is what makes the emotive function of language irrelevant to our present inquiry, however important it may be in other connections. Indeed, it is worse than irrelevant. If we allow it to intrude, we shall be involved in a vicious circle. For one can only understand the emotive aspect of an utterance (in that sense of the word "understand" which is here appropriate)

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if one has *already* got reason to think that the utterance was produced by a foreign mind. Once I have found out, by other means, that the foreign mind is there, I can get evidence that it has certain emotions and certain intentions, and I can discover certain rules for correlating these emotions and intentions with certain tones of voice and turns of phrase, as will be explained presently. But the evidence that it *is* there comes from the informative side of its utterances.

For what is the alternative? When people maintain that it is the emotive element in language which gives us our evidence for the existence of other minds, how are they going to work out this suggestion in detail? I think they must say that tone of voice, and likewise bodily bearing and facial conformation, *directly convey* to me the existence of foreign emotions and volitions. It is not enough to say that these features of utterances or of organisms "express" emotions or volitions, though doubtless they do. Your tone of voice may be ever so expressive. But the point is, how am I to *discover* that it is expressive, and what in particular it is expressive of? Why should I not be content to notice that the noise which this body utters has a peculiar raucous quality like the grating of a wheel, or a soft flowing quality like the sound of running water? And these facial grimaces—what makes me think that they are more than curious visible changes, like the flickering of a flame? No doubt these particular qualities of vocal noises do have what one may call a moving character. They give me so to speak a psycho-physical shake; and one may well suppose that the human organism has an innate tendency to be specially moved by them. But the fact that I myself am stirred by hearing a certain noise gives me no ground for inferring that someone else is feeling an emotion. Even if the emotion to which I am stirred happens to be just like the emotion which you felt when you uttered the noise, this does not help. It is not enough that there should in fact be a foreign mental state which my own mental state resembles—if indeed it does. For the question is, how am I to discover that there *is* this foreign mental state? So far this question has not been answered.

I can only think of one way in which it could be answered by those who hold that one's primary evidence for the existence of other minds comes from the emotive element in language. They must have recourse to a theory of "direct conveyance," as suggested above. They must say that the tone of a voice or the momentary configuration of a face enables me to be *directly aware* of the occurrence of a foreign emotion or volition. That is, they will have to hold that the experiencing of such-and-such auditory or visual qualities releases in me a certain cognitive capacity which cannot otherwise be exercised: a capacity for apprehending other minds, or their states,

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intuitively and immediately. They smuggle in this direct revelation under cover of the word "expressive," and so make their theory seem less paradoxical than it is. For it is really just a form of the Intuitive Theory, which was discussed earlier in this essay. The contention is that certain auditory or visual experiences—such as the hearing of a raucous tone of voice or the seeing of a facial grimace—enable me to perform an act of *extrospective acquaintance* whose object is a foreign emotion or volition. Perhaps the Intuitive Theory is more plausible in this form than in some others. But it is still open to fatal objections. How is it that I can be deceived by the voice or behaviour of an actor, who expresses emotions which he does not actually feel, or for that matter by ordinary everyday hypocrisy? Might there not be a moving waxwork whose face made lifelike grimaces, and which uttered noises in an angry tone of voice?

It appears then that important as the emotive element in language may be, it cannot provide one with one's evidence for the existence of other minds. But it still remains to ask how one does learn that other minds experience emotions and volitions. The evidence so far considered, derived from the informative side of language, shows only that they are percipients and thinkers. In other words, how does one learn that there *is* an emotive element in most or all of the utterances which one hears and understands, and likewise in writing and gesture?

Let us first consider utterances expressive of volitions. How do I get my evidence that other minds experience volitions? It is because I first get evidence that they are entertaining certain thoughts, and then find that the objective world is being altered in such a way as to conform to those thoughts. For instance, I am seeing a door and I notice that it is open. I then hear the words "that the door has got to be shut." At present, we are assuming, the expressive element in language conveys nothing to me (we are trying to explain by what process it comes to do so). So at present I can make nothing of the words "has got to," nor yet of the determined tone in which they are said. It is just a curious auditory quality which the noises have. But I *can* understand the words "that door" and "be shut," both of which refer to certain objective entities which I am aware of: the one to a certain material thing which I observe, the other to an objective universal which I am familiar with. Thus they bring before my mind a *proposition*, the proposition "the door is shut." Now this is a piece of information. It tells me something new which I did not believe before; I did not believe it before, because I believed the contrary, and indeed I still do. So far, then, I have merely received a piece of false information; still it *is* information, and therefore gives me evidence of the existence of a foreign mind which

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is holding a false belief, or at least entertaining a false proposition. But now a curious thing happens. The organism from which the utterance emanated proceeds to move in such a way that the door is shut. The situation is so altered that the information which was false before is now made true. Here, then, I have got evidence of the occurrence of a foreign thought which *affects the objective world*. There was a thought with which the objective state of affairs did not correspond; and immediately afterwards the objective state of affairs is altered so that it does correspond with this thought. Apparently this thought has somehow brought about its own verification. It was false when first uttered, but it has altered the situation in such a way as to make itself true.

Normally this alteration comes about by the intermediation of certain movements in the organism from which the utterances proceeded; it gets up and shuts the door. But even if I observed no organism, I could still get evidence of the existence of a foreign volition. Let us reconsider our previous instance of a disembodied voice. Suppose I heard such voice saying, "Let there be a thunderstorm"; and suppose there promptly was a thunderstorm, although hitherto there had been no sign that any such event was likely to happen (the sky, we will assume, was perfectly clear at the moment when the utterance occurred). And suppose that there were many instances of this sort of thing; many occasions when this voice made an utterance conveying a proposition which was false at the time, but was followed by an objective change which verified it—a surprising change, which no previously observable feature in the situation made probable. I should then have good evidence for thinking that the voice proceeded from a foreign thinker whose thoughts could directly alter the objective world. Such "telekinetic" action of unembodied minds does not in fact happen. But there is no logical absurdity in it. And it is no more difficult to understand how a mind can directly cause changes in the atmosphere than to understand how it can directly cause changes in an organism, which after all is only a complex material object.

We now see how one discovers that certain utterances are expressive of volitions. If one is to discover this, the utterance which expresses the volition must also have an *informative* side. It must among other things propound a proposition, one which is at the moment false. I learn that it is expressive of a volition because of the effects by which it is followed. And when I recognize that a sentence is expressive of a volition without actually observing the physical change which fulfils it, I do so by noticing that it resembles other utterances which *have* been observed to have such effects. It resembles them in respect of tone of voice, or in grammatical structure

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(by containing verbs in the imperative mood), or in respect of the gestures which accompany it. So I conclude that it, like them, is probably followed by an objective change which verifies it.

Thus it is quite wrong to suppose that the utterance "directly conveys" a foreign volition. There is no question of an immediate and infallible revelation, giving me direct insight into the volition of another person. The "conveying" is a misleading name for an induction which I have to do for myself, by observing that noises uttered in a certain tone of voice are frequently followed by objective changes which verify the propositions they propound.

Let us now turn to utterances expressive of emotion. Emotions are intimately related to thinking on the one hand, to action on the other; and in virtue of these two relations, they are also intimately related to the objective world. Every emotion includes some thinking, and this thinking is not a mere accompaniment, but is an integral part of the emotion itself. The thinking may consist in holding a false belief, as when one is afraid of a purely imaginary danger. But even so, certain objective universals must be present to the mind; else there could be no belief, not even a false one. I may be afraid of a lion outside a door, when in fact there is no lion within miles. But in order to have this "groundless" fear, I must conceive of *lionhood* and *outsideness*. It follows that any utterance which completely expresses an emotion must also propound a proposition, true or false. If someone says in a horror-struck voice, "Oh! a snake!" he is incidentally making a statement which gives me information; the information is, that there is a snake in the immediate neighbourhood. But how do I learn that the tone in which he speaks is a tone of horror? I answer, I learn it inductively. I discover by repeated observation that when an object is spoken of in that tone of voice, certain consequences are liable to follow. The objective situation is liable to change in a remarkable manner. The relation between the snake and the organism from which the noise proceeded does not usually remain what it was. The noise-making organism runs away, or strikes the snake with a stick. So when I hear that tone of voice again I conclude that such objective consequences are again likely to occur. We have seen that such utterances do propound propositions, and so give evidence of the occurrence of a foreign thought. But I have now found that when the utterance is in that tone of voice the foreign thought in question is a *tendencious* thought, one which tends to change the objective world in certain ways. And I can correlate differences in tone of voice (and in gesture or facial configuration) with different sorts of objective changes which are liable to follow. Thus I distinguish different sorts of *tendencious* thoughts, one tending to the avoidance of the object which the thought refers to, another tending to the

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pursuit of it, another to the destruction of it, and so on. And these are the different emotional attitudes.

It follows, and indeed is obvious in, any case, that emotional attitudes and volitions are closely connected. Nevertheless, they are not expressed by the same sort of utterance. I discover that an utterance expresses a volition when I find that though false at the moment of its occurrence it results in an objective change which brings the facts into conformity with it. But utterances expressing emotions are related to subsequent objective changes in a more complex way than this. The objective change which follows varies with the specific quality of the utterance. This is not surprising. There is only one way of willing—setting yourself to bring into being the objective situation which you have thought of. But there are many different kinds of emotional attitude; one leads you to alter the objective world in one way, another in another way.

There are, however, certain emotional attitudes which appear not to influence conduct at all, and so do not affect the objective world; for instance, emotions about the past. How am I to discover that an emotion of this sterile kind is occurring in a foreign mind? The utterance which expresses it will indeed propound a proposition to me, and so give me evidence of the occurrence of a foreign thought. But it may seem that in this case the thought has no tendentiousness about it. To this I reply that if the foreign utterance really does express an emotion (and of course hypocrisy is always possible), then the thought of which it gives evidence *is* tendentious, though in rather a different way. Let us consider an emotion directed upon a historical character. Suppose that a man admires the Emperor Valentinian I. If he does, his thinking about that emperor does have effects, effects which it would not have if instead of admiring he disapproved of him. It does not affect the thinker's actions, but it does affect the course of his subsequent thoughts, and this will be revealed by subsequent utterances. We shall find, for instance, that he tends to talk about the good qualities of his hero rather than the bad ones: say, about his military efficiency rather than his atrocious bad temper. If we do not find this, we shall suspect that his utterance did not express emotion at all, but was merely a piece of hypocrisy. Thus in these cases the tendentious character of the thinking lies in the selective control which it exercises upon later thinkings, in directing the thinker's attention upon one set of facts rather than another, and even causing him to ignore certain facts altogether. Thus we may say that in these cases, as in the others, the emotion reveals itself by its tendency to affect one's subsequent relations with objects: only "objects" must be understood to include thinkable objects as well as perceived ones, and "relations" must cover cognitive relations as well as practical ones.

WILL AND ACTION IN ETHICS (II)

PROFESSOR J. L. STOCKS

V

WE may look at the relation of will and motive from another side as follows: Will, we have said, is an individual response to an individual situation. Like the situation itself, it is not a fixed thing persisting through change, but involved in a continuous flow of change, re-adapting itself constantly in one respect or another to recognized changes of circumstance. It can have no more immutability than circumstance, and if it is not to be left behind in the march of events and become old-fashioned, it should have the capacity for the same rapidity of change. Now motives also change, but in a different way. First one motive operates, then another, as circumstance stimulates different inclinations or dispositions: now fear, now curiosity, now love, now hate are aroused separately and together. Thus motives, as influences on action, come and go: but in themselves they seem more stable. Cowardice, avarice, generosity, personal love, and hatred are at least deep-rooted tendencies capable of infinite repetition in action; and it is to such tendencies that we most often appeal in alleging a motive for an action. They are all tendencies to act in certain ways and therefore they are tendencies of will. If an avaricious man is to act generously or a coward to act bravely, we think of him as having first to overcome something in himself which drives him in the contrary direction. There is postulated a discord and rebellion in the will itself, a struggle between two wills—or we may say the will is trying to overcome its own bad habits. Now such tendencies and habits of will are all summed up (and perhaps more besides) in the word character. What the avaricious man or coward has to overcome in such a case is nothing less than his own character. And character is thought of as something capable of change and development indeed, but also as constant and compelling, and often as forming with circumstance the determining cause of human action.

Looked at in this way, motive and character seem to determine action and to deprive the will of power to deal with circumstance as may seem best. Action is determined by will, will is determined by motive, and motive is determined by character. There is thus no power of origination in will—even the growth or development postulated seems to spring only from new circumstances—and as

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the man is so will he show himself in action: will is the slave of character.

The only way to freedom suggested is that will, when good, is free from motive. Good action is alone free, since it alone depends on no pre-existing disposition or desire. But what is this way of escape worth if, as we have said, motives are summed up in character? To be free of motive is to be free of character; and the good action which is unmotivated will be characterless. But character is the personality itself, and if character is to go with it will go all opportunity for love or friendship, all humanity even. We therefore have to choose between two horns of a dilemma: either all will is enslaved to character or good action and the good men are colourless abstractions. That is the logical consequence of the doctrine that character in the form of a motive determines the will.

The position just sketched is a familiar one: much plausible but fallacious reasoning has been based upon it: and it is important to determine the outlines of an answer to it. Take first the general proposition that character determines the motive which determines the will. (Co-operation of circumstance of course assumed.)

This doctrine is an expression of our general tendency to explain the present by the past, i.e. of the conception of causation expressed in J. S. Mill's inductive logic by the formula "the cause is the invariable unconditional antecedent." Character is that in which the effects of past actions and circumstances are stored up in the individual ready to be brought to bear on new actions and situations. Through character past action and circumstance determine the response in action to present circumstance. The immediate antecedent which is the cause of action is the motive, but a motive like any other fact of experience has antecedents in past action which account for it.

Much of the apparent strength of the position vanishes if we reflect that motive and character (regarded as the assemblage of possible motives) are not separate and distinct pre-existent entities of which the will shown in the action can be regarded as the consequent effect. It is the character and motive exhibited *in* the act which is judged good or bad and what is exhibited in the act is not strictly speaking the same as anything that existed before the act. If therefore we are to talk of the present as determined by the past, we shall have a present character-motive-act combination determined by a past character-motive-act combination, not a pre-existent character giving birth to a posterior motive, which in its turn gives birth finally to an act. The assertion will be therefore that past character determines present character and past action present action. The only other interpretation would make present character determine present action, but that does not square with a theory

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of causation which requires the determining cause to be antecedent to its effect. As re-interpreted, then, the doctrine is not that will is enslaved to motive and character, but that will, motive, and character are all alike creatures of the past history of the individual in whom they are seen.

But so interpreted the doctrine ceases to bear upon the relation of motive to will from which we started. It raises instead the metaphysical problems of the relation of present and past and of the freedom of the human will, and the problem of the continuity of human personality through all growth, change, and development. To these problems we must return later: for the present we must confine ourselves to the relation of motive to will.

Avarice, generosity, and other dispositions which serve to supply motives are not to be inferred from a single action. We rely on a series of actions which exhibit a common tendency. The motive specifies directly or indirectly, as we saw, the result to be achieved in action, and in thinking of the motive as repeatable and repeated, we think of a general end which the agent keeps constantly in mind. A man's actions do undoubtedly hang together in some such way as this: the will has a tendency to repeat itself as far as circumstances permit. There is thus good inductive ground for assuming that the will forms habits; and it is as habits of will that avarice, generosity, etc., are best thought of. A tendency to habit means that repetition is easier than variation. If, therefore, there are habits of will, decision in any emergency will not be unbiased: it will be weighted in certain ways: and since such bias is a creation of a man's past history, in this form the past will at least to some extent mould the present. In this form the question of the value of motive again arises. Are such habits conducive to goodness or will? Are they not rather a limitation to its power and range? Mere absence of habits of this kind could not, of course, constitute either goodness or badness of will: but if they exist, they must be of importance, and until we know their value we do not even know what a will really is.

The upshot is that we must for the present qualify our description of the activity of will by recognizing that a man comes to any situation that may confront him not equally free to originate change in every direction: besides the limitations imposed by circumstance there are limitations provided by the lines of habitual response: to some extent, therefore, he comes to any emergency already compromised and committed. The question before us is the question as to the power, value, and extent of these limitations. But we have seen at least this—that it is wrong to think of such habits as limitations imposed by some external entity upon will: they are in will, habits of it: to it, therefore, they should appear (though perhaps they do not always) as freedom not slavery, as choice not as limitations upon

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choice. It is only when we look at the man from without, and ask what prevents him from doing what is obviously demanded by the situation, that we see these habits as limitations and restrictions to the freedom of his choice.

VI

Reflection on these lines inevitably brings us to the notion of virtue. The Stoics, as we have seen, described the moral good as virtue, and the moral bad as vice, and they were criticized by Kant for so doing. It is what the will is, he said, which is judged good and bad: but virtue and vice are properly qualities which the will employs. We have followed Kant in asserting that will alone is good or bad and that will is an individual response to an individual situation. But no philosopher would maintain that virtue was any such response or resolution. Virtue is always considered to be something more than a particular determination of will: it is regarded rather as something behind such determinations, controlling and, as it were, inspiring them, giving some guarantee of the agent's capacity to produce a similar response to any similar situation. Without such a guarantee of repeatability the act is held to fall short of goodness. Aristotle, for instance, realized that the moral good had its being only in action: but he held that mere inspection of the act unsupported by knowledge of the agent's character could not justify the conviction that the moral ideal was achieved in it. It was necessary, he thought, to know not merely that the act was as it should be, but also that it was the manifestation (1) of knowledge, (2) of purpose (disinterested), (3) of a firm and irreversible attitude. The first two requirements may be passed over: they are necessary only because Aristotle here takes action in the external sense (cf. above, § III). When we say the subject of the moral judgment is will, we necessarily make it a judgment upon a purpose or resolution, and a purpose is formed in response to information received and must be judged (as we have seen, § III) in relation to that information. For by knowledge Aristotle means knowledge of the situation—of the circumstances of the act. It is the third requirement which introduces virtue. The externals of an act may be satisfactory, even though by chance or in obedience to command: but in those cases the act is no true act—no evidence of will. But further we are told, even when there is no question of chance-success or external origination, the act may be perfectly adequate and yet imperfect: there may be a tremor and inconstancy in the will which, while not obstructing the *external* perfection, should preclude us from asserting *internal* perfection. The steadfast and constant will is the proof of virtue, and when a man has it he has achieved the moral good. Good actions do not prove a man good, but they go to make him

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good. For goodness is a habit acquired, like other habits, by practice. If for some length of time we see that our actions conform in every detail we can control to those of goodness, we shall in the end acquire the habit of goodness ourselves. Thus the greatest stress is laid by Aristotle on repeatability as a mark of the completely good act, and virtue (without which the completely good act is impossible) is a habit formed by repetition. As good actions produce good habits, so bad actions produce bad habits: the good habits are virtues and the bad habits are vices. As good acts do not prove a man good, so bad acts do not prove a man bad: before badness is asserted we must be sure of a firmness and constancy of purpose, accompanying the act, which is vice and as it were guarantees repetition.

The influence of this, as of other Aristotelian doctrines, has been enormous: it has moulded the language used on these subjects in modern Europe and still dominates our thought more than we know. It seems commonplace and common sense, because by the time we first meet it face to face we have long been familiar with its terms and features. We find it disappointing like the original picture seen after many years' familiarity with cheap reproductions of it. But in truth it is neither commonplace nor common sense: the doctrine of the *Ethics* is not even reasonably coherent. The emphasis laid on habit seems inconsistent with the autonomy of the will, and the whole doctrine suggests a distribution of moral praise and blame differing considerably from that which is customary in everyday life. The point from which we must approach the doctrine is settled by the preceding discussion. We were inclined to suppose that a habit is a handicap and limitation to will, and that a will which is to show its full power either for good or for evil must be free from such limitations. But we are now told that will, whether for good or evil, finds its realization in something of the nature of habit. Here is a plain contradiction which must be cleared up.

First, about habit. No one, so far as I know, has ever attempted to maintain that the habitual, as such, attracts a higher degree of moral praise or blame than the non-habitual. On the contrary, we are apt to think of the growth of habit as involving in its own region a recession and diminution of will and attention, and an approximation to the automatic which threatens in the end to remove it from the sphere of moral valuations altogether. In other words, we recognize will as the subject of the moral judgment and regard will as antithetic to habit: the more will the less habit and the more habit the less will. It is therefore *prima facie* highly paradoxical to find the moral ideal in the exercise of a kind of habit. When the habit is fully formed, one would think rather that the time for speaking of moral good or evil was past. What is claimed for habit is rather that both directly and indirectly it makes for efficiency.

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Its direct value is seen in all forms of skill. If you think of the process of learning to play an instrument or shoot a gun or take photographs, etc., you see at once how large a part habit plays. Movements which at first needed effort and attention come to achieve themselves automatically and when they reach that stage they are not only more rapid but also more accurate than they were in the early stages. This is the direct value—increased rapidity and accuracy of movement. The indirect value is no less obvious. When attention and effort are no longer required, they are not simply superseded. They are set free for other tasks. We can only attend to one thing at a time; but thanks to habit we can do several quite difficult things at once. The infant requires all its attention for the difficult matter of walking and if it tries to talk as well, probably falls over: but we can walk and talk at the same time without difficulty. An accomplished knitter finds knitting so easy that she can combine knitting with practically any activity which does not require rapid motion or the use of the hands. It would be tedious to multiply instances. Indirectly the value claimed for habit is that it sets the attention free for other things. Under both heads the minimization of will and attention are admitted: these, indeed, constitute the value of habit as an economizer of human effort.

Now assuming that it is will which sets habit in motion—i.e. which *starts* the knitting, walking, etc.—it is obvious that habits of this kind do not diminish but actually increase the range and power of the will. A man with a number of spheres of action firmly held by such habits can do more things more accurately than one who lacks them. The number of possible occupations open to him at any given moment is made larger not smaller by his habits.

That is obviously true in these cases, but a difference and a difficulty is seen when we turn to the habits which are virtues and vices or to those habits which are alleged as motives. These are habits of the will itself—i.e. they are comparable not to the automatic action of the hands with the knitting needles or piano notes, but to a habit (e.g.) to knit from five to six or to play the piano from nine to ten. Habits of the last kind obviously do tend to limit the agent's freedom of choice. We must therefore turn to habits of will and consider whether there are such things, what they are, and what their value is (positive or negative) to the human will. Do they make either for efficiency or for goodness?

VII

When it is said that "to form habits is to fail in life" or that "the only habit a child should form is the habit of forming none," it is habits of this last kind which the writers had in view. They think of habit and will as essentially antagonistic, so that a habit of will

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means an inactivity of will. Will is considered as a capacity of free adaptation to the requirements of life and habit as a tendency to the repetition of the same manœuvre. They recognize in humanity this tendency to stereotyped reactions and regard it as a danger. The man who saves himself from it preserves his powers free and untrammelled. If in a novel situation the old oft-repeated manœuvres failed, the man of habit would be at a loss what to do; but the man of no habits would be free to act as seemed best. The novelty of the emergency would very likely discover gaps in his mechanical equipment, but on the internal side he would be free to improvise and to use what equipment he had to the best advantage. He would combine the freshness and power of youth with the ripe experience of age, and escape the dilemma expressed in the proverb—*si la jeunesse savait, si la vieillesse pouvait*. This view, then, gives as an ideal of efficiency an opportunism which excludes habits of will. To form a habit is to sell your freedom, to forsake the path of improvisation which shows an active will and brings success in life.

Writers, on the other hand, who extol habit and represent it as constitutive of the moral good show a tendency to interpret habit rather in the other way as an acquired skill. But habit, taken in this sense, is not will; it is a gift or talent used by the will; and our moral judgments praise or blame men not for their talents but for their use of them. Habit in this application is not an originator of action: its function is that of so co-ordinating the parts of our procedure that one effort of will will do what twenty did before: it affects the internal machinery of action and makes it doubtless more efficient: but it is thoroughly within the will's control. The skill of the pianist enables him with one glance at a piece of music to execute a whole bar on the instrument, but his playing of the bar is as free and voluntary an act as the blundering piecemeal performance of the novice—more so, in fact, for he succeeds in doing what he intended better than the novice does. Thus the increased range brought by habit in this sense is not purchased at any cost to the originative freedom and adaptability of the will. But such habits, again, are acquired gifts which are employed by will; and the moral good must lie not in the gift but in the will which uses it. If therefore virtue is such a gift, virtue is not the moral good.

From these general considerations it would appear that habit cannot in either use be either wholly or partly identified with the moral good. In the one sense habit is the enemy, in the other the servant, of will. But before registering this conclusion let us consider virtue and the virtues and see how far habit in either sense is involved in them.

If courage is a habit, what kind of a habit is it? Courage requires for its exercise a situation in which a specific element known as

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danger is present: it requires secondly knowledge on the part of the agent of the presence of danger: courageous conduct is that of the man who does what is right in spite of the known presence of danger. Knowledge of danger tends to produce in men a specific emotion, fear: and under the influence of fear a man's first movement is in the direction of diminishing danger by such simple means as running away. But the courageous man does not run away: he may feel the emotion of fear, but he is master of it to the extent of refusing the action to which it prompts: indeed, if right and duty point that way he is seen doing the very opposite, increasing the danger which is the stimulus to fear without giving any sign of wavering in his resolve to do the right. Defined, then, with reference to the situation, courage is right behaviour in face of danger; defined with reference to the emotion, it is a capacity for conquering fear so as to do the very opposite of that which fear prompts. In terms of habit, courage might be called the habit of facing danger or the habit of conquering fear. Its opposite, cowardice, would be the habit of retreat before danger or the habit of being worsted by fear. There is postulated a battle between the will and the emotion. Courage means the customary victory of will, cowardice the customary victory of the emotion.

If, then, other virtues are like courage, virtue is a capacity to persist in a course of action in spite of the presence of a disturbing emotion: the emotion disturbs because it tends to arouse a will to do otherwise: two rival wills (actual or potential) are thus postulated; and the victory over emotion is a victory over a "lower" by a "higher" will. (Cf. §§ IV and V. "Higher" and "lower" are not meant to signify a moral difference or to beg any moral question. The higher will is the more general and permanent responding to a general and comprehensive view of the facts, the lower is the more momentary and transient relevant to a more partial apprehension: the will induced by fear, as we have seen, has reference only to that element in the situation which is called danger.) Virtue, then, might justly be called self-control or strength of will. Further, if virtue is a habit, that can only be because this victory over the lower self or will comes to be achieved more easily and completely with repetition. This, in fact, we are always told is the case, and some writers even point as an ideal to the state in which the disturbing emotions will have no disturbing influence at all. In such a state of complete virtue will, of course, would not be automatic: it would still be necessary, as before, to scan the situation and act carefully with due regard to it and action would involve effort: but the control of the higher over the lower will would be automatic in the sense that the wayward movements of emotion would be stifled at birth with no conscious effort on the part of the agent. He would not be aware of his self-control any more than he is aware of the constant

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checking of tendencies to overbalance which occurs when a man stands upright.

It is hardly worth while here to test this account of virtue, drawn from the single instance of courage, by an exhaustive examination of other virtues. The traditional list of virtues is a muddle, and it may be doubted whether most of them have any real existence for modern popular thought. Even Plato's cardinal virtues—wisdom, justice, temperance, courage—are hard to co-ordinate under a single notion. Wisdom is at least a bad name for an attribute of will, and Aristotle himself found a difficulty in incorporating justice with the other virtues of character. Justice certainly deserves special treatment. But for our present purpose we may safely assume that courage and temperance are the only two virtues which are of importance, and that if we can bring them together we shall have little difficulty in dealing with other claimants to the name.

Temperance falls fairly easily under the same formula as courage. It is true that there is a *prima facie* difference in the fact that the enemy of temperance is not described as an emotion but as an appetite or desire. We have seen, however, that the disturbing power of emotion rests upon its arousing a will at variance with *the* will; and an appetite or desire is just such a tentative movement of will responding to some easily specified element in the situation, even if its direction is opposite and it is associated rather with pleasure than with pain. Anyhow, it is beyond dispute that in temperance also we find self-control, the victory of the higher over the lower will, the ability to persist in a course of action in spite of inducements to desert it; and here also we are told that practice makes perfect, self-control becoming easier with repetition, and are recommended an ideal of a state in which the tendency to pluck flowers by the wayside shall be so under control that the wayfarer will not be aware of it at all.

Virtue, then, we may conclude, is a habit of control: its enemies are emotion and appetite: it claims the name of habit since it becomes easier and stronger with repetition and because it exhibits that approximation to the automatic which is the mark of habit. It can hardly be doubted that such a habit is a habit of will: but at the same time it is difficult to say that such a habit in any way lessens or restricts that capacity of free adaptation which is asserted to be the essence of will. The habit which is virtue, therefore, does not seem quite to fall into either of our two classes of habit. Courage and temperance are not the servants of will in the sense in which the skill of the pianist is: but neither are they the enemies of will as habits of routine are. It remains to discover their relation to these two classes of habit and their precise value to the efficiency and moral value of the will.¹

¹ Here the manuscript breaks off.

DISCUSSION

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MR. TYRRELL's book is an excellent introduction to Psychical Research by a writer who has himself made an important experimental contribution to one branch of the subject, viz. extra-sensory perception. It is based, so far as the facts are concerned, mainly on the publications of the English Society for Psychical Research, though it also makes some use of materials from American and Continental sources. As Mr. Tyrrell remarks in his *Introduction*, "after fifty-five years of steady work" the S.P.R.'s "*Proceedings and Journal* have grown into a veritable mine of carefully ascertained information. Yet comparatively few people care to read this information or take any interest in its work." The serene indifference or complacent quarter-knowledge with which most philosophers and psychologists dismiss this mass of carefully sifted material, which must (on *any* interpretation of it) be vitally important to their studies, is evidently due to some very strong and deeply rooted non-rational cause. It is to be hoped that Mr. Tyrrell's book will be widely read, and that many of its readers will be stimulated to tackle the original papers and to help in carrying forward research in these subjects.

It is natural to compare Mr. Tyrrell's book with Frank Podmore's *Studies in Psychical Research* and *The Newer Spiritualism*, which are at present the standard introductory works. Podmore's great merit is that he combined an immense amount of first-hand knowledge of the facts with an almost extravagant scepticism about all super-normal inferences from them. Therefore any candid reader feels that he must take very seriously anything that Podmore cannot explain away and a good deal which Podmore can account for only by postulating extremely far-fetched *ad hoc* normal causes. For these reasons I think that Podmore's two books are still indispensable to anyone who is beginning to study the subject. But they have several deficiencies, and Mr. Tyrrell's book supplements them in these respects. In the first place, they date back to the beginning of the century. Since then there have been great advances in normal and abnormal psychology, and a mass of very important ostensibly super-normal material has been added to the subject of Psychical Research. This later material is fully treated in Mr. Tyrrell's book. Secondly, Podmore made no attempt to consider the philosophical bearings of the alleged facts, or to see how they fit or fail to fit into the generally accepted framework of human knowledge and belief. Mr. Tyrrell is, I should judge, less sceptical by nature than was Podmore of the possibility of the super-normal; his own very remarkable experimental results have convinced him (not unreasonably) of the reality of extra-sensory perception, including clairvoyance and pre-cognition; and he has wide philosophical interests and considerable philosophical knowledge. So his book contains an element which is altogether absent from Podmore's.

The book is divided into five Parts, preceded by a short Introduction. Parts I, II, and IV are mainly expository, being designed to give the reader good samples of the evidence for various kinds of ostensibly super-normal phenomena. Parts III and V are primarily interpretative and theoretical, and,

¹ G. N. M. Tyrrell (London: Methuen & Co., 1938. Pp. xvi, 379. Price 12s. 6d.).

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for that reason, should receive more attention than the others in a review in *Philosophy*. I propose, therefore, to give a brief account of the contents of Parts I, II, and IV, and then to treat Parts III and V in rather more detail.

Part I deals with Spontaneous Extra-sensory Perception. It is divided into four chapters. The first of these defines certain terms which constantly recur in the literature of the subject; discusses the nature and reliability of the evidence for spontaneous (as opposed to experimental) extra-sensory perception; and gives a very brief account of the S.P.R.'s important "Census of Hallucinations." Chapter II gives examples of the evidence for what appears to be spontaneous telepathy between living persons. It includes the famous "Chaffin Will Case" (1925), and a remarkable case connected with the fatal accident to an excursion train at Darlington in June 1928. Chapter III gives examples of the evidence for what seems *prima facie* to be spontaneous clairvoyance. The most interesting case here is taken from Dr. Osty's book *Sur les Connaissances Supranormales*, and concerns the finding of the body of an old French peasant through the clairvoyance of Mme. Morel. Chapter IV gives samples of the evidence for non-inferential knowledge of future and past events and for so-called "psychometry" or "object-reading." Here, again, it is an advantage that Mr. Tyrrell is able to quote quite recent cases from the publications of the S.P.R.

Part II treats of Experimental Extra-sensory Perception. The first chapter gives a short history of the subject. The most important cases mentioned in it are the experiments of Miss Miles and Miss Ramsden in 1905, and those of Mrs. Upton Sinclair in 1928-29 published by her husband in his book *Mental Radio*. The second chapter describes certain collective experiments, done in recent years with large numbers of percipients. Such experiments were tried, and reported in the S.P.R. *Proceedings* by Miss Jephson in 1924; by Miss Jephson, Mr. Soal, and Mr. Besterman; by Dr. Woolley and Sir Oliver Lodge through the B.B.C. in 1927; and by Mr. Soal with certain subjects who were chosen because they had shown *prima facie* signs of super-normal powers in the Broadcasting Experiment. The results of these experiments were negative. Mr. Tyrrell explains this by referring to two facts which, he says, emerge from his own work with individuals, viz. (i) that only a few persons possess the faculty of extra-sensory perception to an appreciable degree, and (ii) that, even with good subjects, this faculty is very liable to be inhibited by psychological resistances. This chapter ends with a description of M. Stefan Ossowiecki's remarkable achievement in describing a drawing presented to him at Warsaw in a carefully sealed light-proof envelope prepared with elaborate precautions by Mr. Besterman at the S.P.R. rooms in London.

The third chapter of Part II gives an account of the much-discussed work done by Dr. J. B. Rhine at Duke University, North Carolina, and sponsored by Professor Macdougall. It is well known that, even after allowing due weight to certain criticisms which have been made by experts on the statistical details of this work, the proportion of successes scored is fantastically above anything that can reasonably be ascribed to chance. Whether it establishes the existence of extra-sensory perception is another question. On this matter the following observations, most of which are based on information that became available after the publication of Mr. Tyrrell's book, may be worth making. (i) I cannot help wondering why the proportion of persons who seem *prima facie* to have marked powers of extra-sensory perception should be so much greater among the students of Duke University, North Carolina, than among otherwise similar persons experimented upon in England. (ii) The S.P.R. have recently been supplied with samples of the kind of cards used in

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these experiments. They are disgracefully badly constructed, and are so defective that in certain sorts of experiment a person familiar with them could sometimes guess the nature of the card from merely seeing the edge of it. (iii) It is quite true that in many of the experiments described by Dr. Rhine this defect would not have helped the percipient in the least. It is also true that the way in which successes tailed off after a time with some of his best percipients does not fit in at all with a normal explanation on these lines. But the facts about the defective cards do produce in my mind an impression of general "sloppiness" which makes me doubt Dr. Rhine's competence to devise properly and describe accurately *any* kind of experiment. This may be most unfair, but, as at present advised, "*ich kann nicht anders.*" (iv) Since Mr. Tyrrell wrote his book a most admirably careful series of experiments, on the same lines as Dr. Rhine's, has been carried out by Mr. Soal, partly on students at Queen Mary College, and partly on the medium Mrs. Garrett who scored an extremely high proportion of successes with Dr. Rhine. In none of Mr. Soal's experiments is there the least trace of any result which cannot reasonably be ascribed to chance. To speak quite frankly, I *know* that Mr. Soal is a highly competent investigator; I have some *prima facie* reason to doubt whether Dr. Rhine is so; and I do not think that any scientist would be prepared to accept as proven in *any* subject a startling claim coming from a youthful American university unless and until it was confirmed by experiments done in older and perhaps more self-critical seats of learning.

In the last chapter of Part II Mr. Tyrrell describes his own very important experiments with Miss Gertrude Johnson, and the extremely ingenious mechanical apparatus which he devised for carrying out a great number of such experiments quickly and for recording the results automatically. I have seen the apparatus, and have been most favourably impressed with it. The positive results which Mr. Tyrrell has obtained are, in my opinion, the most impressive evidence which exists at present for experimental extra-sensory perception. The discussion of certain suggested normal explanations of these results involves some interesting points in the theory of probability and shows how easy it is to fall into traps about "randomness."

Part IV is concerned with Mediumistic Trance. The first chapter begins with a general account of the three varieties which this may take, and then describes and discusses the mediumship of Mrs. Piper, which was studied intensively by Wm. James, Richard Hodgson, Professor Hyslop, and others over a long period of years. There is a masterly paper in Vol. XXIII of the S.P.R. *Proceedings* by Mrs. Sidgwick, entitled *The Psychology of Mrs. Piper's Trance*, and Mr. Tyrrell quotes largely from this. He sums up as follows (p. 178): "The Piper case suggests . . . that in trance-mediumship we are dealing with certain states of consciousness which bear an analogy to hypnosis or auto-hypnosis; that these are full of dream-like associations leading to much nonsensical material; that impersonations of the dead take place, sometimes unconvincingly, sometimes presenting false communicators, sometimes more convincingly; but that behind all this there is evidence of a will to communicate which, when conditions are at their best, gives a strong impression of a genuine deceased communicator somewhere in the background." This seems to me to be an eminently fair summary of the facts.

The second chapter gives an account of the very remarkable "A.V.B." case, which was fully reported by Una Lady Troubridge and Miss Radcliffe Hall, two friends of the ostensible communicator, in Vol. XXX of the S.P.R. *Proceedings*. In this case the trance-medium was Mrs. Osborne Leonard; the ostensible communicator "A.V.B." frequently took control of the medium's

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organism and spoke with the "direct voice"; and the two sitters seem to have taken all possible precautions against fraud, fishing, and leakage of information by normal means.

The third chapter explains certain attempts which have been made in recent years to devise a system of numerical scoring for the various statements made by a medium in the course of a sitting, so that the amount of correct information actually given may be compared with the amount which might be expected to arise purely by chance. This presents a very difficult problem, both theoretically and practically. A theoretically satisfactory method of combining "marks" has been devised by Mr. Soal and modified by him to meet certain criticisms by Professor Fisher. But there still remains the practical problem of estimating the antecedent probability of individual statements being true by chance. Some attempt to solve this latter problem statistically has been made by Mr. J. G. Pratt, of Duke University.

The fourth chapter contains a sketch of an extremely interesting and original method of research which Mr. Whately Carington devised some years ago and has since been practising and perfecting. It consists of two parts. The first is to apply certain psychological tests, such as the reaction-time test, which Jung devised in order to identify the emotional complexes characteristic of an individual, to a medium (*a*) in her normal state, (*b*) when speaking in the person of her habitual "control," and (*c*) in that much rarer state in which her organism is ostensibly under the direct control of this or that deceased "communicator" who is speaking with the medium's vocal organs. The second part of the method is to subject the quantitative results of these tests to a certain kind of statistical analysis, devised by Professor Fisher and constantly used in other fields of research, known as the "Analysis of Variance." Whately Carington used his method (i) to compare the reactions of the same medium in these various states and when controlled by various ostensible communicators, and (ii) to compare the reactions of different mediums through whom the same ostensible communicator was ostensibly communicating. This was pioneer work, and it is admitted that a great many errors and obscurities occurred in the earlier papers, which the author has gradually removed partly by his own self-criticism and partly through the criticism of expert statisticians. The present situation is admirably stated in an expository and critical paper by Professor Thouless in Vol. XLIV of the S.P.R. *Proceedings*. Mr. Tyrrell quotes largely from this paper, and gives as intelligible account of the method as can be expected in the space at his disposal. It is evident from the discussion in pp. 215-20 of his book that he is not himself inclined to view these quantitative methods very favourably. I do not altogether agree with Mr. Tyrrell's arguments on this point, but I accept his conclusion that "although the quantitative method might in time bring to light useful facts, it would be unsafe in the light of our present knowledge to draw any conclusions from the results, whether they are positive or negative."

The last two chapters of Part IV contain an account of two kinds of test which are of special interest for the following reason. They were not originally designed by the investigators, but were proposed in the course of automatic writing or speech by certain ostensible communicators who claimed to be giving tests of their identity. These are the "Book-tests" and the "Cross-correspondences." The latter, whatever may be the right interpretation of them, are certainly signs of great ingenuity and remarkable knowledge of out-of-the-way literary and classical allusions on the part of *someone* other than the conscious mind of any living person concerned in the experiments. It is extremely difficult to give a satisfactory summary of a cross-correspond-

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ence case. Mr. Tyrrell's account of certain of them, including the "*Thanatos*" case and the very remarkable "Ear of Dionysius" case, should suffice to convince any intelligent reader of the great interest and importance of this kind of evidence. Anyone whose interest is aroused by these samples should read an admirable little book by Mr. H. F. Saltmarsh, which has recently appeared, entitled *Evidence for Personal Survival from Cross-Correspondences*. From this he may pass on to the original reports and critical discussions of them in the S.P.R. *Proceedings* which are listed at the end of Mr. Saltmarsh's book.

Having now given a conspectus of the factual content of Mr. Tyrrell's book, I will conclude by saying something about the more theoretical and speculative portions of it, which are contained in Parts III and V.

Part III is concerned with the Significance of the Evidence for Extra-sensory Perception. In the first chapter of this Part, Mr. Tyrrell is concerned to show that extra-sensory perception, if it exists, "has every appearance of breaking away from the scheme of the world as we at present understand it, and of refusing to fall into line with the causal scheme." He shows, conclusively I think, that explanations of telepathy and even of clairvoyance in terms of the emission and reception of physical radiations are utterly hopeless when we consider them in detail. Hence these kinds of perception, if they exist, must be utterly unlike sense-perception as ordinarily conceived. It is still more obvious that non-inferential pre-cognition, if it occurs, falls altogether outside the range of our habitually accepted axioms and postulates. In this part of his discussion Mr. Tyrrell quotes largely from two papers by the present reviewer, viz. the Presidential Address to the S.P.R. in 1935 on *Normal Cognition, Clairvoyance, and Telepathy* and a paper entitled *Philosophical Implications of Foreknowledge* in Supplementary Volume XVI of the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*. The latter paper called forth a most interesting critical commentary from Professor H. H. Price, which Mr. Tyrrell here summarizes. He also makes a brief mention of Mr. J. W. Dunne's theory of Time, and gives a more detailed account of an attempt by Mr. Saltmarsh to account for pre-cognition by postulating a greatly extended Specious Present.

In the second chapter Mr. Tyrrell, making great use of Professor Price's book *Perception*, is concerned to stress the following points: (i) That natural science is based entirely upon the deliveries of human sense-perception, and that all its theories in the last resort are concerned with the sensations which would be experienced by normal human beings under conditions which are themselves describable in terms of sensations. (ii) That human sense-perception is not, as it seems to the uncritical experient, an act of directly prehending independent and public things or events. The objects which a human being prehends in sense-perception are private to himself and directly dependent, both for their existence and their sensible qualities, on his own organism and to some extent on his own past experiences and present expectations. Physical things and events are known only as rather remote causal ancestors of certain groups and sequences of characteristically interrelated sensations. (iii) That the axioms, postulates, and procedures of human thinking are themselves limited and conditioned to an unknown extent by the special situation of human beings as living organisms coming at a certain point in a certain line of biological development.

From the first of these contentions it follows that, if there were extra-sensory perception, it would be very unlikely to fit into the existing scheme of natural science. Mr. Tyrrell appears to hold that the resistance to considering seriously the evidence for extra-sensory perception, which is so notice-

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able among scientists, rests upon a failure to recognize the truth of the second and third of these contentions. (In the third chapter of this Part he gives a very amusing instance of this resistance by quoting from the ludicrously inadequate, ignorant, and supercilious chapter on psychical phenomena which disfigures an otherwise excellent book, viz. *The Science of Life*, by Messrs. H. G. Wells, G. P. Wells, and Julian Huxley.)

In regard to this part of Mr. Tyrrell's book the following remarks seem worth making. (i) In fairness to the scientists (who certainly need all our charity in this matter) it is necessary to stress one point which Mr. Tyrrell rather under-emphasizes. This is the extremely unsatisfactory nature of the evidence, the enormous amount of admitted fraud and self-deception, and the maddening difficulty of reproducing positive results under absolutely satisfactory conditions. When one remembers that at one period this almost made a man so patient, persistent, and fair-minded as Sidgwick abandon the subject in disgust, one can scarcely blame the average scientist for refusing to touch it with a barge-pole. What one *can* blame is his talking dogmatically and pontifically and tendenciously about matters which he has decided (often quite legitimately) not to waste time and temper in studying. (ii) Mr. Tyrrell appears to think that the admission of these three propositions would not only have the negative effect of removing prejudice against the possibility of extra-sensory perception but would also enable us to suggest and test hypotheses about it. I cannot feel very hopeful about this. The difficulties which Mr. Tyrrell has pointed out in conceiving the *modus operandi* of telepathy, of clairvoyance, and still more of precognition, seem to arise from their conflicting with certain fundamental postulates of human *thinking*, in terms of which all causal explanations have to be made. Even if we come to recognize that these postulates are bound up with our special position as biological individuals, I do not see how we are to get outside our intellectual skins and formulate hypotheses in other terms.

Part V, the last section of the book, deals with the Theoretical Aspect of the Mediumistic Trance. It opens with two chapters devoted to the extremely important paper which the present Earl of Balfour contributed to Vol. XLIII of the S.P.R. *Proceedings* under the title of *A Study of the Psychological Aspects of Mrs. Willett's Mediumship*. Mrs. Willett's mediumship, which was studied intensively over a period of twenty years by Lord Balfour, was of a peculiar kind. It was not trance-mediumship in the usual sense. She did not have a certain habitual "control," such as "Fedra" in the case of Mrs. Leonard, nor did the ostensible communicators directly control her organs of speech or writing as in the A.V.B. case. The ostensible communicators through Mrs. Willett professed to be Edmund Gurney and F. W. H. Myers, two of the founders of the S.P.R. The former was an intimate friend of Lord Balfour. They claimed to be deliberately training Mrs. Willett for a special kind of mediumship in which the essential point was that she should remain in an almost normal condition and should then, in her own speech or writing, convey to Lord Balfour what the communicators had impressed on her mind. The mere fact that this claim was made and dramatically and consistently maintained throughout a long series of sittings is of the utmost psychological interest, even if we refuse to admit that what was claimed was in any sense true. But the contents of the communications which come through Mrs. Willett are still more interesting. They consist largely of painstaking attempts by the ostensible Gurney and Myers to describe and analyse the processes by which they initiate their communications and by which the medium's mind gradually elaborates them and eventually utters them in speech or writing. The contents of most mediumistic communications are trivial and twaddling

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in the extreme, but the cross-correspondences and the Willett communications are on an altogether different intellectual level. As Mr. Tyrrell quite justly says, "the communicators are strong, intelligent, natural, and give one the impression of being human beings engaged in a difficult task, hampered by certain natural impediments, and explaining their difficulties and what they are doing as they go along." (It may be remarked that a good deal of information purporting to describe the mechanism and the difficulties of communication from the point of view of the "other side" occurs in sittings held by Mr. Drayton Thomas with Mrs. Leonard, in which the ostensible communicators are his father "John" and his sister "Etta." Here again the contents of the communications are intelligible and informative.)

Basing himself mainly on the Willett communications, but also to some extent on those which come through Mrs. Leonard and Mrs. Piper, Mr. Tyrrell reaches the following tentative conclusions. (i) The ideas which finally emerge in the form of automatic speech or writing originate in the depths of the medium's subconsciousness through the exercise of a faculty of "telaesthesia." This is described as a form of extra-sensory cognition in which the trance-personality "reaches out to gather the fact that it needs from wherever the knowledge of it is to be obtained." (I think that "telaesthesia" would stand to "telepathy" in a relation analogous to that in which "listening" stands to "hearing," or "searching" to "seeing," or "exploring tactually" to "passively touching.") (ii) The ideas, thus super-normally acquired, then rise through various levels of the self until they finally "crystallize into the clear-cut discrete ideas with which we do our normal thinking, and in which form alone they can attain verbal expression." (iii) The function of the communicator is "to select and control, guide and shepherd" the telaesthetically acquired material, in such a way that what finally emerges in automatic speech or writing shall convey a certain idea which he wishes to get through to the sitter. (iv) At every stage of this highly complex process there are snags and difficulties, due partly to the associations and resistances of the medium's mind, partly to the very imperfect control which the communicator can exercise over the medium's mind, and partly to the very imperfect knowledge which the communicator has of his own success or failure. (v) The images, sensations, and quasi-sensations which the medium experiences and describes when in trance are created by her own mind, no matter whence the initial stimulus to this process of creation may have come. Items which originate from purely internal sources, and others which are ultimately due to telepathic influences from outside, are inextricably blended with each other. (vi) There is a peculiar kind of experience in which the medium seems to herself to be directly aware of the presence of this or that communicator, to identify him, and to feel in herself certain emotions which she unhesitatingly takes to be *his* emotions at the time. On such occasions she may have no visual, tactual, or auditory images representative of the communicator's body or his gestures or his speech. (vii) Lastly, some of the statements made by Mrs. Willett and other mediums compel us to envisage the possibility of some kind of literal fusion of two persons and literal joint-ownership of certain experiences.

The next chapter, *Trance-Personalities*, and the earlier part of its immediate successor, *Nature of the Communicators*, may be taken together. It is obvious that an habitual control, such as "Fedra" in the case of Mrs. Leonard or "Phinuit" in that of Mrs. Piper, bears some likeness to the secondary personalities recognized by students of abnormal psychology. This *prima facie* resemblance is to some extent confirmed by the quantitative results of Mr. Whately Carington's work, which also strongly suggest that there is a profound difference between habitual controls and ostensible communicators,

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such as "John" and "Etta" in Mr. Drayton Thomas's sittings with Mrs. Leonard. Mr. Tyrrell points out that there are well-known cases of ostensible communicators who show super-normal knowledge and are dramatically self-consistent and yet can be proved to be fictitious. Some very interesting cases of this kind are described by Mr. Soal in his *Report on Some Communications received through Mrs. Blanche Cooper*, published in the *S.P.R. Proceedings*, Vol. XXXV. In some cases the ostensible communicator, who purports to be dead and gives accurate information about events in his life unknown to medium or sitter, is in fact alive and oblivious of what is going on at the sitting. The essential point which emerges from Mr. Tyrrell's discussion of these and other facts may be summarized in his own words as follows: "We must not assume that there are only two alternatives, either (i) that a communicator, substantially the same as the deceased person in question was when alive, is standing at the other end of a psychic telephone, or (ii) that some hypnotic stratum in the medium is playing a part, eked out by telepathy from the living. It is pretty clear that both these theories are too crude and too simple." The alternative which Mr. Tyrrell and certain other highly competent and experienced investigators are inclined to accept is the following. When it appears *prima facie* that a certain deceased person (e.g. Myers) is communicating through a certain medium (e.g. Mrs. Piper) the communications are produced by something which is a compound of two different factors. One of these factors is a certain constellation of the medium's own experiences, traces, dispositions, associations, etc. The other is a factor which is independent of the medium. This may combine on other occasions in a similar way with a certain constellation of experiences, traces, etc., belonging to another medium (e.g. Mrs. Willett), and the compound thus formed may produce communications which appear *prima facie* to come from the same deceased person (e.g. Myers) but are characteristically different in content, emphasis, emotional colouring, etc. Following Mr. Kenneth Richmond, Mr. Tyrrell calls the first factor a "communicator-vehicle" and the second a "communicator-impulse."

Granted that this is the description of the observable facts which seems least inadequate to those who know most about them, it is plain that it immediately leads on to further questions. What is the nature of the "communicator-impulse"? How is it related to the once-living person, Myers or Gurney or "A.V.B.," in whose name the ostensible communications emerge from the medium? Might it not be due to the subconscious activity of some friend of the deceased, still living among us, and unwittingly gaining knowledge by teleesthesia and impressing it telepathically on the medium's mind? Mr. Tyrrell considers such questions as these, and certain suggested answers to them in Chapter XXI of his book.

Mr. Tyrrell first states and discusses a form of the Compound theory which was tentatively suggested some years ago by the present reviewer in *The Mind and its Place in Nature* as a minimal hypothesis to cover most, but not all, of the well-established facts of trance-mediumship. His objections are as follows: (i) He thinks that, if this theory were true, the most impressive and characteristic communications might be expected to occur in those cases where the ostensible communicator is ostensibly in direct control of the medium's organism. But in fact, he alleges, this is not so. The most impressive and characteristic communications occur in connection with Mrs. Willett's peculiar kind of mediumship, which does not fit at all easily into the theory under consideration. (ii) It is admitted that the theory has to be eked out by the hypothesis of elaborate telepathic action from certain living persons on the mind of the medium. If this can do as much as is required of it, it can

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do enough to make the postulate of a persistent "psycho-genic factor" (which is the essential feature of the theory) superfluous.

Mr. Tyrrell then considers whether telepathy from the living will suffice to account for the facts. In the cross-correspondence cases it is generally admitted that Mrs. Verrall, and she alone, of the automatic writers concerned, had the necessary classical knowledge. If any living mind was responsible, Mrs. Verrall's was much the most likely candidate. But, in the first place, the cross-correspondences continued to go on in the same dramatic form and with the same ostensible communicators after her death in 1916. Secondly, we should have to suppose that some stratum of Mrs. Verrall's subconscious self not only telepathically conveyed to the various automatists concerned the various items of information which were to emerge in a cross-correspondence, but also telepathically induced these automatists to dramatize their utterances in such a way that they appeared to be characteristic of certain deceased persons, such as Myers and Gurney. Lastly, in the case of a medium like Mrs. Leonard large numbers of highly characteristic dramatizations of deceased persons whom she has never met have been produced in presence of various sitters. Some of these have been strikingly life-like from the very first. If we ascribe this to telepathy from the sitter, we must suppose that he not only has somewhere in his mind a "model" of the characteristic traits of his deceased friends, but that he can somehow induce the medium to act and talk in imitation of this "model" which she has never seen in the flesh. If we are going to call this "telepathy," we ought to realize that it is something enormously different from the spontaneous and experimental extra-sensory perception which was discussed earlier in the book.

Mr. Tyrrell reverts to the telepathic theory in the last chapter of his book, and gives an excellent summary of his objections to it. I will quote what seems to me to be a very fair commentary of his on the telepathic theory. "In order to make it work we have to regard the living mind as something different from and immensely wider than what we commonly mean by the term, and we have to endow it with such a range of 'subliminal self' and with such astonishing extra-sensory powers that the proposition of its survival takes on a new aspect."

In the latter part of Chapter XXI Mr. Tyrrell discusses certain arguments against the antecedent probability of human survival which have been put forward by Professor Richet; and certain other arguments, which seem to me to be much more impressive, enunciated by Professor Dodds in his paper *Why I Do Not Believe in Survival* in S.P.R. *Proceedings*, Vol. XLII. (It should be noted that both these writers are thoroughly familiar with the facts of psychical research, and that both accept the existence of various forms of extra-sensory perception.) The gist of Mr. Tyrrell's answer appears to be that both writers take far too narrow and conventional view about the nature and limitations of the embodied self and about what survival would be if it were a fact. Psycho-analysis and abnormal psychology suffice to show that the ordinary embodied self is a far more complex entity than it appears to superficial observation confined to the normal waking life of persons in good mental health. The occurrence of extra-sensory perception and trance-mediumship reveal further depths beneath those which are plumbed by the psycho-analyst and the abnormal psychologist. And the occurrence of pre-cognition shows that our everyday notions of time are so inadequate that it is unsafe to regard mere continuance of a self's earthly life as the only possible form that survival could take.

Mr. Tyrrell's own view about survival is stated very tentatively in the last chapter of the book (pp. 368-9). I do not think that I understand it well

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enough to be able to give a useful summary of it. It involves the notion of a "self-principle" or "I-principle." This is said to have "animated" the deceased person when he was still alive in the body; to persist after the death of the latter; and to "animate" a new personality, which "becomes deranged in the process of helping to form the trance-personality" (during mediumistic communications) "and harks back to something more or less resembling its former terrestrial self, and, while doing so, may even forget a good deal about its other-worldly state of existence."

It remains for me to remark that Mr. Tyrrell devotes to the physical phenomena of mediumship a chapter which is short but is quite as long as the utterly unsatisfactory state of the available evidence warrants. He also discusses, briefly and sensibly, in two successive chapters, the relation of psychical research to Spiritualism and to Religion.

I have noted a good many typographical errors, and I hope that Mr. Tyrrell's book will soon go into a second impression which will give him an opportunity to correct them. On p. 42, l. 4, for *he* read *him*; on p. 114, l. 15, for *Case 17* read *Case 13*, and in the next line for *Lady Z* read *Lady Q*; on p. 125, l. 11, I think that *less* must be a mistake for *greater*; on p. 213, l. 23, for *imposter* read *impostor*; on p. 241, l. 8, for *Aristophenes* read *Aristophanes*; on p. 306, l. 33, for *analogous* read *analogous*. There are probably other small misprints which I have overlooked.

C. D. BROAD.

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY.

BENEDETTO CROCE's book on history¹ is the ideal continuation of his earlier book published over a score of years ago on "La Teoria e Storia della storiografia" forming the final part of the "Filosofia dello spirito." During this long period Croce has had the opportunity to enrich and extend his historiographical experiences with a series of volumes, of which those on the History of Naples, the History of Italy, and the History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century are the most important and have had the widest repercussions. In all this range of experience his fundamental theses on the character and value of history have not been substantially altered. They have actually developed in breadth and depth, so that in the present volume we find them with their characteristic lineaments, old and new together, rendered fuller and more vivid by the rich lymph of the concrete problems of historical life by which they are nourished. In the meantime a series of violent and tumultuous changes, provoking vehement opposing mental reactions, has brought into discussion grave doubts, raised on certain points which first appeared firmly established in the historical view of the world. The antithesis has moved Croce to reaffirm his thought with renewed polemic ardour, thereby throwing it into stronger relief, and giving it a greater sense of reality.

Croce's philosophy is well known to be definitely historical in colouring—he identifies the entire life of the spirit with history and human intelligence with historiography. Philosophy itself is hereby resolved into a methodological energy of history, into a study of the categories of historical criticism, and loses all *raison d'être* as a higher and clearer intelligence. Many weighty critical arguments have been advanced against the consequences, part implicit, part explicit, of this doctrine. Mutually self-supporting, and concurring in a single aim, they have taken shape under a common anti-historicist banner. Where, it has been said, is the supposed rationality of history if, wherever we turn our glance, we find in it nothing but a play of brute and blind forces, a deeper and deeper flood of irrational instincts? Again: is not history, containing all the contrasts of the past and justifying equally theses and antitheses, by reason of their contribution to a common result, a general absolution of the wicked and the unjust, no less than of the good and the just? What discriminating value can its judgment have then, if all have the same rubric in common? And for the man of action anxious to rely on historical judgment is there not something paralysing in the need to recognize that whatever position he takes is equally justified or justifiable, if in the final result the antitheses count no differently from the theses? Why and how, for example, should I decide against Bolshevism, when I know that Bolshevism has its *raison d'être* in the present state of things, and that it will contribute no less efficaciously than its opposite in the final summing up of the present struggles? These and other charges are levelled against historicism, earning it the reputation of being guilty of promoting fatalism, of dissolving absolute values, of sanctifying the past, of accepting the brutality of fact *qua* fact, of applauding violence, of inculcating apathy; in a word, of taking away

¹ B. Croce, *La Storia come pensiero e come azione*. Bari, Laterza, 1938.

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impetus and confidence from the creative forces, of blunting the sense of duty, and of encouraging inertia and slothful compromise.

Croce's replies follow the critiques in all the details and perplexities of their configuration, so that as a whole they form a complete review of the more pressing problems of the contemporaneous world. As it is impossible to give a minute account of them, I will confine myself to a reference to some which may give an idea of the general orientation of Crocian thought. Against the historical fatalism resulting from the alleged neutralization and indifference of opposites in history, Croce enunciates a concept of great importance, which may show itself very fruitful in its development: that of historical catharsis. "To write histories," Goethe said on one occasion, "is a way of getting the past off one's shoulders. Historical thought reduces it to one's material, transforms it to one's object, and historiography frees us from history. Only a strange darkening in the ideas can hinder us from perceiving such cathartic function as historiography accomplishes equally with poetry, the latter releasing us from the bondage of passion, the former from servitude to facts and the past; and only a more strange blinding of intelligence makes us consider and call gaoler the man who opens the door of the prison in which otherwise we should remain confined" (p. 31).

Similarly the sophism of interpreting the concept of the rationality of history as an incentive to practical acquiescence in the accomplished fact is exposed by Croce in all its falseness. A single example suffices to illustrate it, he says, taken from what befell in Russia during the reign of Nicholas I, when Hegelian philosophy began to be introduced there, in those little-prepared and uncritical intellectuals. Then several of the intellectuals, who had nourished the spirit of revolution and conspired with the Decemberists, began to reason thus: "All that exists is rational. But the despotism of Nicholas I exists. Therefore we must reconcile ourselves to it." The nullity of this extravagant syllogism is shown by saying with equal reason: "All that exists is rational. But hatred and the spirit of rebellion against the despotism of Nicholas I exist. Therefore it is not necessary to be reconciled with Nicholas I." With that you are practically back at the original point. The sophism is to be found in taking the word "rational" in two senses: of "that which has its *raison d'être*" and of "that which, in the particular circumstances in which it is placed, moral conscience bids each one of us to do." In the first sense, the despotism of Nicholas I is as rational as the action of the revolutionary; in the second sense, quibbling, that is, with the first, and reasoning with a *quaternio terminorum*, one assumes a practical attitude not founded on the single voice of moral conscience. "It is necessary," Croce concludes, "generally to distrust those who instead of producing from their actions and their behaviour an intrinsic and moral reason, appeal to so-called historical necessity, which too often, as we know, is the necessity of personal convenience" (p. 199).

On the presence of the so-called "irrational" element in history Croce makes some very just reflections which, especially to-day, demand our careful attention. He does not deny that beneath the surface of spiritual life there exist vital forces ready to burst out; but to estimate their strength and consistency, to approve them as powerful energies to be educated and not to be weakened and suppressed, is not the same thing as to admire their roughness and violence, and to elevate those who have represented them and to venerate them as the topmost peaks of humanity. Such idolizing is unfortunately a sign of moral degradation, low ideal, sluggish and corrupt feeling, a relationship of admiration and love of as little worth as that of prostitutes for bullies (p. 164). And in this connection Croce considers it stupid to exalt the State

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which is a necessary condition of stability for the development of the highest spiritual work, to its supreme culmination: exactly as if one were to say that the goal of thought and art and morals is to secure a good digestion for the human organism. The fact that the safety of the State becomes *suprema lex* in moments of difficulty, of wars and revolutions, corresponds perfectly to the case of the suspension of the superior workings when the stomach is indisposed and it is necessary to await its restoration to health (p. 165).

In conclusion, the dominant note in this book, recurring through a thousand variations, is the spirit as liberty, leading to historicism as the theoretical expression of human liberty, which is completed by the practical and moral affirmation of liberty itself. This does not mean that Croce subordinates his historical-philosophical outlook to a particular political belief. For him liberty is a metapolitical value which permeates not one definite political theory, but all politics together, or rather is manifest in their reciprocal interrelationships and conflicts. Naturally even this view seems in conflict with the changes of the present time, and in the light of a narrow empiricism it may be considered as surpassed or belied by experience; but it is a property of philosophy, in contradistinction to the common empiricism, that it may wander in a horizon far broader than the one continually circumscribed and restricted by the daily changes of life. In this wider perspective the same experiences of to-day take on a different shape and proportion, and the man who is deeply convinced that the life of the spirit does not for long permit restriction, much less suppression, cannot help but draw from a more comprehensive view of history the reasons for a virile optimism.

GUIDO DE RUGGIERO.

(Translated from the Italian by Constance M. Allen.)

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Through Science to Philosophy. By H. DINGLE, B.Sc., A.R.C.S. (Oxford and London: Clarendon Press, Humphrey Milford. 1937. Pp. v + 363. Price 15s. net.)

This book is based on a course of lectures given in the Lowell Institute, Boston. Professor Dingle is well known as a very careful exponent of difficult scientific subjects. He has the power of making work which is abstruse, and based on technical developments, clear to the general reader without undue loss of accuracy. Moreover, he has a great advantage over some other writers who attempt similar tasks: he is not in the least impelled by the queerness of modern physics into taking the highly paradoxical statements in which they are often expressed at more than their face value. There are, as Professor Dingle says, gifted expositors in this field who have made the rough places so smooth that it is scarcely possible to tread on them without slipping! But he himself knows that, in the last resort, such results will have to be fitted into the framework of common-sense experience. It is perfectly true that the discoveries of science are always shocking at first to common-sense views; and that whoever wishes to go further and become a philosopher must learn (as Bertrand Russell has told us) not to be frightened by absurdities. It is, indeed, the function of reflection at its best to open our eyes to unfamiliar possibilities, and so free us from the tyranny of custom. Nevertheless, philosophers of science often need to be brought back to everyday realities by the bladder-boys of Swift's satiric imagination.

Professor Dingle performs the function of an enlightened bladder-boy admirably. He deals, in Part II of this book, with a whole set of problems in this manner. Those raised by the unobservable entities used in the physical sciences; with the problems involved in subjective and physical time; with the spate of confusions raised by the measurement of time and the supposed running down of the universe. He provides a critical estimate of recent loose talk concerning indeterminacy and freewill as questions brought to the forefront by the quantum theory. And there are many wise things said about such difficult matters as causality and the nature of our astronomical universe. In all these cases what Professor Dingle is trying to do is to insist that the outstanding achievements of present-day physics are not in the least nonsensical or paradoxical. He relates them to a general scheme (which he propounds in detail in Part I, and applies in Part II) concerning the manner in which scientific work first, and then philosophical thought, arises out of, and is based on, a common-sense attitude to the world.

The title of Professor Dingle's book expresses in itself this point of view: *Through Science to Philosophy*. It is a view which is plausible enough to be attractive, but not plausible enough to be accepted without argument. And in spite of Professor Dingle's persuasiveness, I do not feel that the arguments provided are completely convincing. I believe, like Professor Dingle, that science proceeds out of common-sense experience by approaching it in a more critical manner; and that by being more critical, it reveals unsuspected relationships between the parts of our knowledge, and therefore becomes more systematic. In short (in Huxley's phrase) science is organized common

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sense. This I believe to be true, in spite of Dr. Norman Campbell's demurrer that, so far as physical science is concerned, it is the most esoteric of all the arts. That is why I can say that the exposition of scientific ideas in Professor Dingle's book seems to me to be on the right lines. But the further position which Professor Dingle adopts, and which I used to think the correct one, does not now seem to me to be tenable. It is the view that the step from science to philosophy is the same in character as this. That philosophy is, in short, just an attempt to deal more critically and more systematically with the results passed on to it by the special sciences. He really believes that "If, without violating the principles on which physics and biology have developed, science can extend its correlations over the whole of experience, it will become philosophy" (p. 34).

Now if this were true, the work of the philosopher would simply be that of the scientist writ large. This is claiming both too much and too little. Taking a glance at the philosophers one knows, it would be absurd to claim for them that they were capable of performing this function of being super-scientists. The claim would be so immodest as to be comic. Professor Dingle realizes this when he says (p. 14) that "at the present time the physicist has a better chance of obtaining a sufficient knowledge of philosophy than the philosopher has of obtaining a sufficient knowledge of physics, for the same reason that a seaman acquires land-legs more quickly than a landsman acquires sea-legs." On the other hand, the philosopher does seem to me to have a function of his own: at once humbler and more ambitious. Perhaps an old phrase of Frege's may make this clearer. He spoke of the tree of knowledge; and of science as mounting upwards with the increasing intricacy of the growing tree: whereas philosophy digs down to the roots. It is a crude metaphor for my purpose, because I want to suggest that the work of the philosopher is more than looking into the basic foundations of all our knowledge. But it serves my purpose if it brings home the idea that the labours of scientific and philosophic workers are aimed in opposite directions. That is why I do not agree with Professor Dingle that science, even augmented by psychology, may ever grow into a complete philosophy. Science is perpetually adding to statements of fact; philosophy analyses them, in the sense of finding out the structure of that to which reference is made if these facts are true. Thus the analysis employed by philosophy is not directed to undermining common sense, nor even to undermining the very uncommon sense in which scientific developments are often expressed. Philosophy is simply an attempt to deal in an unusually rigorous manner with both common sense and scientific statements. Not to explain them away, but to refine them; to find out what their various propositions mean, in the sense of being able to give a correct analysis of their structure.

It is this which gives to a great deal of modern philosophical work the appearance of being purely linguistic. It seems as though the logical positivists, for example, are telling us that philosophy reduces to a mere analysis of language. Professor Dingle is both attracted and repelled by such work: attracted because it is clearly a serious attempt at doing something in as rigorously critical a form as possible, and repelled because what it is doing seems to be a matter merely of grammar or syntax. If it were that only, it would be absurd. It might just as well be said that men need not have experiences, provided they can write and speak clearly about them—a view which (in the history of university education) has often been held by more pretentious persons than logical positivists! Needless to say, I do not hold the view that philosophical analysis is merely linguistic; but I do think that it is a serious and necessary attempt to translate all the propositions of

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common sense and science into statements which tell us what is the case if these propositions are significant and true.

So much for the general position adopted by Professor Dingle in this book. In fairness to him, it ought to be added that he himself is not dogmatic about it. He says (p. 38), "I am not attempting to make out a case for science to be considered as the royal road to philosophy. I believe that, in fact, it is, and that at present it has no serious rival; but that belief is, I hope, not a prejudice, and I am willing to admit—nay, even to insist—that it may prove to be misleading." Professor Dingle does, however, make a serious effort to construct a consistent world view out of "atoms of consciousness" (in the sense in which he defines them) and their various groupings. It is impossible in a short review to do justice to this construction in detail. I can only say that I think it well worth consideration.

A word must, however, be added about Professor Dingle's admirable criticisms of some of the cruder views of men of science in this field: In his treatment, for instance, of those views of the relation of science to social needs which ascribe economic factors as the basis for completely independent and abstract developments in pure science (quite unrelated to such needs) Professor Dingle says that to interpret the work of Galileo and Newton as a product of the invention of gunpowder is "as worthy of consideration as interpretation of wave mechanics in terms of the discoveries of M. Marcel." Again, in Chapter V on "The History of a Delusion" there is a valuable discussion of the difficulties concerning the whole problem of substance in modern physics; and here, too, Professor Dingle's combination of knowledge and wit makes it thoroughly amusing reading. The same applies to his treatment of both behaviourism (p. 140 *et seq.*) and of the unconsciousness (p. 145 *et seq.*).

To sum up, Professor Dingle has boldly ventured on a constructive synthesis in the field of philosophy of science. It is incomplete, as he himself would be the first to admit. Indeed, he speaks of its "loose ends" on p. 353. But it is, in my opinion, a very interesting attempt.

A. E. HEATH.

The Principles of Mathematics. By BERTRAND RUSSELL. Second edition (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. xxxix + 534. Price 18s.)

An Introduction to Symbolic Logic. By SUSANNE K. LANGER. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 363. Price 12s. 6d.)

The first edition of Bertrand Russell's important work has long been out of print. The few second-hand copies obtainable have cost the eager buyer many times the price of this second edition. Messrs. Allen & Unwin may be congratulated upon this production; it can be taken for granted that they will have their reward. In the present edition the text is unaltered; the same pagination has been carefully retained; the printing bears comparison with the original. There is a new Introduction, of ten pages, in which Russell briefly discusses the present position of his view that logic and mathematics are identical. He sees no reason to abandon this view although he no longer adheres to his earlier Platonic realism. He briefly examines the criticisms directed against the Frege-Russell doctrine by the formalists and the intuitionists. I am inclined to think that he is not quite just to the Hilbert school of logicians. He does not take into account the bearings of Gödel's work upon the formalization of logic and fails to recognize that the main aim of

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Hilbert's work is to supply proofs of consistency, not to put forward a complete philosophy of mathematics.

Russell also discusses briefly the recent attempts to assimilate logic to grammar. He agrees with Carnap that logical constants belong to a language and not to the subject-matter about which the language speaks. He is, however, dissatisfied with the doctrine that whether a proposition is analytic or not is relative to the language to which the proposition belongs. He holds, on the contrary, that there must be "a sense" in which a proposition of logic is true in virtue of its form. It is much to be hoped that Russell will deal more fully with this point for the present discussion is too brief to be of much use.

"Logic," says Dr. Langer, "is to the philosopher what the telescope is to the astronomer: an instrument of vision" (p. 46). The astronomer does not grudge the labour required for making slight improvements in his instrument; similarly, the philosopher should not grudge the labour of improving the technique of logic. She urges that "every philosopher should be not only acquainted with logic, but intimately conversant with it; for the study of logic develops the art of *seeing structures* almost to the point of habit, and reduces to a minimum the danger of getting lost amid abstract ideas" (p. 334). This is the point of view from which this *Introduction to Symbolic Logic* has been written. Accordingly, Dr. Langer first tries to make clear to the student such notions as logical form, structure, form and content, abstraction and interpretation. These notions are explained in a very simple way and illustrated by examples that will be familiar to the student. The essentials of logical structure are explained in two admirable chapters dealing with relations, propositions, truth-values, and systems. The principles governing symbolic expressions are clearly stated, the usual distinction between natural and symbolic languages is elucidated, and the power of symbols is emphasized. There is a valuable chapter on *Generalization*, which contains an extremely clear account of propositional forms (or functions). It is much less confusing to speak of propositional *forms* instead of propositional *functions*, as the present reviewer pointed out some time ago. Dr. Langer's exposition of quantifiers and of general propositions is very clear and simple.

Chapters V, VI, VII, and VIII contain respectively good expositions of classes, the principal relations among classes, the universe of classes, and the deductive system of classes. Controversial issues are avoided, which is all to the good from the point of view of the elementary student. Here and elsewhere, as for example in her discussion of "logical form," Dr. Langer may give the student a misleading impression that there are no real difficulties to be overcome. Whilst it is desirable that these difficulties should not be discussed in an elementary introduction to the subject, it would have been better to hint that they exist. This is, however, but a small criticism. Chapter IX, on *The Algebra of Logic*, is excellent. The relation of an algebra to a calculus is well explained.

Chapter X, on *Abstraction and Interpretation*, is of central importance from the point of view of Dr. Langer's exposition of logic. She shows how logic, regarded as the science of forms, proceeds by steps from totally concrete notions to totally formal notions. Three such steps are distinguished. First, the separate elements of an uninterpreted, or concrete, universe of discourse, K , are formalized; in this step we attain a partial generalization of a system KR . In the second step K is left uninterpreted; it is regarded merely as the range of significance of the relation R . We thus obtain general propositions about unspecified concrete things; this represents "the *greatest generalization* of the system KR ." The third step consists in leaving R uninterpreted; the

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system then becomes a system *in abstracto*, and we obtain completely abstract propositions, and these are completely generalized propositional forms. It is, in Dr. Langer's view, "the essential business of logic" thus to abstract the form from the content. In the development of the technique required to attain this aim we develop also the habit of "seeing structures." This chapter also contains a useful exposition of most of the important properties of relations. The calculus of propositions is discussed in the following chapter.

Two final chapters provide a useful introduction both to the work of Dr. Langer herself and also to *Principia Mathematica*. Dr. Langer rightly emphasizes the continuity of the development from Boolean Algebra to the work of Russell and Whitehead.

There can be no doubt that Dr. Langer has provided an excellent introduction to this subject. She claims that her work has "no predecessor", from the point of view of arrangement. This claim is just. She professes that it has had "one inspirer", namely, Prof. Sheffer of Harvard. Since acquaintance with the work of Sheffer is for the most part confined to the circle of his disciples, other students of symbolic logic will be grateful for this glimpse of his conception of logic.

Each chapter is provided by Dr. Langer with a careful summary, questions for review, and suggestions for class work. She has added a short bibliography and has provided a satisfactory index.

L. SUSAN STEBBING.

The Problem of Time: University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. 18. (Berkeley, California: University of California Press. London: Cambridge University Press. 1936. Pp. 225. Price 2 dollars 25; 10s.)

Those members of the Philosophical Union of the University of California who deliver every year a set of lectures on some selected topic have frequently put us in their debt by the publication of their lectures. They have usually chosen a topic of considerable interest to contemporary philosophers and have had much to say that was stimulating. It must be admitted that the volume of lectures now being reviewed does not reach the level attained in the earlier volumes. This, at least, is my judgment. I may be mistaken for, I confess, I found some of the lectures boring to read. For this reason I have read, and in the case of some of the lectures have re-read, carefully but without much enthusiasm. There is a considerable amount of repetition, especially in the various attempts to get under weigh. For the most part each of these eight lecturers starts over again. There are some references in the later lectures to some of the preceding lectures, but there is neither the liveliness proper to a symposium nor the continuity of thought that might be found had one of these authors written a single book on the subject proposed for discussion. Perhaps something is amiss with the topic at least as given in the title of the volume. What is *the* problem of time? Is there one and only one problem? If so, what is it? To these questions it is reasonable for us to expect answers. The value of these lectures is in my opinion roughly determined by the extent to which the lecturers have been aware of these questions and have attempted to answer them. It is from this point of view that I shall try to evaluate these eight contributions to discussions about *time*.

Prof. W. R. Dennes and Prof. E. W. Strong are aware of the importance of asking these questions. If I understand them aright, neither of them thinks that there is a special, and peculiarly difficult, metaphysical problem of time. "I can see no problem," says Prof. Strong, "of how a world is temporal

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in a world where we can count our pulses, number the succession of days and nights, observe the phases of the moon and the positions of the sun above the horizon" (p. 79). He suggests that "philosophers have not so much accepted" the observation of counting our pulses, etc., "as they have sought to interpret it in other terms." He urges that philosophers have elaborated their theories of time in the interest of some metaphysical theory. This contention is illustrated by a (necessarily very brief) discussion of the view of Anselm and of Sir Isaac Barrow. He then sets forth his own view, indicated by the title of his lecture, "Time in Operational Analysis." As may be expected, he maintains that: "Time as a concept can be clarified, first, in respect to how the word is used in discourse; and, second, in respect to what is empirically meant by that discourse" (p. 54). Prof. Dennes ("Time as Datum and as Construction") insists that the meaning of such a question as "Is time real?" depends upon what is to be understood by each of the words used in asking the question. He argues that philosophers who answer the question negatively have either combined words in a meaningless form or have given a special meaning to the word "real," thereby begging the question. He is quick to seize upon the truisms that have masqueraded as profound truths. Thus, for example, he points out that "to assert the irreversibility of time as a universal ontological principle" is only to utter a truism, namely, that "every process is what it is" (p. 97). I understand him to be maintaining that it follows from our usage of the word "process" that a process cannot be reversed. Reversal must be clearly distinguished from repetition. It is, I think, not at all uncommon in discussions concerning time to fall, on the one hand, into truisms, and, on the other hand, into self-contradictions. An example of a truism from Santayana is pleasantly revealed by Prof. Mackay (see p. 189) in his lecture entitled "Succession and Duration," but it is too long to quote here.

Prof. P. Marhenke ("McTaggart's Analysis of Time") shows—in my opinion conclusively—how untenable is McTaggart's argument designed to establish the unreality of time. Prof. V. F. Lenzen ("The Schema of Time") has not added much to what has been said elsewhere both by himself and others. In the context of these lectures his contribution may be summed up in the two statements: "Time is the order of succession of phenomena"; "A schema of time is a frame in an order of succession of natural phenomena." Prof. S. C. Pepper ("The Order of Time") is mainly concerned to extricate Prof. Sidney Hooke and Prof. Dewey from difficulties into which, he believes, they have fallen owing to their failure to appreciate the fact that in nature there are many orders of time. His lecture is not readily intelligible to anyone who has not read the works criticized.

Prof. J. Lowenberg ("The Nonspecious Present") is alone among these contributors in his insistence upon "the mystery of time." To this mystery experience is said to be "the key." The specific experience required is the experience of "the nonspecious present." "We need a nonspecious present," he says, "to keep time itself from collapsing like a house of cards" (p. 131). This sentence is to me so mysterious that I cannot attempt to unravel it.

Prof. G. P. Adams ("Temporal Form and Existence") and Prof. Mackay—to whose lecture reference has already been made—are both concerned with the distinction between duration and succession. Prof. Mackay maintains that "our time experience is an experience of succession in duration" (p. 199), to which is added, on the next page, "within the perspective of an enjoyed present." He lays stress upon the past, present, future, determinations, and, in common with Prof. Lowenberg, criticizes William James's theory of the specious present. Prof. Adams, who regards successiveness as

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"the defining characteristic of time," insists that what is fundamental is the serial order of before and after. He says: "We apply a temporal form to the totality of what is presented. The temporal pattern is simply the transitive, asymmetrical relation of before and after. It is through the employment of this pattern that the presented—which, as such, is tenseless—is transformed into the temporal present" (p. 213). There are surely difficulties concealed in this use of the word "transformed." It does not seem to me that Prof. Adams succeeds in making his theory at all convincing.

As is only to be expected, the words "persistence," "existence," and "permanence" occur in many of these lectures. It is to be regretted that the different lecturers do not always use them in the same sense. That there is no agreed sense is no doubt mainly due to the divergence of views. Something might have been done, however, to make clear to the reader—and perhaps also to the writers themselves—why they cannot agree in their terminology and wherein lies the significance of their diverse usages of the same word. Could this be made clear, that we might hope for an enlightening contribution to the discussion of time.

L. SUSAN STEBBING.

The Logical Syntax of Language. By RUDOLF CARNAP. Translated from the German by Amethe Smeaton (Countess von Zeppelin). (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. 1937. Pp. xvi + 352. Price 25s.)

A review has already appeared in this journal of the original German edition of this important work by Prof. Carnap, whilst the present reviewer wrote a critical notice of it in *Mind* (1935). Accordingly this notice will be brief and will be mainly concerned with points relating to the English translation. This book must have been extraordinarily difficult to translate. Prof. Carnap's German is clear and delightful to read. The difficulty lay mainly in finding correct English equivalents of certain words and phrases. In some cases there was no English word that would serve as an exact translation; in other cases the correct equivalent had already been used in the context of some other system from which it had acquired associations that would be misleading in the context of Prof. Carnap's work. These difficulties have been almost entirely overcome either by coining new words or by appropriating words, not hitherto used in a technical sense, and giving them a definite technical significance. The translation is in the main the work of Countess von Zeppelin, but it has been revised and improved owing to the co-operation of Dr. E. C. Graham, Dr. O. Helmer, Dr. E. Nagel, and the author himself, who further expresses gratitude to Dr. W. V. Quine for "valuable suggestions with regard to terminology." The result of this co-operation is extremely happy. There can be no doubt that this is a first-rate translation; it is to be hoped that it will result in giving us a well-established English terminology.

In this English edition Prof. Carnap has fortunately been able to incorporate some sections that were excluded from the German edition owing to lack of space; he has also made additions and alterations inspired, no doubt, in part by criticisms of the original work. These additions include an interesting section on Identity (§ 16), sections on Incomplete and Complete Criteria of Validity, Reduction, Evaluation, a further treatment of "analytic" and "contradictory" in Language II, Logical Content, and some other points relating to the Rules of Consequence for Language II (§ 34 a-i); three new sections (§ 34 a-c) are added to the treatment of "Further Developments of

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Language II," the main part of which had been published, in a slightly different form, in a paper entitled *Ein gültigskriterium für die Sätze der klassischen Mathematik*. Another paper, entitled *Die Antinomien und die Unvollständigkeit der Mathematik*, now appears incorporated into Part IV of the present work. All these additions are of interest and increase the value of the work. Special mention should be made of Prof. Carnap's discussion of Gödel's Arithmetized syntax. This is, so far as the present reviewer is aware, the first discussion presented in English of Gödel's existence theorem. It is to be hoped that it will interest English readers in Gödel's work. The bibliography has been brought up to date; several corrections have been made all of which constitute distinct improvements. No student of logical syntax can afford to dispense with this English edition. It is very well printed in a pleasing form and is remarkably free from misprints.

L. SUSAN STEBBING.

A Commentary on Kant's "Critique of Judgment." By H. W. CASSIRER.
(London: Methuen & Co. 1938. Pp. xii + 412. Price 21s.)

The *Critique of Judgment* may be regarded as the coping-stone of the Critical Philosophy. Only when its teaching has been understood can we be in a position to grasp fully the relation between Kant's speculative and his ethical philosophy and to follow the structure of his system as a whole. Yet, so far as I am aware, it has never been made the subject of an adequate and detailed commentary. There are indeed valuable expositions and criticisms of its doctrines, notably in Caird's work, *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, and in Ernst Cassirer's *Kants Leben und Lehre*; but these works give the student comparatively little help in his attempt to meet the many difficulties that arise as he fights his way, sentence by sentence, through the intricacies of Kant's argument. The *Critique of Judgment* is indeed in some ways easier than Kant's other works, but, as I know from experience, it may seem largely unintelligible to a reader who is not an expert in Kant's terminology. In the vast body of *Kantliteratur* there was here a great gap which was urgently crying out to be filled.

In my opinion Dr. H. Cassirer has been highly successful in his attempt to fill this gap. He says modestly in his preface that when he began this work more than four years ago, he had not made any special study of Kant and was practically ignorant of the English language. But being a son of Ernst Cassirer he has breathed the Kantian atmosphere from his earliest youth; and he has the advantage of having been trained as a classical scholar who specialized in ancient philosophy. The excellence of his translations and the clarity and conciseness of his English style show that his linguistic training and aptitudes have enabled him to overcome the difficulty of writing in a foreign language. I doubt whether any reader would suspect that English was not his mother tongue. The only slip I have noticed is a tendency to speak of "common sense" where "a common sense" would help to make Kant's meaning more clear.

One great merit of this book is its firm grip of the Critical Philosophy as a whole. Dr. Cassirer devotes the first ninety-four pages to a brief exposition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Critique of Practical Reason*. For this he has no need to apologize: it provides a masterly summary of Kant's thought which is valuable in itself besides enabling him to dispense with many explanations which could not have been introduced without awkwardness into the body of his *Commentary*.

This preliminary exposition is followed by a careful study of Kant's First

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Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment*. This First Introduction in its complete form was not published till 1914 and is not well known in this country. It is very much fuller than the introduction which was substituted for it; and I agree with Dr. Cassirer in holding that the only reason why Kant suppressed it was, as he himself said, because of its length. It is of the utmost value for the understanding, not only of the *Critique of Judgment*, but also of the whole Critical Philosophy; and it gives by far the best account of what Kant believed to be the presuppositions of induction. In making its doctrine easily accessible to English readers, and in his patient solution of the many difficulties it contains, Dr. Cassirer has performed a very great service indeed.

His exposition of the *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment* shows the same careful scholarship and clarity of thought. Dr. Cassirer believes that Kant's thought forms what by ordinary human standards must be called a consistent whole; and he is often successful in showing that seeming contradictions can be explained in the light of similar passages elsewhere. When he is unable to solve a problem, he has no hesitation in admitting it frankly. His method may indeed be found by some a trifle austere. He offers us no help in the way of chapter and section titles, and simply follows Kant's own sections with their numerical headings. This is bound to result in a certain amount of repetition—for Kant himself is undoubtedly repetitious—but it has the advantage that we can always find the explanation of any passage without difficulty, and it is only very occasionally that I at least have found the repetitions tedious. It should also be said that Dr. Cassirer's interest seems to lie less in the aesthetic problem as such than in Kant's solution of it as part of the Critical Philosophy. He seldom allows himself the relaxation of considering the more easy and human passages where Kant passes empirical judgments which throw a good deal of light on his own taste and character. The result is that the philosophic argument comes to us in a concentrated form unrelieved by lighter touches. For the student of the Critical Philosophy this is all that is necessary. Those who are interested primarily in the aesthetic problem may be reminded that Kant's aesthetic theory cannot be understood apart from the rest of his philosophy. I believe that Dr. Cassirer's book will give them an opportunity of understanding it with the minimum effort necessary to get some conception of its background.

Kant's account of teleology is often said to be inadequate, but for myself I must say that I found Dr. Cassirer's account of the *Critique of Teleological Judgment* to be quite exciting. There is in it less repetition than in the purely aesthetic part, and the doctrine expounded seems to me to offer less difficulty: indeed, I should be inclined to say that it is obviously true. Incidentally a good deal of light is thrown on Kant's view of intuitive understanding.

A very full analytic index has been added, and is all the more necessary because of the paucity of chapter headings.

It should be clearly understood that this book is what it claims to be, namely, a commentary. For some reason that I have never been able to fathom, it appears to be generally assumed that in the case of Kant, and of Kant alone, a commentator ought to explain not merely what his author says, but what he ought to have said. Dr. Cassirer is fully aware that the first task of a commentator is to explain his author's meaning, and in this he has attained a very high degree of success. Some readers may possibly wish that he had attempted to give a more critical estimate of the value of Kant's philosophy. I do not share this view, though I think that some of Kant's conceptions might have been submitted to a fuller analysis; for example, I should have liked to see a full-dress discussion of what Kant meant by "reflexion." Kant's views generally seem to me so much more interesting and important

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than those of his commentators that it is a source of irritation when one is called away from the difficult task of understanding them to a consideration of theories (this is most obvious in the case of nineteenth-century commentators) which are long since dead, while Kant remains obstinately alive. From this defect Dr. Cassirer's work is wholly free.

Dr. Cassirer has omitted something like twenty sections and the whole of the Methodology. Probably he could not have dealt with these without making the work too long, and on the whole the sections omitted are comparatively easy to understand. I do, however, regret the omission of Section 59, which seems to me of great importance and to offer less difficulty than Dr. Cassirer himself appears to have found in it.

In conclusion, I would say that, as Dr. Cassirer fully recognizes, no commentary at the present stage of Kantian criticism can be wholly free from error, but a careful study of his work has left me with very few places where I am inclined to question the soundness of his judgment. I can confidently recommend his book as a reliable guide to Kant's thinking, whether it is used as a help in reading Kant or treated as an independent work. He has given us a commentary which should long remain authoritative and indispensable; and I hope we may look forward to other philosophical writings from him in the future.

H. J. PATON.

Descartes' "Discourse on Method." By LEON ROTH. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, Humphrey Milford. 1937. Pp. vi + 142. Price 6s.)

In this book Professor Roth argues for the serious treatment of the *Discourse* as Descartes' own summing-up of his contribution to science and philosophy, and as throwing valuable light upon the order of his thinking, the relative strength of his interests, and the importance of his total achievement. He reaches the conclusion that Descartes' fundamental interest was in science (i.e. mathematical physics), always with an eye to its practical value. Metaphysics interested him only in so far as it was needed to give him a basis for his physics—it was "not an end in itself" (p. 29). Negatively, therefore, the book is a reasoned protest against the habit of "fixing on the *Meditations* as embodying the essence of Cartesianism" (p. 74).

An examination of the literary history of the *Discourse* shows that it is "far from being a preliminary manifesto worked out (or abandoned) in the later *Meditations* and *Principles*. It is the retrospect of a Descartes who has been through the stages of *Meditations* and *Principles* and now looks back on them" (p. 73). It shows the order of his philosophical development to have been (1) method—as sketched in the second part of the *Discourse*; (2) exercises in the method—the scientific *Essays* to which the *Discourse* is an introduction; (3) metaphysics, pursued with the object of finding a sure foundation for physics—the *Meditations*; (4) mathematical physics or the philosophy of nature—the *Principles of Philosophy*. Descartes was already in his early twenties alive to the need of a metaphysical basis for his physics, but, as he tells us in the *Discourse*, he deliberately postponed the search for it till he should have reached a more mature age.

There is little or none of this likely to be questioned to-day, especially in the light of M. Gilson's research, to which Professor Roth acknowledges indebtedness in the Preface. But his central and novel contention concerns not the relative strength of Descartes' interests and the order of their development, but the value of the method itself and its relation to science. Professor

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Roth's main contention is that the method is not (what Descartes intended it to be) an instrument of discovery in the sciences, and that not only his immediate successors but even to some extent Descartes himself came to realize this; and further, that its rejection as an instrument of discovery made possible its recognition "as an independent entity"—i.e. as "logic" (pp. 97-8). "It is through the death of the *Essays* that the *Discourse* came to immortality" (p. 116). Now, if the method has no value for discovery and yet, as Professor Roth believes, it is Descartes' great contribution to knowledge, it would seem that its value can only lie in the power it gives us of analysing and ordering the knowledge we have gained by other means. But this is not after all what Professor Roth means. For his conclusion is (p. 108) that "Cartesianism has become a general method of approach to all problems, not a specific system of physics or metaphysics, and it is this general method which is of value, the ideal of order and precision, not the particular historical results which that ideal offered (or was supposed to offer) Descartes himself in his delving into the facts of nature." If all that Professor Roth meant was that Descartes himself fails to apply fully and properly a method which, when so applied, can be a valuable instrument of discovery, his meaning would be clear. But he seems first to deny and then to assert that the method is "an instrument of discovery" at all, outside the sphere of mathematics. He says, rightly, that it is "fruitful in mathematics just because it is mathematics" (p. 96). Is it just this same mathematical method—the method of the *Discourse*—(and if not, what is it?) which, once it has been proved useless in the solution of physical problems, is somehow able to shine forth as a valuable "general method of approach to all problems"? And if to all problems, why not to Descartes' own problems?

Professor Roth gives a plain answer to this last question, but I think a wrong one. According to him, Descartes' "official" view is that the truth of propositions about actually existing phenomena can be established only by unilinear deduction from self-guaranteed first principles, each step in the argument depending on the previous step, but contributing nothing to the establishment of those that precede it. With this he contrasts passages stating the incompatible doctrine that the process is what he calls "global"—i.e. not a chain but a circle, in which principles rest on consequences, including actual phenomena that can be observed or produced by experiment, as much as consequences on principles (pp. 92-5). Professor Roth has no difficulty in showing that the purely deductive method must fail when it has to deal with actual phenomena. But is he justified in ascribing this to Descartes as his only true position, and treating the other view as an incompatible alternative to it, which serves only to show that Descartes was beginning to find flaws in his own method? Plainly the "official" view will not square with Descartes' repeated insistence on the importance of observation and experiment, while this does square with the "unofficial" view, which might indeed be a statement of the ordinary scientific method of hypothesis and verification.¹ Let us examine Professor Roth's attack. He starts from Descartes' admission (e.g. in the sixth part of the *Discourse* and the *Author's Letter* introducing the French edition) that his method breaks down when he comes to deal with actual phenomena in their detail. Descartes himself accounts for the failure by his inability, owing to lack of means, to make the necessary observations and experiments. Professor Roth, on the other hand, ascribes it to an essential defect in the method itself. According to him, Descartes sets out to infer matter of fact from mere possibility, or, in other words, concrete nature from mere mathematics (p. 90). But, in Whitehead's words, which he quotes,

¹ The reader may here be referred to S. V. Keeling, *Descartes*, chapter 5.

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"there is no valid inference from mere possibility to matter of fact." Hence when Descartes has to deal not with abstract mathematics but with actual phenomena his method is bound to break down.

This seems to me a wrong description of Descartes' procedure. There is only one place in his whole system in which he infers the actual from the possible—the ontological argument. The foundation of his metaphysics is not the possible but the actual existence of the self, from which he proceeds to the actual existence of God, and thence, by a circuitous route, to the actual existence of bodies. Thus in his *Physics* he presupposes not merely the conception of a possible extended world, but an actual extended world, and he assumes that, because its essence is extension, so that nothing can exist in it except the modes of extension, it must lend itself to mathematical treatment. In particular, the only process which is possible in it is motion according to certain laws. These are the assumptions with which Descartes' *Physics* starts. But unfortunately he does not regard them as assumptions. They are for him established by metaphysical argument, not taken as hypotheses to be verified or modified or rejected. It is, I suggest, this metaphysical background which gives to Descartes' procedure in *Physics* its peculiarly *a priori* character, rather than any attempt to deduce the actual from the possible. Descartes in his *Physics* always tries to explain actual phenomena by actual causal conditions. It is true that in the earlier stages of this explanation he deliberately dispenses with special observations and experiments. He does so on the ground that the general principles from which he starts enable him to deduce *a priori* the *most general* characters of the phenomena of nature. (And this would be legitimate if the principles themselves were treated as hypotheses.) But when he has to explain particular occurrences (e.g. the behaviour of magnets) or to solve a particular practical problem (e.g. the construction of a certain type of lens), then observation and experiment (one of which, incidentally, must *set* the special problem to begin with) are necessary to enable him to reject all but the relevant hypothesis out of a number equally compatible with his general principles. For what follows not from the general nature of the principles but from the special circumstances under which they work cannot be deduced *a priori* from them. Descartes rightly recognizes this, nor is the recognition inconsistent with the rest of his method. Where he went wrong was in supposing that if only he had the means and the time for adequate experiment he could make a great advance himself.

Whether or not I am right on this question as against Professor Roth makes little difference to the undoubted interest of his book. In particular, the general reader will find the chapters comparing Descartes with Bacon and with Pascal, and the account of Father Daniel's satire, the *Voyage du Monde*, which is used to play an ingenious part in the argument of the book, excellent reading.

I found two misprints. On page 29, last line of text, for "if" read "as" or "as if"; on page 94 the reference to Descartes' reply to Morin should be to vol. ii, not vol. iii.

A. K. STOUT.

Symbolism and Belief. By EDWYN BEVAN. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1938. Pp. 391. Price 15s.)

A Gifford Lecturer has two difficulties to confront. So many courses have already been given, that it must be difficult to find a new approach to, or treatment of, the subject prescribed, and the condition that reason, and not

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revelation, must be set forth as the ground for belief must make it difficult for one who accepts the Christian revelation to keep within the limits imposed. The author of this volume has overcome the first difficulty, as he does offer a fresh contribution; and the second he meets by offering the Christian solution of any problem not on the basis of the authority of Bible or Church, but as itself reasonable. It need hardly be said that this course of Gifford Lectures presents all the excellences that one has learned to expect from any writings of the author—adequate and accurate knowledge, competent and balanced judgment, and lucid and attractive style.

The Introduction indicates the purpose—to show the part played by symbolism in belief. The author distinguishes symbols, which are visible objects or sounds which stand for something of which we already have direct knowledge, "such as flags or trumpets," from symbols which "purport to give information about the things which they symbolize, to convey knowledge of their nature, which those who see or hear the symbols have not had before or have not otherwise." For the first kind resemblance is not necessary, as for the second, which seek to convey by the known knowledge of the otherwise unknown (pp. 11-13). In religion both kinds of symbols have a place. All our conceptions of God are inadequate symbols; but this truth has not always been recognized as history shows. The symbols give some knowledge of God, though not the whole; and there must be discriminations in deciding how far the symbol can be regarded as resembling or not resembling the object. Our thought of God must be anthropomorphic, but there is a true and a false anthropomorphism. Nine lectures are devoted to the discussion of symbols, and six to "the relations of symbolism to truth and belief."

The first symbol is taken from *Space—Height* as indicating God's transcendence, His superiority to all things. In the third lecture the author discusses reasons why height should be thus regarded. In dealing with the symbol from *Time*, he is handling one of the subjects of constant debate in philosophy, the relation of Time and Eternity; and he seems to me rightly to maintain that time must have some significance for God. One of the most generally diffused symbols for God is *Light*; and in the Christian revelation that symbol is freely used. It expresses not only intellectual quality, but perfection generally. The word *Spirit* has come to be so identified with the conception of God as incorporeal, immaterial, personal, that we are ready to forget that it, too, is a symbol. Its primary meaning is wind, breath, and so life. In the Old and the New Testament alike there is the tendency to distinguish soul as man's life, and spirit as God's, and man's only as dependent on God. Paul's distinction between the psychical and the pneumatic man is a notable illustration. Here the symbol seems to convey more of the reality than do the others.

What at first sight might appear a digression but which is fully justified is found in the two lectures on *The Wrath of God*. We are here warned against the false anthropomorphism: the human passions, resentment, vindictiveness, revenge must be eliminated from the symbol; but the true anthropomorphism allows us to work out an analogy between the human moral judgment regarding desert and punishment. While I am in substantial agreement with the author's conclusions, I must confess I should have welcomed more stress on God's grace. These nineteen lectures belong to what we may call the comparative study of religions, the five which follow to the philosophy of religion, or we might even say, the epistemology.

The eleventh lecture shows how early religious thought took literally what is now taken symbolically; and yet insists that not all the Scripture record,

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especially the New Testament, can be regarded thus; for Christian faith affirms not only that Jesus was historically real, but that He is still present and active in the souls of men. The next lecture treats symbols without conceptual meaning. There are three main kinds of emotion called forth in this way by visible objects—the feeling of the beautiful, the sexual feeling, and the germinal feeling of religious awe (pp. 275–6). Interesting as is the discussion here, it need not be followed in detail.

The four lectures following are a progressive consideration of the grounds on which belief in the reality corresponding to the symbol may be based. Recognizing that the *pragmatic theory* may serve a useful purpose in man's dealings with inanimate nature, and is indeed derived therefrom, it is held to fall through in personal relations with man or God. In the one case we are concerned with results, in the other with the personal reality. When the personal relation is love, as in Christianity, pragmatism is unsatisfying. That we cannot know God as we can know our fellow-men, however, must be admitted. Can analogy lead us from the one to the other? How much truth can that yield? Less probably than medieval theology claimed, even although that same theology also recognized that even thus God cannot be fully known. A lecture is devoted to discuss Dean Mansie as representing the agnostic tendency in Anglican theology, though modified by his insistence on the authority of the revelation of God in the Holy Scriptures.

The values of Mysticism and Rationalism are next considered as approaches to the divine reality. While appreciating the testimony of the mystics to the reality of God, the author holds that there must be besides "some ground in our apprehensiveness of things." His judgment on Rationalism is negative: "No cogent rational inference can be made from the world to what is outside it" (p. 363). The justification for Belief is shown in the last lecture to lie in acceptance of, and loyalty to, human values, in rejecting the hypotheses that the world around man is indifferent to values, and in making the venture of faith, which will find its verification, that God cares for these values. Such a justification can be offered in relief of doubt; but the last ground of belief is this: "What actually causes anyone to believe in God is direct perception of the Divine." This bare outline may, I hope, whet the appetite of the reader to seek for himself the "feast of fat things" provided in the volume.

A. E. GARVIE.

The Principles of Art. By R. G. COLLINGWOOD. (Oxford at the Clarendon Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 1938. Pp. xi + 347. Price 15s.)

This book, as I understand it, expounds without deviation Croce's theory that art is the expression of emotion. But it does expound it, and implements it with serious discussions of what is meant by emotion, imagination, expression, intuition, and by the identification of the last two, so that what had been a striking inspiration, summing up the vague hints of a hundred predecessors, becomes a reasoned creed. One can imagine the book written as a Platonic dialogue, with Croce as protagonist, often cornered, sometimes corrected, but fundamentally triumphant. Dr. I. A. Richards and Mr. Bernard Shaw would evidently have been cast for minor but picturesque parts.

The epistemological lacunas in Croce are supplied by detailed consideration of Hume's distinction between impressions and ideas; of Kant's "blind but indispensable function of imagination" in perception; of modern doctrines of *sensa*; of psychological theories of unconscious emotions and their repression or release.

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The history offered by Professor Collingwood of the genesis of art seems to be as follows. First, on the "psychic" level there is an impression or *sensum*, of which we are unconscious, but which, by analysis of what we later make out of it, we know to have consisted in an undifferentiated mass of sensation, such as a visual field with a scarlet patch in the centre, a lot of noise and a gripping sensation. Such a mass of sensation is always "charged with emotion," also unconscious, or with several undifferentiated emotions such as pain and panic. This emotion symptomizes or "psychically" (physiologically?) expresses itself in cringing, grimacing, howling, and the like. The next stage is the elevation of this total impression or part of it, by an act of attention or "imagination" to a conscious "idea." In this act we become conscious both of a *sensum* and of our sensing of it. And the *sensum* thus brought before consciousness is again always charged with emotion, this time conscious and consciously ours, such as anger, love, or grief, and these conscious emotions are, in becoming conscious, expressed not only "psychically," as before, by blushing and weeping, but also "linguistically" or consciously by words, tones, gestures, colours, shapes, and so on, perhaps imagined, perhaps real; but not identical with the *sensa* or ideas charged with the emotion thus expressed. If real, they afford a means of communication, from which an audience may recreate in themselves the original aesthetic process. There are, then, no unexpressed conscious emotions; it is one act which both creates the conscious idea with its emotion out of the psychical impression with its unconscious emotion, and also generates the linguistic out of the "psychical" expression. We have just said that the colours, words, tones, or shapes which "linguistically" express the conscious emotion may be real or imaginary. But we are told that they are not yet really either, or at least cannot be thought to be either, till a further process has taken place. This is "intellection," by which we "interpret" ideas (which, unlike impressions, can be held before the mind for the purpose) and "apprehend or construct" their relations, and according to those relations denominate them real, imaginary, or hallucinations.

To judge anything to be real is to apprehend or construct relations of one *sensum* to others; we *mean* by reality a *sensum* related to others in certain ways.

A reviewer may pick out two points in all this for discussion: (1) Was Hume, as Professor Collingwood asserts, really mistaken in thinking that among conscious experiences there is an initial difference, which he vaguely described as being that of greater vivacity, in what he accordingly calls impressions, than in ideas? Is there not, in fact, an immediate difference between the experience we take to be seeing pink or feeling anger and that which we take to be imagining pink or anger? No doubt when we have come to reflect upon an experience of pinkness and its relations, we often have to admit that what we took to be seeing pink, say a pink rat, was really an hallucination, and we perhaps might, in certain illnesses, mistake seeing rats for imagining them. (I doubt if we could mistake feeling angry for imaginary anger or *vice versa*.) Surely we should not call these corrected experiences hallucinations rather than memories or imaginations, unless there had been that initial difference, called by Hume greater vivacity, which led us *prima facie* to mistake them.

(2) Professor Collingwood opposes art to craft (as distinguished from bad art), with which the Greeks confused it, craft being the taking of means to a clearly conceived end. And the two crafts most commonly confused with art are what he calls "magic," that is the deliberate inducement of emotion which will issue in action, and "entertainment," which, by representation of natural things or *states of mind*, induces emotions, welcomed for their own

sakes. Most so-called "works of art" apparently come under one or other of these crafts, including the representational arts of sculpture, painting, epic and tragedy, which Plato banned, and the "magic" or religious art he might allow, though either of these might incidentally have an element of real art too. Almost the only works, apart from some music, to which the title of true art is unreservedly allowed are those of Jane Austen, T. S. Eliot, and Cézanne. But this is probably an accident, as few works are named at all, and those mostly contemporary, with the confessed aim of reforming our practice. Certainly we all feel the differences between art and amusement, between art and imitation, and between art and the *stimulation* of emotion. But the identification of these differences with one between the expression of emotion (which expression is then communicated) and the deliberate communication of emotion is difficult. Since the view is that we know nothing of emotions until expressed, any design to communicate them must presuppose that we have expressed them, so that what we design to communicate is the expression of an emotion; and that apparently is the true artist's design when he prints or exhibits. The examples of the things distinguished do not fortify the distinction. Miss Ruth Draper is cited as a typical entertainer or pseudo-artist. But I am persuaded that my experiences in hearing her and in reading Jane Austen, however different in degree, are essentially of the same kind. If I am right, either Professor Collingwood has mistaken one of his experiences, or one of his is really different from mine. But if he and I can be severally stimulated by the same communication to an aesthetic and an unaesthetic activity, his fundamental doctrine that criticism can be objective is shaken. It may be true, as he says, that we know the performer is not talking nonsense, but he may insist that she is talking entertainment and I, with equal obstinacy, that she is talking art. The same point may be approached in another way.

Professor Collingwood correctly points out that many critics of Plato, myself among them, have inaccurately said that all artists would be banished from his Republic, whereas the expression generally is "all mimetic artists," and he reminds us that Plato would retain "magical" poetry and music as propaganda for his guardians, and that he does not conceive of any third or genuine kind. This I think is what we always meant. Plato banished art *as such*, all expression of emotion (or the communication of such expression) that has no ulterior aim. He would only retain "pseudo-art." He clearly banishes all sculpture and painting, and tragedy and epic *ὅσα ποιητικώτερα τὸ σόφισμα ἢ τὸν ἀκουστέον*. I doubt if he would have retained Jane Austen, or Mr. Eliot or Cézanne. I believe that, thinking the essence of these arts to be imitation (a belief perhaps explicable from the developments of draughtmanship in his lifetime), he thought them only justifiable if they imitated *κάλα*, a word under which he loosely included moral and aesthetic excellence. For, as we are told in the *Hippias Major*, what is beautiful is either good or productive of good. The "non-imitative" arts he admits as, one way or the other, good. But Professor Collingwood denies that either *καλόν* or "beauty" has any intrinsic connection with aesthetic experience. "To call a thing beautiful in Greek, whether ordinary or philosophical Greek, is simply to call it admirable or excellent or desirable." If this is so, I find it hard to understand why Socrates is represented as saying: "Whatever gives us pleasure, *not any sort of pleasure*, but pleasure of the eye or ear, is beautiful. For surely, Hippias, beautiful men and colour-patterns and pictures and statues please us when we see them; and beautiful voices and all music and poetry and prose and legendary stories have the same effect. . . . Nobody would not laugh at us if we called food and sweet smells beautiful instead of

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pleasant." Nor do I see how Aristotle could have said that beauty consisted *ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει* or that its essentials are order, symmetry, and definition. Similarly, Professor Collingwood maintains that "the words *beauty*, *beautiful*, as actually used, have no aesthetic implication," and that we speak of a beautiful grilled steak with just the same literal propriety as of a beautiful sky or poem. This is a question of usage, and it seems sufficient to reply that Johnson's dictionary (4th edition) defines beauty as "that assemblage of graces or proportion of parts which pleases the eye," and quotes Locke: "Beauty consists of a certain composition of colour and figure, causing delight in the beholder." Certainly the *O.E.D.* further allows that "in modern colloquial use (e.g. 1868) the word is often applied to anything that a person likes very much, e.g. a beautiful soup." But when Keats said "beauty is truth," and Coleridge spoke of the "beautiful and beauty-making power," or Burke of the Sublime and Beautiful, I do not believe they could guess that they would be thought to allude to a quality eminently possessed by any grilled beef-steak. Even if I were wrong here, I should still urge that we need a word (perhaps "comely" or "fair") for the character we *prima facie* attribute alike to the clouds, faces, poems, patterns, statues which stimulate our aesthetic activities, but not to steaks however well grilled; though second thoughts might lead me to agree that the common character belongs only to the experience these things are apt to stimulate, though steaks are not. It is noteworthy that Professor Collingwood thinks the "*art of cookery*" an improper use of the word, though used it certainly is.

This brings us back to our original criticism. For why is Professor Collingwood so anxious to press the apparently verbal point that "beautiful" is not a term properly used both for the natural things and also for the paintings, poems, tunes, which alike stimulate us to aesthetic experience? Surely because he sees that whether natural things so stimulate us depends on what they mean for us, or rather on what we can make them mean; depends, that is to say, much on ourselves—on our age, sex, climate, race, religion, colour, upbringing, and culture. Consequently there is not, as Hegel supposed, an objective aesthetic quality in nature. But Professor Collingwood wants to maintain that the appreciation of art does not so depend, but that criticism can be objective. And by this he means not only that the artist really has (or has not) an aesthetic experience, but that this is so incarnate in the physical things—colours, shapes, words, tones—by which he completes and publishes his aesthetic experience, that we can be sure of either knowing it, or else of knowing that he did not really have one. But we cannot become aware of these physical things except by expressing our own unconscious *sensa* (with their emotional charges) as conscious ideas and then "relating them" into real objects. So we cannot perceive a Cézanne or a Frith picture until we have had an aesthetic experience. Why, then, should we judge that one painter had an aesthetic experience and not the other? How can the aesthetic experience, to which I am stimulated by seeing a Cézanne, possibly resemble the artist's? Mine is created out of my *sensa* and unconscious emotions occasioned by the physical things in which he expressed linguistically his *sensa* and unconscious emotions. But his *sensa* were occasioned by something quite different, namely physical things in which no emotion had yet been expressed. The theory of objective criticism presupposes that we know whether a physical thing expresses another artist's emotion or not. How is this possible since, in becoming aware of any picture, we have always expressed our own emotions occasioned by its effect on our senses, while the artist embodied in it the expression of his own emotions which had a quite different origin? Only if the presentation of the picture to my senses should occasion in me *sensa*

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and emotions which I should then express linguistically in those very same *sensa*, i.e. in the colour-pattern of the picture. But, on this theory, the *sensa* which are charged with an emotion could not possibly be the linguistic expression of that emotion. Otherwise the aesthetic activity would be otiose.

Again, if, *per impossible*, I could hear Chinese music or *Sweeney Among the Nightingales* without having an aesthetic experience, would that prove the composers had none? Or if I do have one in seeing palæolithic paintings, does it prove they had?

To sum up this criticism, I cannot understand how the theory of the genesis of an aesthetic experience is consistent with the objectivity of criticism.

Besides his philosophical and artistic qualifications, Professor Collingwood is a distinguished ancient historian; and clearly there is a good deal of ancient history in this book—of the race, about savages; of the individual, about babies; of ideas, about their unconscious growth. The last two are connected with his main doctrine of expression. He maintains that a baby first makes such a sound as "Hatoff," not because it understands it as the name of an action or thing, but as an expression of triumph. My own observation leads me to conjecture that babies understand the meaning of some sounds like "Hat" or "Wash" and look for the object or try to make the motion before making any similar sounds themselves.

The historical excursus on savages, which is long, seems only necessary as a justification of the queer use of the word "magic" to mean practices which "when intelligently used" are designed to encourage ourselves or to alarm others into doing something, not to alter the course of nature. But I am told by theologians this is unorthodox sacramentalism. As my observation of babies is different, so my acquaintance with savages is little, and with my unconscious self *nil*. But I know a man who put his sick baby through a split sapling towards the sunrise. This I call magic, though it could hardly encourage the baby, and not himself unless he already believed that the act would cure it. And in the church of Cascob, in Radnorshire, is an eighteenth-century charm professing to safeguard Elizabeth Loyd from "desises" by the words "Pater Pater Pater Noster Noster Noster Ave Ave Ave . . . XOn XAdonay X Tetragrammaton Jehovah . . . Abracadabra (repeated twelve times one letter shorter each time) Jah" and the signs of the zodiac. This I call magic, and it would only encourage Elizabeth if she already thought it was. No doubt there is much virtue in being "intelligently used."

It seems a pity that in what is perhaps the most serious attempt at a philosophy of art in our language, our attention should be diverted by what looks like a wilful perversity. But perhaps it is only ancient history for the use of philosophers, and on such matters "it is better to confine ourselves to myths, owing to our ignorance of where truth lies about the dark ages." Or, as Croce confesses of his own genetic of art: "Really there was no such matter; it has only been postulated for convenience of exposition."

E. F. CARRITT.

The Intelligent Individual and Society. By P. W. BRIDGMAN, Hollis Professor of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy in Harvard University. (New York and London: The Macmillan Company. 1938. Pp. vi + 305. Price 10s. 6d.)

In 1927 Professor Bridgman wrote an excellent book entitled *The Logic of Modern Physics*, in which he developed the view that the new situation in physics demands corresponding changes in our attitude to logic. He advo-

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cated what he called an "operational" theory of concepts. To give an account of a concept, it is necessary to describe an operation or set of operations, the performance of which will lead to particular experiences relevant to the concept; and if no such operations can be described, the concept is meaningless. The operations need not be exclusively physical: they include mental attitudes, and the use of language. But Professor Bridgman feels that an operational analysis is not ultimately satisfactory unless there is some element of what he calls "objective control," a term which I think involves some reference to physical experiment. At any rate he is suspicious of any concept which can be described only in terms of mental attitudes and verbal operations, whatever may be the states of mind which result, and, it seems even, whatever may be the pattern of behaviour which results. But this last point would call for a good deal of discussion. It is, he thinks, common for groups of people to engage in mutual verbal operations, which result in states of mind satisfactory to the members, often including intense convictions; but in so far as a group is content with verbal operations and their mental consequences, without any operations which involve physical control of a different sort, it is not applying what he would call a proper operational technique. He would, indeed, describe its activities as mystical. Most philosophies and all religions are for him mystical in this sense. He would not go so far as to call their operations meaningless. He calls them "footless" (78). Under this word Webster's dictionary quotes Tennyson's line, "Dreadful wastes where footless fancies dwell." and though I do not think that Professor Bridgman had this quotation explicitly in mind, it expresses fairly well the general atmosphere of the word.

The principles and conceptions which are ordinarily held to underlie the structure of society, when subjected to Professor Bridgman's operational test, fail. The greater part of the language used about duty, right, property, morality, justice, the state as a super-entity, etc., turns out on examination to be footless verbalism, which is useful in a fairly homogeneous social medium, as a means by which society can put pressure on not very intelligent people and force them to act in such a way as to preserve the social homogeneity; but intelligent people habituated to the operational technique will cease to be taken in by it.

Having shown this, Professor Bridgman deals with the question, what a society would be like if it were thoroughly penetrated by an operational technique, and what would be its chances of survival. The results may be briefly summarized. Each individual is the ultimate court of appeal as regards his own conduct. Being intelligent, he would want to make as good a job as possible of the problem of dealing intelligently with his own drives—"the drives that make me go"—other individuals being quite justified in dealing with him by force if the functioning of his drives brought him into conflict with them, and if they as intelligent individuals decided that this was the most satisfactory way of dealing with the situation. In the main, life would probably go rather more smoothly than it does now, since many of the conflicts and worries of life to-day arise more because (for footless reasons) people are not willing to live and let live than because of any genuine physical incompatibility between their various activities. Education would not be devoted so much to getting people to conform to certain standard patterns as to providing "the technique for criticism and modification of the drives," leaving "the specific drives as much as possible to the individual" (296). The individual, that is to say, would be encouraged to envisage as fully and as delicately as possible all the consequences of his behaving in such and such a way (including the various reactions of his fellows); but when that had

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been done, he would have to be left to it, because footless appeals would no longer work.

The consequences of such an operational technique are not anything like what a "mystically minded" reader may be tempted to suppose, since the course of training which leads to operation-mindedness has effects on character likely to make for rather than against a satisfactory type of society. That is why I think that this view could perhaps be called "operational liberalism." Liberalism, as Bagehot said about Whiggism, is not a creed, it is a character; and I think that Professor Bridgman's whole book is inspired by the feeling that the constant effort to discover the truth in a scientific laboratory produces a discipline of mind and of character which qualifies for "citizenship" of a far higher order than that produced by the current "mystical" training. Not that he would insist that everybody be put to scientific research; but he feels that the life and outlook of the scientist could provide the inspiration for a better society than any existing at present.

But I must leave readers to look it up for themselves.

L. J. RUSSELL.

Studies in Hume's Ethics. By INGEMAR HEDENIUS (Uppsala and Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksells Boktryckeri-A.-B. Repr. from Adolf Phalén in *Memoriam*, 1937. Pp. 388-485. Price 4s.)

This short work is not intended as a systematic exposition of Hume's ethical theory. But the topics with which it is concerned are so central that it in fact combines something of the virtues of a general discussion with the careful and detailed elaboration of its special theme. Dr. Hedenius distinguishes two fundamental problems in Hume's moral philosophy. First comes "an examination of what is common and peculiar, on the one hand, to the qualities that are universally stated to be virtues, on the other hand to the so-called vices." And in the second place, "a psychological inquiry must be made into the approval and the disapproval that qualities must necessarily receive if they are to be characterized as virtues and vices respectively." Dr. Hedenius' long discussion of "Artificial Virtue" corresponds to the former of these problems (the connection here is a little thin, since it is on the artificiality rather than the virtuousness of justice that Dr. Hedenius concentrates): the latter is dealt with in the concluding section on "The Valuation of the Useful."

Hume's difficulty about justice is that he takes it seriously, but does not allow for motives adequate to account for it. "The only motive for acts of justice in society is the sense of duty": but, Hume holds, the sense of duty cannot be an *original* motive, and that is precisely why justice is an artificial and not a natural virtue. Thus we are left with the (insoluble) problem of "explaining how partial affections can have been inspired by an impartial end." Dr. Hedenius shows judgment and subtlety in tracing out the various tendencies in the vague and not very coherent theory that constitutes Hume's treatment of this problem. And if a doubt may be felt whether he is not at times needlessly elaborate, at least he seems to make good his case that some earlier interpretations have over-simplified Hume's position.

As regards the second theme of Hume's ethics, Dr. Hedenius brings out well the difference between Hume and Hutcheson. For Hume moral consciousness is just a special case of a general psychological principle of sympathy, and thus Hume could claim, as Hutcheson could not, to be "explaining" the moral judgment. Unfortunately this explanatory value is lost unless at the same time moral sympathy can be *distinguished* from other sympathy, and

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there Hume completely failed. There is, moreover, another difficulty in regard to the "useful" virtues for the view that sympathy constitutes moral approval. The approval must be for the virtue itself, but the sympathy can only be with the happiness that results from it. Hume himself appears to have been hardly aware of a problem here: but Dr. Hedenius (who rejects Vaughan's interpretation as applying rather to Adam Smith's theory than to Hume's) offers a partial solution of it in terms of Hume's own doctrine of a double association of ideas and impressions.

Dr. Hedenius concludes his essay with a discussion where, so it appears to me, his usual discretion deserts him. It turns on what he calls the "popular" conception of cause and effect, and involves the odd conclusion that Utilitarianism specifically, whatever may be true of moral theory generally, presupposes the idea of the freedom of the will. I must confess that some of the argument of this section appears to me merely sophistical.

But so far as exposition of Hume is concerned this is a sensible and suggestive work. I must add, however, that it could have been easier reading: there is a certain clumsiness in the movement of the argument and a failure to make quite clear the relation between its stages (particularly in the section on "Artificial Virtue") that might prevent a reader profiting as he should from Dr. Hedenius' scholarly and acute study.

W. G. MACLAGAN.

Kierkegaard. By WALTER LOWRIE, D.D. (London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1938. Pp. xviii + 636. Price 25s. net.)

The importance of Søren Kierkegaard, as the primary inspirer both of the "existential philosophy" and of certain contemporary movements in theology, is being increasingly realized, but as yet few of his extensive writings are available in English. (The Oxford University Press, in collaboration with the American Scandinavian Foundation, is publishing certain translations, of which the *Philosophical Fragments* has appeared.) We can therefore be grateful to Dr. Lowrie for an extremely full and careful study of Kierkegaard's life, illustrated with copious quotations from his writings. He has given us a comprehensive biography rather than a critical study of the philosophical and theological significance of Kierkegaard's work. For this the time is probably not yet ripe; but a book such as Dr. Lowrie's forms an indispensable preliminary. For if the "existential philosophy" is an attempt to grapple with the kind of thinking which cannot be done in the spectator's attitude of objective detachment, since the personality of the thinker is bound up in it, his biography, written with sympathetic imagination, plays an essential part in understanding his thought. Dr. Lowrie has given us such a biography of Kierkegaard, and the very interesting portraits which he reproduces are not the least revealing part of it.

It is a misfortune that Kierkegaard did not write in one of the major European languages, for then he might have been answered in his own day, and (as Dr. Haecker remarks¹), what is more important, he might have replied. As it was, his thought was either overlooked, or, while he himself saw it as a "corrective," it was taken by one-sided disciples as a comprehensive view. He himself did not look for disciples, but he would no doubt have welcomed the "sympathetic antipathy" which, as Dr. Lowrie says, he arouses in his few discerning interpreters. They have to fight with him to retain their own positions. Probably his real contribution lies in his power

¹ In his *Søren Kierkegaard* (Oxford University Press), the best short study of Kierkegaard known to me.

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of bringing us to a certain attitude in metaphysics and theology, rather than in the particular content of his thought. He has discovered the weaknesses of the theoretic attitude of indecision and the necessity for the would-be philosopher to realize actual freedom as the capacity of a self-conscious subject to make responsible choices. In the *Grenzsituationen* in which such choices are called for, the thinker can become consciously aware of the contradictions within his own nature, the possibilities before him, and the kinds of authority which he finally recognizes. Kierkegaard described this total experience as "choice of oneself." The Nazi apologists are giving us a travesty of such "*Existenz*" in their insistence on the right of decision of the sacred nation, responsible to nothing but its own inner destiny. To Kierkegaard "choice of oneself" meant a personal venture of the individual soul before God. In this he plumbed some of the same depths as Augustine and Pascal. But to him, as perhaps to them (and to his contemporary, and in some ways kindred spirit, Cardinal Newman), the individual soul before God was a reality so exclusively "luminous" that he throws little light on the ways in which personal existential consciousness develops in responsive communication with others. Here he has been supplemented, with considerable psychological penetration, by Jaspers.

None of these books makes easy reading. It is of the essence of the dialectical philosophy of personality that almost everything that you can say about it must at once be qualified and countered by saying something like the opposite. In lesser hands this may well be an excuse for contradicting oneself and having it both ways; but in a thinker of real psychological and religious penetration it may be the method of saying anything significant about something as paradoxical as human existence.

I have noticed one misquotation in Dr. Lowrie's book. Burke's "Vice itself lost half its evil by losing all its grossness" appears on p. 117 as "Vice gaining more of evil by losing half its grossness." This rendering is a contradiction of the original saying which can hardly be defended as "dialectical."

DOROTHY M. EMMET.

Philosophy and the Concepts of Modern Science. By OLIVER L. REISER. (New York and London: Macmillan Co., 1935. Pp. xvii + 323. Price 15s.)

Professor Reiser is concerned about the state of human affairs. Intellectually, the development of physics has produced antinomies which he thinks are a logical scandal. Practically, we pass from economic crises to political despotism, and possibly to war. There seems to be collapse or regression in all spheres. The scientists have given us power but not knowledge, and they have neglected human nature. It is for the philosopher to co-ordinate scientific results, discover the general principles of human activity, including knowledge, indicate how to restore the intellectual prestige of science, and to apply its results to human welfare. One may share much of Professor Reiser's concern while being doubtful about his philosophical programme. Certainly its results are disappointing. Professor Reiser regards his book, *inter alia*, as a refutation of logical positivism, but he might study with advantage the methods of the logical positivists. The great defect of his book is a complete absence of any logical and critical distinction between types of problem and their appropriate treatment. He accepts, e.g., quite uncritically all statements of scientists, whether they are philosophizing about "dual" tables or stating, qua scientists, the results of research. He has a passion for facts which he scatters lavishly throughout his pages, and frequently, though interesting,

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they are quite irrelevant. Consequently, he offers speculative scientific hypotheses as the solution of philosophical problems, to which they are inappropriate. Nor does he seem to realize that even to a scientific problem such hypotheses are useless unless some means of testing them is indicated. This typical confusion of problems is shown in his treatment of the intellectual "crisis" in science. He regards it entirely (p. 57) as a conflict between physics and the laws of thought since physicists regard the electron both as a wave and a corpuscle, and so deny the law of contradiction. He gives no analysis of what it can mean to say that physics "conflicts" with the laws of thought. Nor does he mention such other philosophical problems as the analysis or re-definition of such concepts as "cause," "space," "time," "prediction," "determination" required by the Heisenberg principle. Indeed, he accepts without discussion the distinction between *dynamical* and *statistical* laws. Incidentally, he describes the first as "causal and necessary," and the second as "probable or contingent" (p. xii), which is inexcusable in any philosopher since Hume. But the "crisis" is due, he thinks, to the unsolved problem of the relation between physical facts and consciousness, i.e. between brain and mental states. He then elaborates hypotheses of physical causes or parallels for conscious processes, suggesting consciousness as a dimension of physical space (p. 173), as a chemical reaction caused by radiation (p. 158), and the laws of logic as similar to the laws of light (p. 118). He treats the "crisis," i.e., as a *scientific* problem. But whatever his suggestions are worth scientifically as explanations of the physical causes of consciousness, they are utterly irrelevant to the philosophical problem of the definition of scientific terms and the relation between logic and physics.

Part 2, on Philosophy and the Social Sciences, includes discussions of history, ethics, religion, and social reform. Much is made of "emergent evolution," though we are not given much help with the use of that blessed word "emerge," which remains as misty as ever. Professor Reiser has some valuable things to say by the way, however, on the need for social change. The last chapter on "The Social Objectives of Humanism" is particularly interesting, though it strikes a European as somewhat optimistic.

MARGARET MACDONALD.

Science and Common Sense: An Aristotelian Excursion. By W. R. THOMPSON, F.R.S. With a Preface by JACQUES MARITAIN. (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1937. Pp. vii+233. Price 7s. 6d.)

The principal thesis of this book, the work of a distinguished biologist and more than amateur philosopher, is briefly that those who seek knowledge of nature can neither cut loose from common sense, nor dispense in the long run with philosophy. The defence of this position entails a critique of knowledge in general, and a survey of the principles and methods employed in the sciences, particularly in physics and biology. If this programme seems a trifle hackneyed—and we must admit that it is not novel—it must at once be emphasized that the author's treatment of his theme raises it from this condition. The "ideological context" of the discussion is French neo-scholasticism: it is indeed, as its sub-title remarks, an Aristotelian excursion.

Common Sense includes (is equivalent to?) what Dr. Thompson calls "normal logic" and the "primary intention of the senses." "Scientific method," he observes, "is not the test of our intuition of the universe; it is our intuition of the universe that is the test of scientific method" (p. 52). If the physicist finds himself at odds with, let us say, the principle of contradiction, or with

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our intuition of space as three dimensional, and of time as yielding a genuine simultaneity, then it is the physicist, and not logic or common sense, which must yield. "... if in some of their recent flights, men of science have thought to give practical proof of the liberation of Science from the bonds of Common Sense, it is evident that they are entertaining an illusion" (p. 26).

Physics, he argues in effect, escaped from the fire of philosophy only to fall into the frying-pan of mathematics. Thus physicists have turned from their proper field—the sensibly apprehensible—and from their proper method—induction—to embrace deductions which are in principle incapable of adding to, or correcting their knowledge of nature. "The mathematical machine works with unerring precision; but what we get out of it is nothing more than a rearrangement of what we put into it."

Not only physicists, it appears, have been thus seduced from their true calling, but the biologists also. These, too, have attempted by deductions from generalizations, e.g. about form and function, to achieve knowledge of the detail of nature without going to the labour of investigating it.

The greater part of his long chapter on *The Use and Abuse of Philosophy* is devoted to a subtle and valuable discussion of finalism, its modes, and its role in science. Bacon's attitude to final causes, he maintains, has been falsified by the foundation upon finalistic principles of whole branches of science. *Intrinsic* finality may, he agrees, be adequate to the needs of biology, but on philosophical grounds he argues for a wider finalism. The general (and timely) trend of this section is toward an Aristotelian explanation of things in their causes—all *four causes*, not merely in their *efficient* causes, and still less in a mathematical equation from which even the efficient cause has been eliminated.

Dr. Thompson concludes with a criticism of the doctrine of evolution. This capital hypothesis is now treated coldly by many biologists since its essentially philosophical character has been understood. On the evidential side, too, it would appear to be in serious case. "It seems certain," he observes, "that there has been *some* evolution, but we cannot decide upon *a priori* principles how much. Natural science has no key to this problem" (p. 212). As to the mode of such evolution as may justly be supposed, the only certitude is that Darwin's account in terms of an infinity of minute variations is untenable on the evidence, most of which, on the contrary, tells in favour of a mutation hypothesis in its older (or large scale) form. The author cites some quite plain evidence telling in favour of the supposedly extinct Lamarckian view. Yet "none of the evolutionary hypotheses now available permits a satisfactory integration of the facts." To the biological laity Dr. Thompson's illustrations drawn from his own field are likely to prove as interesting as they are fresh and arresting.

After several readings, however, I am not clear as to just what relation the author does take to obtain between natural science and philosophy. Of philosophy he remarks very early that it is a deductive study of "*Being as such*." But, we may ask, what can be added to that which our Father Parmenides said of *Being as such*? And where do evolutionary views (which are conceded to be philosophical) stand in relation to such a philosophy? It would appear that there is, on this view, an intermediate, a kind of natural philosophy, between the natural sciences (which deal inductively with the sensible) and metaphysics (which treats deductively of Being as such).

The author, like most neo-scholastics, discloses (e.g. when referring to "a primordial metaphysical necessity as inevitable as the principle of contradiction" (p. 223)) a surprising assurance at points where, to the uninited, doubt does not appear mere impiety to reason or, indeed, to Common

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Sense. Certainly there is much in this book which many will want to question; but no less certainly there is much which most readers at all concerned about science or philosophy will find suggestive. The brevity of this notice ought not to be taken as the measure of its value.

RALPH E. STEDMAN.

Guide to the Philosophy of Morals and Politics. By C. E. M. JOAD. (London: Gollancz, Ltd., 1938. Pp. 816. Price 6s. net.)

This is a fatter guide than Dr. Joad's last, but he is, I think, even a better talker, and that is saying a great deal. The responsibilities of success seem to have improved his quality. He popularizes, but he does not vulgarize, and it is the gusto and vitality of his exposition that, in the main, carries the reader on.

The plan of exposition is simple and captivating. Ethics and politics, we are told, went together in the writings of Plato and of Aristotle. They parted company during some critical centuries of the modern period, but in the present century have revived a very close companionship.

This story may be over-simplified. Dr. Joad's short account of "the split" seems to me to be rather shaky. Protestantism as a historical phenomenon cannot be identified with individualism. It was largely political, even in a secular sense, and Dr. Joad's opinion (p. 134) that the political theory of the Middle Ages has few merits might, I think, be vigorously disputed. That, however, is a minor point.

Dr. Joad begins with a most spirited account of the immortal argument of the *Republic*, Book II, and he seems to me to stick resolutely to his programme of using the discussion of Socratic-Platonic theory as a means of eliciting the logic of civil philosophy. I do not think so highly of what he says about Aristotle, but that may be only my misfortune. In the second part of his book he deals with ethics (after the "split"), in the third with politics, in the fourth with the "reunion" of ethics and politics in fascism, communism, idealistic theory, and the (relatively) free democracies. I cannot, of course, review all the bigger points he raises. His method, on the whole, is detailed rather than impressionistic. He sketches, but tries to avoid sketchiness. Still, I can make some observations.

I find Part II rather unsatisfactory. That, in part, may be bad luck for me. If Dr. Joad is right in his exposition of the authors I have studied most closely, I should have to unlearn rather a lot. That, of course, need not upset anyone except myself, and it would not in any case entitle me to be suspicious of what Dr. Joad says about matters with which I am less familiar. I can, however, make some more general comments. Dr. Joad is fairly liberal with quotations, but he very seldom gives the references. One sympathizes with his desire to avoid masses of footnotes, but anyone who wants to explore the context of the passages quoted, or (in very rare cases, I think) may be suspicious about their verbal accuracy, is asked to do rather too much. Again Dr. Joad as an expositor is frequently inclined to use his own illustrations instead of his authors' illustrations, and I frequently found some difficulty in distinguishing between the voice of the expositor and the voice of the author.

These are small points in themselves, although they have some importance for a class of persons who may be interested in the matter, namely, teachers of ethics. A more serious objection, I think, is that although Dr. Joad plays a skilful and vigorous game, he has marked out the courts much less skilfully

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(or so I think). His main principles of subdivision are (a) objective and subjective, (b) intuitionist and utilitarian. This should yield four classes, although a statement of Dr. Joad's on p. 159 may indicate that in his opinion cross-division is unavoidable. In any case I do not think he is at all successful in avoiding cross-division. The reason, I think, is the mixture of history and logic in his exposition, and the looseness in which he seems to be content to leave some of his terms. "Intuition," for him, is almost as vague as it is in common usage. It includes (a) alleged rational insight into deontology, (b) the "moral sense" in its usual historical sense, (c) the sense in which it may be held that hedonism rests upon the intuition that pleasure is good in itself. It also includes much else. In short, it is much too accommodating to yield a clear white line. "Subjective" and "objective" are also notoriously slippery terms, but Mr. Joad's use of them seems to me to be quite obviously confused. In explaining what he means he refers first of all to the objectivity of the external world (p. 159)—which seems irrelevant—later (p. 163) to the "subjectivity" of opinion. The latter is his usual ground of distinction, but he persistently misinterprets it as may be seen, very clearly, from one of his statements on p. 387. "If subjectivism is correct," he there says, "X is good" means "X produces a feeling of approval in me," or "X conduces to my advantage." Plainly the second sense is wholly objective. Similarly on pp. 316-317 Dr. Joad maintains quite falsely that a utilitarian ethics of actual consequences is open to the objection that it implies that it is sometimes our duty to do a wrong action. The reason he gives is that it is wrong to let a drowning man perish, since his life "may reasonably be expected" to be better than his death, and yet that if the rescued person subsequently beats his wife and murders his children he would have been better drowned. If the objectivist makes duty a matter of (reasonable) opinion, and rightness a matter of actual consequences (that is, if he distinguishes the two), he is immune from logical objection. If he identifies right with duty and duty with actual beneficent consequences, then, plainly, what might be reasonably expected to be right need not be right. (This example shows incidentally that it may be very important to distinguish between a mere personal feeling and a well-grounded opinion.)

In this Part Dr. Joad has most interest in the problems of free will and of ultimate value. I regret that I have space for brief comment only. Regarding the first, he concludes "that if the moral faculties . . . are feeling or akin to feeling, then the task of vindicating free will is wellnigh impossible; if on the other hand they are reason or akin to reason, then moral freedom may be plausibly maintained." It is plain that "freedom" in quite important senses (e.g. a certain capacity to do what one likes) escapes this conclusion, and I have not found much positive support for the conclusion in Dr. Joad's pages with the exception of two of them (which I think very true), namely, pp. 273-274. In his discussion of absolute value Dr. Joad seems to me to offer too general a conclusion to hearten him in what (as I surmise) he really wants to do, that is, to support his contention that men and women are the only bearers of the higher values, and therefore that totalitarianism in politics is insecurely based in comparison with a democratic ethos in the community. In his summary on p. 446 he appears to be advocating a theory of progress towards totalitarian pantheism.

Part III deals on rather stereotyped lines with the doctrines of the social contract, sovereignty, natural rights, and the like. It ends with a chapter on the idealistic theory of the State that leads towards Part IV. In Part III the guide seems to me to do his job very usefully; but I shall pass to Part IV.

I have already mentioned the chief topics of this Part. His discussion of

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them seems to me to be the best part of his book. The method employed, partly no doubt because so much historical discussion has preceded it, is freer than in the earlier books; but it is a gain to avoid even the appearance of tension between logic and erudition. (I hasten to add that I do not mean that the discussion is ill-informed. The reverse seems to me to be true.)

The author's determination to be impartial and to indicate clearly where he is pressing some view of his own is more difficult to preserve about contemporary affairs than in discussion of the preterite, but it seems to me that he has been resolute as well as successful in this, the most difficult part of his self-imposed task. His account of Fascism (including Nazism) is sympathetic and discriminating. His chapter on Communism gains vastly from the argument of his book as a whole, and particularly from his ability to compare Lenin's communism with Plato's. Similarly, his defence of "democracy" is temperate. He is very well aware of the difficulties that have to be faced regarding the extent to which the activities of the State should be limited to the background, or thrust into the foreground of the good life of sociable men and women. He is aware that the principle of liberty need not be indefectible, but he also provides sound general arguments for refusing to put even the experts into a sort of military command, and his discussion benefits enormously from his understanding of the relations between civil servants and others in the government of a democratic country.

JOHN LAIRD.

On p. 179, l. 23, "Thomas" should be "Samuel," on p. 172 the name should be Prichard.

The Future of Christianity. By EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN. (New York: The Abingdon Press. 1937. Pp. 158. Price 1 dollar 50 cents.)

Professor Brightman, who holds a chair of philosophy at Boston University, gives us a very readable book, untechnical, and thoughtful. He begins with a chapter on prediction scientific and religious, and in these days the scientist is also amongst the prophets. He cites some interesting predictions concerning history, for example Tolstoy's forewarning in 1884 of the Communist revolution. He then passes to a chapter on the future of the Bible and Church, a frank statement of loss and gain which, though dealing with the United States in particular, is in general true of the conditions in this country. The next chapter is oddly named the future of God. This does not simply mean as one would expect the future of belief in God, but also "the future existence and plans of God." Actually it is the future of values rather than of God which is envisaged. The last chapter deals with the future of man, a chapter which comes nearer than any other to dealing with the subject of the book as a whole. If it is asked exactly what this book has to offer, the reply is that it is the judgment of an educated thinker, with Christian sympathies, on the present situation. It is neither pessimistic nor yet blind to the dangers of the day. Professor Brightman believes stoutly in the goodness of the human heart. He believes in ideals. He believes in God. In days when so many prophets walk in sackcloth, Professor Brightman's reasoned optimism is a reminder that there is another side to the picture.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

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Books received also:—

- E. S. DUCKETT. *The Gateway to the Middle Ages*. New York and London: The Macmillan Co. 1938. Pp. xiii + 620. 21s.
- A. A. LUCE. *Charles Frederick D'Arcy: 1859-1938*. (From Proceedings of the British Academy, vol. xxiv.) London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1938. Pp. 19. 1s. 6d.
- A. SHANKS. *An Introduction to Spinoza's Ethic*. London: Macmillan & Co. 1938. Pp. v + 103. 4s. 6d.
- VARIOUS AUTHORS. *Where Theosophy and Science Meet: A Stimulus to Modern Thought*. Part I: *Nature: From Macrocosm to Microcosm*. Edited by D. D. Kanga. Adyar, Madras: The Adyar Library Association. 1938. Pp. xxv + 163. 3s. 6d. R. 1.14.
- VARIOUS. *Money Enough for Everyone*. By a Group of Scientists. St. Albans: J. Sault, Victoria Press. 1938. Pp. 82. 1s. 6d.
- Masaryk on Thought and Life. Conversations with Karel Čapek*. (Translated from the Czech by M. and R. Weatherall.) London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1938. Pp. 214. 7s. 6d.
- G. VAN DER LEEUW. *Religion in Essence and Manifestation. A Study in Phenomenology*. (Translated by J. E. Turner.) London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1938. Pp. 709. 25s.
- G. C. FIELD. *Some Problems of the Philosophy of History*. (Hertz Lecture, 1938.) London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1938. Pp. 31. 1s. 6d.
- G. H. MEAD. *The Philosophy of the Act*. (Edited with introduction by C. W. Morris; in collaboration with J. M. Brewster, A. M. Dunham, and D. L. Miller.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press. London: Cambridge University Press. 1938. Pp. lxxxiv + 696. \$5; 22s. 6d.
- R. W. CHURCH. *An Essay on Critical Appreciation*. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1938. Pp. 299. 10s. 6d.
- A. KOLNAL. *The War against the West*. (Preface by W. Steed.) London: V. Gollancz, Ltd. 1938. Pp. 711. 18s.
- J. MACDONALD. *Some Suggestions towards a revised Philosophy of Education*. (University of London Institute of Education lecture.) London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1938. Pp. 25. 1s.
- A. A. BOWMAN. *Studies in the Philosophy of Religion*. (Introduction by N. Kemp Smith.) London: Macmillan & Co. 1938. Vol. I: Pp. xlviii + 423; Vol. II: xiii + 438. 30s. the two volumes.
- R. METZ. *A Hundred Years of British Philosophy*. (Translated by J. W. Harvey, T. E. Jessop, H. Sturt; edited by J. H. Muirhead.) London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Co. 1938. Pp. 828. 25s.
- W. H. V. READE. *The Problem of Inference*. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press. Humphrey Milford. 1938. Pp. 174. 7s. 6d.
- A. C. CAMPBELL. *In Defence of Free Will*. (Inaugural Address.) Glasgow: Jackson, Son & Co. 1938. Pp. 31. 1s. 6d.
- B. T. REYNOLDS AND R. G. COULSON. *Human Needs in Modern Society*. London: J. Cape, Ltd. 1938. Pp. 284. 10s. 6d.
- VARIOUS AUTHORS. *The College Journey. An Introduction to the Fields of College Study*. (Edited by R. B. Levinson.) New York: T. Nelson & Sons. 1938. Pp. xiii + 569.
- E. M. POPE. *India in Portuguese Literature*. Osmania University, India. 1937. Pp. xviii + 300.
- MRS. RHYS DAVIDS. *What was the Original Gospel in "Buddhism"?* London: The Epworth Press. 1938. Pp. 144. 3s. 6d.

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- TEJA SINGH. *Sikhism: Its Ideals and Institutions*. London and Calcutta: Longmans, Green & Co. 1938. Pp. vii + 146. 3s. 6d.
- B. SCHULTZER. *Observation and Protocol Statement*. Copenhagen: Levin & Munksgaard; London: Williams & Norgate, Ltd. 1938. Pp. ix + 151. 7s. 6d.
- W. R. PATERSON. *The Passions of Life. Being the Search for an Ideal*. London: Williams & Norgate, Ltd. 1938. Pp. 220. 6s.
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- M. FRANCÉS. *Spinoza dans les pays Néerlandais de la seconde moitié du XVII^e siècle*. Première partie. Paris: F. Alcan. 1937. Pp. viii + 365. Fr. 50.
- J. ET P. DE LA COURT. *La Balance Politique*. (Livre premier traduit par M. Francés.) Paris: F. Alcan. 1937. Pp. xxvii + 127. Fr. 30.
- Actualités Scientifiques et Industrielles. Philosophie et Histoire de la Pensée Scientifique:*
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Paris: Hermann & Cie. 1938.
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- D. ROUSTAN en collaboration avec P. SCHRECKER. *Œuvres Complètes de Malebranche*. (Édition critique.) Tome I: *De la Recherche de la Vérité*. Livres I et II. Paris: Boivin et Cie. 1938. Pp. xl + 491. Fr. 80.
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- Bibliographie de la Philosophie*. Second Fascicule pour L'Année 1937. 1 (1937). 2. Paris: J. Vrin. 1938. Pp. xi + 343 + x.
- C. A. SACHELI. *Atto e Valore*. Firenze: G. C. Sansoni. 1938. Pp. 340. Lire 18.
- I. SCIACY. *Il Problema dello Stato nel Pensiero del Rousseau*. Con Appendice di Saggi Kantiani. Firenze: G. C. Sansoni. 1938. Pp. viii + 133. Lire 12.
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- E. SCHJOTH. *Gegenstands und Verhaltnis Lehre*. Oslo: J. Dybwad. 1938. Pp. 279.

CORRESPONDENCE

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

SIR,

May I offer some (I hope) constructive comments on Dr. Bourke's article on "Responsibility, Freedom, and Determinism," in *Philosophy* for July 1938?

First, it will (I think) clarify the problem to recognize expressly that "freedom" denotes not a positive quality, but the absence (or at least incompleteness) of some determination. "Capricious freedom" is the absence of *all* determination, and must be rejected for the reasons correctly stated by Dr. Bourke. "Rational freedom," *qua* freedom, is "independence on the determining causes of the sensible world"; *qua* rational it is determination by reason. As Dr. Bourke points out, it is exemplified not only in moral action but also in knowledge.

But what is "neutral freedom"? Is this term anything more than a name for a problem, or a confession of ignorance as to its solution? Sometimes I act morally, determining myself by the law of reason; sometimes I act immorally, or "a-morally" (as the case may be), being determined by "causes of the sensible world." Since I do both, obviously I *can* do both—this is "neutral freedom." The problem is, *What* determines me to act sometimes on one side, sometimes on the other, of the line that divides the moral from the non-moral? One is tempted to postulate just the least trace of capricious freedom! But that has been shown to be inadmissible, since it denies, not safeguards, responsibility and moral value. So until we can show the existence of some third kind of determination which decides between natural and rational determination, "neutral freedom" remains but a name for the problem.

In what direction lies the solution? I would make a suggestion. How in fact do men try to promote morality? The answer is twofold—first by "rewards and punishments," secondly by persuasion. The first by itself cannot make men moral, it can at best make the moral choice easier by balancing inducements to outwardly right conduct against those to outwardly wrong conduct. Persuasion, however, is nothing but trying to bring rational determination into operation; and its success depends upon the person to be persuaded being already in some degree reasonable, that is, rationally determined.

Does not this indicate that the problem of freedom in the sphere of human action is not, How can one kind of determination replace and overthrow another? but rather, Where every event is describable in terms of an intermingling of different types of determination in varying proportions of relevance, how *in fact* does one or the other attain to dominant relevance in each case?

If so, the function of philosophy here is not to solve by *a priori* methods a problem set by experience; but rather to purge our statement of the problem from illegitimate *a priori* elements, and to send us back to concrete experience for its solution.

And that is where Religion comes in.

Yours faithfully,

F. C. LONG.

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The *Evening Meetings* for the Michaelmas Term of the Session will be held at University College, Gower Street, W.C.1, at 8.15 p.m., on the following dates:—

Tuesday, October 11th: Presidential Address. The Rt. Hon. Viscount Samuel, G.C.B., G.B.E., Hon. D.C.L.

Tuesday, November 15th: "The Development of Aristotle's Thought." Sir W. David Ross, K.B.E., Litt.D., LL.D., P.B.A.

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